

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER ESTABLISHED

The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of the National Intelligence Officers have been merged to form a new organization, the National Foreign Assessment Center. The change was effective 11 October 1977. Robert R. Bowie, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for National Intelligence, has been appointed Director of the Center. The Center is located in the CIA Headquarters building where personnel involved in the merger had worked previously, i.e., no movement of people has taken place.

The merger is designed primarily as a streamlining move, combining under one person all of the DCI's subordinate elements involved in the production of finished intelligence. No major internal realignments or changes in personnel are contemplated. The merger is another step in implementing the Presidential Directive concerning reorganization of the Intelligence Community announced on 4 August 1977.

The National Intelligence Officers have been responsible for the production of National Intelligence Estimates for the President and the National Security Council. These studies provide the best information and judgment available to the U.S. Government on major trends and events

DEFENSE/ SPACE DAILY
17 AUGUST 1977

CIA TO SEEK OUT STRATEGIC BALANCE CONSULTANTS

CIA director Stansfield Turner says he is planning to create a group of consultants to work with the agency on assessments of force estimates such as the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. -

He said the CIA would look at a particular estimate and the agency will call from the group of consultants "the right mix of people to join in the estimate."

Turner said the use of the consultants would not be on a full-time basis, but rather would be used at the beginning of an exercise, following it through and critiquing as the CIA proceeded.

He said he did not think an "ideologically structured" Team A-Team B approach is a good idea. "I would not reject it entirely, but I think it is something upon which I would look with suspicion." The reference was to the controversy that developed over the "Team B" review of last year's National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities.

Turner denied the assertion that, because of the Team B assessment, the "so-called hard liners won the day and forced the CIA to re-evaluate its opinions about Soviet military strength."

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ON PAGE IV-3

NEW YORK TIMES

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The Many Studies About the United States

Apparatus End the Same Way: Reform

The C Solution Is To Try Centralizing

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

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ASHINGTON—When Senate and House Committees completed their investigations of the operations of the intelligence community last year, several conclusions stood out:

- The intelligence agencies had been allowed to operate without sufficient direction, either by the President or by Congress.


- Their structure and their secrecy made it nearly impossible to trace responsibility for abuses. As one weary member of the Senate Intelligence Committee put it in 1975: "It was like the old joke. 'Nobody was driving. We were all in the back seat.'"

- The \$5 billion—until recently, \$6 billion—intelligence apparatus was cumbersome, "redundant" (in Governmentese, that means it has enormous duplication of effort) and often didn't collect the information the President needed to know when he needed to know it.

Last Thursday President Carter took an important step toward dealing with some of these questions: He centralized more administrative power under the director of Central Intelligence than that official has possessed since the agency was set up in 1947.

In Washington, centralization of power is no panacea for abuse. Indeed, the history of the intelligence community over the last three decades suggests that it was at its worst when it had its greatest power. It was, for instance, part of the sad chapter of the Chilean affair—the United States involvement in the downfall of President Salvador Allende Gossens—that a former director, Richard Helms, left President Nixon's office feeling he had "a marshal's baton under his arm."

But in President Carter's move there is also centralization of responsibility. Now, presumably, the President can ring up Adm. Stansfield Turner, his director of Central Intelligence, ask "What's this I hear" about an intelligence matter and be talking to the man responsible. By the same token, the two Congressional oversight committees should be able to get their answers and issue their advice through



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ON PAGE 14

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 July 1977

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A Worthwhile Debate on Soviet Intentions

As a fellow academician and colleague of Professor Vladimir Petrov, I was quite alarmed by the tone and implications of his letter published July 22, in which he derides the Outlook articles by Richard Perle, Professor Pipes and Boris Rabbot concerning Soviet foreign and military policies and/or the proper American response to them. Petrov hopes for "restoring sanity to discussions of such matters, restricting them to those who possess both competence and integrity."

Is he in fact suggesting that The Post in its Outlook section censor important opinions and viewpoints, which represent the inputs into our decision-making? Should Sen. Henry Jackson's aide Perle (in spite of the admitted CIA underestimation of Soviet military expenditures in the 1960s) be denied publication merely because he is a strategic-arms expert rather than a Sovietologist? Will Professor Petrov "muzzle" the highly gifted and productive "Team B" head, Professor Pipes, merely because he has been primarily a historian of pre-Revolutionary Russia? And need Rabbot, a slightly "suspect"

recent émigré with access to inside information but, admittedly, liable to the foibles of insiders, including uneven memory for details and a tendency to overrate personality factors, get security clearance before he can tell his story in a newspaper that a few days later published a critique by another Soviet émigré (Victor Zorza)?

Professor Petrov seems especially perturbed by The Post's printing articles (in an opinion section, not with straight news) that "clash so directly"—a strange position, indeed, for an academician. I, for one, would like to commend The Post and the American system as it is operating today for the comparatively intelligent manner in which the public debate over Soviet intentions and capabilities and U.S. strategic and foreign policy is being conducted. The American people in opinion polls have shown a general willingness to spend the necessary money for an adequate defense of the U.S. and its allies. All serious positions, as well as American strategic doctrine itself, are geared to the preservation and strengthening of the coexistence we have always had with the U.S.S.R. and the avoidance of major armed conflict, as well as the safeguarding of our civilization. Given the nature of politics and people, how much more "sanity" could one reasonably ask for?

DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

Director, Russian Area Studies Program
Associate Professor of History
Georgetown University

Washington

10 July 1977

The strategic equation

The name of Richard Pipes, Baird professor of history at Harvard and distinguished Sovietologist, first came to our notice a few months ago. He and a team of strategists studied the Central Intelligence Agency's yearly evaluation of Russian strategy and, by all accounts, found it too optimistic.

The considerations that led Professor Pipes and "Team B" to bleak conclusions were then secret. But in a fascinating article in the July *Commentary* ("Why The Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War") Mr. Pipes expounds the pessimistic view at length. His piece has been called "rank hysteria in scholarly garb" by one knowledgeable critic. We did not find it so, but there is room for strenuous exception.

Professor Pipes' article is probably more valuable as a glimpse of the mind-set of those sometimes called, too simply, "hawks" than as a convincing appraisal of the origins of Soviet strategic doctrine. But this frame of mind is worth understanding, because it corrects more optimistic outlooks and because it is far from uninfluential in national councils today.

To summarize Professor Pipes' argument is to simplify it; but some summary is needed here. There is, he insists, a drastic difference between the American and Soviet views of the usefulness of nuclear war. By his reckoning, the Russian military dominate Russian strategic planning; and as professionals, they reject the view that thermonuclear weapons have altered warfare absolutely.

By contrast, he insists, American strategic policy has been deeply — he believes unduly — shaped by two forces effectively excluded from Soviet planning: scientists and civilian specialists who think the atomic age makes nonsense of war considered as "a continuation of policy by other means"; and a succession of civilian defense officials whose paramount concern was economizing.

He lays out a stark contrast, then, a contrast between a rational, bourgeois, commercial society (the U.S.) and a peasant society, inured to tolerate the loss of human life on a staggering scale and thus to take a far more "realistic" view of the role of violence in history (the U.S.-S.R.).

Thus whereas we tend to rely on "mutual assured destruction" as a deterrent, the Soviet Union looks beyond devastating nuclear exchanges to survival, even victory, in nuclear war. To understand this Soviet outlook, he argues, we need only read their military manuals and examine their writings on military policy. Obscured though they may be by "Aesopian" language, and striking the Western reader as "unadulterated rubbish," these writings announce over and over again the Russian rejection of our notion that nuclear war is too costly and damaging to be profitable for anyone.

Professor Pipes is a professional student of Russia, and by reputation a diligent one. Appropriately, then, what he says about the Russian political and military structure, and its mentality, is far from implausible or uninformed.

What is far less plausible is his account of the way American strategic policy is made. It all seems too simple. A nation that has been for some 24 years spending approximately half its discretionary national budget on defense, and the influence of whose "military-industrial complex" one President, himself a distinguished soldier, felt it expedient to warn against, is not obviously the scientist-and-penny-pinching-accountant-ridden society Professor Pipes portrays.

More specifically, the Pipes analysis falters in historical detail — largely by omission. For instance, describing the advent of Robert S. McNamara as defense secretary (and straining, perhaps, to fit that event into the larger argument) Professor Pipes writes: "A prominent business executive specializing in finance and accounting, McNamara applied to the perennial problem of American strategy — the methods of cost analysis. Under McNamara the procurement of weapons, decided on the basis of cost effectiveness, came in effect to direct strategy, rather than the other way around. It is at this point that applied science in partnership with budgetary accountancy — a partnership which had developed U.S. strategic theory — also took charge of U.S. defense policy."

continued

9 July 1977

STATINTL

But Carter Scraps B-1

Defense Expert Warns of USSR Military Intentions

President Jimmy Carter's decision to oppose production of the B-1 bomber is shocking for two reasons: (1) because the White House was assuring key congressional leaders only hours before last Thursday's press conference that the President had decided to approve production of the plane; (2) because the presidential decision flies in the face of a devastating analysis of Soviet military doctrine that shows the Soviets are moving inexorably toward military victory, not parity, in the East-West arms race.

That analysis was prepared by Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard, former head of the school's Russian Research Center and one of the world's outstanding authorities on Kremlin thinking. Last year, the President's Foreign Intelligence Board asked Dr. Pipes to head up the so-called "Team B" to analyze the annual strategic estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Team B—composed of some of the most respected academicians and intelligence experts in the world—concluded that the CIA had systematically underestimated Soviet capabilities, that the Russians were ideologically committed to victory over the West and that their doctrine was designed precisely to achieve that goal.

Unfortunately, few who have made this country's major strategic decisions over the last 15 years have taken the Russians at their word. Typical is Paul Warnke, Carter's personal choice to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who was asked recently about the Soviet's conviction that they can fight and win a nuclear war.

"In my view," Warnke said, "this kind of thinking is on a level of abstraction which is unrealistic. It seems to me that instead of talking in these terms, which would indulge what I regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate them into the real world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win."

This answer strikes Pipes not only as condescending but as folly. Writing in the current *Commentary*, the Harvard professor asks: "On what grounds does he, a Washington lawyer, presume to 'educate' the Soviet general staff composed of professional soldiers who 30 years ago defeated the Wehrmacht—and, of all things, about the 'real world of strategic nuclear weapons' of which they happen to possess a considerably larger arsenal than we? Why does he consider them children who ought not to be 'indulged'? And why does he chastise for what he regards as 'primitive' and unrealistic strategic doctrine not those who hold it, namely the Soviet military, but Americans who worry about it?"

Warnke's belief—that nuclear war is unwinnable, and therefore irrational—has shaped American thinking since the mid-1960s when we unilaterally froze our ICBM force at 1,054 and dismantled all our defenses against enemy bombers. Civil defense was all but abandoned, as was an ABM system that scientists said was technologically feasible.

But the Soviets paid no heed to our good intentions. They engaged in a frenetic, massive build-up of quantity and quality, soon outstripping the United States in areas where we had long held overwhelming superiority. But the Warnkes who shaped American policy were little concerned.

As Pipes notes:

"The expectation was that as soon as the Russians felt themselves equal to the United States in terms of effective deterrence, they would stop further deployments. The frantic pace of the Soviet nuclear buildup was explained first on the ground that the Russians had a lot of catching up to do, then that they had to consider the Chinese threat, and finally on the grounds that they are inherently a very insecure people and should be allowed an edge in deterrent capability."

To Pipes, the West has made a tragic mistake in not studying Soviet military doctrine. Nothing could be more clear, after such analysis, than that the Soviets regard war—particularly nuclear war—as something that can be won. As the Soviets proclaim: "War must not simply [be] the defeat of the enemy, it must be his destruction. This condition has become the basis of Soviet military strategy."

The strategic doctrine adopted by the USSR over the past two decades, Pipes stresses, "calls for a policy diametrically opposite to that adopted in the United States by the predominant community of civilian strategists: not deterrence, but victory, not sufficiency in weapons, but superiority, not retaliation, but offensive action."

Soviet theorists regard strategic nuclear forces (organized since 1960 into a separate arm, the Strategic Rocket Forces) to be "the decisive branch of the armed services, in the sense that the ultimate outcome of modern war should be settled by nuclear exchanges."

Towards this goal—the destruction of the enemy—the Soviets have been building a military machine that dwarfs that of the United States. While American strategists scoff at the Soviets' stockpiling of huge quantities of arms, new and old, calling it a throwback to Czarist thinking, Pipes replies:

"It is not, however, as mindless as it may appear. For although Soviet strate-

By Martin Schram and Jim Klurfeld

(Newsday Washington Bureau)

This is the second of two articles on the U.S. intelligence community.

Washington—Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner has begun working with top Carter policy-makers to bridge the intelligence gap and solve what he concedes are "very real" problems in the way the system works.

"There has been too much emphasis on what I call intelligence by committee—by consensus," the new CIA director said this month in his most extensive interview since assuming office four months ago. "The system has had too much emphasis on having an agreement, so you can . . . come up with a community solution. . . . I think I have to bite more bullets myself."

The trim, gray-haired admiral—he retains his active duty rank—spoke candidly and on the record as he acknowledged criticisms that had been leveled at the intelligence community by a number of current and former top policy-makers.

Those comments of dissatisfaction, outlined in Newsday yesterday, included complaints by policy-makers that they are deluged by raw intelligence that is poorly analyzed—that the espionage experts often do not tell the decision-makers what the information means and how it may affect present and future policies.

Now, for the first time, a president and his top policy-makers will begin telling the intelligence community—on a regular basis—specifically what they expect them to provide in military, political and economic analysis.

"The decision-makers have been too preoccupied to give [the intelligence community] the attention," Turner said. "We are now actively engaged with the President and top people . . . in sorting out the priorities that will be ordered on me to do." He said he had begun setting up a procedure in discussions with President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Turner spoke while sitting at the head of a long, dark mahogany conference table in his seventh-floor CIA office that blends blond wood paneling and an expansive wall of windows overlooking the woodlands of Langley, Va. In the wide-ranging interview, Turner:

- Agreed that the CIA does not provide enough analysis of the mass of hard data that is delivered to policy-makers;

- Volunteered that perhaps the best remedy for this is for the CIA director himself to "bite the bullet" more often and offer his own analysis and prediction of major events and trends;

- Outlined the manner in which the intelligence community is beginning its most important

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current assessment—the study of capability and strategy.

- Criticized the controversial "Team" approach to assessing Soviet capability and strategy, which was initiated by predecessor, George Bush, and pitted analysts against a team of outside analysts;

- Conceded that many CIA analysts lack training and experience because

they are in charge of assessing the countries they are in charge of assessing.

Intelligence: Analysis Needed

Turner agreed with complaints of top officials such as Brzezinski that the policy-makers are not provided with enough good analysis of the mass of hard information that is fed to them by the intelligence community.

Another problem, he conceded, is that the policy-makers are simply fed too much information from the various sources in the intelligence community.

"There is too much information and they can't use it—that is a very real problem," Turner said. "If I had a complete throttle on all of the information going around town from intelligence [agencies] I could prevent some of that. [But] to do so would be dangerous in that I obviously could have my biases and could leave something out. So it is a risk you take in order to have multiplicity of sources."

He added: "It is unfortunate that one of the games in Washington is 'Who Has the Latest Intelligence?' And that puts too much emphasis on current intelligence. The problem is as soon as something happens, somebody runs in and says, 'Mr. Jones, did you hear what has happened? Hot off the press, raw intelligence has just arrived!' Three days later we find out it was a bad report or put it in context."

So it is that the director of intelligence has some suggestions of his own for the policy-makers who rely on intelligence: "If the consumers would learn to be a little more patient and let us put it in context for them, I'd be happier."

Still, he concedes, the criticisms of a lack of good intelligence are "valid." Turner offers his explanation.

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8 JULY 1977

WASHINGTON POST

Stephen S. Rosenfeld **A Hawkish Argument With Holes**

For rank hysteria in scholarly garb, it's hard to top Harvard Professor Richard Pipes's Commentary article, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," reprinted in last Sunday's Outlook. It's worth jousting with a bit because it's typical of so much of the worst-case alarmism that the military-intellectual complex passes off as serious argumentation.

Pipes, a Soviet specialist and member of the "Team B" invited to critique CIA intelligence estimates last year, believes that what counts "above all" is Soviet intent, and that such intent can be accurately divined from Soviet military doctrine: official thoughts on using force abroad. He marshals quote after leaden quote to demonstrate that Moscow feels it could fight and win a nuclear war and has prepared to do so.

By contrast, Pipes goes on, the United States has accepted "mutual assured deterrence," a doctrine holding that both sides' bombs are now so destructive that the sure anticipation of mutual mass killing, regardless of who hits first, is the best guard and an adequate guard against war. Since the United States believes that the workings of deterrence will save it from having to fight a war, Pipes suggests, it has not prepared to fight one, and therein lies the danger.

It is, first of all, misleading to ignore the ongoing between-the-lines Soviet

"Does anyone really believe formal doctrine, whatever it is, would be [Brezhnev's] only guide?"

debates on nuclear war and to credit only the starkest version argued. It is even more misleading not to ask what relationship military doctrine has to actual Soviet policy. Would Brezhnev in the clutch take solace and determination from the thought that the loss of tens of millions of Russian lives wouldn't really be all that serious? Does anyone really believe formal doctrine, whatever it is, would be his only guide?

In fact, the whole matter of basing policy on a measurement of the other fellow's perceived intent is suspect. That method licenses a reading as narrow, or as extravagant, as the reader's central nervous system. It is too open-ended, too undisciplined, too subjective. Pipes's reading is less analysis than Rorschach test.

In the 1960s military-oriented conservatives argued that you couldn't judge Communists by their intent; you had to measure their capabilities. Now that Soviet and American capabilities are so roughly equal and so difficult to sort out (they have more throw-weight, for example, while we have more hard-target kill capability), conservatives rally around intent.

But what is worst is Pipes's blindness to what the United States has been doing to acquire the very war-fighting capability that, in Soviet hands, he deplores.

As early as 1970 President Nixon, openly questioning exclusive reliance on deterrence, suggested that to be credible the United States had to be able to respond other than by all-out city-busting to a limited Soviet nuclear attack. Thus were initiated the changes in targeting (from cities to missile

launchers) and in weaponry (to the more accurate, powerful and reliable missiles needed to hit those new targets) developed since. In a word, war-fighting.

Listen to the last Pentagon "postura statement," where American doctrine is defined: "We believe that a substantial number of military forces and critical industries in the Soviet Union should be directly targeted, and that an important objective of the assured retaliation mission should be to retard significantly the ability of the U.S.S.R. to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the status of a 20th-century military and industrial power more rapidly than the U.S...."

"The Soviets, by their activities, indicate that they are not interested in mutual assured destruction. Accordingly, they must be accepted for what they are, not for what we want them to be. Their actions indicate that they take nuclear war seriously; the U.S. must do no less. Part of taking it seriously is responses short of full-scale retaliation in our strategic nuclear capabilities."

Pipes seems to have missed entirely the efforts of American strategists over the better part of a decade to work their way out of what they regarded as an unusable deterrent, one threatening so much force as not to seem credible.

It is startling that someone who presumed to correct what he felt were too-rosy CIA intelligence estimates evidently ignored the impact on Soviet programs and plans of the growing American war-fighting capability.

There is a strange process at work here. The devil that seems to drive Pipes and others of his stripe, such as Paul Nitze, a fellow member of the Committee on the Present Danger, is the conviction that American policy is in the hands of raving doves. But this is absurd. I don't understand it.

SECURITY AFFAIRS

Navy Now Too Dominant In Intelligence Areas?

By Lt. Gen. IRAC. EAKER
 USAF (Ret.)

LATELY, most of the heads of the principal intelligence agencies have been placed under Navy leadership. The Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and Defense Mapping Agency (which provides cartography and geodesy essential to global targeting) all now have admirals as their directors. Also, congressional committees now are talking about an intelligence reorganization, including an "Intelligence Czar."

It is unwise, in fact dangerous, to permit the Navy, or any other service or agency, to dominate the intelligence community. It would be equally unwise to put all intelligence under Army or Air Force domination.

It is understandable that President Carter would turn to a Naval Academy classmate, Adm. Stanfield Turner, to head the CIA. After all, it has been the weak link in the intelligence community during the past decade. In the National Intelligence Estimates, subsequent events have proven the CIA's estimates on Russian military strength to have been too low. The CIA has admitted this and has upgraded its estimates on Soviet military capability. During this period, the estimates of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and of the intelligence sections of the armed services, have proven much more accurate.

But now to put the intelligence agencies of the military services under Navy leadership, in addition to the CIA, may let the pendulum swing too far. It creates the possibility for a dominant authority — a President, a Secretary of State or a Secretary of Defense to say, as in the past, "This is my decision, now give me an intelligence estimate to support it."

This concern was intensified recently when it was reported that President Carter was justified in reducing U.S.

ground forces in Korea because he had consulted Russia and Red China and each had assured him that they would not encourage or support North Korea's Kim il-Sung in any offensive adventures.

Do we not remember that Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's principal national security assistant, was assured by the Reds at the Paris Peace negotiations that North Vietnam would not attack South Vietnam after U.S. forces were removed?

Do we not know that North Vietnam was, at that very time, secretly moving supplies and troops into forward positions from which it launched such an attack immediately after U.S. troops were withdrawn?

As a matter of fact, each time we have been caught by surprise, as in the 1973 Arab attack on Israel, one agency — or in that case an individual, Dr. Kissinger — was dominating the intelligence community.

The lesson from all this is to make sure that all segments of the intelligence community are free, and in fact encouraged, to submit their views on the National Intelligence Estimates. It is upon the validity of those estimates that the President must rely to make fundamental decisions on such critical matters as defense budgets, arms sales and arms limitations agreements.

Dissent in the intelligence community must be encouraged, not suppressed. Any dissenting views also must be available to the Congress and our people. The wisdom of this policy was demonstrated in the recent case of the "beam weapon" controversy, as it was in divulging the massive Russian civil defense effort.

President Carter, I understand, wisely has assured the Congress that no international commitments will be kept secret from that body.

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NEW YORK TIMES

25 June 1977

Report on Soviet Nuclear Strategy Says Moscow Emphasizes

By DREW MIDDLETON

The Soviet Union's strategic nuclear doctrine seeks victory, not deterrence, superiority in weapons rather than sufficiency, and offensive, perhaps pre-emptive, operations rather than retaliation, according to Dr. Richard Pipes of Harvard University who headed "Team B" of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Dr. Pipes, in an article in the magazine *Commentary*, asserts that the American negotiators in the strategic arms limitation talks miss the point as long as they concentrate on numbers of nuclear weapons.

The former head of Harvard's Russian Research Center, Dr. Pipes is highly critical of the prevalent United States doctrine that contends that a nuclear war would be so destructive that it would leave no winner. Soviet doctrine, he argues, emphasizes winning a nuclear war and the destruction of American society.

The article is expected to revive the debate within the American intelligence community over Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions. The debate began early this year when Dr. Pipes' "Team B" termed the Russian nuclear position more threatening to the United States than the Central Intelligence Agency's had reported it.

Alternative to C.I.A. Study

"Team B" was appointed in 1976 by President Gerald R. Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to prepare an alternative estimate of Soviet strategic objectives to that produced by the C.I.A.

The United States strategic doctrine, as summarized by Dr. Pipes, is based primarily on the concept that a full-scale nuclear war is not a rational policy because there would be no winner in such a war. If the Soviet Union launched a surprise attack, America would emerge from it with sufficient forces to devastate Russia in a retaliatory attack.

Such an attack would destroy all of the Soviet Union's major cities and kill millions. Because of this retaliatory threat, American strategists feel that a Soviet first strike is highly unlikely.

Finally, American strategists and Congressional sources believe that meaningful defenses against a nuclear attack are impossible to build and psychologically counterproductive.

The American conclusion based on all these factors is that nuclear superiority is meaningless.

Critical of Warnke Comment

Dr. Pipes is scathingly critical of Paul Warnke, President Carter's chief disarmament negotiator, for his comment that, on the "primitive aspects" of Soviet doctrine, "we ought to be trying to educate them into the real world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win."

On what grounds, Dr. Pipes asks, does "a Washington lawyer presume to 'educate' the Soviet general staff" about strategic nuclear weapons "of which they happen to possess a considerably larger arsenal than we?"

Soviet doctrine, he writes, "emphatically asserts that while nuclear war would indeed prove extremely destructive to both parties, its outcome would not be mutual suicide; the country better prepared for it and in possession of a superior strategy would win and emerge a viable society."

The Russian strategic doctrine, according to Dr. Pipes, contains five related elements.

These are: pre-emption or first strike, quantitative superiority in arms, counterforce targeting, combined arms operations and defense.

The Russian concept of pre-emption is traced back to Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 and

"no point is emphasized more consistently" by Soviet strategists "than the need never to allow themselves to be caught in a surprise attack."

This military memory and the speed of modern weapons—a missile can go from the United States to the Soviet Union in 30 minutes—are considerations that call for a pre-emptive strike, especially since once the missiles have left their silos, bombers are airborne and submarines at sea "a counter attack is greatly reduced in effectiveness."

There is no indication, he continues, that the Russians share the American view that the number of nuclear weapons does not matter once a certain quantity has been attained.

Soviet strategists believe that the ultimate outcome of a nuclear war will be decided in the first hours but they also believe that a nuclear war will last for months or longer, if the destruction of the enemy is to be achieved. Consequently, a large arsenal of nuclear delivery systems may be of "critical importance."

Attack Against U.S. Missiles

Counterforce targeting by the Soviet Union is the strategy of attacking United States missile launchers and command and communications systems.

"The central idea of the U.S. strategy of deterrence holds that should the Soviet Union dare to launch a surprise first strike at the United States, the latter would use its surviving missiles to lay waste Soviet cities," the analyst reports.

Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the late Soviet Defense Minister explained Soviet strategy in an article published in 1971 and cited by Dr. Pipes. In it, the Marshal said that the Soviet nuclear arm was "designed to annihilate and neutralize the enemy's nuclear attack, large groupings of his armies and his military bases; to destroy his military industries; (and) to

Prolonged War of Attrition

Combined-arms operations occupy an important place in Soviet nuclear strategy because of the Soviet emphasis not only on an enemy's defeat but on his destruction in the sense that he is incapable of offering further resistance.

Consequently, Dr. Pipes says, the Russians have prepared for "the follow up phase" of a nuclear war which "may entail a prolonged war of attrition."

Soviet writings on strategy, the author declares, reject "unequivocally" reliance on one strategy and stress that a nuclear war will require the employment of all arms to attain final victory.

Fundamental Differences on Defense

Nothing illustrates better the fundamental difference between American and Soviet strategic doctrines than their approach to defense.

The Russians, Dr. Pipes notes, agreed to certain "imprecisely defined limitations" on anti-ballistic missiles in the first agreement on arms limitations but "then proceeded to build a tight ring of anti-aircraft defenses around the country while also developing a serious program of civil defense."

The relevance of the Russian civil defense program to negotiations on nuclear arms limitations has been the subject of heated controversy in American defense circles. Last month a congressional committee decided that civil defense was not an important element. Earlier Maj. Gen. George Keegan, then head of Air Force Intelligence, had contended that it was not only important but vital to an understanding of the Russian overall strategic concept.

Dr. Pipes' comments about Soviet civil defense:

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THE ESCAPE



James Earl Ray

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WASHINGTON POST

10 JUNE 1977

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Scuttling of PFIAB: An Intelligent Move?

Whatever the ultimate cost of the unnoticed burial of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the short-run effect is to silence the most important intelligence sounding board—other than U.S. intelligence agencies themselves—for every President since Dwight Eisenhower.

The most persuasive agent on President Carter last month in recommending the death of the board was Adm. Stansfield Turner, the new Director of Central Intelligence. But Central Intelligence directors have never particularly liked the advisory board with its high-powered membership drawn from former government officials and the loftiest niches of American science and business. To them, it represented a threat as a competitor for the President's ear and a source of intelligence inspiration.

PFIAB, for one notable example, engineered the intelligence breakthrough by the CIA that led to spy-in-the-sky reconnaissance. That might have been delayed for years without hard pressure from PFIAB and Edwin H. Land, Polaroid chairman and a PFIAB member since 1961.

The risks inherent in killing PFIAB

are manifold. It was PFIAB that persuaded former President Ford and ex-CIA Director George Bush to engage an outside team of hard-line experts to debate CIA's estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities last summer.

Those experts, called "Team B," produced much harsher estimates than the CIA's "Team A" of experts. The result: a much harder-nosed "national estimate" regarded by experts as far more realistic than estimates by the CIA acting alone.

The point man in exposing the CIA's experts to such formidable competition was Leo Cherne, the board's last chairman (a post previously held by Dr. James Killian, Clark M. Clifford and Gen. Maxwell Taylor since Eisenhower established PFIAB in 1956).

The scuttling of PFIAB is clearly tied to the fear of similar outside competition for the intelligence bureaucracy, plus a desire to centralize control over all intelligence within the CIA and the National Security Council staff inside the White House.

The explanation for this, a view widely held by skeptical outside experts on Soviet weapons and geopolitical planning, is the bureaucracy's zeal to screen out points of view that challenge the prevailing administration line. Consider the following incidents:

- Dr. Richard Pipes, the Harvard Russian scholar who played a key role in "Team B" last summer, believed he had an informal agreement from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for up to \$7,500 to help finance a Harvard-MIT conference on basic Soviet strategic doctrine. But ACDA, now under controversial director Paul Warnke, informed Pipes last month it could not help fund the project (even though Warnke has publicly said he has no idea whether Moscow seeks military superiority over the U.S. or simply equality).

- An invitation to retired Gen. George Keegan, former Air Force intelligence chief, early this year to lecture at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base was withdrawn. The only explanation: The Pentagon and/or White House did not want Keegan to be sponsored by the government in view of his well-known alarm over Soviet intentions.

- Concern within the Defense Intelligence Agency that the Carter administration—and Turner—may be plotting enhancement of CIA at the expense of DIA.

What makes the demise of PFIAB more mystifying is that two authors of the Senate Intelligence Committee's final report on "the President's office" last year, David Aaron and Rick Inderfurth, said the board had been "useful," partly because "its advice and recommendations have been for the President. As such, the executive nature of this relationship should be maintained."

Aaron is now deputy to national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski; Inderfurth is Brzezinski's special assistant. They headed Jimmy Carter's transition team on intelligence, proposing to abolish PFIAB despite what they wrote in that report only months earlier.

One conclusion from this is that the incoming administration was planning to centralize long before it took office, a possibility duly reflected by Aaron and Inderfurth. Their report sat on the President's desk until early May when, pressed by Turner, Carter delivered the *coup de grace* to PFIAB—a blow to challenges from outside the bureaucracy that have proved invaluable to U.S. intelligence in the past.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Spectrum STATION WTOP Radio
CBS Network

DATE June 4, 1977 10:55 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT U.S. Intelligence

ANNOUNCER: This is "Spectrum," on the CBS Radio Network, personal opinion on issues of public interest from six different viewpoints.

Now one of those perspectives.

M. STANTON EVANS: I'm M. Stanton Evans.

U.S. intelligence agencies have engaged in a massive cover-up of Soviet intentions and behavior to preserve the fragile image of detente, so at least says Major General George Keegan, Jr., recently retired after twenty-seven years in the U.S. Air Force, and five years of service as Air Force Chief of Intelligence.

Keegan recently told a Washington audience a hair-raising tale of data suppressed by higher-ups and intelligence estimates concocted for the purpose of keeping detente alive.

Keegan charged, for instance, that the CIA had doctored translation of Soviet documents to obscure the real intentions of the enemy, and that only through independent channels was an accurate reading of the Soviet position obtained.

He also noted that since the early 1960's, the United States has had access to the papers of Oleg Konkovsky, a high official of the Soviet government, proving the aggressive nature of the Kremlin's policies. Not once in all this period, Keegan asserted, did U.S. intelligence estimates reflect the contents of the Konkovsky papers.

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
 HARPER'S
 JUNE 1977



THE ARMS ZEALOTS

Arms Coalition

A group called the Committee on the Present Danger constituted itself last year to awaken us to the "present danger." The names of its 141 founding board members provide a good cross section of the personalities and interests in the AC (as well as a couple of surprises)—Saul Bellow, William Colby, John Connally, Lane Kirkland (secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO), Clare Boothe Luce, Norman Podhoretz (editor of *Commentary*), David Packard (head of Hewlett-Packard), Gen. Matthew Ridgway (Ret.), Eugene Rostow, Dean Rusk, Gen. Maxwell Taylor (Ret.), Edward Teller, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.). The chairman of its policy studies is Paul Nitze, who has been involved in almost every major effort to jump up the defense budget since 1949. The committee has consciously modeled itself on groups of distinguished laity that campaigned before World War II for preparedness and, after, for the Marshall Plan. It describes the "present danger" as follows: "The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup."

Those who would expand "defense capability" are prepared to sell America short by Daniel Yergin

AS HAS BECOME customary when an old administration departs and a new one marches in, we are in the midst of a loud and passionate debate about arms. Some of the relevant questions have become familiar over more than three decades of such debates. Are the Russians getting ahead of us? Are they actively seeking world domination? Should we spend more money on arms? Should we rush headlong into new military technologies? Some of the questions are more recent, the result of nuclear parity between the two superpowers and halting steps toward arms control. Is there or is there not a new Soviet military buildup? Is real and secure arms limitation possible with the Russians? Or are they taking advantage of such agreements to achieve nuclear superiority? While the debate is easily fogged in by the special codes used by those who talk about arms (MX, MIRV, PGM) the issues are clear—budgets, jobs, prestige, weapons systems, the structure of Soviet-American relations, the next spiral in the arms race, and that most basic of all matters—survival.

The argument in Washington and throughout the nation is between two "parties." On one side is the arms lobby or what might be called the arms coalition (hereafter to be abbreviated as the AC). Its members are those people, both inside the government (particularly in the Defense Department and the Congress) and outside, who believe that the Soviet Union is an ever-expanding menace. They believe that we are still living in the Cold War, a confrontation emanating from, as they see it, the predatory character of the Soviet Union.

On the other side is the arms-control lobby.

Its members believe that the common interest

between the Soviet Union and the United States in avoiding conflict, particularly nuclear war, outweighs their differences, and makes arms control not only possible but necessary.

It seems clear to me that these days the public argument is going in favor of the AC. The Carter Administration has already found itself hampered in its efforts to work out further proposals for the strategic-arms-limitation talks. Before negotiating with the Russians it must negotiate with the AC, and that does not leave much room for flexibility. Meanwhile, the propaganda campaign of the AC is growing. For instance, an organization called the American Security Council has produced a film dwelling on Soviet strength, *The Price of Peace and Freedom*, which has been on television stations around the country 225 times. Another 1,250 prints have been dispatched throughout the land. The Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament got forty Senators to vote against Carter's nomination of Paul Warnke for arms-control negotiator.

At the same time, various versions of intelligence reports, meant to strike fear into the national heart, regularly find their way into the press. Generals retire from active duty to carry their message to a wider public. The Central Intelligence Agency, usually thought to be beset by critics from the Left, is one of the agencies that does not have a direct vested interest in an expanding defense budget, and its analyses of Soviet strength have, until recently, been the most balanced. But the CIA has been subjected to a powerful assault from the Right, in the course of which it has virtually been charged with purveying Soviet propaganda.

WASHINGTON POST
30 MAY 1977ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4/13*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

The CIA's Admiral

Caustic corridor gossip criticizing CIA Director Stansfield Turner for signing even routine memoranda as "Admiral" finally wrought a change: He no longer signs that way.

Unfortunately, the change is only cosmetic. Turner, one of the Navy's brightest stars who was shanghaied by President Carter to run the beleaguered Central Intelligence Agency, perceives his CIA job as a way-station to greater military glory.

Both friends and non-friends of the brainy, barrel-chested admiral are convinced that Turner got a deal from Jimmy Carter. He is believed to have told his former Annapolis classmate: I don't want the CIA job; I want to be Chief of Naval Operations or chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But Carter, smarting from the collapse of his first CIA choice of lawyer-politician Ted Sorensen, would not take no for an answer.

So, the President gave Turner the job without requiring him to resign his naval commission, with the implicit understanding of a future high-level Pentagon post. Once again, the weakened CIA, badly needing a strong director

over the long run, is back in the hands of a short-term caretaker.

The real interests of this nation's intelligence community, costing billions of dollars every year, were sacrificed to the needs of the man in the White House to quickly name a widely acceptable director after the Sorensen fiasco. President Ford also sacrificed CIA interests when he named George Bush CIA director, knowing Republican politician Bush would last in that job no longer than the Republican who appointed him.

But there was a difference. Bush renounced all political aspirations for 1977 (perhaps costing him the vice-presidential nomination). Turner renounced nothing.

Moreover, he has flaunted his real loyalties by isolating himself in his new inner office, located not at CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters but across from the White House in the Executive Office Building. That guarantees him access to the Oval Office. Indeed, the President now seems more impressed by what he hears from Turner than by his daily briefings from Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser.

Turner's supporters vigorously deny that he is all that scarce at CIA headquarters. They claim Turner spends 70 per cent of his time there, only 30 per cent next to the Oval Office. Turner defenders also point to Senate legislation to establish a "Director of National Intelligence," a post that Turner, or a successor, would occupy in the office of the President. That would leave special deputies running the CIA and other intelligence units.

Even if true, however, this does not answer the stockpile of complaints about Turner. He has removed himself from regular contact with his own officers in the CIA; surrounded himself with at first four, now nine, top inner-office Navy aides; insisted on a military ritual before seeing CIA officers (requiring a precise memo explaining why the admiral should be bothered, plus a 24-hour wait).

Though trivial in itself, some critics feel that most symptomatic of his lack of interest in the CIA's well-being was his decision to put his son, Navy Lt. Geoffrey Turner, on the CIA payroll. The job is "junior assistant" in the Office of National Intelligence Estimates.

Old hands at the CIA contrast this with the conduct of a former CIA chief, whose son had a summer clerk's job at CIA but was sent packing the day his father took the oath of office. The contrast does not help sagging morale.


Beyond morale is the vital matter of building back this nation's intelligence system during rising competition from the Soviet Union. To convince the CIA that he can be the architect for rebuilding, Turner must change the CIA's perception of him as a transient—a temporary custodian whose purpose is to avoid mistakes that might deflect him from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That is by no means impossible. If, however, Turner's conduct in the future continues as it has in the past three months, further decline in the chief U.S. intelligence bulwark is assured.

That spells danger for an organization that has been horsewhipped in one kangaroo court after another—generally for following direct orders from Presidents of the United States. The horsewhipping from the outside has eased a little, but Turner has not yet started the rehabilitation.

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2 May 1977



Concept of a charged-particle beam weapon is based on the design of a negative hydrogen beam that is accelerated and neutralized by passing the beam through a charge exchange cell. In this ballistic missile defense concept, the collimated charge-particle beam is directed

Soviets Push for Beam Weapon

USSR developing charged-particle device aimed at missile defense, exploring high-energy lasers as satellite killer

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington—Soviet Union is developing a charged-particle beam device designed to destroy U.S. intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile nuclear warheads. Development tests are being conducted at a facility in Soviet Central Asia.

The Soviets also are exploring another facet of beam weapons technology and preparing to test a spaceborne hydrogen fluoride high-energy laser designed for a satellite killer role. U.S. officials have coined the term directed-energy weapons in referring to both beam weapons and high-energy lasers.

A charged-particle beam weapon focuses and projects atomic particles at the speed of light which could be directed from ground-based sites into space to intercept and neutralize reentry vehicles, according to U.S. officials. Both the USSR and the U.S. also are investigating the concept of placing charged-particle beam devices on spacecraft to intercept missile warheads in space. This method would avoid problems with propagating the beam through the earth's atmosphere.

Because of a controversy within the U.S. intelligence community, the details of Soviet directed-energy weapons have not been made available to the President or to the National Security Council.

Recent events have produced criticism of U.S. analysts that directed-energy weapons are nearing prototype testing in

upper atmosphere. The USAF/TRW Block 647 defense support system early warning satellite with scanning radiation detectors and infrared sensors has been used to determine that on seven occasions since November, 1975, tests that may be related to development of a charged-particle beam device have been carried out in a facility at Semipalatinsk.

Ground testing of a small hydrogen fluoride high-energy laser and detection of preparations to launch the device on board a spacecraft. Some U.S. officials believe the test of the antisatellite laser may be related to recent Soviet activities on a manned Salyut space station.

Test of a new, far more powerful fusion-pulsed magneto-hydrodynamic generator to provide power for a charged-particle beam system at Azgir in Kazakhstan near the Caspian Sea. The experiment took place late last year in an underground chamber in an area of natural salt dome formations in the desert near Azgir and was monitored by the Soviet early warning satellite stationed over the Indian Ocean.

by Marshal of the Soviet Army General P. F. Batitskiy. Since the PVO Strum would be responsible for deploying a beam weapon to counter U.S. ICBM warheads, Marshal Batitskiy's role indicates a near-term weapons application for these experiments, U.S. officials believe.

Point-by-point verification by a team of U.S. physicists and engineers working under USAF sponsorship that the Soviet had achieved a level of success in each of seven areas of high-energy physics necessary to develop a beam weapon.

Shifts in position by a number of experienced high-energy physicists, who earlier discounted the Soviet capability to develop the technology for a charged-particle beam device. There is a grudging admission that the USSR is involved in a program that could produce such a weapon.

Recent revelations by Soviet physicist Leonid I. Rudakov during a tour last summer of U.S. fusion laboratories that the USSR can convert electron beam energy to compress fusible material and release maximum fusion energy. Much of the data outlined by Rudakov during his visit to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory has since been labeled top secret by the Defense Dept. and the Energy Research and Development Administration. Rudakov gave a clue to U.S. scientists that the USSR is far ahead of the U.S. in controlled fusion by inertial confinement compression of small pellets of thermonuclear fuel.

CONFIDENTIAL

May/June 1977

U.S. versus Soviet Military Strength: *points of view*

"The global military situation that will confront Jimmy Carter as he takes office January 20 differs significantly from that faced by any of his predecessors since 1945. The difference arises from the growth of Soviet military strength and the relative decline of American power over the past 10 years."

The New York Times, January 4, 1977

By Charles DeVore


SINCE 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union have become the world's top military superpowers. Which, if either, has superior military strength is the subject of a continuing debate among military and civilian defense analysts.

That debate intensified in 1977, partly, perhaps, because of a new administration, headed by a President who has been outspoken in his views on arms reduction and in eventual "elimination of nuclear weapons from the earth," and because the first strategic arms agreement—SALT I—expires this October. President Carter's views are certain to be reflected in the actions of his administration, with emphasis on defense spending and arms control.

National Intelligence Estimate

The defense budget a President submits to Congress is guided by the general conclusions in what is called the National Intelligence Estimate, an analysis of the strategic capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. "Intentions" are what you want to do; "capabilities" are what you can do with what you have available. The United States prepares and publishes estimates of Soviet military capabilities; Soviet intentions are more difficult to assess, because the Soviet Union is a closed society. As *Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7* and foreign military assistance, it still remains 35-40 per cent below the estimated Soviet defense budget, which has shown a consistent increase of about 3 per cent annually.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BASELINE FORCES BUDGET TRENDS
(TOA — \$ BILLIONS)



Source: Department of Defense
DOD Budget trend has been downward for nearly a decade in real (constant dollar) terms, turned the corner in FY '76, made more substantial gains in FY '77, and kept moving in the proposed FY '78 budget and its revisions. (Baseline forces ex-

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGETHE NEW REPUBLIC
23 April 1977

Even among the national security relics, Robert Bowie is a vintage antique.

Deputies are Forever

by Roger Morris

Even among the cold war and Vietnam relics who adorn the national security officialdom of the new administration, he is clearly the vintage antique. In his well preserved record hover ghosts we have forgotten without even trying. Not Dean Rusk or Walt Rostow, but even more venerable spirits of empire: John Foster Dulles and John J. McCloy and the phantom MLF flotilla with its multinational NATO crew and a nuclear warhead for every member nation.

Across nearly 30 years in the pattern of a classic in-and-outer of the foreign policy establishment, Robert Bowie is in Washington again. This time he will be CIA Deputy Director for National Intelligence, principally in charge of the "national intelligence estimate," a bureaucratic weapon that can be used so effectively against makers of policy on subjects as various as arms control, defense budgets and covert intervention. Once more, by clubby connection, perhaps in part by default, in any case by a stunning lack of originality and insight, the Carter regime has chosen what the *Washington Post's* William Greider has aptly called "the painful past."

His countenance has changed remarkably little through the lengthening files of official photographs. The shock of wavy hair has gone a distinguished white but it is still atop the same doughy, slightly florid face. In 1968, when Bowie was counselor of the State Department, an admiring reporter described him in his seventh floor Foggy Bottom office as "gazing on the world out of wise pixie eyes." And his world at least has

usually been congenial and uncomplicated, though seldom a matter of pixies or wisdom.

Carrying a patrician Maryland name, he went through Princeton while the rest of the country was in the depths of the Depression, and graduated from Harvard Law in 1934. There followed eight years in his own Baltimore law firm, brief tenure as an Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, and then wartime service in the Army, including staff work with the occupation government in Germany. When Bowie left the Army in 1946, he was a lieutenant colonel with a legion of merit and, more important, profitable contacts among the establishment civilians and gentlemen officers who would graduate from the occupation to inherit most of America's postwar foreign policy.

He began teaching at Harvard Law School in 1946, and in 1950 was back in Germany as general counsel to the US High Commissioner in Bonn. Three years later he was appointed by John Foster Dulles as the State Department's director of policy planning in the first Eisenhower administration. Then 44, Bowie suffered from foreign policy credentials that were scanty at best, but enjoyed patronage of senior figures like McCloy and others that was impeccable. So from 1953 to 1957, by several accounts, he became one of Dulles's closest and most trusted aides. He is credited by some with earnest efforts to educate the "old man" on strategic policy. This education proceeded at an unavoidably

continued

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM "Who's Ahead: The Debate
Over Defense"STATION WTOP TV
CBS Network

DATE April 20, 1977 10:12 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Full Text

CHARLES COLLINGWOOD: Not since the coldest days of the Cold War has there been so great a debate about growing Soviet military strength as there is today. Listen:

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE ^{Keeton} KEATON: I believe the United States today is in a position of very serious strategic disadvantage.

THOMAS REED: I think the Russians are going for a tactical and a strategic superiority by the early '80s if they possibly can.

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: I don't know what strategic superiority means. The term implies that whoever possesses it has some advantage, some added measure of security. But that can't be true when both sides have already developed arsenals capable of utterly destroying the other.

ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS News Special Report, "Who's Ahead: The Debate over Defense," with CBS News correspondent Charles Collingwood.

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COLLINGWOOD: As we have heard tonight, the number one concern of President Carter in domestic policy is energy. And as we shall hear in this hour, the President's number one concern in foreign and military policy is also energy, in its most fearsome form, the nuclear bomb and the way to control it and its carriers. Both priorities are in for a very hard time.

When Secretary of State Vance first tried out the President's proposal for a substantial cut in nuclear weapons on the

Admiral appears to CIA on even

By Keyes Beech
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—The other day a reporter called a senior CIA official at the Agency's splendidly isolated headquarters in Langley, Va., and ruined his day with an offhand remark:

"I hear you're being fired."

"It could be," the CIA man said calmly, "but nobody has told me yet."

He isn't going to be fired — far from it — but the thought of quitting has crossed his mind more than once during the last few years. And his reaction to the reporter's fishing expedition was more or less typical of the wary attitude of a good many career intelligence officers. Battered and bruised by congressional investigations, newspaper exposes, wholesale revelations of CIA misdeeds and blamed for everything in the book with the possible exception of lousy weather, they wonder what's going to happen next.

No one can be sure. But what is happening right now to the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community is Adm. Stansfield Turner, the new director of central intelligence.

A brisk, crisp Chicago-born onetime Rhodes Scholar who was picked for the job by a U.S. Naval Academy classmate named Jimmy Carter, Turner promises to be the best thing that has happened to the CIA since the invention of the electronic bug.

AS A MILITARY MAN he commands the respect of military professionals (90 per cent of all intelligence funds come out of the Defense Department budget). As an intellectual, he commands the respect of academics. And, most important of all, he has the respect and the ear of the President.

Despite these admirable credentials, the admiral is not without his critics in CIA corridors. Some career officers complain that he has surrounded himself with a screen of naval aides which limits their access to him.

Turner's disarming reply-to-this is that he landed running and needed some of his own crew. The "screen," as one news magazine described it, consists of four navy men, and one of them is leaving soon.

The admiral's naval shakedown approach to his new job has nettled some professionals, one of whom grumbled: "He wants to reorganize things. I wish to hell they'd just leave me alone so I could do my job."

"It's the same with every new director," said a 25-year CIA veteran. "He comes in and discovers the wheel. Let me tell you something: It's still round."

Perhaps that is the real source of some of the testiness of the CIA professionals. The CIA has had four directors in

Continued from Page 1

four years, three of them varying ideas on how the a

ONE OF THE MORE JI
or nothing to criticize in
Turner's predecessor, Ge

changes during his first
has," the CIA man observ

Because Bush was a hi
many CIA officers shuddered at the thought he would point
cize the agency. As they later confessed, they were dead
wrong. Bush was not only good for the agency, in their view,
but they would have liked to see him stay on.

Suspensions of "Navy coup" were aroused when Turner
sacked his public affairs officer, a former United States
Information Agency man, and brought in a retired Navy
captain to take his place. But Turner has promised more,
not less, press access to CIA affairs — within the limits of
national security.

Turner's most widely applauded appointment was that of
Harvard Prof. Robert R. Bowie, 67, a man with wide ex-
perience in and outside government, as deputy director for
national intelligence. Bowie will be responsible for CIA in-
telligence estimates, the agency's most prestigious product.

"The intelligence estimate," said one CIA veteran, "is the
ultimate refinement of all the intelligence we have from
available sources. It is the basis of presidential decisions.
Its importance cannot be overestimated."

The estimates have come under attack in recent years,
especially on issues of Soviet military capabilities and in-
tentions. The agency's board of estimates was scrapped four

years ago and replaced with 10
intelligence officers directly re-
sponsible to the director for various
areas and subjects. Bowie's appoint-
ment promises to restore to the
estimates what Ray S. Cline, a for-
mer deputy CIA director, called "an
independent and objective scholarly
image."

"I took this job because I feel
strongly about the estimate func-
tion," said Bowie, founder of Har-
vard's Center for International
Affairs and a former member of the
State Department's policy planning
board. "The estimate has been tar-
nished, and I would like to restore

Stansfield Turner



Washington REPORT

WASHINGTON, APRIL 1977

WR 77-4

STRATEGIC BALANCE: TRENDS AND PERCEPTIONS

This is the first sixteen page *Washington Report*. We are publishing this double-size issue because the material is of vital importance.

On March 11, Maj. Gen. George Keegan, former chief of U.S. Air Force Intelligence and currently Executive



Maj. Gen. George Keegan

Vice President of the United States Strategic Institute, spoke to nearly eighty of Washington's top newsmen at one of ASC's press luncheons. His remarks were the basis for major stories in both the *Washington Post* and *Star*, as well as for AP and UPI stories that covered the country. The prestigious *Aviation Week* magazine devoted nine full pages to his talk in its issue of March 28th.

General Keegan presented a withering condemnation of those in the intelligence community involved with making estimates and analyses of Soviet military R & D, production, and plans for aggression. Of itself, General Keegan's explanation of what has gone wrong in the intelligence community is of vital importance.

But General Keegan's remarks go well beyond that point. They provide insight into the weaknesses of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Policy rests upon intelligence. There is no way our national policies can be right if our intelligence estimates are wrong. That is his primary message.

General Keegan makes a specific recommendation on how

intelligence estimates. It is hard to imagine a step that the new Administration could take that would do more to improve foreign and defense policies than to restore rigor and objectivity to the intelligence estimative process.

At our press luncheon, General Keegan talked from notes. We offered him the same opportunity a Congressman enjoys of reviewing and amending his statements for the record. What is presented below is his amended text. Editor


Today, I speak as a private citizen — expressing my own personal views regarding the Soviet threat and the evolving world power balance.

It is difficult for a member of the military establishment — and especially for one who has served in military intelligence as long as I have — to retire and render public judgment about the adequacy of the Establishment's perceptions of our most serious national security problems.

What has troubled me most has been the wisdom of suggesting to the free world that its defenses are not nearly as effective as might otherwise have been thought. Such a suggestion runs counter to conventional wisdom and to accepted points of view. It upsets the diplomats and challenges the assumptions upon which they have based many of their foreign security policy initiatives. And most of all, such a suggestion can have important negative psychological feedbacks in the critical area of morale — especially where NATO's defense is concerned.

Rest assured that these matters weigh heavily on my mind. However, after many years of devoting my professional career to the study of the Soviet Union and the evolving threat, it has become necessary for me to speak out. Far better to be wrong now — while there is still lead

Approved



Tupolev Backfire B supersonic bomber takes off from a Soviet airfield with its variable-sweep wings in the extended position. Twin-engine aircraft is capable of Mach 2.2 at 40,000 ft., and has a subsonic unrefueled range of 5,500 naut. mi., also at that altitude. Weapons include AS-4 and AS-6 air-to-surface missiles, as well as gravity bombs. Note aerial refueling probe in nose.

Intelligence Analysis

New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat

(It is very seldom that a bona fide, long-term member of the U. S. intelligence community speaks candidly in public about what goes on in the super-secret recesses of the national intelligence estimating process. Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., recently retired as chief of Air Force Intelligence and a 20-year veteran of varied top-level military intelligence posts, recently spoke to a group of Washington newsmen under the auspices of the American Security Council to provide such a viewpoint. His remarks are published here in full because they deserve close study by everyone concerned about the future security of this nation and the peace of the world.—R. B. H.)

Today I speak as a private citizen expressing my own personal views regarding the Soviet threat and the evolving world power balance. It is a very difficult thing for a member of the military establishment to serve that establishment for better than 30 years, to work in harness with it to weigh what has transpired on his watch and, upon retirement, render public judgment about the adequacy of the Establishment's perceptions of our most serious national security problems. What has troubled me most has been the wisdom

of suggesting to the Free World that its differences are not nearly as effective as might otherwise have been thought.

For in so asserting, one runs the risk of all of the negative, psychological feedback on morale, etc., and invites the risk of rather negative impingements on the foreign security policy arena. I want to assure you that those matters weigh very heavily on my mind.

But in the last five years, in watching anyone labeled "worst-case scenario advocate," who suggested even the most modest real case, I realize that what I have been living as a member of the intelligence community was a part in a Charles Dickens novel. The shocking fact about our intelligence community, with its thousands of able, competent and dedicated people, is that for 25 years, it has consistently underestimated. What the press has heard, in contrast, is a vast mythology about overestimation—citing bomber gaps, missile gaps, overkill, with very few people ever devoting any time to addressing the realities.

A little over a year ago, Dr. Albert Wohlstetter made one of the most important contributions to understanding the

strategic balance ever published: "Legends of the Arms Race," issued as a special report by the United States Strategic Institute. And he undertook what very few before him seem willing to do. He checked the record and documented the past decade's intelligence—projections of future Soviet strategic force strength. And then for each successive year after the estimate had been issued, he most carefully and rigorously researched the available evidence on the forces that the Soviets had developed and deployed. His principal source was the Defense secretary's annual posture statement to the Congress. He found that without a single exception, the United States had consistently underestimated the development and deployment of Soviet strategic forces.

He found, secondly, that in a substantial number of the cases—better than 75%—the actual Soviet deployments had exceeded the high estimates.

Such a condition has, in fact, existed for the past 25 years of my direct participation in the national estimative process. There is no way that I can describe to you, and have you believe me, what has gone on in the business of perceiving the threat,

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

March 23, 1977

their own, while at the same time they are denied the primary human characteristic of responsibility. The rich are regarded as having a will of their own, but as being villainous. Poverty is seen as a condition caused by external forces, while prosperity, is viewed as the result of conduct, although reprehensible conduct. The poor are considered passive but virtuous, the rich as active but wicked. Bureaucrats and social reformers—and at times also academics, artists, media sorts, and entertainers—are distinct categories who seem to get the best of both worlds: they may be prosperous and yet retain virtue.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE

Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. President, the security of intelligence is one of the most difficult questions with which the Executive, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Congress are wrestling. Equally important is the quality and objectivity of intelligence. Unfortunately, all these requirements—security, quality, and objectivity—have often been damaged in recent years, by selective and self-serving accounts of sensitive intelligence matters leaked to the press, always by persons unknown.

Recently we have seen the intelligence process politicized by garbled press accounts of the "B team" exercise, in which outside experts were commissioned to evaluate the national intelligence estimates concerning Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions. And, still more recently, the distinguished columnist Joseph Alsop has returned to one of his favorite subjects, berating the acuity and objectivity of CIA's analysts and estimators, in so doing luridly painting someone's account of CIA analytical intrigue in allegedly suppressing congenial new intelligence. CIA's analyses and estimates have in general enjoyed a good reputation for wisdom and objectivity.

With regard to these questions I commend to my colleagues the thoughtful "Reply to Mr. Alsop" which Mr. John Huizenga, former Chairman of CIA's Board of National Estimates, has contributed to the Washington Post. Whatever the case with respect to the particular estimative questions he and Mr. Alsop are debating, Mr. Huizenga performs a useful service in reminding us of the need for objective, nonideological analysis which can stand "the test of events and makes a contribution to policy" and for political leadership which refrains from pressuring the intelligence analysts "to obtain agreeable findings."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Huizenga's excellent article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A REPLY TO MR. ALSOP

On March 7 The Post carried an article by Joseph Alsop, titled "A Cautionary Tale," in which he worried a theme that has preoccupied him before: that CIA analysts and estimators have shown a persistent bias, which has led them, wilfully and against all the evidence, to minimize the Soviet threat to the United States.

This time Mr. Alsop's somewhat feverish "journalism" unmasks analysts who contrived to understate the real scale of Soviet

defense effort. The cops and robbers tale of how they were foiled is in Mr. Alsop's best vein. While I am unable to recognize my former colleagues in this melodrama, the style of attack on anonymous analysts who are unable to defend themselves is only too familiar.

In 1973 Mr. Alsop found CIA analysts guilty of what he called "marked historical bias." Reasons given were that they were playing down the likelihood of Soviet attack on China and "had always been broadly gloomy about the Vietnam war." Time and events make it appear that the bias Mr. Alsop perceived derived from their disagreement with him rather than from their own lack of objectivity.

His latest article also revives charges made in 1973 that an unnamed senior analyst was responsible for tendentious errors on Hungary in 1956, Cuba in 1962, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Mr. Alsop is given to dicta and mostly disdains an accounting of his evidence; whether "sources" or his own formidable powers of invention misled him it is impossible to say. But people who could testify to the falsity of these charges were never consulted by him. Being a knowledgeable source and an interested party, I tried to discuss the matter with him myself. The distinguished "reporter" hung up the phone.

Mr. Alsop did get one thing right in his 1973 articles. He wrote that the role of CIA analysts "is most unlikely to have escaped President Nixon's sharp eye" and that James Schlesinger, the incoming director, was a "new broom" who would have "the President's backing and encouragement" in "sweeping clean." The unnamed senior analyst was "soon to depart." CIA's estimators would be glad to settle for forecasts that turn out as well as that one did.

Mr. Alsop's explanation for the "extreme ideological slants" of CIA analysts is that they "belong, broadly speaking, to the American professoriate." This is odd because the only actual professor ever to serve as director was Mr. Schlesinger, and he obviously had his "slants" right. What is also odd is that many professors, and especially those who would have to be judged ideologically unsound by Mr. Alsop's lights, won't come within shouting distance of CIA any more. True, many professors have served as consultants over the years, but anyone who heard their noisy debates on the relevant issues could hardly believe that they had a uniform, let alone a nefarious, ideological influence.

It is puzzling that Mr. Alsop makes himself the instrument of renewed attack on CIA analysts at this time. The alleged tendentiousness and "unresponsiveness" of their work was supposed to have been corrected years ago, in particular by William Colby's abolition of the Board of National Estimates and by steps he took to give military agencies a larger role in the production of national intelligence. It is possible that Mr. Alsop and his informants believe that CIA analysts have been too stubborn in defense of their independence despite efforts to get them to see the light, as for example in the recent Team A/Team B episode. It is also possible that Mr. Alsop believes that a new director at CIA needs to be alerted promptly to the unwholesome elements he will find in his own house.

Of course, analytical/estimative work in CIA has not always avoided error, and nobody assigns analysts there a purity of heart others lack. But it is a fact that the mission, structure, and traditions of the agency were designed to promote objectivity. No analyst who shows persistent ideological bias, of any sort, will go far in that environment. The career payoff normally derives from penetrating analytical writing that stands the test of events and makes a contribution to policy.

This holds true, however, only when political leadership respects the independence of the intelligence function, refrains from pressures to obtain agreeable findings, and also from urgings to "get on the team." Unfortunately, these conditions have not invariably obtained during the commotions of the last decade or so.

There is likely always to be tension between some politicians and "journalists" on the one hand, and CIA analysts and Foreign Service professionals on the other. The latter are disagreeable because they seem to harp on complexities and uncertainties in world affairs; worse, they may even define the Soviet threat in other than a one-dimensional way. Almost inevitably, they arouse suspicion among self-styled "tough" people for whom a more simplistic version of reality is obvious.

Thus it will never be easy to carry out CIA's analytical mission, and certainly not in a period when the national security consensus is fractured and when the decline of civility makes attacks on personal integrity and half-baked ideological innuendo the norm in public debate. Still, I remain confident that my former colleagues will do their jobs honestly if given half a chance.

Perhaps the new director will see that they get it. All he has to do is to insist on high standards of competence and objectivity and, no less important, to support and defend those who may be threatened when they try to meet such standards.

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN INDIA

Mr. THURMOND, Mr. President, a recent article appeared in the Washington Star which reported that an estimated 30,000 persons are being held as political prisoners in jails throughout the country of India.

It was also reported that these prisoners intend to go on a hunger strike in the near future to protest this detention in a supposedly free and independent nation.

In this era when the term "human rights" has become a watchword, I believe that it is incumbent upon Americans to question the policies of any nation which espouses the same fundamental freedom as America, yet imprisons a large number of its citizens for exercising these freedoms.

While many are quick to condemn the internal actions of some nations, they simultaneously overlook, and completely disregard, the recent occurrences in India, which I believe to be incompatible with the fundamental ideals of freedom seeking people everywhere.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the United Press International article which appeared in the March 9 1977, issue of the Washington Star be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

30,000 IN INDIA'S JAILS PLAN A HUNGER STRIKE

NEW DELHI (UPI)—An estimated 30,000 political prisoners still in jail in India despite relaxation of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's state of emergency have vowed to go on hunger strike next week to protest their detention.

A spokesman for the opposition Janata (People's) party said yesterday that the prisoners made the decision in meetings in jails last week.

Jayaprakash Narayan, who has emerged as a leader of the opposition challenge to

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 March 1977

The Death Ray Debate: Do the Soviets Have It?

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Despite years of careful study by leading American scientists, the U.S. intelligence community is unable to decide if the Soviet Union is close to building a workable "death ray" weapon — one that could drastically alter the Soviet-American military balance.

The former head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence says the Soviets are testing the new weapon and might soon be ready to use it. But most scientists are skeptical that the Soviets have made such progress on the frontier of high-energy physics.

Potentially threatening Soviet advances in the field are "a theory that

can't be disproved," but so far it's only a theory," according to one source who rechecked the latest thinking in the intelligence community before commenting.

Such comments nettle Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr. Since he retired Jan. 1 from heading Air Force Intelligence, Keegan has publicly warned that the Soviets might be able by 1980 to neutralize U.S. nuclear deterrent power by destroying missiles with the new weapon.

KEEGAN INSISTS the intelligence data is clear enough to show that a massive Soviet scientific effort over some 20 years has now come close to a usable weapon. He argues that American scientists are too blind to concede that the Soviets might have made technological advances which have eluded this country.

If Keegan is right, a major danger could face the United States. The achievement of a workable Soviet defense against missiles while this country has nothing to stop Soviet missiles would leave the United States vulnerable to blackmail or destruction.

But, despite the potentially catastrophic implications of what Keegan says, his warning has received little public attention. The government has not commented on it because there has been no demand for public reassurance that Keegan is wrong and the danger which he sees does not loom in the future.

The reason seems to be that Keegan is a controversial figure whose statements tend to produce an automatic reaction of disbelief.

HE HAS FOR SO LONG been a lone voice within the secrecy of the intelligence community warning of Soviet military developments and, since going public, has made such sweeping predictions of doom that he now finds it difficult to get a serious hearing.

According to an authoritative source, the CIA for years was inclined to look for reasons to refute the warnings coming out of Keegan's Air Force work rather than give them a fair hearing. Yet, with the faith of a true believer, Keegan recites the times he was finally proven right, and informed observers concede that he sometimes has been first to detect important new intelligence developments.

The "death ray" weapon would train a charged-particle beam on an object in order to destroy it.

An atom is a miniature solar system of particles. Electrons wheel like planets around a sun-like nucleus which is composed of protons — each weighing some 2,000 times as much as an electron — and neutrons.

Scientists who split atoms with high-energy particle accelerators under experimental conditions know

that it is also possible to make a brick explode by pumping enough atomic particles into it. "People are continually reinventing the wheel by suggesting that that kind of thing can be turned into a weapon," says a senior scientific adviser to the government who is connected with a West Coast laboratory.

LIKE FOCUSING a beam of light on an object to illuminate it, a particle beam can focus energy on something. When a charge is put on particles of atoms, by jolting them with 5 million volts of electricity in the example cited by one scientist, the resulting beam can carry enough energy to destroy.

The use of laser beams of high-intensity light to carry energy and destroy objects has been studied extensively. Some "death ray" uses are already being made of them. But lasers cannot deliver enough energy quickly enough to destroy heavy objects in tiny fractions of seconds, which might be all the time it is clear warhead.

Charged-particle beams can deliver far more energy more quickly, and therefore are more effective weapons — if they can be made to work. The United States has conducted research on them without developing a workable weapon.

The largest effort, Project Seesaw of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency, was abandoned about four years ago after running into a blind alley. The Army and the Air Force still have small, separate research programs under way with tight funding and low priorities. The military project managers get nervous when a reporter asks about them.

ACCORDING TO ONE source, Seesaw tried to use beams of electrons and failed, but the Soviets have worked with protons. Electrons are too light to carry much impact, a scientist explains, but protons from the nuclei of atoms are heavy enough to deliver a punch.

There are many other problems, however. One is focusing a beam tightly, since protons tend to repel each other and scatter because they all have the same positive electrical charge. They also have trouble getting through the atmosphere, in effect having to split atoms along their path.

Another problem is locking a beam onto a small, rapidly moving target while it is dozens or hundreds of miles away. The technology being developed for laser weapons is also applicable to targeting charged-particle beams.

Perhaps the main problem in the U.S. development of charged-particle beams has been the skepticism of the scientific community. It has discouraged the government from providing large-scale funding in a determined effort to solve the problems and make weapons. Seesaw was abandoned when the confidence to pursue new scientific approaches declined, according to an intelligence community expert on weapons technology.

John Huizenga

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Frank Church

WASHINGTON POST 14 March 1977

Which Secrets Should Be Kept Secret? STATINTL

Secrets. Can anyone keep a secret?

In the aftermath of The Washington Post's disclosure that the CIA for 20 years had been secretly paying King Hussein of Jordan sums adding up to millions of dollars, that was the question that Newsweek featured in its discussion of the Hussein affair. President Carter's reaction was, first, constructive—to stop the payments; second, defensive—to assert that there was nothing improper or illegal about them; and third—regressive, to reduce the number of people in the executive branch with access to information about covert operations and to suggest that a joint congressional committee on intelligence be formed to reduce access in Congress to such information. Adm. Stansfield Turner, the CIA director, volunteered that he might support criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure and publication of national secrets, a position seemingly endorsed by several members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Finally, the Secretary of State sought to detect a distinction between our payments to Hussein and the Korean CIA's alleged financing of U.S. political figures.

I suggest that the wrong question is being asked and the wrong remedies are being proposed. The right question is not whether anyone can keep a secret but, rather, what are the secrets that ought to be kept?

I suspect that if we examine this question we would find that, with very few exceptions, secrets that ought to be kept are being kept. For example, with the single exception of the book by Phillip Agee, a CIA defector who left the United States, there has been little or no disclosure of CIA sources or methods; or of the confidentiality of sensitive negotiations, such as preceded the partial test ban treaty, SALT I, and the release of the Pueblo crew. The practices that have been revealed are mainly those that should never have been approved or undertaken: the CIA's secret war in Laos, the subversion of a freely elected government in Chile, the prolonged and illegal mail openings in the United States, and the conspiracy to murder foreign leaders, to name a few.

The Hussein case is a classic illustration of the confusion that surrounds the issue. If slipping money to King Hussein wasn't "illegal or improper," as the President maintained after stopping the payments, why were the payments stopped? Why, indeed, did we run the risk of so embarrassing a revelation in the first place? The United States has openly extended economic assistance to Jordan for years. If we had to purchase the king's cooperation to get intelligence, why put him on the payroll of the CIA? Money is fungible: U.S. aid could readily release Jordanian funds, which the king could then use to furnish us intelligence. The explanation just won't wash.

Indeed, the whole operation won't wash. Throughout the many years of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Jordan has basically relied upon the

Sen. Church (D-Idaho) was chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

United States to ensure its sovereignty and, until recently, its economic viability. If intelligence collection was the objective, as claimed, it was in the king's own interest to share intelligence with the United States, and he should not have had to be paid for it. If, on the other hand, Hussein used the money for his personal needs, then the purpose as well as the means chosen was clearly improper. Nevertheless, the disclosure seems not to have harmed the king; the facts of geography and geopolitics appear to be working to fortify his position.

Why then the draconian response? Perhaps it reflects only the inexperience of a new administration abruptly confronted with the basic contradiction of official secrecy in an open society. If so, it is best that it happened early, before knee-jerk reactions become entrenched habit. The dynamic of an open society, by definition, works in favor of disclosure. A determined free press probes relentlessly to uncover dubious practices and, in the aftermath of Watergate, the automatic invocation of national security no longer suffices to hide dirty linen.

This is also a society in which all kinds of special interests—in and out of government—compete for resources and influence. They will "go public" with information whenever it

Intelligence: Realities and Myths

By DANIEL O. GRAHAM

The recent publicity over the U.S. intelligence community's ability to assess Soviet Russia's unprecedented military build-up is all to the good. National debate over this issue is of critical importance.

The pity is it is being obscured by irrelevant and largely uninformed assaults on the efforts of the panel of experts. This panel, called "Team B," was directed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to determine why past assessments of the intelligence community failed to alert the national leadership to important Soviet military developments. It was created as an alternative to the regular compilers of the National Intelligence Estimates, the so-called Team A.

I am directly involved in this matter, as a member of Team B, and as the only member of the team who must accept much personal criticism of past errors in the intelligence estimating process. I have been part of that process at the CIA and in the Defense Department since the "missile gap" days of the early 1950s. Yet while I welcome debate on this whole vital question, I think it essential to focus on the real problems.

Team B's critique of late last year has been depicted by critics as a "kangaroo court" operation forced upon an unwilling CIA by a cabal of outside "hardliners." George Bush has been accused of deserting his troops in battle. And the outsiders have been described as devoid of intellectual honesty. Ignored amid these charges are several critically important points:

The A-B exercise was not solely the work of the CIA but of the entire U.S. intelligence community, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence establishments within the three military services and within State, plus a number of other agencies with intelligence functions.

Nor was this particular exercise unique or even exceptional. Indeed, there has been a succession of postwar precedents. The first followed the surprise Soviet A-bomb explosion in 1949; another followed the unanticipated display of an array of new Soviet weapons systems at the May Day parade in Red Square in 1950.

Later that year, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith was summoned from his post as American ambassador in Moscow to assume the directorship of the CIA. He was charged by President Truman to get at the source of the intelligence failures that resulted in the U.S. being caught unawares by the Communist attack on South Korea.

Figuring Out the Implications

The Team B critique was aimed not at assessing how well our basic level of intelligence was performed, but at the reliability of "estimates." The same has been true of the various critiques cited above. The fact is that we have done far better collecting and analyzing basic intelligence than we have in estimating the meaning and implications of available information. As any number of experienced observers have remarked, the main intelligence problem is not in finding out what an adversary is doing, but in getting agreement as to the implications of what it is doing.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, most of our serious mis-estimates of Soviet military matters have failed on the side of underestimating them. One notable exception—the so-called "missile gap" estimate following the trauma of Soviet Sputnik successes—is tediously cited as proof of the tendency of "hawks" and Pentagon intelligence people to exaggerate Soviet arms efforts. "Remember the missile gap!" has become a comforting slogan for those unwilling to face unpleasant facts about Soviet military exertions.

Actually, analysts differed rather widely at that time as to the actual size of the Soviet ICBM force, and the rate at which the missiles could be produced and deployed. CIA, the State Department and the Air Force arrived at high estimates. But the Army and Navy held that the Soviets had deployed few, if indeed they had deployed any, ICBMs.

Observe that the only intelligence chiefs who dissented from the high estimates were those of the Army and Navy, those very military analysts we are constantly being told are prone to exaggeration about such matters.

This is all a matter of record. It is also a matter of record that the growth of the Soviet ICBM force was underestimated for a decade after the "missile gap" by the entire intelligence community—including Pentagon "hawks."

Over the last year or so, evidence of the build-up in Soviet military capabilities has been disturbing enough to cause deep concern, including among some previous optimists. Even before Team B came into existence the trend in national estimates turned unmistakably more somber, as witness CIA testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in June 1976. Several circumstances contributed to this trend.

For one thing, U.S. hopes that detente and arms control negotiations would diminish Soviet emphasis on military power—hopes that were reflected in earlier national estimates—have been dashed by the unprecedented scope and scale of Russia's military build-up since the inception of detente in May 1972.

For another, we have found that our old assessments of Soviet military spending—that it represented only some 6% to 8% of the U.S.S.R.'s gross national product—were way off-base. It is now agreed in intelligence circles that Russia is devoting two to three times that much.

Finally, there has been a new awareness of a large continuing Soviet civil defense effort, which was greatly stepped up after the ABM agreement and the accompanying Strategic Arms Limitation agreement in Moscow in 1972.

Analysts can reasonably argue as to how effective this continuing defense effort will prove to be, or whether the Soviets can achieve their stated goal of losing fewer than 10 million people (as opposed to over 100 million Americans) in a nuclear war. But the inescapable conclusion that analysts must draw from this huge civil defense effort is that it represents an attempt to terror—mutual assured destruction, a concept based on the belief that when both countries' civilian population is hostage to

the nuclear threat of the other, reason will prevail.

In the light of such evidence, it would be strange indeed for the U.S. intelligence community to continue to express doubt that the Soviets are seeking overall military superiority. To suggest that CIA analysts would have dismissed all this evidence in order to paint a reassuring picture, but for the efforts of Team B, is either fantasy or calumny.

Ironically, the Soviet decision-making processes mirror our own, even to producing an unending stream of disputes within the leadership between "hardliners" and "softliners." Even our own modish terminology of "hawks" and "doves" is being applied to the Soviets.

Doves on the Rise

It is being said today that the Soviet doves are in the ascendancy. Indeed, columnist Victor Zorza claimed recently in *The Washington Post* that "we are approaching one of those rare moments in history when a lucky combination of circumstances on both sides of the great divide opens the way to a breakthrough in international relations."

Prime among the fortuitous circumstances cited by Mr. Zorza is that "Moscow has welcomed most of Carter's appointments to the national security cluster." He approvingly names Cyrus Vance ("whose past pronouncements the Soviet press recalls with approval"); Harold Brown (some of whose recent statements "must sound like sweet music in the Kremlin ears"); Marshall Shulman (who "has stood up to U.S. hawks through thick and thin"); and Paul Warnke ("who has few equals when it comes to arguing against the follies of the arms race").

Mr. Zorza says this "is a team that gives Moscow's own doves every reason to claim, in their continuing debate with Kremlin hawks, that the Soviet Union ought to lean over backwards to make a quick SALT deal with Carter."

But much more in keeping with the evidence is that throughout detente, the Soviet Union has at every level consistently proclaimed that each and every Washington concession to Moscow was forced by Russia's growing military might.

Rather than meeting concession with concession, Moscow's prescription for continued success is to confront the U.S. with more of what made it give ground in the first place. As former Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko liked to put it, the greater the combat capability of the Soviet armed forces and the more powerfully they are equipped, "the more peaceful it will be on earth."

Lt. Gen. Graham (USA, ret.) is professor of international studies at the University of Miami, and has served as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and deputy director of the CIA. An editorial related to this subject appears today.

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Virulent, Vehement, etc., etc.

President Carter charged that opponents of Paul Warnke as top disarmament negotiator "just do not want to see any substantial reduction in atomic weapons." In fact, Senator Henry Jackson, the spearhead of the opposition, has also been the leading advocate of proposing to the Soviets actual reductions in existing arms.

Senator George McGovern said that criticism of Mr. Warnke's views on atomic weapons is acceptable "only if one loves these weapons for themselves—if one actually prefers them over the homes and schools and transportation systems and medical attention" The Senator talked of "professional scaremongers" and warned of "psychopaths" in the military services. He said that in taking testimony from Paul Nitze, one of the nation's most distinguished arms control experts, a Senate Committee provided "a ready forum and a serious audience to inflict his paranoia on the public mind."

Meanwhile, columnist Joseph Kraft was remarking on the "crude terror tactics" of "the Senate Hawks," whom he labeled "a leftover product of the Cold War." The New York Times was editorially pondering the "virulence" and "protracted passion" of Mr. Warnke's "vehement" opponents. And The Washington Post talked of the opponents' "bizarre" logic, and concluded that "the weeks-long assault on Mr. Warnke has shed virtually all pretense of being a reasoned debate."

Mr. Warnke has now been approved by a vote of 58-40, a sufficient margin for confirmation but short of the two-thirds vote necessary to ratify an eventual treaty. In the wake of this outcome there remains a question: Which side of this debate was it that was virulent, impassioned, vehement, bizarre and crude?

The question is especially pertinent because the Warnke debate was not the first occasion for the kind of calumny displayed above. Indeed, such attacks seem to be a hallmark of the current stage of what ought to be the most serious defense and arms control debate of the last two decades.

It is now universally conceded that since the signing of the first strategic arms treaty the Soviet Union has been engaged in a non-stop arms buildup. It is also conceded that our intelligence agencies failed to predict this development, and have substantially

underestimated the percentage of the Soviet gross national product devoted to buying arms. By now the Soviets have forged ahead of the U.S. in a number of crucial areas, and more generally are in the region of parity, but the Soviet build-up shows no sign of abating.

All this is known. The precise current balance can be disputed, but the direction of the trend cannot. Yet if someone suggests that we have something to worry about, and that arms control may not solve all of our problems, he had better be prepared for attacks on his motives.

This certainly was the experience of the members of Team B, described alongside by General Daniel Graham. Disturbed by the persistently low estimates of Soviet deployments, the CIA director set up a special team, with members picked for impeccable reputations and a skeptical view of the Soviets, to insure that official estimates were exhaustively debated. When this was revealed, the same columns cited above were filled with words like "black-mailing," "kangaroo court" and "worst-case assumptions." In such quarters the issue became the motives of the participants, not the merits of the views or the reality of the Soviet buildup.

There are also real issues to deal with in the case against Mr. Warnke. The views he has repeatedly expressed over a long period of time will give pause to anyone worried about imbalance in the current negotiations, as we thought Senator Jackson demonstrated neatly in the speech quoted nearby. And we do not think these reservations can be dismissed with arguments that Mr. Warnke expressed somewhat different views in recent testimony, that since the President makes the real decisions we may as well send the office boy, or that in an eventual treaty ratification the Senate can always send back the wine.

So we think the outcome of the Warnke vote is healthy. It puts President Carter, his negotiators and the Soviets on notice that the Senate will not automatically approve just any treaty. And if we go through this often enough, with 40 Senators willing to stand up and be counted, it will clear the air on what views are respectable. It may even be possible to observe that the Russian tanks and missiles really do exist, without being immediately thrust into a defense of your motives, intellectual honesty and sanity.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-21

WASHINGTON POST
7 MARCH 1977

Joseph Alsop

A Cautionary Tale

The Central Intelligence Agency sharply raised its estimate of what the Soviet Union was spending on defense, a change that can mean, according to one's point of view, either that the Russians have started to expand their forces in a terrifying manner, or that the earlier estimate was too low.

—The Economist

Nothing in this city has been more amazing than the totally blank response of the American political community to the episode above mentioned. The change of estimate was made long prior to the intervention of the so-called Watch Committee in the estimating process.

Furthermore, the official figure on Soviet defense spending rose from "6 to 8 per cent" of the Soviet Gross National Product to no less than "13 per cent." In other words, America's single most important foreign estimate in the whole book was approximately doubled, apparently overnight. It is therefore high time to tell the cautionary tale of what really happened.

It is time, in the first place, because too many people have too good reasons for fearing that President Carter's nominee for chief disarmament negotiator, Paul C. Warnke, will reinforce a dangerous policy bias in the crucial estimating process. And secondly, it is time because this same bias has already produced results which look unpleasantly like (but do not in fact resemble) the ugliest kind of spy drama.

To make what happened understandable, it is necessary to say something about our little understood American intelligence community. On the estimating side, in brief, there is a sharp division between the military and civilian analysts. The Central Intelligence Agency's analysts belong, broadly speaking, to the American professoriate. Many of them in fact have the ideological slants—often in extreme form—of any characteristically liberal American university professor.

To give one example, there is the honorable but misguided man who rose to the head of the CIA's analytical branch, but ended his career after Dr. James Schlesinger took over the CIA. He was dead wrong about Hungary in 1956. In the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he was so obstinately wrong that he wished to stop the U-2 overflights, which alone revealed the

dead wrong about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

There was nothing evil about these errors—although it was perhaps a bit odd that the man who committed them was continuously promoted. The errors simply reflected the view, so common in the American professoriate, that the Soviets at bottom are much nicer and a lot less militaristic than nasty-minded persons too often believe.

Inevitably, this view deeply affected the estimates of Soviet defense outlays. A Byzantine system was evolved by the CIA's civilian analysts—and partly accepted, too, by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence analysts—which was obviously calculated to produce comfortingly low estimates.

The resulting estimates looked grossly unrealistic to some people, including this reporter, because of the vast quantities of weapons the Soviets were buying. But nothing much was done about the problem until Lieutenant General Daniel Graham was

Mr. Alsop spent 40 years as a political reporter.

named Director of Defense Intelligence in 1974, when a serious debate began.

In 1975, the American intelligence "processing centers" in Germany then picked up a Soviet emigrant-defector who must be nameless, since he would otherwise go in peril of his life. It is enough to say that thus he had been able to be defected from an extremely high post in the Soviet central planning apparatus, the GOSPLAN.

This emigrant-defector produced an earthquake-like convulsion among the analysts and estimators of the American intelligence community. Somewhat earlier, he had had an indisputable "need to know," which caused him to be shown the secret, line-by-line Soviet defense budget for 1970. He was heavily guarded when studying the defense budget, and was forbidden to take notes. But by luck, he had a near-photographic memory.

Because of his former key position in the GOSPLAN, the emigrant-defector was brought to this country for "debriefing" by the CIA. He promptly made himself bitterly unwelcome. The published American estimate for Soviet defense spending in the year 1970 had been "6 per cent" of Gross

based on a more detailed calculation by the estimators that the Soviets had spent 25 billion rubles on defense that year.

The emigrant-defector reported, instead, that the actual total for Soviet defense spending in the 1970 budget he had seen was no less than 50 billion rubles! He further backed up this highly unsettling report with a wealth of remembered figures from the various subordinate parts of the secret Soviet budget.

As the debriefing proceeded, the Pentagon was informed under the usual procedures. Dr. James Schlesinger, by then Secretary of Defense, even agreed to defer any revision of the published intelligence estimates until after the U.S. defense budget had passed through Congress that summer—for fear of accusations of propaganda-making for U.S. defense spending. But the Pentagon was only most casually informed about the curious lie-detector test that was abruptly administered to the Soviet emigrant-defector by his CIA debriefers, or perhaps by some of their superior officers.

As director of Defense Intelligence, General Graham only learned that the emigrant-defector had failed a lie-detector test when this invaluable witness was on the very eve of being shipped back to Germany in heavy disgrace as a probable provocateur. General Graham promptly obtained the backing of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and then demanded the body, as it were, first from Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, and then from the next man in the CIA pecking order, Deputy Director for Intelligence Edward Proctor.

At first, Proctor tried hard to resist turning over the emigrant-defector to General Graham. But there was no remedy under the established procedures, so the emigrant-defector was sent to General Graham's office in the custody of a CIA operative. This latter had been surprisingly instructed not to leave the emigrant-defector alone with General Graham, and he had to be forcibly prevented from entering General Graham's office.

General Graham, who speaks excellent Russian, then discovered that the lie-detector test had been improperly administered—to put it almost too politely. It is not generally known, but polygraph or lie-detector tests can easily be crooked by using long, many-claused, highly conditional questions that cannot be answered accurately

American Cause

A Humanitarian, Educational, Political Education Organization
The Honorable General Murphy, Director

Do We Have to Learn to Live With Ambiguity?

A thoughtful look at the varied company of scientists, scholars, and lawyers who are taking over the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council, and the Arms Control Agency. They are largely drawn from the implacable opponents of nuclear strategy and the doves of the Vietnam war.

by Charles J. V. Murphy

Mr. Murphy was for 34 years a writer and editor of Fortune magazine. He is a Member of the American Cause Board of Directors.

There is a disturbing aspect to President Carter's preparations to impart a promised fresh direction to the conduct of American defense and strategy, which is only just beginning to attract the wide public attention that it deserves. It has to do with the public performances and political philosophies of the people whom he has placed in command at the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council in the White House's precinct, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—the four institutions primarily charged, along with the Central Intelligence Agency, with maintaining the Nation's security.

For reasons that may in time tell us more about President Carter's own ambitions in the fields of military and foreign policy than he has so far vouchsafed, there is a notable absence among these personages of the new faces, innocent of power and private ambition, which candidate Carter assured us would now be seen in these high jurisdictions. Instead, save for a slight sprinkling of scholars, businessmen, and journalists of modest reputation, the installed magnates have nearly all served in their present fields as senior or junior lieutenants well back in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; and, by the standards of the Plains, Ga., morality, they have certainly sinned in the exercise of power and the pursuit of influence.

For some of us, with long memories and a certain familiarity with these matters, the group that now presides over the fields of national policy, where Dr. Kissinger so long held sway, has the look and bearing of men restored to authority at least four years, perhaps as much as eight years, too late. They sound today much as they did when

they were trying to haul Lyndon Johnson out of the quagmire of Vietnam, which is to say out of the world itself—out of the grinding, shifting, remorseless pressures of the Cold War. They were pathfinders in the search for a way to an unacknowledged and hoped-for painless retreat from that war and into a lull we have lately known as detente.

Cyrus Vance, 59, at State and Paul C. Warnke, 57, at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, lawyers both, have been in and out of government and politics most of their lives. Years ago, they cast their lots with the left-of-center wing of the Democrat Party, and they have been active in the politics of arms control.

Dr. Harold I. Brown, 49, at Defense, is a nuclear scientist, the first scientist to take the quarterdeck at the Pentagon. He comes from the presidency of the California Institute of Technology, where he long has been a relatively silent but senior member in the league of left-wing scientists and technipols assembled around the Charles River Basin at Harvard and M.I.T. who keep the Pentagon's advanced weapon programs under unremitting attack. No stranger to the Pentagon, he served there eight years, 1961 through 1968, under Secretary Robert S. McNamara, first as Director of Research and Engineering, then as Secretary of the Air Force.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 48, at the National Security Council, where the President's channels to national security policies converge, is a left-tilting centrist in foreign policy who has on occasion styled himself a "dawk." That suggests either a dove in hawk's plumage or a bird with the temperament of Ferdinand the Bull. Like Kissinger, he is a professor (Columbia University) and a naturalized citizen (son of a Polish diplomat). His principal patron is another Rockefeller (David, the banker) with an affinity for detente and accommodation.

One is left to wonder: Is the "dawk" about to supplant

continued

IT'S BUDGET TIME AGAIN

'THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING!'

DAVID CORTRIGHT & ROBERT BOROSAGE

Over the last twenty years, Americans have been treated to an annual performance of *Sturm und Drang* in advance of Congressional hearings on the defense budget. A fusillade of press leaks on some new Soviet menace blends with the blare of the brass seeking additional weapons. The spectacle has had so many reruns that many in the legislative audience are now bored with it. This year, however, a much more intense and concerted performance has captured the attention of legislators and the national press alike.

The primary theme is the new National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet military intentions, first leaked to *The New York Times* during the slow-news Christmas holidays and picked up by nearly every print and broadcast outlet since then. The estimate—a product of what is described as a “furious” debate between regular intelligence analysts and a special team of outside “experts”—gives a “grim” portrayal of Soviet aggressiveness. But the NIE is only one of many variations in a well-orchestrated performance by conservatives, designed to scare citizens about Soviet intentions. The entire movement poses a major policy challenge to President Carter, one which will tell much about the future directions of this administration.

Annual assessment of Soviet military intentions is the task of analysts within the \$10 billion intelligence apparatus. Over the years, the views of the CIA's analysts have predominated, with conflicting views footnoted in the text, and often supported in appendixes. Clearly irritated by the moderate, unimpassioned findings of previous analyses, President Ford and CIA Director George Bush sought to influence the result by appointing an outside team to provide an “alternative” view. The panel was headed by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes and included retired Army Lieut. Gen. Daniel Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; Thomas Wolfe of the Rand Cor-

poration; John W. Vogt, former Air Force General; William Van Cleave, a member of the SALT delegation, and Foy Kohler, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union—all known to hold gloomy views about Soviet designs. This outside group, designated Team B, was given access to raw data and told to debate its views with the regular analysts. In an exchange described as “bloody,” the panel apparently succeeded in moving the accepted analysis closer to its own predilections. Team B was a stacked jury, chosen to deliver a predetermined verdict. The process gave very conservative voices official endorsement to attack intelligence community analysts.

Political leaders have ignored or rebuked disagreeable intelligence analysts since at least the time of Xerxes. The Greeks had to be warned against the folly of killing messengers bearing bad news. Modern practice is somewhat more subtle. The Pentagon Papers demonstrated that the Johnson administration repeatedly ignored CIA assessments of the bombing of North Vietnam. Walt Rostow (like his Nixon counterpart, Henry Kissinger) often preferred to get raw data directly, the better to fit them to his views. Instead of basing policy on assessments, estimates were created to fit the policy. The Pipes committee is another variation of the practice, in this case changing the analysts to get the desired result—that is, an official finding that the USSR seeks strategic “superiority” over the United States.

There is much less to support the claims of the Pipes panel than meets the eye. According to reports, it based its estimate on three primary charges: that the Soviet Union is improving its air defenses; that it is proceeding with a massive civilian defense program, and that it is improving the accuracy of its missiles. The USSR is improving its capabilities in each of these areas, but there is no evidence in the public domain to suggest that there has been a new surge of development. Moreover, none of these steps gives the USSR an edge over the United States, or substantially alters the present relationship between the two powers. For example, the Soviet program for low-level air defense may well be a response to American acquisition of the F-15 fighter-bomber and the likely procurement of the B-1. Low-level air penetration has always been an area of U.S. technological ad-

David Cortright, author of *Soldiers in Revolt* (Doubleday), is an associate of The Center for National Security Studies. Robert Borosage, director of the center and a practicing attorney, is co-author of *The Lawless State* (Viking) and co-editor of *The CIA File* (Grossman).

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Agronsky at Large

STATION WETA TV
PBS Network

DATE February 18, 1977 10:00 PM

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Interview With George Bush

ANNOUNCER: Agronsky at Large. Tonight, a conversation with the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Bush.

MARTIN AGRONSKY: Good evening. In this capital city, knowledge is the power. And that's what makes any man who's the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the possessor of an awesome power.

In world crises, the Director knows what the President of the United States knows, and he knows it as soon as, or sometimes even before the President does, because that's his job.

George Bush was Director of the CIA for a year until January 20th. He was appointed by President Ford after having represented the U.S. in Communist China. He served Richard Nixon first as U.S. Ambassador, and he was Chairman of the Republican National Committee during Watergate -- served Mr. Nixon loyally into Watergate -- forced Nixon to resign.

Mr. Bush, when you took your seat as Director of the CIA, did you find that the world looked like much more dangerous place from there than you had anticipated?

GEORGE BUSH: Not immediately, Martin, but as one looks at the totality of the information, I do feel that it was -- it's more dangerous in some ways than I thought when I went there. On the other, I think that there are some real opportunities now to make the world more peaceful.

But, yes, I am concerned, and have been concerned about the -- some of the trouble spots in the world. I'm concerned about

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
17 FEBRUARY 1977

THE DOOMSDAY REPORT

By STAN CARTER

Of The News Washington Bureau

THE CAREFUL way that President Carter hedged his remarks about the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms balance at his first press conference last week indicated that he had rejected the "worst case" argument of some experts that the Soviets have already gained military superiority over this country. But he was concerned that the Soviets soon could be stronger than we are.

So are most—if not all—informed observers both within the government and without.

Some experts, using the same basic intelligence data as that given the President by the Central Intelligence Agency, believe the Soviet Union already has established a lead in virtually every category of military power.

Others, mostly outside government, think that the Soviets, despite their breathtaking headlong buildup, still are merely seeking military parity with the United States.

A thick CIA report captioned National Intelligence Estimate 11/8, which was placed before the President during his first days in office, reportedly reflects the majority assessment.

The Soviets are determined to attain military superiority over the United States, but have not yet done so.

The Top Secret document is said to take a much sterner view of what the Soviets are up to than that taken by previous assessments.

It incorporates two independent evaluations, one devised by the CIA, the other by outside experts. Both groups worked with the same raw intelligence data.

The conclusion of the two panels was identical: The Soviet Union is seeking arms superiority. What's more, the

outside panel reputedly took a darker view of Soviet intentions than the CIA itself did.

Some academic critics who think the new assessment exaggerates the Soviet threat, base their criticism on the participation of the outside experts, whom the critics describe as hard-liners, predisposed to make "worst case" estimates.

One of the outsiders, retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, dismisses that allegation: "Since I had much to do with the way estimates were made in the past, I was in fact criticizing myself," he points out. Graham is a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

"I didn't make my reputation by being an arm waver or a worst-case estimator," he declares.

GRAHAM AND another outsider, University of Southern California Prof. William R. Van Cleave, insist that the harsher assessment grew directly out of the evidence:

"There isn't any doubt that they are trying—there is a doubt over whether they can achieve superiority," is how Graham sees it.

A third outsider, retired Air Force Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., is now convinced that the Soviet Union already has achieved superiority—"by every criterion used to measure strategic balance."

But this dread view apparently was rejected by the CIA panels and by Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a letter late last month to Gen. William Proxmire, Brown said the chiefs—"do not agree that the Soviet Union has achieved military superiority."

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, however, that the recent U.S. and Soviet trends in military programs and civil defense could permit the USSR to attain superiority."

"The Soviets are rapidly closing the technological gap, but they still lag in several important areas."

After studying the new CIA estimate and discussing it with his military advisers, the President accepted the majority view.

"At the present time, my judgment is that we have superior nuclear

The United States was ahead in the number of missile warheads, missile accuracy and the number of bombers, he said, while the Soviet Union led in missile size and explosive power throw-weight.

"I think that we are roughly equivalent," Carter added, "even though

"I think we are superior, in that either the Soviet Union or we could destroy a major part of the other nation if a major attack was made, with losses in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 million people."

The threat of world holocaust, Carter said, showed the need both for negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the two countries' nuclear arsenals and maintenance by the United States of "an adequate deterrent capability."

While Carter's remarks implied rejection of the "worst case" estimates, they also appeared to indicate a determination not to let the United States fall too far behind the Soviets in total military power.

THIS IS essentially the conclusion reached by the previous administration. Before leaving office last month, President Ford submitted a record \$123-billion defense budget for the next fiscal year, saying that it was the minimum needed to brake America's fall and the Soviets' rise.

Despite Carter's campaign promise to trim \$5 billion to \$7 billion in waste from the Pentagon budget, Joint Chiefs Chairman Brown indicated last week that the new administration's cuts may not be too drastic.

He viewed the President as being "entirely reasonable. He's obviously been exposed to facts that were not available to him in the early days of the campaign."

Just how grim is the situation? One Pentagon analyst who has studied the latest CIA report gave this personal view:

"We've had a downward trend at the same time the Soviets have been going up every year. Now, we have turned up, and if we maintain the programs that we have started on, there is no

panic."

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

15 FEBRUARY 1977

THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT

By STAN CARTER

of The News Washington Bureau

First of a Series

THE STAKES are high in the debate that has been roiling Washington over whether the Soviet Union is headed toward military superiority over this country.

Are the Soviets really seeking superiority? And if so, how close are they to achieving it? Conceivably, national survival could hinge on the answers.

While there is disagreement over Soviet intentions, there appears to be little doubt that Moscow has been engaged in a massive buildup of both conventional and nuclear forces that could, in time, upset the balance if the United States does nothing to counter it.

President Carter's position on the giant B-1 bomber is indicative of the seriousness of the question. During his campaign, Carter viewed the vastly expensive bird as being "wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."

Now that he is President, the betting is that Carter will go ahead with \$21.4 billion program for the new war plane.

Carter still insists that he will explore every possible way of working with the Soviet Union and other potential enemies "to cut down dependence on weapons of all kinds," but — as he said after his first week in office — we don't know yet how much the Soviets would be willing to cut back their defense capabilities to match American cuts.

With the continuing Soviet arms buildup clearly in mind, Carter told some touring junior high school students, "The B-1 bomber is one of those items we will have to consider, along with the Cruise missiles and a new kind of intercontinental ballistic missile."

The debate about Soviet intentions and achievements has been building up for months, fed by the newest and bleakest estimates of the Kremlin's arms build-up.

The furor is coming to a head just as Congress begins consideration of the record \$123 billion defense budget left by President Ford.

Naturally, this has brought out comparisons to the so-called "missile gap" debate that enlivened the late '50s and early '60s. That alarmist episode, at least one published suggestion, in the New Republic, wondered if the latest arms gap projection is "a plot by the

industrial complex to hog-tie the Carter administration into adopting its weapons priorities."

This time, however, there is no basic dispute over what the Soviets are doing. The raw intelligence coming from satellite photographs, interceptions of Soviet communications, clandestine agents and other sources indicates a broad Soviet buildup in virtually all categories of strategic and conventional forces.

Although Defense Secretary Harold Brown has scoffed at the more alarmist rhetoric, it is said that he's advised the President to build five of the eight B-1s the Pentagon wants to put in the air this year.

Here's how Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assesses the Soviet buildup at the beginning of the Carter administration:

- "The Soviets continue an aggressive program of upgrading their intercontinental ballistic missile capability by replacing older systems with improved missiles.

- "The Soviet nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine force continues to grow in size and capability.

- "The Soviets are continuing modernization of their strategic bomber force with production of the multipurpose Backfire bomber.

- "Also, the Soviets may be developing a capability to attack our satellites."

The numbers—and effectiveness—of U.S. and Soviet strategic and conventional forces which make up the overall balance of military power will be compared in later articles in this series. But two other recent developments have contributed even more to the new concern over Soviet intentions than the "arms gap."

- One of these "shock factors" was the revised CIA estimate, made public for the first time last October, that the Soviets in recent years have been spending 11% to 13% of their gross national product on defense, almost double earlier estimates of Kremlin arms spending and at least double the American expenditure of 5½% of GNP.

According to a CIA report last month, during the past decade Soviet spending on defense has approximately equaled our own.

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the trends of the defense spending in

the two countries differ greatly when measured against inflation.

From that real standpoint American defense spending shows a continuous decline since 1968.

In sharp contrast, Soviet spending shows a steady growth of 3% a year.

"As a result of these diverging trends," the report continues, "the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense exceed U.S. defense outlays by a widening margin in every year after 1971."

What's more, the CIA analysis found that if pensions paid to retired servicemen were deducted from both sides' budgets, "the estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities in 1976 exceed those of the U.S. by about 40%."

According to one Pentagon analyst, this frightening trend began "way back in 1960."

The other major factor in changing the intelligence community's perception of the Soviet threat has been the growing realization of the size of the Soviet civil defense program.

For all practical purposes, the United States abandoned its civil defense program after the abortive effort

in the early 1960s to get people to build backyard air-raid shelters. Not so the Russians. It's been known for years that they were continuing to put great emphasis on civil defense, but we didn't pay too much attention until recently. When we took another look, this is what we found:

- A national network of modern shelters for both civilian and military leaders.

- Extensive national protection for essential industries.

- A network of protected food and fuel depots outside some urban areas.

As yet, however, there seems to be no broad system of shelters for the general public.

The CIA has been told to make a crash assessment of the Soviet civil defense program, which is expected to take several more months to complete. If the assessment is that the size and effectiveness of the program are sufficient to make the Kremlin's leaders think that the Soviet Union could survive a nuclear war without irreparable damage, it would make the Soviet Union a much more damaging

Next: Who Is Stronger

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE K-1

By HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

13 FEB 1977

BALTIMORE SUN

'There is no question the U.S. is superior...'

The new Carter administration has been left a legacy of fear—an unreasoning fear of the growing Soviet military threat, not an appropriate fear of a nuclear catastrophe. During the political campaign, the public was fed tales of U.S. military inferiority, and few politicians had the courage to counter these allegations. But this did not end with the election; in fact, it has continued to this day with the sanc-

tion of the outgoing administration. So far the new administration has not succumbed to this campaign, but their tasks have certainly been made more difficult.

In December a panel organized by the

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with the blessing of departing CIA Director George Bush, prepared an alternate top-secret estimate of Soviet military capabilities. This panel, known as Team B or the Pipes Committee, after its Chairman, was admittedly composed entirely of "worst case" analysts, supposedly in order to check the validity of the normal national estimating process. Leaks to the press reported their conclusion that the Russians were seeking nuclear superiority which they intended to use for political, and if necessary even military, advantage.

More recently Maj. Gen. George Keegan, retiring chief of Air Force intelligence, publicly proclaimed that the Soviet Union already had nuclear superiority, a view denied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He emphasized an extensive Soviet civil defense program, which put the Russians in a position to evacuate their cities, protect their leaders and industries, and then threaten the United States with nuclear blackmail.

What are the facts that support this sudden spate of alarms over Soviet capabilities and intentions? The former Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, in his FY-78 Annual Report, the only official public source on the subject, refers to a serious Soviet effort which could make it the dominant military power in the world. Yet a careful review of this document fails to unearth any support for these heightened fears of Soviet nuclear domination. In fact, just the opposite.

A year ago Mr. Rumsfeld predicted that the U.S.S.R. would in 12 months deploy 1,000 more strategic nuclear weapons—warheads and bombs. Now he finds they actually added only 800 in 15 months; thus, the buildup was 35 per cent slower than forecast. Since they now have only 3,300 such weapons, as compared to 8,400

for the U.S., what is the cause for sudden alarm? Since the 1972 Interim Agreement, we have added about 3,000 of these weapons to our stockpiles while the U.S.S.R. has added only 800, hardly much support for Mr. Rumsfeld's argument that in contrast with the Soviet Union the U.S. has acted with restraint. The U.S. is still, and will clearly remain for years, superior in this most critical measure of total strategic strength.

Since these current Soviet additions to their nuclear stockpile result almost entirely from deploying new intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV's (multiple warheads which can be aimed at separate targets), one must conclude that this, too, is behind the schedule of a year ago. Although the exact number of their MIRV-

See U.S. POWER, K2, Col. 1

Herbert Scoville, Jr., is secretary of the Arms Control Association and formerly deputy director of the CIA.

equipped delivery vehicles has not been released; it is certainly less than 200 while we have about 1,000 and are still adding more.

Much is made of the fact that they have been simultaneously testing four or five different types of ICBM's.

This is only evidence of the inefficiency of their system, since the latest technology could better be incorporated into one or two models. Would we be better off with four separate B-1 programs? The much-vaunted Soviet larger missile payload or throw-weight has not yet been used effectively since the more advanced U.S. technology in such areas as accuracy still gives us an advantage in hard-target capability. It is claimed that Soviet doctrine calls for emphasis on counter-force capabilities; yet the U.S. is admittedly superior in this area, and according to Mr. Rumsfeld will remain so well into the 1980's. Since counter-force was a fundamental element in former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger's strategic policy, such condemnation of Soviet doctrine is somewhat two-faced.

In submarine-launched missiles the story is similar. Last year Mr. Rumsfeld estimated they would deploy such missiles at appears to have been only 56, less than

half that forecast. The U.S. has nearly 5,000 submarine missile warheads while the U.S.S.R. has only 800. They have only now started testing their first such missile with two MIRV's. We started in 1963 and have up to 14 warheads in a single missile. Mr. Rumsfeld also avers their subs are less quiet than ours and that most would have to go on station within range of allied anti-submarine warfare forces. There is no question that the U.S. is superior in this most important element of the strategic deterrent triad.

Finally, the U.S. also has a two-to-one superiority in number of intercontinental bombers. The Soviet force is composed largely of aging Bears and Bisons with a small complement of the new Backfires, which can only reach U.S. targets by

flying subsonically at high altitudes on a oneway mission or on a two-way mission with refueling. The modernized U.S. B-52's can fly to the U.S.S.R., penetrate Soviet defenses at low altitudes, and return to friendly bases. The U.S. refueling capability far surpasses that of the Russians.

General Keegan has warned that he is unaware of a single important category of technology used to measure the strategic balance in which the Russians have not established a significant lead over the United States. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and indeed almost all other experts including the CIA, have agreed that the U.S. technology is years ahead in almost all important areas. For example, our guidance systems provide far greater missile accuracy, and the Soviet Union is only now employing MIRV technology which we were putting into our missiles more than five years ago.

In his valedictory General Keegan was probably wise in stressing civil defense since the Russians are behind in all three elements of the offensive strategic force triad. Their superiority over the U.S. in civil defense would not come as a surprise to most civilians in this country, since this has been treated with scorn here since the early 1960's. But what is the significance? They do have extensive civil defense manuals, marked shelter areas, and probably

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13 FEB 1977
BALTIMORE SUN

'We're outnumbered, outproduced'

By GEORGE J. KEEGAN

On January 1, 1977, I retired from active service after more than four years as the chief of Air Force intelligence. During that period I was privileged to share with my colleagues in the United States intelligence community access to a great deal of information bearing on the security of the free world. Although I had had many years of experience with the intelligence community I was not prepared for what I found upon assumption of my duties.

Despite the great professional competence and dedication of the many analysts and experts who work in the national intelligence community, I found many serious deficiencies in the quality of the intelligence judgments being provided to the nation's policymakers and senior leaders. Specifically, the deficiencies related to estimates of Soviet objectives, goals, force capabilities, weapons development and projections of future Soviet fighting power.

Ever present, of course, were the difficulties inherent in trying to correlate Soviet intentions and capabilities. Immediately following my retirement I was asked to summarize some of my views about the Soviet Union and to outline my concerns about evolving Soviet military capabilities. Despite the great care which I took in outlining my thoughts, the sense of some of my remarks was lost in the necessary editorial and condensing process which often follows interviews with the press. In view of the sound, fury and interest which has ensued, it would be useful to clarify some of my thoughts.

It may come as a surprise to many that the U. S. Government has for a number of years, and with great persistence, underestimated almost every facet of the Soviet threat. Those of us who have served in military intelligence during the past 25 years have been keenly aware of the proclivity among some of our intelligence mentors, especially those serving in high places, for consistently failing to anticipate Soviet scientific, technological and military growth. On rare occasions there has been overestimation of Soviet capabilities. These instances have usually been followed by a great deal of ballyhoo and mythology—in which the reasons for honest error in a very uncertain business have sometimes tended to be ignored.

Some time ago Dr. Albert Wohlstetter, in his now classic study "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race," performed a valuable service by conducting a post-mortem analysis regarding the accuracy of earlier predictions. Using the Secretary of Defense's annual posture statements to the Congress, Dr. Wohlstetter was able to follow in great detail each annual prediction of Soviet force development and capability as presented to the Congress from agreed national intelligence.

He found that for the decade starting in the early 1960s the intelligence community had consistently and in every major case underestimated, usually by a wide margin, the development and deployment of Soviet strategic forces. Furthermore, he found that in a significant number of cases the strategic forces deployed by the Russians exceeded even the high side of many of the intelligence threat estimates. This came as no surprise to those of us who for many years have provided raw data for strategic estimates, only to find the bulk of our contributions ignored, neglected or downgraded.

One classic case of underestimation had to do with forecasts of Soviet defense expenditures. For years a few of us within the military intelligence community had taken issue with what we believed to be grossly understated forecasts of Soviet defense spending. While the economic forecasting process is a subjective one at best, it seemed to some of us that the large array of weapons being developed and deployed were not being adequately accounted for. Finally, through a number of foreign sources, and with a great deal of analysis, it was possible to confirm that Soviet defense expenditures were probably twice what had been estimated.

Recently, there has been considerable press treatment of the differing views between the so-called B and A teams involved in the preparation of the latest estimate of Soviet future capabilities and trends. An outside team of scholars, headed by Richard Pipes of Harvard, found itself differing substantially from the views of the intelligence community's A team. The B team apparently found a significant failure on the part of the national intelligence community to properly consider the record of Soviet history, finding the U.S.S.R.'s well-advertised ideological conflict goals a more proper context in which

to assess and interpret Soviet investment in military capability.

The debate is not a new one. It has been going on since at least the early 1950's when some of us in the Air Force intelligence community were shocked by the persistent naivete and lack of genuine historical scholarship on the question of Soviet objectives and goals.

One reason for persistent underestimating relates to the sciences. Over the years, accepted practice has been to rely on the advice of competent American scientists in judging Soviet science. Traditionally, these scientists, many of whom have traveled extensively in the Soviet Union, have looked upon the U.S.S.R. as a stone-age scientific culture, theoretically competent, but technically inept, non-inventive and mismanaged.

By and large, our scientists erred seriously in their advice about Soviet capabilities to develop the atomic bomb, heavy jet bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, high yield thermonuclear weapons and sophisticated naval weapons systems. Since the late 1940's and 1950's, for similar reasons, the scientific community has failed to anticipate virtually every other major Soviet scientific advance in military weaponry.

In the few cases in which to my knowledge correct predictions have been made, they usually occurred only after an extraordinary amount of evidence had been considered and then usually only on the eve of the appearance of a new Soviet weapon technology.

Next is the problem of the "mirror image." We tend to see the Soviet Union and its capabilities only in light of our own knowledge of military developments and our own scientific capability. This has precluded anticipation of many Soviet scientific achievements, some of which were more advanced than our own. And it has tended to obscure our understanding of Soviet war strategies and doctrines which differ profoundly from our own.

Americans tend to dream a great deal about a better future. The leaders of our intelligence community have been no different. Since the days of Allan Dulles our top intelligence echelons have tended to be influenced by groups who believe that the road to peace is through restraint and disarmament. For many, the projection of the least threat has become an article of necessary faith and the key to inducing rationality in superpower relationships. For these ideological hopefuls, least projections of the threat became quite important, especially for keeping a lid on de-

Least case projections have become a vehicle for demonstrating restraint to the Soviet Union—hoping through such re-

Mal. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr. (USAF) is the former chief of Air Force intelligence and executive vice president of the United States Strategic Institute.

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 11 FEBRUARY 1977

Brezhnev termed detente a ruse, 1973 report said

By William Beecher
 Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A suppressed report from British intelligence in early 1973 quoted Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as privately declaring that detente was a ruse designed to lead to a decisive shift in the balance of power.

The report was denigrated and dismissed by Henry Kissinger, according to well-placed sources. But the first reference to it was included in the latest National Intelligence Estimate in 1976, sources said.

The sources, who have seen the report, say it was represented by the British as dynamite, comparable in importance with the text of the 1956 speech by Nikita Khrushchev detailing the sins of Stalin.

It quoted Brezhnev as telling a secret meeting of East European Communist party leaders in Prague that detente was a stratagem to allow the Soviets to build up their military and economic power so that by 1985, "a decisive shift in the corollation of forces" would enable the Russians to "exert our will wherever we need to."

The report came during the height of euphoria in the United States about the promise of detente, a policy of which Kissinger was the principal architect and exponent.

The report was as welcome as a dose of chicken-pox as far as Henry was concerned, the source recalls. "I suspect that had it been more congenial to what he was trying to accomplish, it would have gotten wider attention and credence."

The British said they obtained the account from a man who attended the lengthy Prague meeting called by Brezhnev to assuage fears that he was ready to sacrifice East European interests at the altar of detente.

British intelligence was so sensitive about the source that one copy was hand-carried to Washington for the director of Central Intelligence. He, in turn, sent copies to only six officials: the president, his national se-

curity adviser, the secretaries of State and Defense, and the intelligence chiefs of the State Department and the Pentagon.

The document, classified top secret, carried the unusual admonition not to duplicate it or discuss it with any but the addressees.

That admonition notwithstanding, sources say, the matter was discussed among a tight circle of high officials. Kissinger and others reportedly suggested that since the account came from an untried source and couldn't be corroborated, it should be regarded as untrustworthy and dismissed.

Others said that even if genuine, the report represented the kind of thing Brezhnev might be expected to say to calm nervous Communist-bloc leaders, without reflecting his true thinking or plans.

An attempt to reach Kissinger for comment this week, before he left on a Mexican holiday, was unsuccessful.

The British report was based on the recollections of one man at the Prague meeting. There is no way of knowing whether specific quotes attributed to Brezhnev were entirely accurate.

According to three senior officials who read it, this was the gist of the report:

Brezhnev said he was aware of the concern of the East European leaders that detente initiatives seemed to be moving so fast that their interests might be sacrificed.

But he insisted that his pursuit of detente was designed to serve their common interests, not to compromise them. "We are achieving with detente what our predecessors have been unable to achieve using the mailed fist," he reportedly said.

He then went through an appraisal of trends in various western countries, reportedly saying that Finland was in the Soviet pocket, Norway was still troublesome, but trends were moving in the right direction. Denmark, he said, was no longer a viable element of western strength.

In the United Kingdom, Brezhnev continued, the USSR's fondest expectations were being exceeded because of the efforts of its "fellow socialist brethren." French foreign policy, he said, was Marxist. Trends in Italy, he remarked, were favorable.

But he reportedly said it was in West Germany that "our greatest achievements are being realized." He said "our great and true friend, fellow socialist Willy Brandt, has brought about a miracle" by making it possible permanently to consolidate contested borders and by pushing through his Ostpolitik.

"We have been able to accomplish more in a short time with detente than was done for years pursuing a confrontation policy with NATO," he said.

He noted that while negotiations proceeded on SALT and on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, the United States was unlikely to build up militarily in reaction to the Soviet buildup. He reportedly concluded:

"Trust us comrades, for by 1985, as a consequence of what we are now achieving with detente, we will have achieved most of our objectives in Western Europe. We will have consolidated our position. We will have improved our economy. And a decisive shift in the corollation of forces will be such that, come 1985, we will be able to exert our will wherever we need to."

Even in retrospect, senior analysts say they cannot be sure how faithful was the account of the Brezhnev speech. But they say the words are consistent with subsequent public statements by Brezhnev and with certain Soviet actions.

So in the National Intelligence Estimate for 1976, drawn up late last year after a major debate between CIA analysts and a team of outside specialists headed by Harvard Professor Richard Pipes, for the first time reference was made to the Prague meeting and the reported Brezhnev statements there, well-placed sources say.

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NEW YORK TIMES
7 FEBRUARY 1977

Letters

Of Moscow's Arms Buildup and a U.S. Analysis

To the Editor:

In joining the debate on national intelligence estimates, The Times has substituted personal attacks and doctrinal assertions for responsible discussion of the issues. In your Jan. 19 editorial "Handicapping the Arms Race" you:

- Cast aspersions upon the objectivity and motives of a group of individuals who were officially requested to undertake a special intelligence analysis.


- Summarily discount the conclusions of the Team B report despite the fact that the analysis remains highly classified, and so far as I know, unavailable to The New York Times.

- Insinuate that the panel members themselves leaked the analysis to the press, in order to use the prestige of the "once proudly independent" C.I.A. in a partisan debate about U.S. strategic spending.

- Blandly dismiss the Soviet strategic buildup as merely "running hard to overtake an American 'lead' in strategic nuclear weapons," even though it has far exceeded in quantity and quality anything foreseen in the theories about Soviet acceptance of inferiority (and later parity) that have been dominant in the U.S.

The motivation behind the establishment of the Team B intelligence analysis was not, as one might infer from

the editorial, an ignoble effort to pressure or distort official intelligence estimates. The intention, as stated by C.I.A. Director George Bush, was to see whether a group of experts—who were skeptical of existing explanations for the magnitude of the Soviet build-



Elizabeth Van Halbe

up—could come up with an alternative explanation for evident Soviet programs. There is reason to believe that the C.I.A. director concluded that the experiment was a success and also that it was undermined by the publicity which has depicted the effort as merely a partisan struggle.

As to the substance of the panel's conclusions, The Times, which has not been exposed to them, is confident that they are unwarranted. There are on the record the predictions and the reality of the extent of Soviet long-range offensive force increases. It is clear that there was an intelligence failure of massive extent. More re-

cently, evidence has come to light on Soviet civil defense efforts. There are some genuine puzzles concerning Soviet motivation in engaging in these massive programs that need investigating.

The Times, however, contributes nothing to this important subject in impugning the motives behind a study of Soviet purpose which reaches "somber" conclusions. Even more unwarranted is your confident assertion that the Pipes panel "wants a big new effort on strategic weapons." It by no means follows that the appropriate American response to large and continuing Soviet programs is for us to match them with similar American programs. This, in my view, would not be an intelligent response, and I understand that the members of the B Team were by no means of one view on this issue and did not address it in their report.

In short, The Times, unable or unwilling to deal with the substantive issues, adopted a doctrinaire stance that anyone who is invited to examine and question the Establishment's view on Soviet purposes is "trying to capture the Government's fact-finding machinery" if he comes up with the wrong conclusion.

HENRY S. ROWEN
Stanford University
Stanford, Calif., Jan. 27, 1977

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NEW YORK TIMES

6 February 1977

Strategic Superiority

Eugene M. Altschul

By Richard Pipes

CAMBRIDGE — Having recently chaired, at the initiative of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, under Gerald R. Ford, the so-called "Team B" whose task was to re-evaluate the data on Soviet strategic objectives, I have become painfully aware of the emotion and confusion that surrounds this subject.

As soon as the story of "Team B" was leaked to the press, in the usual garbled fashion, a campaign got under way to discredit the effort, partly on the ground that the panel consisted of "well-known hard-liners" and/or "right-wingers" who merely found what they had set themselves out to find (that the Soviet Union is out to obtain strategic superiority), and partly that such superiority made no sense in any event.

The *ad hominem* argument can be quickly dismissed: It belongs to the nursery, not the world of adults. By questioning motives, one seeks to avoid responsibility for dealing with the issues, but one does not thereby dispose of them. Suppose that a panel composed of civil-rights activists were charged with investigating the status of minorities. Would one deny the existence of civil-rights violations on the ground that the panel reporting them found what it wanted to find?

More subtle and more pernicious is the argument, backed by the prestige of Henry A. Kissinger, that nuclear superiority is meaningless. This view was essential to Mr. Kissinger's détente policy, but it rests on flawed thinking. Underpinning it is the widely held notion that since there exists a certain quantitative level in the accumulation of nuclear weapons that, once attained, is sufficient to destroy mankind, superiority is irrelevant: There is no over-trumping total destruction.

Unfortunately, in nuclear competition, numbers are not all. The contest between the superpowers is increasingly turning into a qualitative race whose outcome most certainly can yield meaningful superiority. This might entail the following considerations, among others: improving the accuracy of one's missiles to the point where they can preventively destroy all, or virtually all, of the opponent's fixed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as strategic bombers not on alert; hardening one's command posts so effectively as to make them invulnerable to an enemy attack; organizing large-scale civil-defense programs able to save essential political and industrial cadres.

Dealing with these matters, one often runs into confusion between "intentions" and "capabilities." Intention, of course, denotes what one desires; capability, what one is able to achieve with the forces at one's disposal. The distinction might appear elementary. Yet in the public discussions over the strategic situation stimulated by disclosures of "Team B's" report, these two factors have been persistently confused.

Reports that the Russians were striving for strategic superiority were usually interpreted to mean that they have already attained it; refutations of the latter proposition have been greeted with relief and used to discredit the former.

Recently, for example, Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed Senator William Proxmire that the Soviet Union does not enjoy strategic superiority over the United States but that the "available evidence suggests the U.S.S.R. is engaged in a program to achieve" such superiority.

This information, the newspapers report, gratified Senator Proxmire and moved him to congratulate General Brown for not having engaged in "scare tactics." Why Mr. Proxmire should be cheered by information that the Soviet Union is striving for strategic superiority over the United States baffles me. Or does he perhaps think

Unless we are so blinded by arrogance as simply to preclude *a priori* the possibility of ever forfeiting the ability effectively to defend ourselves, the very striving of the Soviet Union for strategic superiority, of which General Brown speaks, should give us cause for concern.

Strategic superiority, one must bear in mind, has many uses besides its application in nuclear war: It can be used to shield a conventional war, to extract political or economic concessions, to intimidate, to compel acquiescence.

The capability of the Soviet Union to attain such superiority, its implications if and when realized, the measures to be taken with a view to preventing it — all call for a reasoned, informed national debate. In such a debate, "right-wingers" and "left-wingers," "hard-liners" and "appeasers" should freely question each other's judgment, but not motives, mindful of Thomas Jefferson's admonition that differences of opinion are not differences of principle.

Richard Pipes is professor of Russian history at Harvard.

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6 February 1977

NEW YORK TIMES

Assessing Soviet Strength Is a Team Task

By JOHN W. FINNEY

WASHINGTON—Probably the most important document to be placed before President Carter in his first days in office was a thick report captioned NIE 11/8, the latest National Intelligence Estimate of the strategic capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union.

Over the years, NIE 11/8 (it is called that by the intelligence agencies) has become the single most significant piece of intelligence analysis, for upon its general conclusions are based the defense budget the President presents to Congress.

This year, even before it reached the President's desk, the estimate was caught up in an unusual public controversy: The estimate, or at least one version of it, reportedly reaches the conclusion that the Soviet Union is striving to achieve strategic superiority over the United States. That would put Russia potentially in the position of waging and winning a nuclear war.

In the past, the United States premise has been that the Russians' fundamental desire was to reach nuclear parity. That stance does not threaten the long-held American strategic concept of mutual deterrence. But the latest would. Already, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are pushing for new strategic weapons programs and perhaps a civil defense effort to maintain what they consider new parity that they say will deter the Soviet Union from starting a nuclear war.

Ultimately, Soviet intentions is a political judgment that only President Carter can make as on one hand he tries to reassess the defense budget and on the other hand prepares for negotiations with the Soviet Union on a new strategic arms agreement. The latest national intelligence estimate may or may not help him reach that judgment. But the method by which the estimate was reached raises basic questions about the integrity and objectivity of an intelligence process upon which Presidents must rely in reaching such momentous national security policy decisions.

How was the latest NIE 11/8 put together? The analysis was the product of an unusual adversarial proceeding. At the initiative of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, two teams were set up during the Nixon years to analyze the latest raw intelligence data about Soviet strategic programs. Team A was composed of the analysts within the intelligence agencies who normally would have drafted the estimate. Team B, headed by Richard E. Pipes, a professor of Russian History at Harvard, was deliberately composed of acknowledged hardliners on the Soviet Union.

There are some indications that Team B became a runaway study group, exceeding its mandate and leaking its conclusions in much the same manner as the Gaither Committee troubled President Eisenhower by leaking its dire and ultimately unfounded warnings about the Soviet strategic threat in 1958. Whatever the intrigue in publicizing the results, it is apparent that Team B, whether by force of logic or institutional power derived from the advisory board, has been able to persuade the Government analysts to take a more somber view of Soviet strategic intentions.

Now an adversary proceeding may be the best way for lawyers to establish facts for a jury, but it is not necessarily the best way to reach an objective judgment about Soviet strategic programs. For one thing, the adversarial process carries with it a potential for political pressure and bias. It was specifically to provide for objective impartial analysis that Gen. William Bedden Smith, the guiding architect of the Central Intelligence Agency in its formative years, set up an independent office of analysis within that agency

composed of government officials, academics, and "prominent" citizens, was created to provide the estimates that summarized and analyzed data the agency gathered. Supporting it was an "office of national estimates," manned in large measure by what the office considered some of the brightest products of the country's graduate schools.

The concept was that the board, responsible directly to the director of Central Intelligence, would be insulated from the kind of political pressures and institutional biases, such as those displayed by, say, the Defense Department. The office of national estimates would draft the preliminary estimates, the Pentagon would provide its dissenting footnotes and then in a collegial atmosphere the board would hammer out the accepted estimates to be presented to the President.

The board was never completely insulated from outside pressures. In 1969, for example, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, who was then trying to sell a missile defense system to Congress, succeeded in expunging from the

national estimate a key paragraph stating that the Soviet Union did not have multiple warheads for its presumably ominous SS-9 intercontinental missiles. The board also had internal problems. In the period of Vietnam disenchantment, recruiting graduate students became difficult.

In 1973, the independent analysis organization was disbanded by William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, who perhaps significantly had come up through the operations rather than analysis side of the intelligence agency. Instead, a team of national intelligence officers was established, each responsible for a particular region of the world. Because they did not have their own supporting staff, the burden of drafting the preliminary estimates on Soviet strength was shifted to the Defense Department, and in the Washington bureaucracy the man who holds the pencil in large measure dictates the final result.

Even so, the military and its academic supporters continued to complain that there was an arms control bias among the intelligence agency's analysts. In fact, history gives these complaints some support. In retrospect the national intelligence estimates, which rested on the predicate that the Soviet Union was seeking only nuclear parity, understated the growth in Soviet strategic programs.

The way was thus opened for the adversary proceedings on which the hardliners have apparently capitalized. It was eased by another important change in the intelligence gathering business. With the advent of reconnaissance satellites, there no longer was much dispute—as there was during the 1960 "missile gap"—over actual military developments within the Soviet Union. Because everyone was starting from the same base of facts about the present, the dispute turned into arguments about future intentions. One byproduct has been a curious turnabout on the part of the military. In the past, the response to critics who contended that the Soviet Union was not planning to use its military might against the United States was that the military had to plan on the basis of Soviet capabilities rather than intentions. Because intentions are by their very nature difficult to define, the shift in emphasis opened the door to all kinds of "worst case" analyses of what the Soviet might be up to ten years from now.

John W. Finney is an editor in the Washington bureau of The New York Times.

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6 FEB 1977

WASHINGTON POST

Warnke Confirmation Seen Virtually Certain Despite Critics

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Staff Writer

Some White House officials are describing the nomination of Paul Warnke to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as a crucial test of the new administration's nerve and muscle, a rite of passage.

If Warnke is rejected by the Senate, they say, the Carter administration will be irreparably weakened in its dealings with Congress, having lost a second nomination battle after the forced withdrawal of President Carter's choice to head the Central Intelligence Agency, Theodore C. Sorensen.

One of the reasons the White House is happy to attach such touches of drama to the nomination is that in the absence of any surprise developments Warnke seems certain to be confirmed.

His confirmation, the White House hopes, will rub away the lingering pain from the Sorensen defeat.

Senate Majority Leader Robert C.

Byrd (D-W.Va.) said yesterday that although "there are some problems" in the Senate, "as of today, the nomination would be confirmed." Other Senate veterans predicted Warnke would win approval by a comfortable majority.

Eager for that success and at the urging of Warnke supporters in Congress, the White House jumped Warnke's name ahead of dozens of others awaiting White House clearance.

The nomination was sent to the Senate Friday, and the Foreign Relations Committee, which had no other business on tap for its regular meeting this week, immediately scheduled Warnke's confirmation hearing for Tuesday.

Warnke is expected to win near-unanimous approval from the committee. Whatever troubles his nomination faces will come either if the Armed Services Committee follows through on the desire of some members to invite Warnke to testify or when the nomination reaches the Senate floor.

If senators like Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) choose to mount a major challenge to Warnke, then the nomination will provide the first major debate in this administration on U.S. strategic policy.

"Maybe this is a good time to go ahead and have a national debate on this issue," a Warnke supporter said last week. "After the reports of hawks vs. doves, leaked CIA reports, the formation of a Committee on the Present Danger and statements by retired Air Force generals," he said, "a nice, big, fat airing of the whole thing might be a good idea."

The Committee on the Present Danger was formed last year by a number of experienced national security affairs hands to warn that the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in military strength.

Leaks about a panel of outside experts called Team B which criticized the CIA estimates of Soviet military strength and intentions and warnings from retired Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, former head of Air Force intelligence, have also fueled the debate over strategic arms.

Warnke's critics believe that he is too ready to cancel U.S. weapons systems and that he would allow the strategic balance to tip too far in Moscow's favor.

"This is a good time to debate the issues," a Senate foe of Warnke's views said last week. "The basic problem," he added "is that it seems from his writings that the strategic balance doesn't matter very much."

Warnke has written: "To conclude that we must overcome every Soviet lead despite its lack of military meaning is to accept the rule of illogic."

Several senators have expressed concern about his views, but even Jackson has remained neutral, saying he wants to hear Warnke before deciding how he will vote.

Unlike Sorensen, Warnke is well-liked on Capitol Hill—even by people who disagree with him. He is a law partner of former Defense Secretary

Clark Clifford, and is a former assistant secretary of defense.

Also unlike Sorensen, Warnke will have the full support of President Carter.

The President has called him "the best man in the country for the job" and described the nomination as "crucial" to his administration.

WASHINGTON POST

5 Feb 77

How Do We Know Who's Ahead?

IT'S USEFUL that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have publicly disparaged Air Force Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr.'s claim, made as he retired, that the Soviet Union has achieved military superiority over the United States. This doesn't prove absolutely that Gen. Keegan was wrong. But his erstwhile peers are surely familiar with his information; and, as professional military men, they presumably share his feeling that the U.S. military must, if it is to be responsible, anticipate such stark contingencies. So if he is unable to persuade them of the perils he professes to see, the rest of us are entitled to breathe a bit more easily.

But, of course, that is saying very little. A close reading of the Joint Chiefs' views, presented by Chairman George S. Brown in response to a query from Sen. William Proxmire, reveals that the Chiefs are not providing any basis—beyond their own flat assertions—to ease a bewildered citizen's anxieties. As it happens, the Chiefs do not accept Gen. Keegan's proposition that the Russians are here—that is, ahead. They believe the Russians are coming—that is, trying to achieve superiority. But no more than he do they provide the materials on which their judgment is based.

In fact, there is an element of unreality threaded through almost all discussions of the Soviet-American strategic equation. Only the smaller part of it arises

from the simple fact that some of the relevant information is secret. By far the larger part arises from the more complicated fact that there is no agreed measuring rod among professionals (as we learned from the recent Team A/Team B controversy). Some analysts count missile warheads; others count missile throw-weight. Some analysts stress hardware and technology in hand; others stress what's in the pipeline. Some analysts subtract from Soviet power those of its military forces trained on China and East Europe. Others lump everything the Russians have in the total available to hit the United States. Factors of each nation's putative will and its capacity to inflict or suffer attack are weighed in very different ways. So the argument goes.

It should be obvious from the debates of the past few months, not to speak of the past few decades, that in the absence of a minimal and explicit consensus on standards, either confusion will reign or arbitrary judgments will be made. The Carter administration, if it is to satisfy the public's legitimate concerns to be secure and to be consulted about its own security, must try to recast the framework of decision-making and discussion. It must expose not only its conclusions but its premises. It must provide more facts about defense, and more insight into the methods by which it fits facts into strategic judgments.

WASHINGTON REPORT**TO ARMS! TO ARMS!**

The plans for the Carter Inaugural provided the most widespread popular entertainment and cultural manifestations within memory—and provided most of them free or at nominal cost, in sharp contrast to the traditional top ticket at \$1,000 a head and not very far down from that for the cheapies. One entertainment not listed in the Concourse of Events and at least as expertly choreographed, rehearsed and conducted as the best of those that were, was the Soldiers' Chorus lifted in the last days of the Ford administration warning the Carter administration and the country at large that The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming and the only way to stop them is to inundate the military-industrial-flackery complex with money from the U.S. Treasury, the more securities the more security, the sooner the better, not a moment to lose, damn the cost overruns, full speed ahead, and curst be he who first cries, Hold, enough.

The overture was sounded in letters to *The Times*, swelled to a brilliant opening number, everybody on stage, in an Op-Ed Solemn Warning about the Soviets signed by everyone the military-industrial flacks could dredge up, including such an honorable former naval person as Elmo Zumwalt and several less so. After the opener, individual divertissements began the build-up all over again, in traditional, George Abbott-Leonard

Bernstein style. Retiring officials appeared before congressional committees, others made addresses to citizens' groups. The interregnum President did his own number with variations in a masterpiece of timing just when, for a change, everyone in the country wanted to think well of him.


All of this gave way to the big set piece of the show: the CIA report on the Great Soviet Arms Build-Up of the last decade or so. Here it was at last, the voice of ultimate authority, the Charlton Heston of government. If the burglars, liars and letter-openers of the CIA said it was so, how could anyone doubt? If there are citizens who honestly think, on the record, that the CIA has done more, much more, to "erode the cause of freedom" in America than the Soviets have dreamt possible, such observers simply don't understand the true nature of American freedom: our freedom lies, not in citizens' freedom from having the CIA climbing in their windows and rifling their letter-boxes, but rather in their freedom to have CIA reassurances that those things don't really matter compared to the Agency's ability to cope with the dread Soviet menace, as it did so brilliantly at the Bay of Pigs, in Indochina and elsewhere.

So there it all was, out on the stage. The remainder was, appropriately, diminuendo, with a coda consisting of the new/old Carter Secretary of Defense reiterating

continued

BACK TO THE COLD WAR

PRESS



There is only one crucial question facing the modern world, and I guess we all know what it is. It's odd to go back and read *The Guns of August* and think of the time and effort the Great Powers of Europe put into finding ways to speed up mobilization. A day or two might make all the difference then, when my father was a young man. Now he's an old man and it's hard to imagine a major war in which mobilization would matter at all. It wouldn't take long to fire off all the rockets, and after that little would be left but the odd plane or two over the Arctic, on its way to deliver a final, vindictive bomb.

No one would win such a war. No one in his right mind could want such a war, and yet such a war could easily happen. Some people even think it will certainly happen. Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., who retired as chief of Air Force intelligence the first week in January, thinks the Russians expect such a war, are planning for such a war, and may even think they could win such a war. If General Keegan is right we are obviously in bad trouble, but how are we to determine if he is right?

Occasionally a news story comes along which reporters can only grope about in like men in a darkened room, and this is one of those stories. It involves the most fundamental issues of war and peace and it is the subject of the fiercest sort of controversy, but most of the evidence on both sides is secret, the participants are mostly keeping mum, and journalists must feel about for truth with little more than instinct to guide them.

The question of Soviet intentions, of course, is an old one. It is hard to know if the American conflict with Russia is more like Britain's with France in 1816, or Rome's with Carthage. God knows there has been no want of Catos. I once asked a friend and colleague of Allen Dulles in Bern during World War II when it was that Dulles began to shift his concern from Germany to Russia. "Stalingrad," she said.

When the CIA was established in 1947 its major target was Russia, and since the early 1950s its most important piece of paper every year—the document which absorbed the most time and money and aroused the bitterest dissension—has been the "Annual Survey of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities." The first few "Surveys" were about 25 pages long. By the mid-'50s they were up to 100 pages and now they're as much as 400 pages divided into several volumes filled with charts and graphs, facts and figures touching on just about

every facet of Soviet military might and strategic purpose.

The early "Surveys" were short partly because the CIA did not have much information to go on. Most of it came from agents in Europe run by the CIA itself, the British SIS and the German intelligence agency run by Reinhard Gehlen, who had been in charge of German military intelligence on the Eastern Front during the war. There was a good deal of uncertainty about Russian military matters because agents found it hard to operate in the "denied areas" of Eastern Europe and Russia, with their huge and efficient security services.

Now that has all changed. The introduction of U-2 flights in 1956 and of spy satellites somewhat later, in addition to the enormous volume of electronic intelligence—radio traffic, radar signals and the like—collected by the National Security Agency, has allowed the CIA to establish with great accuracy just what the Russians have by way of planes and tanks, submarine pens and hardened missile sites.

That leaves the question of Soviet intentions. As intelligence officers never tire of pointing out, you can't photograph a "forward plan" from the sky. With the exception of Oleg Penkovskiy for a year or so ending in the fall of 1962, the CIA has never had a high-level spy in the Kremlin, which means that Soviet intentions have always been very largely a matter of conjecture. Since we simply don't know what Soviet leaders are saying in the Politburo, we must deduce it from what we do know. This leaves plenty of room for argument, to say the least.

"After the Czech coup in 1948," an early member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates (BNE) told me last spring, "it wasn't a matter of whether they were going to attack, it was just when. Would it come in 1950 or 1951? Or would they wait until 1955?"

"For years the military would come in with these inflated estimates of Soviet military capabilities and intentions. They were all aimed at the budget. The Air Force would argue they've got the capability of building such-and-such a number of bombers, so they're going to build them, so three or four years from now they will have 800 bombers."

Since the United States had both nuclear weapons and air bases well within reach of Russia the military had to posit some credible Russian threat to the mainland U.S. Otherwise a war would be brutally one-sided and a poor bet from the Russian point of view, with the implication the Russians would hardly be planning such a war. The American military's solution to this dilemma was ingenious: one-way bombing. Russian bombers could not reach U.S. targets and return, but they could make one-way suicide runs. For years one-way bombing was the sole, even faintly plausible Russian threat to the U.S. the military could come up with.

"The imagination that has gone into the Russians," "They never built up

WASHINGTON POST

3 FEBRUARY 1977

Around the World

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-19

Soviets Widen Case Against U.S. Correspondent

MOSCOW — The Soviet weekly Literary Gazette renewed allegations of espionage against American correspondents yesterday and suggested that one of them, George Krinsky of the Associated Press, could be expelled.

The writers' union weekly also accused Krinsky of giving a Soviet citizen hard-currency certificates used by foreigners and their employees in special shops.

Associated Press, noting that Krinsky has covered the Soviet human-rights movement, said that Krinsky gave the currency to his maid and declared that he would not be withdrawn "on the basis of such flimsy charges."

Literary Gazette referred to its accusations last May that Krinsky, Christopher Wren of the New York Times, and Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek were spies for the CIA and added that while Wren was still in Moscow, Friendly "preferred to depart." In fact, he left at the end of his assignment.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

Correction

Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who retired Jan. 1 as head of Air Force intelligence, was not a member of "Team B," which prepared an independent assessment of the Soviet military threat for the Central Intelligence Agency. Keegan briefed Team B, according to Paul H. Nitze, a member of that panel, but was not a member of the group as stated in a Washington Post article of Monday, Jan. 31.

Warnke to Head Arms Control Agency

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Staff Writer

Paul C. Warnke, an outspoken advocate of limiting the arms race, will be named director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also the top U.S. negotiator on U.S.-Soviet arms limitation, according to reliable sources.

The choice of Warnke rounds out a top-level Carter administration team that rejects the "worst case" arguments of Soviet military superiority and will fight for arms reductions.

The point man will be Warnke, but Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and President Carter have all called for new strategic arms agreements with Moscow.

Warnke has criticized the U.S.-Soviet agreements made by the Nixon and Ford administrations as too permissive, allowing levels of armament and development of new weapons systems that permit continued mutual defense spending increases.

In the spring, 1975, issue of Foreign

Policy magazine, Warnke suggested trying "a policy of restraint, while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union."

The United States, he wrote, could begin by telling Moscow privately and publicly that it was placing a hold on development of certain weapons systems that would be reviewed in six months in the light of what actions the Soviets had taken.

If the Soviets responded by some significant pause in their weapons development, the United States could announce further initiatives, Warnke wrote.

A compulsion to proclaim "we're No. 1" militarily is incompatible with effective arms control agreements, Warnke wrote. "To conclude that we must overcome every Soviet lead despite its lack of military meaning is to accept the rule of illogic."

These views will place Warnke in the front line of those who defend the current U.S. military posture against critics who charge that the Soviet Union

has achieved military superiority that imperils the United States.

A group of outside experts engaged by the Central Intelligence Agency attacked the national intelligence estimates of Soviet strength last year in a report that has touched off furious debate in Congress as well as in the executive branch.

Arms control advocates are eager to see the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency once again play a leading role in pushing for arms limitations. Many think their cause was weakened in recent years because outgoing director Fred C. Ikle was less enthusiastic about cutbacks than Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Kissinger, in turn, found it difficult to operate in the field as the administration's strongest top-level advocate of arms reductions, particularly after the Republican primaries last spring brought President Ford under attack from challenger Ronald Reagan, an advocate of greater defense spending.

Warnke was a candidate to be Carter's Defense Secretary, a job he wanted, and when first approached about the arms control job reportedly was not eager to accept. It could not be learned yesterday what persuaded him to take the post.

Vance told a press conference yesterday that the announcement of a director for the agency would be made by the White House yesterday. However, routine checks on Warnke had not been completed and the formal announcement is expected within a few days, sources said. Apparently, someone in the White House mistakenly told Vance the announcement would be made yesterday.

Warnke, whose 57th birthday was yesterday, has a credential widely shared in the Carter administration—he was a member of the Trilateral Commission. At least 14 other members of this David Rockefeller-supported, Zbigniew Brzezinski-organized group that examined U.S.-European-Japanese relationships in the world have joined the Carter administration.



Washington REPORT

WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 1977

WR 77-2

ASC Press Seminar Focuses National Defense Debate

In recent months, an intense debate has been developing within the United States concerning the military balance and Soviet motives. More and more articles have been appearing that have concluded that the Soviets have either already overtaken the United States in overall strategic nuclear forces or are about to do so.

For example, former SALT negotiator Paul Nitze stated in the winter 1976-77 issue of *Foreign Policy* that, "Today, after a strategic nuclear counterforce exchange under normal U.S. alert conditions, the Soviet Union would hold superiority in all indices of capability except number of warheads, and even that sole remaining U.S. advantage would be gone within two or three years."

And, at the beginning of January, General George Keegan, the just-retired head of Air Force Intelligence, stated in a *New York Times* interview that, "By every criterion used to measure strategic balance — that is, damage expectancy, throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage, or technology — I am unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States."

In addition, newspaper reports had indicated that the latest National Intelligence Estimate prepared annually by the Central Intelligence Agency had concluded that the Soviet Union was striving for military superiority. It was also revealed that a new two-team approach had been used and the "B Team" consisted of "outside" analysts. According to some press reports, the "B Team" was composed of "hawks" who "forced" the regular analysts (the "A Team") to take a more



Dr. Van Cleave and ASC President John Fisher listen as Gen. Graham discusses 'B Team' study at ASC seminar for newsmen.

pessimistic view. Several commentators used the term "worst case analysis" in describing the B Team report.

On January 21, the American Security Council sponsored a seminar for newsmen at the Army-Navy Club in Washington. The subject of the seminar was the military balance, and we invited key members of the B Team to speak and take part in a panel discussion.

More than 80 newsmen attended the seminar and luncheon following as guests of the American Security Council. A number of stories based on this seminar appeared in major newspapers such as the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Washington Star*. Both the Associated Press and United Press International carried wire service stories resulting from this seminar. A few of these stories are reproduced in this newsletter.

Analysis of Developments Affecting The Nation's Security

PARTICIPATING NEWSMEN

Among the nationally-known newsmen who participated in the seminar were:

David Binder and John Finney of *The New York Times*; William Beecher of the *Boston Globe*; George Wilson of *The Washington Post*; Henry Bradsher and Vernon Guidry of *The Washington Star*; Robert Kaylor, Daniel Gilmore and John Milne of United Press International; Fred Hoffman and Bill Kreh of the Associated Press; Orr Kelly and Joseph Fromm of *U.S. News & World Report*; Jerry Hannafin and Bruce Nelan of *Time*; Jim Coates of the *Chicago Tribune*; Ken Bacon of *The Wall Street Journal*; Eugene Methvin and Charles J. V. Murphy of *Reader's Digest*; Robert Hotz, editor-in-chief of *Aviation Week & Space Technology*; Allan Ryskind of *Human Events*; John Frisbee, executive editor of *Air Force Magazine*; James Hessman, editor of *Sea Power*; and columnists Ray Cromley, George Will and Frank Vanderlinden as well as many others.

This was the 31st in a series of press luncheons and seminars held in Washington by the American Security Council to give experts and leaders in different fields of national security and top newsmen the opportunity to meet with each other.

Usually, the professional journalists in attendance find the comments of the featured speakers to be newsworthy enough to warrant writing articles based on these luncheons and seminars.

THE PANELISTS

The members of the B Team who made presentations and answered questions at this seminar were Dr. William R. Van Cleave and Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, (retired).

Dr. Van Cleave is Director of the Strategic and Security Studies Program at the University of Southern California and is a consultant for the Department of Defense, the C.I.A., the Energy Research and Development Agency, and the Rand Corporation. He is also a member of the Defense Science Board and was a member of the delegation to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

General Graham was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, is a graduate of West Point and has held numerous command and staff positions in the Army. He was assigned to the Office of National Estimates at C.I.A. headquarters for four years and is a recipient of the C.I.A.'s Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

The following remarks are drawn from the transcript of this seminar and panel discussion.

A Responsible Analysis

DR. VAN CLEAVE: One of the major things, indeed the principal thing, that I would like to make clear has to do

with recent news media reports such as the article in the *Washington Post* that refers to the B Team effort as a "worst case analysis."

I believe that this is an attempt to rob a good deal of the force from the conclusions of our analysis. And I would like to make clear that it was not our charter to prepare a worst case estimate, none of the members of the B Panel conceived of our purpose as preparing a worst case estimate, and I doubt that any of us feel that our analysis and its conclusions represent a worst case estimate.

Instead we did our very best to look at the available evidence and to put together responsible and supportable conclusions based upon that evidence.

The facts really do speak for themselves, and they ought to be very clear to anybody who takes the time and trouble to look at the information that is available in the unclassified as well as in the classified realm. The simple fact of the matter is that the Soviet strategic programs have continued unabated, with unarrested momentum of an unprecedented nature, and have continued this way to the extent that for the past few years each successive National Intelligence Estimate has been somewhat harsher than the preceding estimate, and the Estimate this year, I believe, even without a B Team exercise of competitive analysis would have been harsher than the one last year. The press has focused on the alleged differences between the B Team and the A Team when it could probably do better by focusing on the broader areas of agreement that I can assure you existed between the A Team and the B Team.

In other words, I think that to portray the B Team as out to make a worst case analysis, or what's even more hilarious, a group of seven outsiders bullying the entire intelligence community, CIA, and Department of State into our way of thinking, is comical and no less than that.

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Dr. William R. Van Cleave says Soviets now have superiority.

Probably the one advantage that we enjoyed which the A Team did not enjoy was that we were free from bureaucratic or institutional positions or bureaucratic horse trade.

One of our major problems is that we have not yet adequately conveyed to the public an appreciation of the determination of the Soviet Union to build superior military forces wherever possible and to judge the capabilities of those forces in terms of a war-fighting and war-winning capability. The Soviets have adopted extraordinarily ambitious strategic and other military force goals and have moved steadily to meet them, so far without much concern that the U.S. might react by stepping up its effort.

Now, certain observations really are not seriously questioned. I don't think there is a serious question about the enormity of the Soviet military buildup over the past several years — naval, ground and strategic forces. I don't think there is a serious question about the intensity, seriousness and continuity of the effort. I don't think there is a serious question that the Soviet Union is following doctrinal and strategic concepts and objectives quite different from those that have been held in the West over the past decade or decade and a half.

In my own view, and I am not using hyperbole when I say it, I see no more serious problems facing the U.S. today, whether domestic or international, than those being posed by the Soviet military buildup, unrestrained by Western concepts of stability and mutual deterrence or by any theory of limitations such as how much is enough, but rather guided by an open-ended, intense, and determined pursuit of strategic superiority to the maximum extent feasible.

We have, in my opinion, reached a crucial point. In fact I've grown increasingly concerned that we are rapidly passing the point in timing of an American response to Soviet strategic programs. If there is to be an adequate response, sufficient to prevent the greatest threat to the security of this nation in its history, that response must be made now and with determination.

Opponents Attempt to Block Impact of Study

GENERAL GRAHAM: I would like to add a bit to what Dr. Van Cleave has said about this exercise because I see an, if not deliberate, then accidental, attempt in the publicity that has come out about this Team A — Team B business,

to block the impact of a very important subject, which is: What are the Soviets up to militarily? With regard to these accusations that somehow everybody involved in the Team B effort was a worst case estimator, I'd like to point out something about my own record in the intelligence business.

Now, I was in a peculiar situation. Whereas we criticized methodologies and assumptions that had gone into previous estimates, I was, in fact, criticizing myself, because I spent over four years as a staff member in the Office of National Estimates preparing these estimates and I have had a good deal to do with the way those estimates have been worded in the past. The Team B criticism of those analytical errors were very often criticisms of my own analytical errors that I made in the past as an intelligence estimator. I did not make a reputation in the intelligence business by overstating the Soviet threat. I was one of those who worked very hard to try to get rid of CIA overestimates of the Soviet ICBM buildup in the early 60's. I didn't make my reputation in the intelligence business by being an arm waver or worst case estimator.

Another thing that should be understood about these efforts is that parallel papers were not produced. There was not an estimate of the total Soviet strategic program prepared by Team B. Team B could take the entire estimating process to find out why certain things had happened that not only Team B, but most people in the intelligence community realized had been mistakes all along.

Our Intelligence Missed Key Developments

Dr. Wohlstetter's report on our consistent underestimating of the Soviet strategic buildup was public knowledge. The fact that we have underestimated the burden of Soviet military spending by 100% was public knowledge. And the fact that we had missed a very significant civil defense buildup was public knowledge.

We were looking to see why was it that we, the old intelligence estimators, had missed those developments and had not properly reflected them in estimates upon which national policy was based. We went into the exercise with questions that were on the minds of many, inside and outside of government, as to what has happened with our assessment of the Soviets and why was it that the Soviets were consistently doing things that we were not estimating. So one shouldn't look at this, as Professor Van Cleave has pointed out, as a bunch of hawks coming in and bulldozing the poor analysts of CIA into taking a different view. They would have taken a different view in any case.

What We Need Is A National Strategy

What does all this mean? Well I'll tell you what it means to me and what it does not mean. In discussing the Soviet buildup over the past six or eight months, I've seen the argument turn around to the B-1, the Trident, the new Army tanks, helicopters or something; in other words, how does this new look at the Soviet Union's military buildup translate into dollars and support for specific military hardware programs. I hate to see that. Because that's not the problem. The problem is that what we need in this country is a strategy.

We have got to recognize what kind of struggle we are in. We've got to recognize that the Soviets have a strategy that is working very well for them and that we have to have a strategy to counter it. Once you have a national strategy,

Seminar Results In

General Says U.S. Fails In Strategy Planning

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States does not have any strategy for meeting the Soviet military challenge, but without a strategy questions of what weapons to buy cannot be properly considered, a former senior intelligence officer says.

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham said this country should work out a strategy for countering what he sees as a long-range Soviet goal of achieving worldwide dominance, and then the U.S. government should put together the hardware to implement this strategy.

But Congress argues over the capabilities of the B1 bomber or the precise size of the defense budget instead of looking hard at the military tasks facing the nation, Graham said.

Graham, who retired a year ago from the directorship of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, spoke yesterday at a meeting sponsored by the American Security Council, a private group that publicizes the need for stronger defenses.

A SECOND SPEAKER was Dr. William R. Van Cleave, a University of Southern California professor of strategic studies and consultant to the CIA and other government agencies.

Both were members of the "B Team" that recently reviewed U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic forces. The team of seven persons now outside of the government helped influence the "A Team" of intelligence community analysts to express concern that the Soviet Union is seeking strategic superiority.

Graham and Van Cleave defended this conclusion as having developed

within the intelligence community on the basis of hard intelligence. They denied published reports that the outsiders pushed the government into too alarmist a conclusion.

Van Cleave said he believes that "over-all Soviet strategic superiority already exists." Graham said whether Moscow has superiority already is not so much the question as recognizing that the curves of military developments in the Soviet Union and the United States are leading to it, and deciding whether the United States will take steps to prevent it.

SOME CRITICS of militant warnings about the Soviet military buildup argue that there cannot be meaningful superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. Neither side would win a nuclear war, they contend.

But Graham said he did not believe that "the Soviet Union has any big attack in mind." Instead of general war, he expected a militarily dominant Kremlin to show "more aggressive behavior — more Angolas." The United States could become paralyzed by the increased risks of trying to stop this.

The question facing this country is not whether the Pentagon's total obligatory authority for the 1978 fiscal year should be \$123.1 billion, as the Ford administration proposed; it is whether the United States is going to meet the Soviet challenge, Graham contended, and then see what it costs.

"That doesn't mean adopting every general's or admiral's proposals, but finding the best way to do the job," Graham added.

VAN CLEAVE SAID U.S. arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, which he was involved in negotiating, had not slowed down Soviet military expansion. But the negotiations had reduced U.S. expectations of Soviet good intentions about controlling the arms race, he said.

Van Cleave said the most worrisome period in the Soviet-American military balance, on the basis of the present Soviet buildup, is 1980 to 1984.

then a military strategy can be put together to support the national strategy. The military hardware program that follows should be justified by that strategy and there should not be arguments, in Congress for instance, about whether a B-1 bomber can or cannot penetrate a real or imagined air defense system of the Soviet Union. That's not what the argument should be about.

The argument should be about what the United States should require of its military forces and then the military force men should say, "this piece of equipment fits this requirement in this way."

We don't have a strategy. Those who think that the Triad is a strategy are wrong. People who think that 1½ or 2½ wars is a strategy are wrong. They are substitutes for strategy, they are structures on which you hang your military posture, your military structure, and your hardware. They do not constitute strategy. But we must have a strategy now. It is not the long suit of the Pentagon today. The Pentagon is run by program managers. There are not enough strategists in the Pentagon and I wish they'd put a strategist back in charge of it. Thank you very much.

Importance of Soviet Civil Defense

QUESTION: I want you to comment on a piece that Mr. Drew Middleton wrote which said there is no objective evidence to indicate that the Russian civil defense program should be counted as a factor in the supposed Soviet drive for superiority. The creation of the vast atomic shelter system may be a normal Russian reaction in fear of any foreign attack.

VAN CLEAVE: Let me try and address some thoughts to that on 2 or 3 different levels . . .

I think not to take the Soviet civil defense plan seriously would be an egregious error on our part. In the first place, I think it is a prime example of a fundamentally different approach to problems of planning strategic war, concepts about deterrence and the purposes of strategic forces than exist in the West. I don't think that should be ignored.

I think there is enough evidence of a program of such scale and such effort that at a very minimum it should be taken seriously as a reflection of Soviet expectations and thinking. The amount of work that goes into it, which we are just barely beginning to appreciate as more and more evidence comes in, the amount of effort, the number of things we see, the way it is ranked within the military hierarchy, altogether indicate the Soviets are very serious about a civil defense program on a scale which is difficult to conceive here.

Now the questions of effectiveness are based upon such a range of assumptions and premises that they are very difficult to address. Usually people who intend to detract from the Soviet civil defense effort compare the putative effectiveness of it against an all out U.S. response designed to maximize population fatalities and say that in view of such a response capability, the effectiveness of it cannot, with confidence, be very great. That's one way of looking at it. And even that way is really dependent upon your assumptions about the status of the program and your assumptions about the American surviving forces and their targeting.

Another way of looking at it is not to isolate it or compartmentalize it, but to put it together with other Soviet activities in strategic intercontinental attack forces and in active defense forces, and then compare those with the range of possible reactive options that the United States might infinitely prefer to consider over a massive assured destructive type of response. In those types of cases, it may be very effective indeed.

GRAHAM: There is not enough evidence to say that the Soviets will succeed in their stated goal of protecting all but about 10 million of their population in the event of a nuclear exchange. There is no way to really assess how they would make out and it is very scenario-dependent, as Dr. Van Cleave has pointed out.

The most important thing to bear in mind about the Soviet civil defense effort is that they think it is worthwhile. And if they think it's worthwhile and they get

Major News Stories

Report's Authors Repeat, Defend Russian Alarm

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two members of an outside team that analyzed the Soviet threat in concert with government intelligence officers contended yesterday that Russia is striving for military superiority over the United States.

In taking that position Daniel O. Graham and William R. Van Cleave denied that their Team B report is a "worst case" statement about Soviet military capabilities and intentions.

Graham, retired Army lieutenant general who formerly headed the Defense Intelligence Agency, said at a meeting sponsored by the American Security Council that Team B "shouldn't be looked at as a bunch of hawks who bulldozed CIA analysts" as they prepared national intelligence estimates.

Such characterizations in the press, Graham complained, amount to "an

accidental attempt to blunt the impact" of Team B's report. He said he and his colleagues on Team B went into the analysis of intelligence data "with questions" but not bias.

Although asserting that the Soviets are driving for military superiority, Graham said they cannot reach that goal unless the United States make a "deliberate" decision to allow it.

"We don't have a strategy," Graham said in decrying how "the Pentagon is run by program managers" rather than strategists. He said a cohesive strategy, not more money for defense, is the key need right now.

Van Cleave, University of Southern California professor who is a frequent Pentagon consultant on strategic issues, said there is "absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Soviet quest for superiority," including ability to fight a nuclear war as well as deter one.

Van Cleave took a swipe at President Carter's inaugural promise to "move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth."

Van Cleave said that was "such a silly platitude that one has to wonder why it was worth uttering in an inaugural address."

Analysis of Soviet Goal Is Defended

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21—Two participants in a recent intelligence review of Soviet military capabilities and aims said today there was unanimity within the intelligence community that the Soviet Union seeks strategic superiority over this country.

William R. Van Cleave, of the University of Southern California, said the latest intelligence estimate of Soviet goals came to the conclusion: "There is absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Soviet quest for superiority."

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, the retired chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said: "The Soviets are in fact out to achieve superiority."

Questions About Result of Study

Both men were members of a team of outside specialists engaged last year to participate in "competitive analysis" of Soviet abilities and intentions with another team of regular specialists from the Central Intelligence Agency and other government intelligence offices.

Some question has been raised recently as to whether the latest intelligence estimate had concluded that the Soviet Union was intent on achieving strategic superiority.

General Graham and Mr. Van Cleave made their remarks at a meeting spon-

sored by the American Security Council, a conservative organization that concentrates on military affairs.

Mr. Van Cleave rejected allegations in the press that the seven members of the team of outside specialists approached the question on Soviet strategy on the basis of "worst case" thinking.

He said that "over the last couple of years, each national intelligence estimate has been somewhat harsher than its predecessor" regarding the Soviet military buildup.

Says He's Not an 'Arm-Waver'

General Graham said that in criticizing past intelligence estimates, "I was criticizing myself" because he had been involved in making estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency a few years ago. "I didn't make my reputation by being an arm-waver or a worst-case estimator," he said.

The two men said the only real disagreement among experts in the intelligence community was whether the Soviet Union would achieve military superiority over this country, and if so, when.

Mr. Van Cleave said he was "quite concerned about the short term." He added: "The Soviets will pose a great problem of disparity in the time frame 1950 to 1984" unless there is a sufficient American buildup of strategic capabilities.

to the point where they think that our population remains hostage and a much smaller percentage of their population remains hostage, then they are going to be a lot more vigorous in what they do politically and militarily. One should never rule out the civil defense effort as something that doesn't make any difference. That's the worst kind of mirror imaging. Trying to put our notions into their heads has been the biggest flaw in our assessment of the Soviets.

VAN CLEAVE: Let me add one thing to emphasize these points a little bit more. In this country there has been such an overriding tendency to focus on one particular type of nuclear war scenario: a massive assured destruction exchange which sprung from the prevailing doctrine and concepts of the 1960's, and we have been able to dismiss the effectiveness of ABM or a civil defense by comparing it with that one and only one particular type of attack; a massive counter population strike. If you were to look at ABM or civil defense against other types of threat scenarios, you might find them to be quite a bit more effective than they are generally supposed to be.

QUESTION: Professor Van Cleave, do you favor a program of mass evacuation of U.S. cities as a U.S. civil defense response to the Soviet civil defense buildup?

VAN CLEAVE: I am strongly in favor of a more ambitious and more consistent civil defense program on the part of the U.S., not as a response to the Soviet program necessarily, but just as a wise thing to do in any case. But I doubt that it is realistic to expect anything on the level of effort the Soviets are going on. We simply cannot marshal our population and human resources to the extent that the Soviets can.

What Is National Strategy?

QUESTION: Gen Graham, you have said the U.S. has no strategy and I wonder if I could get you to define a little more closely what you mean by a national strategy and military strategy and in the process I hope that you might propose your own strategy?

GRAHAM: Well, it takes a lot of folks to propose a strategy, but let me say that first of all, strategy has been a rather short suit for Americans. The United States has been able to reach most of its goals with rather unstructured application of energy without a strategy. And as a matter of fact, that is largely the way we have won wars.

But today we need a strategy because we're up against a strategy that now can seriously threaten the achievement of our national goals and even threaten the destruction of the country.

To me a strategy is how do we want the systemic struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union to come out? Do we want a draw? Do we want our system to triumph peacefully? What do we want? Once we have decided on that, the national strategy is how do we apply ourselves in the economic, political, and military spheres to accomplish this.

In coming up with a strategy there are a number of things that ought to be considered. I am not going to tell you what I believe all the aspects of a strategy should be. But, I am influenced by what I saw back during the Khrushchev era which was a drawing away to a certain extent by the Soviet Union from its fundamental, long term goal and some indication of moving in the direction of a status quo nation. Khrushchev talked about the reality of mutual deterrence. He was saying, not just to us but to his own people, that both societies would be destroyed in a nuclear war. And so he was sounding a bit like we sound in talking about a nuclear war at that time. I think the reason he was sounding that way and was willing to take a chance with that break with Marxist-Leninism was because he couldn't see any way out of the strategic inferiority situation that he was in at that time. Every time he'd get a little leg up, like getting up the first sputnik and getting ahead of us in space, he'd turn around and we had a big space program that was going to wipe out that lead. He did in fact have a minor advantage in intercontinental ballistic missiles. But he turns around and McNamara has put out a second Minuteman and he's behind again.

One thing necessary to any strategy is that our military capabilities at a minimum throw up such possibilities for development that there are obstacles to the Soviets in continuing their strategy, and I don't think parity is the answer to that. You are not going to change the Soviet point of view unless you present them with alternatives downstream which they cannot surmount, so that they go back to something like the Khrushchevian heresy of the mid 60's.

QUESTION: If parity is not the answer, by extension are you advocating some form of superiority for the United States?

GRAHAM: The question was: do I advocate superiority for the U.S.? I say yes.

How The Soviets Measure Superiority

QUESTION: There's been some discussion concerning whether the Soviets are really going for superiority. What do you believe and why?

VAN CLEAVE: My personal opinion, based upon an analysis of the capabilities of the Soviet Union, a comparison of these capabilities with the capabilities of the U.S., and a comparison of the doctrine, concepts and objectives of the two is that there is absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Soviet quest for superiority. Even more ominous than that is their belief that superiority should be measured in terms of war-fighting capabilities.

It seems to me that if the Soviet actions and words are consistent, the person who says they don't mean what they are doing and what they are saying has a burden of proof himself to show that. So my personal opinion is clearly that they are on a quest for superiority. I think our major issue here, as I posed at the start, is what does that really mean, what are the implications of it, where is the superiority to be measured and the like.

GRAHAM: I agree with Dr. Van Cleave that the Soviets are, in fact, out to achieve superiority.

I will not comment on what's in the National Intelligence Estimate, but I will say that the arguments between the people on the inside about whether or not the Soviets are attempting to achieve superiority have disappeared. There isn't any doubt now, I don't think, in the minds of any responsible intelligence analyst that they are trying. There still remains an argument as to whether they will make it. The argument about can they make it is so dependent upon what do we do that it becomes easily arguable at this point depending upon what you think the United States' reaction will be.

"Soviet Superiority Exists Today"

VAN CLEAVE: Let me add something so that I'm not hedging my own personal beliefs any more than necessary on the evaluation of superiority and where it exists today. I am fully aware of the fact that this is a very complicated and sometimes intractable question because we all have different conceptions of what superiority is all about and what contributes to it.

But if I might just for the moment confine my remarks to what we refer to as the strategic nuclear level, that is to say the strategic intercontinental attack forces and strategic defensive forces, it is my conclusion on the basis of analysis that I've done, that overall strategic superiority exists today for the Soviet Union and that is the essence of U.S.

countermeasures, projections show an increasingly large margin of superiority.

In this regard, let me refer you to the article in the current issue of *Foreign Policy* by Paul Nitze on "Deterring Our Deterrent," where he carries his classic *Foreign Affairs* argument a couple of steps further analytically. I've gone over this analysis in quite a bit of detail to the point that I am professionally persuaded by it. And according to this analysis, looking at it either in peace-time comparisons, in comparisons after an initial optimized Soviet counter-force attack, or after an exchange including a U.S. counter-force response, the Soviet superior situation given presently projected forces is relatively favored even after a counter-force exchange at the highest level. And this is true whether you look at it in terms of throw-weight, megatons, equivalent megatons, or whether you look at it in the more sophisticated index of equivalent weapons which takes into account accuracy, target hardness and other things. All the curves go in that direction. And that's all there is to it.

QUESTION: I wonder if you can explain why China has suddenly become unmentionable by you analysts. You remember when McNamara first justified the ABM, he said well, it's not a good idea, but China is kind of irrational, and therefore for appearances sake we should build an ABM. Why couldn't one assume that Russia is likewise building its civil defense against a Chinese nuclear attack?

Secondly, is it fair for the Pentagon to compare directly the Warsaw Pact forces versus NATO forces without crediting any of those forces to the China front which is right on the Soviet border?

And thirdly, do you agree with Professor Garwin who said that if you figure how many rubles the Soviets would have to spend to buy our own defense establishment that there might well be a gap in our favor for defense spending?

And lastly, and I think this is more targeted to Van Cleave, what do you mean you want a better response? Is the 123 billion dollar new defense budget too low? Do you want 200 billion? What are you talking about when you say let's have a better response?

Plenty of Soviet Threat To Go Around

VAN CLEAVE: In the first place the China matter: I don't think it makes much sense to try and make any comparison with Mr. McNamara's justification of the early ABM on Chinese rationale. We all have to recognize that Mr. McNamara just plain didn't like ABM and therefore wasn't much interested in a very strong rationale for it at that particular point in time. So I don't think that has any relevance today in any context whatsoever.

Is the Soviet Union deploying a civil defense against China? I don't think it matters against whom they are building a civil defense. What matters is what it reflects in terms of their beliefs about limiting damage in the event of a nuclear war and what its effectiveness might be against a range of potential American options.

As to the Soviet Union building forces principally for China, we're very well aware of the forces that the Soviet Union designs and deploys against China and we tend to factor those out. We don't add them into what we think are Soviet intercontinental forces against the United States. We thoroughly separate the two whenever they are separable. At times they are not. But, I'd like to point out to you, the types of intercontinental attack forces and defenses that the Soviet Union is deploying against the U.S. are not quite



General Daniel O. Graham called for a "National Strategy."

those that are needed against China against whom medium range and shorter range systems are all that is necessary.

As to Mr. Garwin's assertion about the Soviets buying our own defense establishment, I think it's getting to the point that if we can make a trade with the Soviet Union of defense establishments, I'd be heartily in favor of it.

Finally, about the \$123 billion. I haven't seen or gone over the full budget for this year. I don't think it makes much sense to look at some particular aggregate in total and say, is this a good enough response or isn't it. I don't think it is a matter of money really, quite frankly. Particularly when we are addressing strategic forces and the strategic balance in the context that I've been using these terms we have to recognize that strategic forces are cheap. It is a very very small fraction of the defense budget. You could do an enormous amount by very small additions to that program. The situation has gotten to the point that even the Brookings Institute in *Setting National Priorities* this year, came to the conclusion that a substantial real increase is now necessary for at least the next five years. I think these things can be done by focusing on a strategy, by focusing on a consistent set of goals for technology, and by taking more initiative in technology than we have in the past without a good deal of money. Now the \$123 billion may look awfully big, but two weeks ago the Social Security Administration announced that social welfare spending went up 45 billion dollars in the past year, after having gone up 47 billion the previous year, and is now at a level of 331 billion dollars per year. Now I am not arguing that one should dispose of these social economic welfare programs, but I think these types of figures are necessary to put the defense budget in some perspective.

GRAHAM: I essentially agree with what Dr. Van Cleave had to say. If you take the threat to NATO — well if it is any comfort to say that 50 of the Soviet divisions are disposed against China, and the Warsaw Pact presents NATO with a threat of a mere 150 divisions — I don't take much comfort from that. If the Department of Defense's posture statement has put all those divisions together and said they were directed at NATO, of course, that would be a mistake because there is plenty of Soviet threat to go around.

With regard to the money thing, 123 billion or so, that's what worries me about the reaction to the situation that is facing us strategically: it winds up a question; are you for 123 billion or 150 billion? I'm not for any number like that, I'm for pulling up our socks, finding out what we are going to do about this challenge and then see what comes out of

program that every admiral and general in the Pentagon thinks is a good idea should be adopted. As a matter of fact, I think that if we put our minds to it, American technology can come up with cheaper ways to do the job if there is some good description of what the job is.

SALT Is A Segment of Soviet Strategy

QUESTION: Do you see the strategic balance being affected by a SALT II agreement?

VAN CLEAVE: I don't have any expectations that SALT is going to accomplish anything to ease one iota the strategic problems facing the United States today. I can't see that in the offing. All I have to do is point to a comparison between those goals and aspirations commonly posed for SALT in 1968 and 1969 with what's expected by the administration or by arms control scholars today. Today, the emphasis isn't on what you can accomplish in SALT so much as it is how can we hurt ourselves less, by any particular agreement.

If you look at the SALT agreements proposed for SALT II or any prospective agreement after that, they simply reflect one particular thing and that is that arms limitations agreements that would restrain planned Soviet programs are unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

GRAHAM: I agree, I see no indication of any dampening effect on any Soviet program, as a result of SALT. I think the real problem with SALT is that SALT agreements and detente in general in the Soviet view is part of a strategy that's aimed in the long run in achieving their overall national goals. For the West, SALT and detente has been sort of an end in itself and hooked very closely to the proposition that somehow we could reduce the armaments load, or the defense problems for our own countries. So the two sides have entered these negotiations with entirely different sets of motivations.

QUESTION: My question is: to what extent does the transfer of advanced Western technology make a contribution to these particular Soviet military efforts?

GRAHAM: Well, on the technology transfer side, I think that what we have to realize is that much of the technology that the Soviets lag in are not the theoretical technology and so forth. Where American genius really overhauls them is in the engineering and production end of technology. But when we turn to giving them plants and machinery that allows them to go into production on defense and defense-related materials, I think we make a mistake and I think we've made some grievous mistakes in the past.

QUESTION: Haven't we lost the political will to resist? The point being that we will be reducing our defense budget. And is not this discussion here today inescapably linked to this political background?

VAN CLEAVE: I think that you've put your finger on a very important point and that is the question of political will which is also the question of the ability intellectually to grasp the situation and the mental toughness to be able to figure out the responses that are appropriate. That is purely in the political realm and there are many indications that the political will has been lacking in the U.S. I don't think that that lack, however, springs from the public. I am not a Kissingerian on this at all. I think that with the right type of national leadership, it would be entirely possible to have this will spring forth and be manifested.

☆☆☆

Civil Defense

In the developing debate over civil defense — how much, if any, is enough? There has come a stark warning of what could happen to the United States if the Soviet Union should ever believe it could successfully threaten the U.S. with surrender or nuclear destruction.

Dr. Eugene P. Wigner of Princeton University, a Nobel Prize winning physicist, was interviewed for the American Security Council Education Foundation's new documentary film, *THE PRICE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM*.

DR. WIGNER: "We have no definite plans for evacuating our cities in response to a Russian evacuation. We have no — what I call — counter-evacuation plans that are valid.

"In the present situation, the population loss the Russian missiles could inflict is about 45 percent. If we had an evacuation plan, or as I call it, a counter plan, this 45 percent would be reduced to about 11 percent at a ridiculously low cost — a couple of dollars per person.

"If we had a good shelter system similar to that which the Chinese can afford, the loss would be 5½ percent, which is quite similar to the 4 percent which we could inflict to the Russians. So that would be a real defense."

Saigon Today

With the terror came hunger, poverty, mass brainwashing, finally waves of suicide. This is the death of once free South Vietnam as described by Father Andre Gelinis, a Canadian Jesuit priest, recently expelled from Saigon after 19 years of missionary work.

Father Gelinis estimates that between 15,000 and 20,000 Vietnamese have committed suicide rather than live under Communism — 10,000 in the Saigon area alone in one month. Back home in Montreal after 15 months in Saigon under the Communists, Father Gelinis describes how the new regime has begun remodeling the nation:

FATHER ANDRE GELINAS: "All the intellectuals were ordered to register at the police station, and in Vietnam anyone who has a high school degree is considered

an intellectual. All the people from 25 to 60 — male — had to register at the police station and two days later, on the twelfth of June, they were called for one month of reeducation. They were imprisoned in the big school and four days later — on June 16th — there were vast movements of trucks during the night. People saw convoys leaving the city for the countryside. And for the next ten days — from June the 16th to June the 26th — every night convoys would leave with all these people. About 500,000 people were carried away, and this was nearly two years ago. And they haven't come back."

Western Technology: Russia's Invisible Ally

Is Western technology helping build Soviet weapons aimed at us? A leading authority on the subject, Miles Costick, author of the forthcoming book, *U.S. and Soviet Computer Capabilities*, has no doubt.

MILES COSTICK: "The Soviets are making every effort to close the computer technology gap in the only way possible for them — to get us to give it to them. During the last four years, U.S. computer manufacturers have sold to the Communist governments about \$400 million worth of computers and related equipment.

"The Control Data Corporation has a joint venture with the Communist government of Romania for production of peripheral equipment which is one of the weakest links in the Communist computer technology. In addition, Control Data has an agreement pending with the U.S.S.R. to manufacture one hundred megabit disk memory units in the Soviet Union. It is well known that one of the main deficiencies of all computers produced in the Soviet bloc is the memory system. The International Business Machine Corporation is one of the major suppliers of advanced computers to Communist governments. Many IBM computers have been sold from its European branches, and apparently, in some cases, no export license was obtained. From its U.S. facilities, IBM has sold to Poland several computer systems, among others, the largest industrial computer system in the world, consisting of the IBM-370/158 with eleven satellite systems, for the automation of the Kama River truck plant which, among other things, will mass produce tanks."

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Soviet Arms Superiority Is Denied by Joint Chiefs

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The nation's top military leaders, in a report that rebuts charges by the former head of Air Force Intelligence, yesterday disputed the claim that the United States has lost its strategic edge to the Soviet Union.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff," consisting of the heads of the military services, "do not agree that the Soviet Union has achieved military superiority over the United States," Air Force Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the joint chiefs, said in the report released yesterday by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.).

In their 11-page paper, the chiefs took direct issue with Air Force Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who said in farewell remarks as he retired as head of Air Force Intelligence on Jan. 1 that the Soviets had gained superiority over the United States.

"I am unaware of a single important category" involving the strategic balance "in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States," Keegan said in a

New York Times interview published Jan. 3.

While agreeing with Keegan that Soviet long-range missiles can lift heavier nuclear warheads with more explosive power than their American counterparts, Brown, speaking for the chiefs, said that "the United States has a substantial lead over the Soviet Union in bomber payload, missile accuracy, survivability and numbers of warheads and bombers."

"The available evidence," Brown continued, "suggests the U.S.S.R. is engaged in a program to achieve military superiority over the United States but that they have not attained this goal."

These and other statements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are expected to be discussed today if the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee meets as scheduled to hear testimony from Gen. Brown and Defense Secretary Harold Brown.

"The United States is moving in the correct direction" both militarily and diplomatically in regard to the Soviet Union, the chiefs said in a statement that indicates military and civilian leaders agree on overall strategy.

Keegan has been warning about the Soviet threat through most of his Air Force career, and helped make an independent assessment of Russian military programs for the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He did this as a member of the panel known as "Team B," which worked independently to produce a report separate from the national intelligence estimates put together by the CIA.

In discussing 25 separate issues of American strategic policy, the chiefs did provide ammunition for those warning that the Soviet civil defense program should be viewed with grave concern.

Brown, on behalf of the chiefs, disputed Keegan by declaring in the report that despite Soviet civil defense efforts, U.S. weapons "through the 1980s" would be able to inflict the amount of retaliation on Russia that national policy makers want.

Secretary Brown told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that U.S. nuclear weapons could overcome Soviet defenses in a nuclear war. Other arms specialists have argued that living underground eventually would prove futile because lethal radioactivity would last longer than food stored in shelters.

The chiefs, in their report, said the Soviet civil defense program is "more extensive and better developed than it appeared to be several years ago."

"Under optimum conditions," which include a warning prior to U.S. attack and successful evacuation and other preparations, Soviet civil defense measures could probably "lessen damage and protect the Soviet leadership

and most of the city population," the report said.

The chiefs also conceded that "civil defense has received little consideration during past U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations." Keegan has charged that the 1972 treaty limiting missile defenses by both sides was based on the wrong assumption that the Soviets were not seriously building a defense for nuclear war.

The chiefs confirmed that "some current studies indicate" that 10 times as many Americans as Russians might be killed in a nuclear exchange "but only in a worst case scenario . . . such studies are scenario-dependent and should not be regarded as definitive forecasts of outcomes."

Proxmire, in releasing the report of the joint chiefs yesterday, said: "This was a courageous statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff" who "publicly refute" the "exaggerated and, in many cases, erroneous claims of Gen. Keegan."

Proxmire, who in the past has often assailed military and civilian leaders at the Pentagon, called the chiefs' statement "a service to the American public which needs a fair accounting of Soviet activities, not scare tactics."

NEWS

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JAN 28 1977

The CIA estimate

According to a report in the New York Times, President-elect Carter will receive on his assumption of office an intelligence estimate from the CIA which suggests that the Soviet Union no longer seeks "rough parity" with the United States in strategic nuclear capability but "superiority."

In this highly political year, the debate concerning the military balance has been intense, and its outcome will affect the whole scheme of American foreign policy. The United States can hardly afford to pursue strategic arms limitation and "detente" with the Soviet Union if it thereby places its own national security in jeopardy. During the campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, Governor Ronald Reagan claimed that the United States had already fallen to the status of a "second-rate" military power. While unable to secure the nomination for Secretary of Defense for their candidate, James Schlesinger, hardliners in the Democratic Party, led by Senator Henry Jackson and AFL-CIO president George Meany, did successfully veto Paul Warnke for that position.

The CIA estimate also has a more political flavor than usual. It emerges out of a process of "competitive analysis" between the CIA and a team of outsiders including well-known critics of detente such as former Pentagon official Paul Nitze and Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard. Indeed, the group was selected by this criterion at the suggestion of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a mixed bag of retired professionals and out-of-work politicians. Naturally, in the process of negotiation between the agency professionals and the outside team, a shift to the right was registered.

The new estimate uncovers no new facts. Rather, it takes a more pessimistic view of known Soviet programs, such as civil defense shelters, air defenses, and new missilery. The outsiders view these programs as part of a concerted Soviet drive for strategic supremacy. Among intelligence officials, Major General George Keegan, retiring chief of Air Force intelligence, agrees. Keegan, who has been out of the mainstream of intelligence thinking for 20 years, believes that the consensus is moving his way.

What is curious about these old facts is that they can also be construed as evi-

dence of Soviet backwardness. The Soviet Union's new missiles could as easily be seen as an effort to catch up with more sophisticated American technology; its air defenses as an effort to cope with superior American strategic bomber forces; its civil defense shelters as a means to compensate for overall strategic nuclear inferiority.

The same can be said of Soviet programs in conventional weapons. The Soviets have, for example, a huge submarine fleet but this is a traditional means of compensating for naval inferiority on the surface. Now we hear from a Soviet defector that Russian pilots are expected to perform "suicide missions" — notoriously, a desperation tactic.

But if alarm is not justified, neither is complacency. Basically, there are two new developments which must be considered. First, there are the strategic arms limitation agreements. Since World War II, the United States has generally maintained a sizable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. By agreeing to limit the number of strategic delivery systems, the U.S. has made possible Soviet parity in this area, assuming that the Russians eventually match U.S. capability in missile accuracy and multiple warheads. Parity will be more of a problem for the United States than for the Soviet Union because we have always relied heavily on nuclear supremacy while the Russians have made the most of superiority on land.

Second, the United States military position has suffered in the last 10 years because of diversion of U.S. resources for the Vietnam War and the eviscerating effect of inflation on real military expenditures. As a result, the Russians have been gaining on the U.S. in air and sea capabilities.

None of this requires panic. But the United States must consider carefully the effect of nuclear parity on its strategic position and must reverse the decline in military expenditures in real dollars. In an era of nuclear parity, the United States will have to modernize its conventional military forces and maintain the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet Union from potentially strong allies. America is in no immediate danger. But if we do not take the necessary steps at this critical juncture, we might find ourselves in real trouble some years hence.

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
26 January 1977

CIA Ex-Director Warns Of Soviet Arms Aims

By THOMAS W. OTTENAD
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 — The former head of American intelligence says there are "worrisome signs" that the Soviet Union "is doing more than just trying to catch up" with the United States in military power.

George H. Bush, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, expressed doubt whether the Russians' "prime objective" in international relations is to relax tensions with the free world.

At breakfast yesterday with a small group of reporters, Bush pointed to higher estimates of Soviet defense spending as cause for concern about Russian intentions.

Referring to recent American intelligence figures doubling earlier estimates of the percentage of the Soviet gross national product devoted to defense, Bush asked:

"If tensions have been relaxed, why are they burdening the economy to that extent?"

Bush refused to discuss details of a recent CIA study that is said to have concluded that the Russians are seeking superiority over United States military forces.

He said the revised estimates of higher Soviet spending did not necessarily mean that the Russians had more tanks, planes and other weapons than was thought previously.

"I think we were correct on the numbers of missiles, ships and so on," he explained. "But the cost is higher than we thought." He said he did not know why the CIA had underestimated Russian spending.

His major worry, he stressed, concerns the Russian intent that may be indicated by this greater level of spending.

Former CIA official Lyman Kirkpatrick said elsewhere yesterday that the United States must become aware of the meaning of the Soviet buildup of a vast civil defense system to protect "key elements of the population."

"This information will be the basis of the upcoming round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, and if we make a mistake it could be catastrophic."

Bush said he had not seen "any signs that make me feel relaxed" about the Russian interest in reducing tensions with the West. He said he was "somewhat reserved in my optimism" about the Soviet attitude toward nuclear disarmament.

"Let's hope it is more than rhetorical," he said.

Bush disputed reports that members of the intelligence community had helped organize opposition that led to the withdrawal of President Jimmy Carter's choice of Theodore C. Sorensen to be director of central intelligence.

Bush said he "never heard of" intelligence officials acting against Sorensen's nomination. On inquiring into the matter, he said, he was unable to learn the identity of any such opponents.

He expressed confidence that efforts to clean up had succeeded after the CIA disclosures of abuses, including spying on American citizens.

Bush, who was former national chairman of the Republican Party and was regarded last year as a possible vice-presidential running mate for President Gerald R. Ford, indicated interest in resuming a political career.

He said he no longer believed, as he did upon accepting the CIA appointment, that the intelligence position probably ended any long-term political goals.

The Annual Red Scare

The Russians are coming. They are always coming at this time of year. It is not the wintry winds off the steppes that drive the Tartar hordes ever westward, it is budget time in Washington. The rise and fall of the Red Menace is a seasonal thing. It is at its most ominous when the weather is worst for military operations. It shrinks from its monstrous maximum under the gentle breezes of spring.

If ever a thing was cyclical, it is Soviet might, swelling and subsiding according to a schedule set by those who decide in Washington how much the United States should spend on arms and men each year. So the whole thing is out of the Russians' hands and in those of the intelligence analysts and military thinkers, so to speak, who salute the Stars and Stripes, not the hammer and sickle. And the cycle is controlled by the clockwork of the federal budgeting process.

The United States has been through, and survived, these winter scares before. Sometimes they have been based on a new Russian weapons system, discovered just in time. Sometimes a Russian intervention in some part of the world has brought the shivers to official Washington. Always the superiority-parity-sufficiency equations are trotted out and from year to year the balance is seen to tilt, in this season, toward the great adversary.

What is remarkable about this year's exercise in strategic fright is the extent to which it is based on alleged Russian "intentions." In the trade, profession or business of military intelligence (and it is all of those things), intentions are famously the least reliable factor. It takes no expertise to see why that is so. Plain common sense tells us that we can have a fair idea of the capabilities of another power but that to divine its intentions exceeds the capacity of the human mind, even as extended by the computer. That was impossible even in the good old days when war's casualties were measured in mere millions as against the hundreds of millions that modern weaponry have brought within easy reach of annihilation.

Nevertheless, this year's CIA estimate of Soviet military capabilities and strategic objectives relies to an extraordinary degree on the "intelligence community's" guesses about Russian intentions. These characters would naturally deny that guesswork played any part in their deliberations. They would claim that sober analysis of objective reality brought them to their current "somber" conclusions about what the USSR will do to have its way in the world.

That was why the CIA's Director George Bush brought in a so-called "B-team" of professional pessimists to challenge the more sanguine "A-team" fellows of the regular intelligence establishment. By all the thoroughly leaked accounts of what happened in this dialectical game, the official pessimists managed to tip the consensus toward a much darker view than usual about Russia's real aims. MADness (mutual assured destruction) is out, passé, and we are told that Russia is hell-bent for strategic dominance.

Even without these grim estimates of the United States' comparative military strength, Congress would be beginning its annual round of hearings. But with this gloomy new impulsion, three Senate hearings are already scheduled and the House, which must actually raise the money to pay for all this, will not lag far behind. Our elected representatives will be told such horror stories as that, by 1980, Moscow will be able to drop an ICBM within sprint, as against quarter-mile, distance from our own missile silos, those storehouses of destruction.

One would think, or hope, that Congress by now would be aware of the seasonal nature of these Soviet scare stories and resist their manipulative effect. But our representatives are so set in their accustomed grooves that they regularly go through the response phase of this reactionary cycle, just as if there were something new in it every year.

Two members of the outgoing Ford Cabinet have recently been heard on this great topic of "national security" and they are on diametrically opposite sides of the question. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, as expected, looked into the closet where he keeps our arsenal and found it nearly bare. He told *The Washington Star* (January 9) that the "steady modernization, strengthening the improvements (*sic*) and capability of the Soviet Union, coupled with a behavior pattern by the United States over some fifteen years of actually reducing our effort in real terms, would inject a fundamental insecurity into the world situation."

Secretary of State Kissinger, on the other hand, told the National Press Club the other day that he did not believe that the Soviet Union "is achieving military supremacy over the United States." He made the key point when he added the observation that "the essence of the contemporary problem in the military field is that the term 'supremacy,' when casualties will be in the tens of millions, has practically no operational significance as long as we do what is necessary to maintain a balance." (Perhaps the hawks will say that Kissinger was corrupted by that Nobel Peace Prize for the 1972 Vietnam peace non-agreement.)

Balance is, of course, the essential idea. Even if it is called "balance of terror," what it means is that either side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other and therefore that there can simply be no nuclear "exchange" between the two superpowers. No amount of fiddling with destruction ratios, throw-weights or any other component of the balance that has existed for a generation can alter that basic fact. The military, by its very nature, will go on inventing new and more awful devices. And its allies in "intelligence" will go on inventing rationales for more and more of these weapons even if they have to justify them with the foggy stuff of "intentions."

This is the nature of these beasts. All of us, and especially Congress, should know that by now. We will soon see whether Congress and the Carter administration have learned anything at all from the many years of this annual exercise in strategic blackmail.

WASHINGTON POST

22 January 1977

Report's Authors Repeat, Defend Russian Alarm

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Two members of an outside team that analyzed the Soviet threat in concert with government intelligence officers contended yesterday that Russia is striving for military superiority over the United States.

In taking that position Daniel O. Graham and William R. Van Cleave denied that their Team B report is a "worst case" statement about Soviet military capabilities and intentions.

Graham, retired Army lieutenant general who formerly headed the Defense Intelligence Agency, said at a meeting sponsored by the American Security Council that Team B "shouldn't be looked at as a bunch of hawks who bulldozed CIA analysts" as they prepared national intelligence estimates.

Such characterizations in the press, Graham complained, amount to "an accidental attempt to blunt the impact" of Team B's report. He said he and his colleagues on Team B went into the analysis of intelligence data "with questions" but not bias.

Although asserting that the Soviets are driving for military superiority, Graham said they cannot reach that goal unless the United States makes a "deliberate" decision to allow it.

"We don't have a strategy," Graham said in decrying how "the Pentagon is run by program managers" rather than strategists. He said a cohesive strategy, not more money for defense, is the key need right now.

Van Cleave, University of Southern California professor who is a frequent Pentagon consultant on strategic issues, said there is "absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Soviet quest for superiority," including ability to fight a nuclear war as well as deter one.

Van Cleave took a swipe at President Carter's inaugural promise to "move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth."

Van Cleave said that was "such a silly platitude that one has to wonder why it was worth uttering in an inaugural address."

Page All

Analysis of Soviet Goal Is Defended

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21—Two participants in a recent intelligence review of Soviet military capabilities and aims said today there was unanimity within the intelligence community that the Soviet Union seeks strategic superiority over this country.

William R. Van Cleave, of the University of Southern California, said the latest intelligence estimate of Soviet goals came to the conclusion: "There is absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Soviet quest for superiority."

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, the retired chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said: "The Soviets are in fact out to achieve superiority."

Questions About Result of Study

Both men were members of a team of outside specialists engaged last year to participate in "competitive analysis" of Soviet abilities and intentions with another team of regular specialists from the Central Intelligence Agency and other government intelligence offices.

Some question has been raised recently as to whether the latest intelligence estimate had concluded that the Soviet Union was intent on achieving strategic superiority.

General Graham and Mr. Van Cleave made their remarks at a meeting spon-

sored by the American Security Council, a conservative organization that concentrates on military affairs.

Mr. Van Cleave rejected allegations in the press that the seven members of the team of outside specialists approached the question on Soviet strategy on the basis of "worst case" thinking.

He said that "over the last couple of years, each national intelligence estimate has been somewhat harsher than its predecessor" regarding the Soviet military buildup.

Says He's Not an 'Arm-Waver'

General Graham said that in criticizing past intelligence estimates, "I was criticizing myself" because he had been involved in making estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency a few years ago. "I didn't make my reputation by being an arm-waver or a worst-case estimator," he said.

The two men said the only real disagreement among experts in the intelligence community was whether the Soviet Union would achieve military superiority over this country, and if so, when.

Mr. Van Cleave said he was "quite concerned about the short term." He added: "The Soviets will pose a great problem of disparity in the time frame 1980 to 1984" unless there is a sufficient American buildup of strategic capabilities.

The Washington Star

22 January 1977

General Says U.S. Fails In Strategy Planning

By Henry S. Bradsher

- Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States does not have any strategy for meeting the Soviet military challenge, but without a strategy questions of what weapons to buy cannot be properly considered, a former senior intelligence officer says.

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham said this country should work out a strategy for countering what he sees as a long-range Soviet goal of achieving worldwide dominance, and then the U.S. government should put together the hardware to implement this strategy.

But Congress argues over the capabilities of the B1 bomber or the precise size of the defense budget instead of looking hard at the military tasks facing the nation, Graham said.

Graham, who retired a year ago from the directorship of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, spoke yesterday at a meeting sponsored by the American Security Council, a private group that publicizes the need for stronger defenses.

A SECOND SPEAKER was Dr. William R. Van Cleave, a University of Southern California professor of strategic studies and consultant to the CIA and other government agencies.

Both were members of the "B Team" that recently reviewed U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic forces. The team of seven persons now outside of the government helped influence the "A Team"

of intelligence community analysts to express concern that the Soviet Union is seeking strategic superiority.

Graham and Van Cleave defended this conclusion as having developed within the intelligence community on the basis of hard intelligence. They denied published reports that the outsiders pushed the government into too alarmist a conclusion.

Van Cleave said he believes that "over-all Soviet strategic superiority already exists." Graham said whether Moscow has superiority already is not so much the question as recognizing that the curves of military developments in the Soviet Union and the United States are leading to it, and deciding whether the United States will take steps to prevent it.

SOME CRITICS of militant warnings about the Soviet military buildup argue that there cannot be meaningful superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. Neither side would win a nuclear war, they contend.

But Graham said he did not believe that "the Soviet Union has any big attack in mind." Instead of general war, he expected a militarily dominant Kremlin to show "more aggressive behavior — more Angolas." The United States could become paralyzed by the increased risks of trying to stop this.

The question facing this country is not whether the Pentagon's total obligatory authority for the 1978 fiscal year should be \$123.1 billion, as the Ford administration proposed; it is whether the United States is going to meet the Soviet challenge, Graham contended, and then see what it costs.

"That doesn't mean adopting every general's or admiral's proposals, but finding the best way to do the job," Graham added.

VAN CLEAVE SAID U.S. arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, which he was involved in negotiating, had not slowed down Soviet military expansion. But the negotiations had reduced U.S. expectations of Soviet good intentions about controlling the arms race, he said.

Van Cleave said the most worrisome period in the Soviet-American military balance, on the basis of the present Soviet buildup, is 1980 to 1984.

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Issue and Debate

American Security and Expanding Soviet Military Strength

By DREW MIDDLETON

A national debate has developed over the security of the United States in a period of steadily expanding Soviet nuclear and conventional military strength.

The central question is whether the Soviet Union is seeking overall military superiority, rather than the present situation, in which the United States has parity in some areas of military power and marked superiority or a degree of inferiority in others.

Contributing to the debate, which began four weeks ago, are reports by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and other organizations that study Russian defense programs. Differences over the question arise largely from opposing interpretations of these reports.

Background

The debate arose when, on Dec. 26, some of the findings of a high-level intelligence review were published in The New York Times. In this review the finds of the C.I.A. were modified by a team of outside experts. The result was a judgment that the Soviet Union is now seeking not parity but military superiority.

Early in January Lieut. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., the recently retired head of Air Force intelligence, communicated even more alarming views. He said he believed that the Russians had already achieved military superiority and that American defense policy and détente diplomacy would invite, rather than deter, a global war.

Members of the Ford Cabinet, notably former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, took opposing sides. A larger number of military and civilian experts on defense aired their views in the press and on television and radio.

The outcome of the debate, if there is one, should have marked political impact. President Carter has promised to squeeze at least \$5 billion out of the defense budget. If the new Administration decides that the C.I.A. review and General Keegan are correct in their interpretation of the Russian aims, it will be very difficult to make more than marginal cuts in defense spending.

On the other hand, if the leaders of the Administration reject the intelligence findings, they will assume that reductions can be made safely in military investment. These reductions, Pentagon sources said, would provoke strong opposition within the military and "possibly one or two high-level resignations."

No Challenge on Findings' Reliability

One interesting aspect of the debate is that those most bitterly opposed to the intelligence community's conclusions have not challenged the reliability or the objectivity of the findings on which the conclusions were based.

Much of this material came from satellite photographs of Soviet strategic and conventional weapons. The definition of these photographs, an intelligence officer said, is now so good that "you can see clearly the bolts that fix a missile launcher to the deck of a destroyer."

Other material came from covert sources in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Although the Russians are adept at manipulating double agents, this material has been checked against data reaching the intelligence services of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from similar but not identical sources. One American said there was "near-unanimity on reliability."

But although the material gathered by the intelligence community on Soviet military programs is not challenged, the community's conclusion — that the Russians are seeking military superiority over the United States — is hotly contested.

Against

Mr. Kissinger has been the most powerful of those who argue that the Soviet Union is not seeking "superiority" in strategic nuclear weapons.

"I do not believe that the Soviet Union is achieving military superiority over the United States," he said on Jan. 10. No American administration, he went on, would "permit" a situation to arise in which the Russians could achieve "strategic superiority" over the United States.

Mr. Kissinger urged that conventional and tactical nuclear forces, such as those that are deployed in Europe, should be "modernized and strengthened." His view is that American concern should be focused on conventional and tactical nuclear forces, rather than on strategic weapons.

On the same day Cyrus R. Vance, who succeeded Mr. Kissinger yesterday, also rejected the idea that the Soviet

Union has achieved or is achieving superiority, saying that he believed there was a "general parity" between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Support for Kissinger-Vance View

A large number of State Department officials, Congressmen, academics and experts on Soviet affairs support these views.

Their arguments may be summarized thus:

The team of outsiders brought in to study the C.I.A.'s findings was composed largely of "hard-liners" who were disposed to exaggerate the impact of current Soviet nuclear weapons on the balance between the superpowers.

There is no objective evidence to indicate that the Russian civil defense program should be counted as a factor in the supposed Soviet drive toward superiority. Creation of a vast atomic-shelter system may be a normal Russian reaction to fear of any foreign attack—or, specifically, against Chinese nuclear power. In any event, the system is by no means as complete and efficient as some intelligence officers believe.

The assumption that the Russians are driving toward nuclear superiority makes no allowance for known deficiencies and weaknesses in military and industrial programs, and supposes that all weapons are efficient and that operational readiness is at the highest level. The known faults in Soviet industrial programs and the lack of computers are overlooked or discounted.

Basis of Comparisons Questioned

Intelligence conclusions on Soviet military superiority tend to stress weapon-vs.-weapon comparisons rather than weapon-vs.-antiweapon comparisons. The Russian numerical advantage in tanks, for example is compensated for by the superiority of American anti-tank missiles, artillery and air-to-surface missiles.

There are more Soviet submarines, but they are noisier than American submarines and, consequently, easier to detect. The Soviet advantage in numbers of tactical aircraft is balanced and will continue to be balanced by the superior performance of a new generation of Air Force and Navy planes.

Psychologically, the Russians are unprepared for war. The scars of World War II remain after almost a third of a century and the Soviet leadership is acutely aware that even if it had achieved "superiority," the consequences of a nuclear exchange would come close to destroying the Communist society.

Conventional arms programs may have more to do with fears about the reliability of Eastern European allies and over the un-

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REVIEW & OUTLOOK

On the Uses of Diversity

As James Earl Carter Jr. takes the oath today as 39th President of The United States, he remains something of a question mark to the nation he will lead. We are still more-than ordinarily unsure what he will do with his presidency, though his obvious native talent gives room for hope. Yet watching his slide to a narrow electoral victory and his rather uncertain start as President-elect, it seems evident that he and the rest of us will have to grow together.

For whatever it's worth, our own special advice to President Carter would be to take care to understand the uses of diversity. He has of course paid lip service to the latest conventional wisdom about the danger of a President being isolated from dissent, and has pledged an open staff and other pieties. What he has not done, though, is to surround himself with men of diverse views. Rather, he has tried to assemble a Cabinet of homogenized problem-solvers.

In the economic area, for example, we wonder who will be the Carter administration's no-man. This role has fallen to the Treasury Secretary in most administrations, even Democratic ones, as it falls to the Finance Minister in most other democracies. The man charged with raising the funds is the logical man to set limits on the men charged with spending them. It is not entirely clear that Michael Blumenthal will fill this role; he was an extraordinarily successful businessman but certainly not a conventional one in his political or economic attitudes.

Perhaps, of course, Mr. Blumenthal will sense his natural role, or perhaps Bertram Lance at the budget office will step in to set the brakes. There have been some good second-order appointments in Treasury, Kenneth Axelson, for example, though it's too bad Mr. Blumenthal lost Richard Cooper to the State Department. But it seems likely that by the time the Carter economic program can be considered the economy will be in danger of slipping into an inflationary boom, and we wonder who will carry the burden of turning around the hastily announced policy of "stimulus."

In the area of foreign and de-

fense policy, the concern over diversity is even more pressing. The second-order appointments seem to be giving us George McGovern's State Department. Harold Brown is an unlikely stalwart for the side of the debate the Pentagon ought to uphold, and there are suggestions of a deliberate effort to fill key positions there with anti-military types. So far at least Zbigniew Brzezinski's National Security Council staff offers little respite from this pattern, and it is also continued by many of the names floated for Mr. Carter's second try at appointing a Director of Central Intelligence.

The Sorensen debacle, we should have thought, would be a warning to Mr. Carter in precisely this regard. It would not have taken any unreal range of advice to learn that this appointment would be a troublesome one; the editors of The Washington Post warned as much. Beyond that, the breadth of opposition to Mr. Sorensen, including many Senators usually taken as rather liberal, ought to be a warning to Mr. Carter that the political winds are changing on defense issues.

We should remember, after all, that last year an increased military budget breezed through Congress almost unscathed. Since then there have been increased warnings—in congressional committee documents, in new CIA intelligence estimates, in independent publications like Jane's—of the seriousness of the Soviet arms build-up. If Mr. Carter comes to Congress with cuts in defense, or with a new arms treaty, it seems that for the first time in a good while real questions will be asked about whether the nation can remain secure. Mr. Carter needs at least enough diversity within the administration to know what the questions are likely to be, and whether his problem-solvers have the answers.

Mr. Carter takes the nation's helm today as a personally able President, but an inexperienced one. We are moved to wonder what price the nation will pay for his education, and we would be far more sanguine about the cost if we felt more than one school of thought.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR

ON PAGE 6

19 January 1977

Critics of Arms Balance Alarmism

Sound Off

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

A leading critic of alarmist thinking about the Soviet-American military balance warned today that the world will think this country weaker than it is if the government focuses attention on only some military comparisons rather than the whole picture.

Jan M. Lodal, a former program analysis director for the National Security Council, said U.S. defense thinking should not succumb to cries about such things as larger Soviet nuclear warheads. The United States should buy only the military "forces we need to carry out a rational doctrine, and then present a consistent and positive posture to the rest of the world."

Lodal's testimony, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was part of an attempt being made by a number of persons — so far only feebly — to correct what they see as an imbalance in recent discussion of the Soviet-American military relationship. The committee is looking into strategic questions and weapons systems.

SINCE LAST February, when a Library of Congress study showed growing Soviet military power and the CIA was disclosed to have doubled its estimate of Soviet military spending, there has been mounting publicity for what the latest CIA estimate calls an "increasingly ominous" Soviet arms buildup.

One of those responsible for the publicity, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, told the committee today that most people "appear to hold the view that the strategic nuclear balance is not at this time negative (for the United States) but that, with a continuation of present trends, it would become so soon enough to justify our being concerned today."

There is a public debate over how to react to this, Nitze said.

Lodal deplored the way U.S. strategic options have "become dangerously politicized in the last year or so" by the debate.

He noted that there are "no new or recently discovered Soviet programs which change the basic nature of the strategic relationship . . . rather, what has occurred in recent years is a growing concern on the part of many persons about Soviet purposes and intentions."

THE SOVIET military buildup has been proceeding fairly steadily for a decade, Lodal said. A CIA study made public last week showed an annual increase in military spending of about 3 percent a year during that period.

At the same time, Lodal said, "our defense budgets have fluctuated dramatically, as has our overall position toward the Soviet Union."

"Many of the problems we face today in our relations with the Soviets are, in my opinion," Lodal said, "as much a result of our own policies and instabilities in our own policies and politics as they are of Soviet actions."

Another critic of hawkish alarms, Dr. Sidney D. Drell, deputy director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, said in prepared testimony that each superpower has reason to be concerned about the others weapons developments.

"The over-all scope and intensity of Soviet military programs, their civil defense efforts, and particularly the initiation of (multiple warheads) on their new land-based missiles, are viewed with disappointment by some and with suspicion, if not outright alarm, by others in the United States," Drell said.

BUT "THE SOVIETS have also had cause for concern about U.S. programs" to deploy more multiple warheads and improve missile accuracy, Drell said. "In this atmosphere of mutually aggravated perceptions, prospects for arms control remedies have dimmed."

Both Drell and Lodal denied that the Soviet civil defense program has as great a significance as has been suggested by people like Nitze. Nitze has said the program is seriously undermining the U.S. nuclear deterrent by reducing the vulnerability of the Soviet population.

Any Soviet civil defense program, Lodal said, "is unlikely to be effective against current U.S. forces." Drell made a similar statement and added:

"Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of Soviet civil defense activities is that they might lead their people and even their leaders to believe erroneously that they can really survive a nuclear conflict. Statements in this country enhancing that inaccurate view which ignores all human and physical realities increase that risk."

Rumsfeld Hits Soviets on Buildup

A Hard-Line Valedictory on U.S. Defenses

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
 Washington Star Staff Writer

Two years after the United States asked the Soviet Union for a slowdown in the strategic arms race, the outgoing administration believes there can be no doubt about the answer from Moscow: a resounding "no."

It was in February 1975 that then-Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger made the offer for a mutual slowdown, promising the United States would either build to the limits allowed by arms agreements or slow down itself, depending on the signals received from Moscow.

Speaking in the annual Defense Department report, Schlesinger said then that "how we proceed on these accounts will depend essentially on the actions of the Soviet Union."

Yesterday, Schlesinger's successor as defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, offered the final defense report of the eight years of the Nixon-Ford administrations. In it are some sharply worded verdicts about what the Soviet Union has been up to.

"THE KREMLIN is behaving as though it is determined to increase Soviet military power, whether we show restraint or not," Rumsfeld said.

Rumsfeld took note of the argument that Soviet expansion of strategic nuclear forces could be interpreted as a response to U.S. capabilities. But whatever the reasons for past efforts, he said, "It should now be evident that the Soviets have taken the initiative in a wide range of programs, that restraint on

our part (whatever its reason) has not been reciprocated and is not likely to be, and that the behavior of the Soviets indicates an interest — not in the more abstract and simplistic theories of deterrence — but in developing their strategic nuclear posture into a serious war-fighting capability."

More generally, the Soviet Union, Rumsfeld said at another point, "is without question engaged in a serious, steady and sustained effort which, in the absence of a U.S. response, could make it the dominant military power in the world."

SCHLESINGER'S 1975 offer had come a year after the so-called Vladivostok agreement between the two superpowers. The limits he referred to were those established at Vladivostok: 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, among them 1,320 with multiple war-

Three years later, the United States and the Soviet Union have yet to agree on a new treaty embodying those limits. Rumsfeld says he knows why.

"The reason is clear. Despite repeated U.S. proposals, movement thus far by the Soviet Union has not been sufficient to permit the signature of an agreement that would be in the U.S. national security interest," he said.

The annual defense report is, perhaps second only to the defense budget itself, the chief defense policy justification document of the administration in office. This year's report, issued by an outgoing administration, was a hard-line valedictory intended to influence public and congressional opinion and push the incoming Carter administration in the direction of budget increases the Ford administration has recommended.

ONE ASPECT OF the report likely to draw attention is its repeated assertions that the Soviet Union is committed to nuclear "warfighting" capabilities; that is, the ability to "win" a nuclear exchange by surviving with enough of the population and industrial base to continue as a modern nation.

U.S. nuclear doctrine has long rested on the deterrent of mutual assured destruction; that is, the ability to convince a potential enemy, and the Soviet Union is the only candidate, that U.S. strategic forces can survive a first strike and remain capable of devastating the attacker. Thus, a nuclear exchange is deterred because to initiate one would be to invite assured destruction.

Rumsfeld approvingly quoted a CIA analysis that says, in effect, that Soviet planners aren't falling in with the plan. "The Soviets are committed to the acquisition of 'warfighting' capabilities," a decision which reflects a consensus on the need to assure the survival of the Soviet Union as a national entity in case deterrence fails," said the CIA. "It also accords with a long-standing tenet of Soviet military doctrine that a nuclear war could be fought and won, and that counterforce capabilities should be emphasized in strategic forces."

MOVING FROM THERE, Rumsfeld endorsed the kind of prominently supported by Schlesinger: flexible response.

That doctrine holds that an enemy might be tempted to launch a small, selective attack against, say, American missiles. If the United States had only the options of doing nothing or destroying the industrial and population base of the enemy, it might do nothing since to launch an all-out counter attack would invite similar destruction, according to this reasoning.

Critics say no nuclear conflict could remain limited for long, and that no national leader would accept the terrible damage from even a limited nuclear attack.

Acknowledging uncertainty in any nuclear exchange, Rumsfeld insisted that the United States must retain some less than all-out options. And, he noted, those options are presently

handled with the accuracy and control possible with U.S. ICBMs, the land-based leg of the triad of missiles in silos, bombers and missiles in submarines that make up the U.S. strategic arsenal.

GIVEN SOVIET advances, confidence in the ability of these land-based missiles to survive, and in the options they embody, will begin to wane within a decade, Rumsfeld asserted. Thus, the reasoning went, the Carter administration should go along with the suggestion to accelerate development of a new generation ICBM, called Missile X.

By the end of fiscal year 1977, the outgoing secretary said the United States would have 1054 ICBM launchers compared to 1450 for the Soviet Union, 656 submarine launchers compared to 880 for the Soviet Union, 418 long-range bombers compared to 210 for the Soviet Union. The United States would have 8,500 warheads compared to 4,000 for the Soviet Union.

Rumsfeld argued for other programs, like that for the new bomber, the B1, and for strengthening the conventional forces of the nation in order to increase the responses available short of nuclear war.

A6
WASHINGTON POST*'Worst-Case' Intelligence Hit*

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Official U.S. intelligence estimates reject the "worst case" argument about Soviet military intentions, senators said yesterday after secret testimony from Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush.

However, "there are honest, legitimate bases for disagreement in this area," said Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), who stimulated an inquiry into the current intelligence dispute.

Claims that "political considerations" altered official estimates of Soviet strategic intentions, are unwarranted, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said following three hours of testi-

mony by Bush before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"I'm satisfied, as a member of the Intelligence Committee and as a member of this committee," Case said, that this (political influence claim) is not so."

Bush, who is leaving office as CIA director, was questioned in the controversy over using outside specialists to challenge the official intelligence estimators. The outsiders, labeled Team B, headed by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, essentially took a "worst case" view of Soviet intentions, to prepare for war against the United States.

"I think this is a matter of subjective judgment," Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) said after hearing Bush, who supervised both Team A and Team B.

"There isn't any doubt that the Russians have engaged in a rather substantial military buildup since 1973," Humphrey said. "There has been an upward revision" of U.S. concern about the Soviet buildup, Humphrey added.

"I think the Soviets' competition with the United States is one of catch up, so to speak," Humphrey said. Others argue the opposite, that it is clearly to surpass.

"The Soviets, on balance, have a position of parity with us," Humphrey said. "As for the immediate future I don't think there is any doubt that the United States has the edge. But looking into the 1980s it's questionable whether we can maintain that edge. So that's when the issue

comes as to whether or not the Russians are engaged in a program of military superiority."

Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), when asked if the official estimates turned toward the "worst case" analysis of Soviet intentions as a result of the Team A-Team B competitive analysis, said: "No, I would not say that. I would say there are two clearly delineated points of view," which the committee must now consider.

"The worst case proposition," Javits said, is "that the Russians are striving for superiority." It is countered, he said, by "the general intelligence estimate which would indicate that American policy is proceeding on the right assumptions, that is, that the balance of terror still remains the policy of both countries."

Some critics have charged that the Team A-Team B exercise over-stiffened the estimates which the Carter administration inherits. Humphrey, however, said "I think it's beneficial to have outside critics. It doesn't require that you agree with their analyses, but it does compel you to reexamine your methodology."

Case said the official estimates, "as always, expressed a majority opinion and dissents." He said that "in my judgment the estimates correctly included any propositions by Team B that were regarded by the estimators as important enough to be included."

Percy said he attempted, unsuccessfully, to bring the intelligence judgments onto the public record, because "we ought to tell the Russians what we are concerned about."

STATINTL

What a spy chief should be

By Albert C. Hall

The Director of Central Intelligence is the president's representative for managing intelligence, one of the more complex jobs in the federal bureaucracy. There are upwards of 70,000 people in intelligence with half a dozen agencies involved in collecting and producing intelligence. When an intelligence estimate is made there may be a dozen agencies participating and whose views have to be considered. Important functions of intelligence report to the president through separate Cabinet officers like the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Director of Central Intelligence is not a czar.

Indeed it would be unwise to have one-man control of a function so pivotal to U.S. national security. The effectiveness of the Director of Central Intelligence therefore must stem from his experience and personal expertise, his management ability and his closeness to the president.

In the last 12 years we have had five individuals assigned to this specialized and sensitive post. Two were intelligence professionals, neither of whom was personally close to the president under whom he served. None of the other

three appointees remained in office long enough to master the job.

The Director of Central Intelligence has two major responsibilities. The first is the control of the resources — how should we spend the money we allocate to intelligence. The second is the development of the national intelligence estimates, the intelligence product that is the result of all the collection, correlation, analysis and even guesswork that make up the intelligence process.

Money management is in fair shape primarily because of review and approval procedures instituted five years ago in the Defense Department where three-quarters of the intelligence budget is spent. As a consequence of these reviews, the size of the intelligence program today is approximately half what it was five years ago with savings of more than 50,000 people and the elimination of many marginal efforts. So long as a limit is kept on the intelligence budget and we force a selection of the best among the various alternative collection programs always being proposed, the management of intelligence resources should not be of national concern.

On the other hand, the process that develops intelligence estimates leaves something to be desired. A basic restraint on the process is that both the Defense Department and State Department want their own analysts, in part for reasons of expertise special to the department needs but also because neither department wants to be guided by intelligence estimates which it had no part in preparing.

Therefore, the development of a so-called national estimate produced under the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence involves an intricate coordination process among CIA, State, and Defense. While the process allows for dissent, historically there has developed very strong motivation to develop estimates that all parts of the intelligence community agree upon.

One reason for the motivation is that an agreed-upon product is much less likely to be questioned or challenged by the reader. Since there is unlikely to be any hard data to force a clear distinction between views, the estimates tend to be equivocal and the issues not clearly drawn. Those with different views can often read the estimate to fit their preconceptions,

and busy decisionmakers rarely have enough time to understand the nuances.

What could be done to improve the process?

It seems clear that the coordination process should be less a factor than it has in the past. One way this can be achieved is to establish a board of national estimates separate from any of the agencies involved (State, CIA, or Defense). This board should have access to the collected material and analyses developed anywhere in the community but should have the latitude to draw its own conclusions together with the reasoning supporting them. The board should work for and be responsive only to the Director of Central Intelligence.

A group similar to this used to exist. It was terminated a few years ago because there had been so little new blood introduced that the function had become senile. It could be the time to reconstitute the activity with more careful selection of the experts in the board, continuity, but enough rotation to keep a fresh outlook.

Dr. Hall was formerly U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
19 January 1977

Handicapping the Arms Race

Speaking of the C.I.A. (as we were yesterday on the affair Sorensen), we are still perplexed by the manner in which that once proudly independent agency allowed itself to be drawn into an open debate about the size and shape of the American strategic defense effort.

For reasons that have yet to be explained, the C.I.A.'s leading analysts were persuaded to admit a hand-picked, unofficial panel of hard-line critics of recent arms control policy to sit at their elbows and to influence the estimates of future Soviet military capacities in a "somber" direction. Then, fresh from this inside exercise, the panel — headed by Richard Pipes, a professor of history at Harvard — developed a further report that moved from Soviet "capabilities" to Soviet "intentions." It speculated that Moscow was determined to achieve strategic supremacy and an ability to win a nuclear war by 1985 — not necessarily to wage the war but to intimidate the West. And the essence of the argument, of course, soon appeared in the press, with vague attributions to the C.I.A.

There are two distinct problems here and we ought to keep them apart, even if the C.I.A. could not during the weeks when no one seems to have been in charge in Washington.

The responsibility for evaluating Soviet military capacities belongs in our Government to the Director of Central Intelligence, who is supported by the information and analyses of dozens of sources, in and out of Government. Presumably, no available facts or suspicions are unavailable to this effort. Demonstrably, no serious dissents from these periodic estimates are denied a hearing, in the Government and outside. In particular, there have been ample and sympathetic military channels to the President, the Congress and the public for those who dispute the C.I.A.'s estimate of recent years that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had much hope of soon attaining nuclear "supremacy" in any meaningful sense, even if they had the desire.

There was no need, therefore, to place a panel of members with predictable views on a privileged inside track in this evaluation process, except to give a propaganda edge to a partisan faction. It seems to us not only a wrongheaded but also shortsighted ploy, policy debates that are won by debasing the intelligence currency in which we all must trade will not long count for much or be worth winning.

Now to the heart of the current dispute. Ever since

the humiliation visited upon Nikita Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet Union has been running hard to overtake an American "lead" in strategic nuclear weapons. The Russians are still running, even though we have slowed to a jog. The gap has not been closed, nor will it be in the next year or two. With or without a gap in various technical senses, what already exists is an "essential equivalence" of arms. The Russians possess more missile throw-weight and the United States possesses more nuclear warheads on its missiles, more accurate missiles and more bombers.

By 1985, Russia's big and more accurate multiple warheads and missiles may equal or exceed the destructiveness of the American forces, which rely on bombers to deliver half their payload. They cannot endanger our alert-ready bombers or the missiles aboard submarines, but they may begin to threaten the survival capacity of our fixed Minuteman missiles in underground silos. In other words, they might begin to threaten some of our retaliatory power, assuming a Soviet first strike.

The outgoing Administration, and apparently also the incoming, believe that any current fear of "supremacy" is unfounded. "When casualties will be in the tens of millions," Henry Kissinger has said, it "has practically no operational significance as long as we do what is necessary to maintain a balance."

What is necessary? The Pipes panel, among others, presumably wants a big new effort in strategic weapons to match its "worst case" assumptions about Soviet intentions. It is particularly disturbed by Russian civil defense programs, believing that a capacity to hold down civilian casualties might lead the Soviet leaders, some years hence, to contemplate a first strike against the United States.

Even if these fears are justified, there are ways of adjusting strategy to preserve the threat of comparable casualties. The real problem is the rival build-up of offensive missiles. It is costly and can eventually destabilize the nuclear balance.

That recognition is what led us into the arms limitation talks and agreements of recent years — SALT I and II — which, for all their imperfection, remain the best hope of arresting and eventually reducing the arms race. We welcome debates that will frame our negotiating positions and assist the public in evaluating the results. We deplore any effort to capture the Government's fact-finding machinery for a fleeting advantage in the discussion.

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(BUSH)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS ARE SPLIT OVER WHETHER THE FORD ADMINISTRATION SHOULD HAVE CREATED "B-TEAM" -- AN OUTSIDE BODY OF EXPERTS -- TO CRITIQUE CIA ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS.

THE PANEL PRODUCED SOME STIFF CRITICISM OF CIA READINGS AND CONCLUDED THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES -- NOT JUST NUCLEAR PARITY.

WORD OF B-TEAM'S SECRET EXISTENCE AND OPERATION LEAKED TO THE NEWS MEDIA DEC. 26.

OUTGOING CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH APPEARS TODAY BEFORE A CLOSED SESSION OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TO EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT AND OPERATIONS OF B-TEAM.

KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES SAID THE IDEA ORIGINATED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD WHICH WAS CONCERNED WITH WHAT IT CONSIDERED THE CONSISTENT UNDERESTIMATING OF SOVIET STRATEGIC GOALS BY THE CIA.

BUSH AGREED LAST FALL, THE SOURCES SAID, TO APPOINT AN OUTSIDE BOARD TO CRITIQUE THE CIA'S ESTIMATES. NOW, FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS IN CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT OUTSIDERS ARE WONDERING IF THE B-TEAM EXERCISE WAS WORTH IT.

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NUCLEAR

WASHINGTON (AP) -- MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SAID TODAY THAT DESPITE NEW ESTIMATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS SPENDING MORE FOR WEAPONS, IT IS TOO SOON TO JUDGE WHETHER IT SEEKS NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OR SIMPLY WANTS TO STAY EVEN WITH THE UNITED STATES.

CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH BRIEFED THE COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF SOVIET STRENGTH AND INTENTIONS, WHICH DIFFERS WITH THE RECENTLY-DISCLOSED FINDINGS OF AN INDEPENDENT TEAM OF NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS.

THE NONGOVERNMENTAL TEAM, HEADED BY PROF. RICHARD PIPES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, ADVANCED A WORST CASE THEORY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN AN EDGE OVER THE UNITED STATES IN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OVER THE NEXT DECADE.

THE OFFICIAL, AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED, VIEW IS SAID TO BE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION, BUT ARE COMPLYING WITH AGREEMENTS TO EXPAND NUCLEAR STRENGTH AT A RATE OF ABOUT 18 PER CENT ANNUALLY, ABOUT EQUAL TO THE U.S. RATE.

ULTIMATELY THE COMMITTEE HOPES TO REACH A CONCLUSION ON WHETHER THE SOVIET INTENTION IS NUCLEAR PARITY OR SUPERIORITY, AND DECIDE WHETHER TO RECOMMEND CHANGES IN U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY.

SEN. HUBERT HUMPHREY, D-MINN., SAID THE COMMITTEE HAD RECEIVED FRESH INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF HOW MUCH OF THE SOVIET UNION'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS GOING INTO WEAPONS, AND THE ESTIMATES ARE UP FROM WHAT THEY WERE A YEAR AGO.

HUMPHREY SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AHEAD IN THE ARMS RACE NOW. BUT HE SAID IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A MILITARY BUILDUP SINCE 1973, ESPECIALLY IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY IN WHICH IT HAS LAGGED BEHIND THE UNITED STATES.

LOOKING INTO THE 1980S, ITS A QUESTION WHETHER WE CAN MAINTAIN THAT EDGE, OR ARE WILLING TO MAINTAIN THAT EDGE, HUMPHREY SAID.

THATS WHERE THE ISSUE COMES IN OF WHETHER THE RUSSIANS ARE ENGAGED IN A PROGRAM OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY. I THINK WE CANNOT REALLY DETERMINE THAT. I DONT THINK THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REALLY FEELS THAT IS THE CASE, BUT THERE IS OBVIOUSLY DISSENT WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, SAID HUMPHREY.

SEN. CHARLES PERCY, R-ILL., WHO REQUESTED THE HEARINGS, SAID THE COMMITTEE NEEDS TO GATHER MORE DATA BEFORE MAKING ITS POSITION KNOWN. HE SAID SOME OF THE INFORMATION COLLECTED IN THE HEARINGS MAY BE MADE PUBLIC.

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ON PAGE 1

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
17 January 1977

Soviet taking high, low paths in arms debate

By HAL PIPER

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The Soviet Union has mounted a high-road, low-road campaign to counter American assertions that it is driving for strategic military superiority.

The high ground was occupied over the weekend by a gathering of the "World Forum of Peace-Loving Forces" in Moscow. Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, did not attend, but a speech he had prepared was read. In it he called the arms race "a waste of material and spiritual resources."

The low ground has been a two-week propaganda barrage in the Soviet press and in radio broadcasts impugning the motives and the character of American political and military analysts who have accused the Soviet Union of contributing to the latest spiral in the arms race.

Both responses addressed the growing American political debate on the global military balance. A well-publicized difference between the Central Intelligence Agency's analytical staff and a team of outside experts has raised the question whether the Soviet Union is trying to break free of an existing rough military parity to achieve a superiority that could enable it to dictate its political will to the world in the next decade.

Soviet commentators predictably have come down on the dove side of the argument. They see the debate as timed to exert influence on policy formation in the new Carter administration.

"A flood of militarist propaganda," said the Communist party newspaper *Pravda* last week, is designed to tie "the hands of Carter, who came out for a cut in military spending."

By quoting from Americans on the dove side of the debate, the Soviet commentators argue that the spokesmen for a strong United States defense are out of step with mainstream American opinion.

Soviet pundits accent the positive with daily reminders to Mr. Carter of his campaign promise to cut \$5 to \$7 billion from the defense budget. "Noteworthy is the statement by the U.S. President-elect,"

said *Pravda*, "that the pronouncements [of Mr. Brezhnev] coincide with his own aspirations."

The Soviet press has not dealt in any substantive way with the issue of relative strength raised in the American debate. In a commentary distributed through foreign channels, a Tass commentator, Yuri Kornilov, said that rough parity existed, with the United States ahead in some areas and the Soviet Union in others.

Even that assessment was grayed out to the two words "about equal" when Mr. Kornilov's article was reprinted, otherwise unchanged, for a Soviet readership in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the armed forces daily newspaper.

Otherwise the attack has been almost entirely rhetorical, accusing Gen. Alexander Haig of being tainted by Watergate and relying heavily on words and phrases like "unsavory," "war psychosis" and "anti-Soviet concoction."

The weekend "Forum of Peace-Loving Forces" has been presented as a case of Moscow's doing something for peace while others only talk about it. Representatives from about 120 countries yesterday finished up three days of discussions about the need to control the arms race and methods of mobilizing public opinion.

Mr. Brezhnev's speech was read to the assemblage by Boris N. Ponomarev, the Communist party secretary in charge of relations with Communist parties outside the Soviet Union.

"Our party and the Soviet people together with all the peoples of the world," Mr. Brezhnev said, "are waging and will tirelessly wage a struggle against the stockpiling of more and more armaments."

Letters to The Times

Few writers on the national scene can point to a record of experience and contacts on high (indeed, the highest) in this world than Kraft. With his background and reputation, Kraft obviously deserves to be taken very seriously when he tells us something on a matter of great import. Nothing could be of greater import than Soviet objectives in strategic thermonuclear weaponry.

The trouble is, however, that Kraft doesn't discuss Soviet strategic objectives with us; instead he discusses people and how they view these objectives. And those who view the Soviets as seeking strategic superiority over the United States, or have been critical of U.S. intelligence for not estimating a bigger Soviet buildup, are made out to be something more far out than hawkish. They are "righteous."

While Kraft seems to show some distaste for the behavior of the righteous, of far more concern—since the issue here has to be of the most profound and crucial relevance to U.S. security and survival—than the ways and manners of the righteous is whether the righteous are right. Kraft seems to feel, without coming right out and saying so, that they aren't. But he doesn't tell us why and instead accuses the righteous of peddling their wares to arouse the public, in order to pressure the new administration into countering the supposedly ominous Soviet development.

Kraft brings up Prof. Albert Wohlstetter, who authored a number of articles taking the CIA to task for constantly underestimating Russian strength. Wohlstetter may be tagged by Kraft as righteous, but those who are aware of his writings in this area, also are aware that he has a record of being right. One should note that Kraft doesn't find Wohlstetter to be wrong in his findings; that doesn't even seem to be pertinent. It's that he's one of the righteous; and that's wrong.

We are told that CIA Director George Bush handpicked a team of experts, who, according to Kraft, were also righteous, to check on the CIA. Apparently, the findings of these experts forced the CIA to toughen its estimates of Russian strength. However, what Kraft doesn't tell us is that the Ford Administration—which earlier in the year had waged hot and desperate battle against Ronald Reagan's claims that the Soviets were achieving superiority over the United States—hardly would have appreciated a group whose alleged beliefs were opposed to it coming up with embarrassing findings during an election year.

Maybe Bush should be roundly applauded for insisting on experts who were more concerned with being right than righteous. And, again, Kraft doesn't tell us that the experts were wrong. In fact, if the experts' findings forced a raising of CIA estimates, as Kraft reports, one would suspect that they were indeed right.

Plainly then, Kraft feels that there is something wrong about being right. What seems particularly wrong is when the righteous decide that the American people ought to be told what's right and what's wrong.

The right way to deal with this issue, he tells us, is through "long-term actions"; but, unlike the righteous, he won't confide in us ordinary citizens what these actions are. Or is it that he's afraid we might think him wrong? Perhaps, but we're all together in this business of saving our skins, and if Kraft can tell us all the super-secret inside stuff that goes on in the CIA these days, maybe he also can tell us the way out.

S. T. COHEN
Los Angeles

continued

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

Hazards of Soviet scare stories

By G. B. Kistiakowsky

A heavy rash of scare stories has appeared lately, such as: "Pentagon Fearful of Soviet Effort to Develop Hunter-Killer Satellites," "Carter to get U.S. Study Suggesting Soviets Seek Nuclear Superiority," "Top Secret National Intelligence Estimate Reports the Soviets Seek Military Superiority," and others. Similar but less macabre stories appear usually in the spring when Congress is working on the military budgets. The current crop is out of season, aimed evidently at influencing Jimmy Carter in the selection of his senior appointees and revising his campaign promise to seek the end of the nuclear arms race.

The leaking of sensitive foreign intelligence information by professional superpatriots in and out of the government is not new. In the early '50s the press was flooded with stories of a "bomber gap." The result of the campaign was the buildup of B-47 and B-52 strategic bomber forces, although gradually it came out that the gap was a myth.

In 1957 a major "top secret" study in the executive office of the President reported to him that "evidence clearly indicates increasing threat" of the Soviet Union, which will "become critical by 1959 or early 1960," because the U.S.S.R. will "acquire significant ICBM delivery capability with megaton warheads by 1959." It urged increasing United States military budgets and a multibillion dollar civilian defense program to counter that of the Soviets.

President Eisenhower took unkindly to most of these recommendations, and so the contents of this "Gaither" report were leaked out. They were much used by his opposition in Congress and led to the "missile gap" of 1957-61.

The columnist Joseph Alsop confided to me "positive information" in the spring of 1959 that the Soviets had 150 ICBMs ready to strike the United States. I knew that actually our information (from U-2 flights, etc.) was totally negative, no deployment having been detected, but I could not discuss it. Later Mr. Alsop went public with his "information." Sen. John F. Kennedy used the "missile gap" in his 1960 campaign and in 1961 the strategic missiles program was greatly expanded, although the missile gap was turning out to be a myth.

A couple of years later there was a flurry of stories about the massive Soviet civil defense program that almost resulted in Washington's starting one. Still later stories appeared of a countryside Soviet deployment of an antimissile defense, nicknamed Tallinn, which would defeat American missiles and thus undermine the U.S. posture of secure deterrence. As some in-

telligence analysts asserted throughout, the Tallinn system was only for anti-aircraft defense, but in the meantime the U.S. MIRV program got going. The Soviets followed suit and the MIRVed missiles have now greatly increased the already excessive destructiveness of strategic forces on both sides.

The currently leaked National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was produced with the novel participation of a panel of outsiders chosen, it is said, for their hawkishness. One of the members was Paul H. Nitze, who 20 years ago was a member of the Gaither panel and still earlier authored the "NSC 68," a top secret paper that urged a cold-war posture on President Truman. History does repeat. The now leaked NIE concluded that the Soviets have a new goal of military superiority over the United States, as evidenced by various indicators, such as extensive civilian defense.

A word about the NIEs. Since Soviet society is tightly closed, it is usually possible to estimate only current military capabilities. To project the rates of production of missiles, planes, tanks, etc., into the future and to translate this into Soviet intentions involves largely value judgment. It is in this process that the intelligence community splits, and this time the extreme wing, evidently the Air Force as usual, was reinforced by the outside ultras.

The Soviet leaders make no secret of their desire to spread communism and to make the Soviet Union the world leader. Just as openly Americans pride themselves on being No. 1 and commit themselves to staying there. The real issue is whether the Soviets intend to risk nuclear war by driving for military superiority since the Cuban missile crisis showed how risky it is to bluff with nukes. This intent is firmly denied by the Soviet leaders and is not inferred by experienced analysts of Soviet intentions.

To assess this intent one must bear in mind that strategic weapons deployed by the U.S., half of them totally invulnerable in subma-

rines, would wreak such unimaginably total damage on the Soviet Union that no civilian shelters, grain caches, etc., could make it in any sense the winner of a nuclear war, which would destroy the U.S. as well.

Both sides are pressing hard in the arms race, and the U.S. is not falling behind. Since 1972 it has added about 4,000 strategic warheads while the Soviets added about 1,500, so that now the U.S. deploys about 9,000 to the Soviets' 3,500. The U.S. Navy is second to none, its tonnage being nearly twice that of the Soviet Navy, and the average ages of its ships are lower. This year the CIA stated that no single weapon system of the Soviets is technologically superior to America's. The United States is bordered by friends — not, like the Soviet Union, by potential enemies or allies that need occupation troops to continue being allies.

But the future of the U.S. should not be a fortress existence. The unfortunate result of the current campaign could be another spurt in the arms race, further increasing the likelihood of nuclear war, instead of progressing toward arms control agreements that would provide both sides with secure nuclear deterrence on the road to real peace, as has been advocated by Mr. Carter.

Professor Kistiakowsky of Harvard is a chemist who served as a presidential science adviser, 1957-63, and has received the Medal of Freedom among other honors.

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TAN 16 1977

Soviet Military Goals

A new consensus in the United States intelligence establishment on the military strength and intentions of the Soviet Union will give President-elect Jimmy Carter cause for grave thought when it is presented to him next month.

For two decades it has been assumed by the majority of those in U.S. intelligence, who were evaluating Russian intentions, that the U.S.S.R. was seeking rough parity with this country in its military strength. This was based in great part on the "nuclear umbrella" theory that with each power able to deal the other a devastating nuclear attack that either would be insane to consider such a move.

However, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials now are apprehensive that rather than parity Russia is showing signs of seeking to attain a position of military superiority.

Particularly somber signs from intelligence studies of the Russian program are newly developed guided missiles, a continuing buildup of air defense and a vast program of building underground shelters of the type which would be used in the event of nuclear attack.

The shelter program is perhaps the most ominous sign since it would indicate that Russia is preparing to survive an atomic attack and hence is abandoning in some degree the theory that neither side would resort to nuclear weaponry use because of the retaliatory capability of the other.

For years the intelligence agencies have had a consensus supporting the rough parity theory, even though there have always been some who took a

grimmer view of Russian intentions than the majority. It now appears that the majority is swinging the other way and that those taking a somber view of our future relations with the Soviet Union may be forming a new consensus.

The CIA took a new step this year in preparing its analysis of Russian intentions. In addition to the studies and conclusions of its own people it also created a body of outsiders to evaluate the material which it had and to arrive at its own conclusions. This group, which included retired top military people and American historians of Russia, arrived at much more pessimistic conclusions than the CIA people, and in fact caused some of the CIA experts to amend their thinking on Russia's long-range purposes.

News of the revised view of Soviet intentions seems to have been released to the New York Times and the Washington Post to publicize the new view and to undoubtedly affect the annual battle over the size of our defense budget.

Some Washington circles see it, cynically, as a step made solely to buttress the Pentagon's budget requests. Past history indicates there is some substance to such a thought, all right, particularly since there were some top military people involved in the review of the CIA report. But regardless, we believe there remains a grave question of what the U.S. defense posture should be under the circumstances.

Certainly Mr. Carter will have cause to reflect over his stated goal of reducing defense spending. And it also should be an incentive to our diplomatic corps to try to reactivate Strategic Arms Limitation Conference talks at Geneva.

New Intelligence View: Soviets Push Buildup All Across the Board

By Henry S. Bradsher
 Washington Star Staff Writer

A U.S. intelligence estimate now being completed on Soviet military objectives finds an "increasingly ominous" buildup not only in Soviet strategic weapons but also in conventional arms that never slowed down for detente.

The estimate follows a separate National Intelligence Estimate that was recently completed on Soviet strategic weapons and the Soviet-American strategic relationship. That estimate, which became controversial because it was influenced by outsiders, concluded that the Soviet Union is seeking to attain superiority over the United States in strategic forces over the next decade.

The new NIE has the broader scope of evaluating overall Soviet objectives. It reflects mounting concern in the U.S. intelligence community about the thrust of Soviet military development for the past decade and the continuing buildup in conventional as well as strategic forces, according to informed sources.

THESE SOURCES, who read the highest level intelligence documents, assert that the intelligence community has been hardening its view of a possible Soviet danger over recent years, rather than having been pushed into what the CIA calls a "more somber" outlook by outside pressure.

But the effect of publicity for the examination of strategic weaponry by an outside team headed by Harvard Professor Richard Pipes has been to create a public controversy that has somewhat discredited the development of this grimmer outlook. Some critics of the hardened view have contended that outside hawks have distorted the government's intelligence evaluations.

Informed sources, including senior administration officials outside the intelligence community, deny this.

Even the finding of "increasingly ominous" Soviet trends in the latest NIE does not satisfy some intelligence officers. Although George Bush, the head of the intelligence community as well as CIA director, signed off on that wording some days ago, footnotes with even stronger

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Estimates are written as the collective view of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency at the Pentagon, the State Department's intelligence branch and other units of the government dealing with foreign intelligence. Dissents from them by some of these units are expressed in footnotes.

One footnote to the new NIE expresses a military view that its tone fails to convey strongly enough the Soviet drive for overall military superiority, not just strategic superiority.

Strategic forces include intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers for nuclear attacks on major military targets or cities and industries.

Conventional forces, which also have nuclear weapons, are intended to capture or defend territory. Since conventional forces are considered to be usable when strategic weapons are not, they can be used to exert political pressure in localized situations.

In his farewell State of the Union report to Congress Wednesday President Ford voiced concern about the Soviet-American strategic relationship, while mentioning conventional forces only secondarily.

THE DIRECTOR of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Fred C. Ikle, said Friday that the loss

of U.S. strategic superiority made maintenance of conventional balance more vital.

Sen. Dick Clark, D-Iowa, commented to Ikle at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that anyone who follows the subject must conclude "that the Soviet Union is building up its strategic and conventional weapons in a most disturbing way."

But Clark voiced one of the several common misconceptions about the earlier NIE on Soviet strategic weapons that was influenced by the Pipes committee. Clark had the impression that only the committee thought the Soviets are seeking strategic superiority but that was also the conclusion of the intelligence community staffers who actually wrote the strategic NIE.

Other misconceptions include the idea that the Pipes committee itself wrote the strategic NIE and that the committee pushed the intelligence community into a more hawkish interpretation of the same old evidence. Some old evidence was reinterpreted, but new material has been influential in changing the community's attitude.

PUBLIC DISCUSSION of Pipes' "team B," which worked on strategic intelligence parallel to the community's regular "team A," has created such misconceptions. It has also distressed some senior officials.

One official calls this use of outside evaluators of intelligence "a disaster. It turned into a publicity exercise," with leaks from the seven-man B team picturing it as turning around official thinking on the Soviets.

The decision was made last spring to bring in outsiders because of several factors. One was the new intelligence data, which could be interpreted several ways. Another was the recognition that for many years NIE's had underestimated the Soviet military buildup.

Bush and the National Security Council wanted to see if a group of known hardliners on Soviet-American relations would come up with different results from the same raw material as the intelligence community's staff. Had the staff evaluators become too fixed in their thinking, too inclined to fit new evidence into the same old assumptions without properly re-examining those assumptions?

BUT INSTEAD OF making the broad study expected of it, the Pipes committee built a "worst case" assessment, according to one regular reader of intelligence reports.

Such committee members as Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, who until retirement a year ago headed Defense Intelligence and often argued for tougher evaluations of Soviet intentions, and Paul H. Nitze, a former defense official, "knew where the skeletons were buried" from previous disputes on how to interpret raw material, sources said. They dug up the skeletons in two limited areas, Soviet missile accuracy evaluations and civil defense programs.

From new interpretations on these two limited subjects, they drew what one source called "sweeping conclusions" and another termed "a great leap forward." Some intelligence experts assert that the brief intentions section of the B team's report on Soviet strategic weaponry went much further in ascribing warlike tendencies to the Kremlin than its evidence justified.

BUT THE PIPES team did influence the official NIE writers finally to abandon the long-weakening assumption that the Soviet Union is seeking only to attain parity with the United States in strategic weapons.

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NEW YORK TIMES

15 JAN 1977

Top Arms Aide Disputes Carter On Deadlock in Talks With Soviet

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14—Fred C. Iklé, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, disagreed today with President-elect Carter's view that the Ford Administration was at fault for the failure to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union last year that would limit each side's strategic bombers and long-range missiles.

In a farewell appearance on Capitol Hill, Mr. Iklé told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Russians, being more inflexible than the American negotiators, were more responsible for the deadlock that Mr. Carter has vowed to end with a new strategic arms limitation treaty by next October.

Mr. Iklé, who testified after the committee had unanimously voted approval of Cyrus R. Vance to be the next Secretary of State, also expressed concern over long-range Soviet military objectives, adding fuel to the latest military debate

Soviet Goal Called Superiority

A panel of experts has recently concluded that the Soviet Union is seeking to achieve military superiority over the United States over the next decade. An American intelligence document, known as the National Intelligence Estimate, has also formulated a more sober analysis of the military balance, but, according to Senator Dick Clark, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has not concluded that Moscow is seeking superiority.

Mr. Iklé, refusing to be drawn into the debate over Soviet intentions, asserted that not even Soviet leaders could be sure of what they wanted in the next decade. Nevertheless, he said, "we have to ask whether our long-term objectives for arms control and disarmament are shared by the Soviet leadership."

"We need a healthy sense of realism on this question," he said. "On the one hand we could dangerously deceive ourselves if we took for granted that the Soviet military and political elite share our premises regarding the prevention of war—that is, that they seek a stable or mutually deterring balance the same way we do, and that this consensus will safely override disparities in armaments and differences in political philosophy."

Internal Discord and Election

On the other hand, he said, "we must reject the view that because of these differences in outlook, serious progress in arms control is impossible."

On the negotiations for a new accord limiting strategic arms, Mr. Carter, who had been briefed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, told the Foreign Relations Committee on Nov. 23 that "the talks have in effect been recessed since early last spring or late last winter be-

cause of a disagreement between the Defense and State Departments, and because of the fact that this was an election year."

Mr. Kissinger is known to hold the view that if President Ford had overruled the Pentagon's objections a treaty could have been concluded.

The main disagreements have been whether the new Soviet bomber, known in the West as the Backfire, should be included in the agreed level of 2,400 and whether American cruise missiles of more than 375-mile range should be included. Various approaches to compromise were discussed, and Mr. Iklé said today that the United States offered "five different solutions within as many months." Finally, the Ford Administration proposed that the two vehicles be excluded; the Russians rejected this.

Alluding to Mr. Carter's comments, Mr. Iklé said, "We have often heard the accusation that the Ford Administration or, more specifically, alleged dissension within the Administration is responsible for the fact that some important issues in SALT are still unsettled." He said that the Soviet Union "failed to make any effort to come up with counterproposals of its own which could help to resolve these issues."

Committee members joined Mr. Iklé in expressing concern about Soviet growth in military strength, although there was no consensus on Soviet intentions.

A-2

WASHINGTON POST

15 JAN 1977

Arms Control Chief Thinks Soviets Are Uncertain on Intent

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. arms control director Fred C. Ikle cautioned yesterday against basing American nuclear strategy on estimates of Soviet military intentions, which he said "are not fixed."

"We shouldn't go around asking ourselves, 'are the Russians planning superiority'; 'are they planning a first strike,'" Ikle, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"I think it is an uncertainty in their mind," Ikle said.

The Soviet Union, he said in effect, will do what it believes it can get away with doing, with its actions depending on the strength and capability and will of the United States.

In farewell testimony on his experience and views as director of the arms control agency, Ikle blamed the failure to achieve a new accord in the nuclear Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) on Soviet intransigence, rather than on "alleged dissension within the administration."

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who was in disagreement with the Defense Department and with Ikle's agency on SALT strategy, privately has blamed internal disagreement as a major reason for delay.

President Ford said in a Jan. 7 interview with The Washington Post that "it was a combination" because "We were faced with two problems: one was some honest disagreement within the administration on the one hand; and some nonresolvable differences with the Soviet Union on the other."

Ikle's assertion yesterday was that, if anything, the U.S. position was too flexible, not too firm.

"On the controversial issue of cruise missiles and the new Soviet bomber," Ikle said, "we offered five different solutions within as many

months, between last fall and early spring this year."

"In retrospect," Ikle said, "perhaps we took too many initiatives, giving our adversaries the impression that they could wait us out."

Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), who proposed the hearings which began yesterday, said that "there is honest and strongly felt disagreement on Soviet intentions" among U.S. officials. Percy said he was concerned about reports that the new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate shows that the Soviets are "seeking superiority."

However, Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) said, "It's my impression that the recent Soviet intelligence estimate concludes that the Soviet Union is not trying to achieve superiority," but rather it is "Team B that has come to that conclusion."

In the recent estimating process, a team of outside panelists was used to challenge the views of the official analysts, known as Team A. Percy said the committee will hear outgoing Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush in closed session on Tuesday, to try to clarify the controversy over the top secret estimates.

A principal argument in hardening U.S. estimates of Soviet intentions, Clark noted, is that the Soviet Union is engaged in a massive civil defense program, to survive a nuclear war.

Ikle said the Soviet civil defense is "puzzling and disturbing." But he would "not put so high a priority" on its implications and effectiveness as some U.S. specialists, because no one "could predict what could happen in a mass nuclear war."

However, Ikle said, "We have to ask whether our long-term objectives for arms control and disarmament are shared by the Soviet leadership." That was a central argument of the more pessimistic Team B, in the internal intelligence debate.

Ikle also said the contention is wrong "that U.S. strategic programs drive the arms race, and the Soviets merely respond. The actual record strongly refutes this charge."

Clark disputed Ikle on the record. Ikle said the United States must do its utmost to achieve an effective SALT accord, but also "must be careful not to overdramatize SALT" by believing that the absence of a quick accord means a "go-for-broke arms race... which could quickly take us to war."

A-18

WASHINGTON POST

Two Calls for Joseph Kraft to 'Repent'

Two years ago, Henry Kissinger urged a national debate on "detente," to which the issue of strategic superiority is centrally relevant. This debate has never really got underway because those holding the view that the Soviet Union is not seeking strategic superiority and that, in any case, strategic superiority is meaningless, have been unwilling seriously to address the evidence. Their technique has been either to ignore the statements of those who advance views opposed to their own, to attack their motives, or as a last resort, to accuse them of being unhelpful and of offering no alternative. On the Jan. 4 Op-Ed page of The Post, in a column entitled "Righteous Concern," Joseph Kraft goes even further. He suggests that those prosecuting the opposing side of the debate are engaged in a concerted effort to place the Carter administration under threat of political reprisal.

Many of us believe that this country is in danger and, unless we bestir ourselves, that that danger will increase. Joe Kraft does not discuss whether the available evidence supports that assessment; in fact, he agrees that Soviet military strength is increasing. His attack, and that of many of the others on his side of the debate, is largely directed against the motives of those who believe we should take such assessments seriously and do something about them. Being one of those who take a serious view of our strategic problems, I feel called upon to say a few words in defense of myself and those similarly situated, and, in particular, of the Committee on the Present Danger.

The work to create such a high level, bipartisan committee goes back to 1974 and 1975. The first draft of the Committee's initial statement was circulated to its members in March 1976. On August 23, shortly after the conventions, it was decided to issue that statement on November 11 regardless of who won the election. This we did. A determination to persist in analyzing the evidence and in bringing before the executive, the Congress, and the public, where appropriate, those judgments that the evidence appears best to support cannot justly be said to pose a political threat. On the contrary, the absence of people with such a determination could, in fact, constitute a threat to the essence of the democratic process.

It has been suggested by others—not Joe Kraft—that those holding views such as mine are motivated by venality in being financially interested in increasing armaments or in a search for office. Ever since I first became associated with the Defense Department 15 years ago I have owned no securities of companies doing business with the Defense Department, whether in or out of office. I have never sought office in the executive branch; I have served when asked. I have resigned whenever to continue to serve loyally under direction appeared to me to be inconsistent with my oath of office.

I also consider the complaint to be unwarranted that those who hold views similar to mine have failed to come up with constructive alternatives. In each of the articles I have written on the strategic balance, arms control and related subjects, I have recommended those courses of action that I judged to be prudent and wise.

Since I was one of the earliest opponents of our increasing military commitment in Vietnam, when many of our now leading doves were our leading hawks, Joe Kraft's tag "repenter" is hardly applicable, but neither do I think the tag "righteous" to be fair or illuminating. More importantly, I do not think these pejorative tags are helpful in describing the new top foreign policy, defense and intelligence appointees to the Carter Administration, whom, from long association, I know to be men of character and judgment.

As the reader can by now judge, today I am angry. Tomorrow I will relax and go about the business of continuing as politely and reasonably as possible to support those propositions I believe both to be true and to merit consideration by those who are called upon to concern themselves with U.S. foreign and defense policies appropriate for the future.

PAUL NITZE

Arlington

(The writer is former Secretary of the Navy and Under Secretary of Defense.)

Joseph Kraft's column of Jan. 4 suggests that I am one of a "righteous" group that has suddenly raised "undiscriminating alarms" to block the easing of tensions with Moscow. Instead the "group" should be making "long term constructive proposals" to meet what he recognizes as a growing Soviet military capacity. Specifically he states that I supplied staff support for Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow of the recently formed Committee on the Present Danger; and that articles by me in Foreign Policy started the recent examination of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the Soviet threat. The results of that inquiry by an independent team picked by the CIA director, he says, have been leaked in a way to exaggerate the menace. He contrasts this "righteous group" with the "repenters" (such as Harold Brown, Theodore Sorensen and Cyrus Vance), whose appointment by Carter, he believes prompted the "righteous" suddenly to go public. In the new administration the only "right" name in any important spot he says is Zbigniew Brzezinski.

I doubt that any of the serious men

he mentions fit such simple minded opposites as righteous-repenter, hawk-dove, good guy-bad guy or the like. If there are two "groups" that contrast less starkly and in different terms they are far from tightly linked and uniform internally. Harold Brown, for example, cautioned us recently about declining U.S. defense budgets and the large and increasing Soviet defense effort. As for myself, Mr. Kraft was simply wrong in saying that I supplied staff support to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Rostow, or Mr. Nitze. Nor am I a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. I had no part in the team that recently took an independent look at past and present national intelligence estimates. Nor have I seen their report.

14 JANUARY 1977

Charles W. Yost

The greatest challenge

Washington
Philip Gibbs, the celebrated World War I correspondent, once reported a curious incident which occurred on the Western front at a point where the opposing lines were close to each other and no-man's-land was narrow:

Above the German trench was lifted one day a large sign proclaiming: "The English Are Fools." The English, of course, peppered it with machine-gun fire. A moment later, however, another sign was raised reading: "The Germans Are Fools."

The English were puzzled. Finally a third sign was raised: "We're All Fools. Let's Go Home."

Unfortunately nobody did go home until November, 1918, after 39 million had been killed in an avoidable and useless European civil war which, in addition to its immediate casualties, spawned communism, nazism, and World War II.

This story comes to mind as one reads the recent deluge of published or leaked "intelligence" reports emanating from the "Committee on the Present Danger," from a recently retired Air Force general, and from an outside panel commissioned by the CIA to review intelligence estimates concerning Soviet capabilities and intentions.

These are not actually "intelligence" reports in the sense that they convey new information about what the Soviets are doing and planning. They are ideological theses setting forth biased evaluations of information which has long been available and which has in the past been interpreted otherwise.

Most of the members both of the Committee on the Present Danger and the CIA's team of outside consultants have been prone for many years to extravagant interpretations of Soviet intentions. They are about as capable of objective judgment on these matters as the Soviet general staff would be about U.S. intentions.

For instance, these experts have recently become much concerned about the Soviet civil defense program and claim it indicates that the Soviets not only contemplate nuclear war but expect to be able to survive it. This is, of course, one possible interpretation. But a more plausible one would seem to be that the Soviets, having lost 20 million people in the last war, are trying to limit casualties in another if it should tragically occur.

Moreover, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Soviet or any other feasible civil defense program would, in case of general war, prevent enormous loss of life, enormous destruction of industry and trans-

port, and enormous disruption of entire social systems.

Soviet leaders have for many years been acutely aware of these hard facts and, however ambitious they may be, are extremely unlikely to run the risk of such catastrophic consequences to themselves for the highly problematical gains a nuclear war might bring.

On the other hand, Soviet leaders have been persistently culpable, as in many cases U.S. leaders have been, in proceeding with buildups of both nuclear and conventional forces which cannot be justified as necessary to defense and which give grounds for the charge that they are seeking not parity but superiority. The stupid lengths to which the Soviets carry secrecy enables critics to level the most extravagant charges against them without refutation.

It unfortunately seems improbable that Soviets and Americans will decide one fine morning that the whole costly, dangerous, and useless competition in arms is simply foolishness and should be ended.

The next best recourse is to get on, far more vigorously and speedily than in the past, with the negotiation of strategic, conventional, and naval arms-reduction agreements and with the exercise of rigorous reciprocal restraint in the introduction of new weapons systems.

This will be the first and most important problem in foreign and military affairs which the new administration will face. On its response to this challenge is likely to rest, most of all, the judgment of history about it.

Our inveterate hard-liners, having blown up the Soviet menace to unreal proportions, can be counted on to oppose any arms-control agreements or any reciprocal restraints which are not so heavily weighted in America's favor as to be wholly unattainable.

What else do they have to offer? Some utopia in which the United States is so clearly superior in all categories of arms that no one dare challenge us? That the Soviets have both the will and ability to prevent such American predominance is entirely clear from the history of the last 15 years.

No, what the hard-liners are in fact offering the American people, as the alternative to realistic arms control, is an endless escalation of ever more sophisticated, destructive, and expensive weapons on both sides, ending all too probably, whatever may be the intentions of either, in nuclear war.

Who would then be left to raise out of the cellars the sign: "We're All Fools. Let's Go Home"?

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REPORTS • NOTES • COMMENT • REPORTS

OPERATION BLUDGEON

As the New Year got under way, it became known in Washington that the Central Intelligence Agency had put out another "top secret report"—in fact, two reports, both on the same theme: the "Soviet threat."

Such "top secret reports" are a regular December feature designed, as Washington news analyst Murray Marder puts it, "to reinforce the defence budget." Come December, the CIA is bound to raise the "Soviet threat" scare. But as astoundingly naive as CIA logic is, the people behind it are by no means simpletons. They are past masters at repeating the same old arguments "over and over until they penetrated the public consciousness," as the Washington Post said.

This time they decided to hammer in two reports, just to make sure there are no doubts left.

Nevertheless the credibility of the CIA is being questioned—and questioned primarily in the United States itself, where informed people have learned to see through the "national intelligence estimates." "Apparently there is a major effort under way to re-create the atmosphere of the 'missile gap' days of 1960," Thomas A. Halsted, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, said. (It should be recalled that at that time John Kennedy fell for this contention, but later admitted no such "gap" had existed.) In the opinion of Jeremy J. Stone, Director of the Federation of American Scientists, "the predictable result of the current exaggerated reports" of Soviet armed strength "will be a wholly unnecessary increase in our defence budget."

President-elect Carter, who is to enter upon office on January 20, has on repeated occasions promised to reduce military spending by \$5,000-7,000 million, and voiced his determination to conclude at the earliest date a new agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation. Such intentions evidently go against the grain of certain elements in both the CIA and the Pentagon who are trying to press upon the new Administration the old militarist policy of confrontation with the U.S.S.R. at all costs, not stopping at outright falsification such as the provocative "experiment" with the two latest reports which in the United States itself have been described as a "bludgeoning exercise."

The exercise has so many loose ends that the experimenters have not been able to give it even a semblance of credibility. Donald H. Rumsfeld, the outgoing Defence Secretary, is reported to have said that he "read the most recent national intelligence estimates about the Soviet build-up and found nothing new in them in the sense of any spectacular advance in weaponry." He even admitted that the U.S.S.R. was living up to the Vladivostok understanding. But at the same time, so as not to spoil things for those who have again trotted out the "Soviet threat" bogey, he maintains that the U.S. could not feel secure if the Carter Administration reduced military spending.

The "Soviet threat" is not an episodic thing like December snow on the Potomac which melts as soon as it falls. The threadbare propaganda canard is systematically released by the CIA to the accompaniment of the rolling of Pentagon guns and the rustle of dollars going down the military-spending drain. Behind the two CIA reports there are dozens of Pentagon military programmes.

Speaking of reports, mention should be made of one that has regrettably been overshadowed by the above-mentioned two. It is a study put out by the Brookings Institution showing that since 1943 the U.S. has on 215 occasions resorted to armed force to back its foreign policy actions, and in 33 situations threatened to use nuclear weapons, twice against the Soviet Union.

One could supply the votaries of "top secret" reports with weighty, authoritative documentation proving that the U.S.S.R. has never planned to attack anyone and does not intend to do so now. However, this is hardly necessary, for the fabricators of the endlessly recurring "Soviet threat" myths hardly believe themselves what they are trying to hammer into the public consciousness. But it is in place to remind those in the CIA who are engaged in engineering political assassinations and coups in other countries, those who have chosen as their target détente and peaceful co-operation and good-neighbourship among the nations, that what they are doing borders on political crime.

V. KUZNETSOV

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

WASHINGTON POST

14 JAN 1977

'Preemptive Leaking'

We have it from outgoing intelligence chief George Bush that "the worst thing" he could do would be to discuss publicly "sensitive conclusions of national intelligence estimates." He said so on "Face the Nation" by way of fending off questions on the controversy over the CIA's "somber" new estimate of the Kremlin's strategic aims.

But surely Bush has got it upside down. Especially at this moment when, fairly or not, the integrity if not the competence of the intelligence estimating process has come into question, talking straight to the people might be the best thing an intelligence chief could do.

Who, after all, should be better qualified to lay out the kinds of evidence that go into estimates, the different methods of assessment, and the choices thus offered to policy-makers? Bush is the one official in government who, by his position, not only has the facts available to him but, presumably, is not under a temptation to bend the facts to support any one department's budget request or policy preference.

Bush notes that he has a duty to protect intelligence "sources and methods." Quite so. But like a lot of other Washington journalists, I have been hearing for years about some of these "sources and methods," and I am persuaded that—with rare exception—virtually everything I have heard could be released, and on a timely basis, without harm.

Prompt disclosure could have other public benefits. For instance, I recently heard a knowledgeable official reporting, off the record, certain intelligence findings about Soviet military activities. A few days later, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared in a public speech that "the facts drive one to the clear conclusion that the United States must act now and in the future to reverse these adverse trends by providing real increases for national security."

A white-hot branding iron could not draw from me the substance of those off-the-record ruminations. I violate no confidence, however, by reporting that the "facts" that were adduced off the record did not point to anything near what I would call a "clear conclusion," one way or the other. They point to a judgment call. Maybe Rumsfeld's right about our defense needs. My point is that, even when you toss in the evidence I heard privately, he has not made the case he asserts publicly. This, I would argue, the public has a right to know.

The incoming Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, I might add, is not necessarily an improvement in this regard. True, he does not come to these questions cold. But even before he has had the chance to study the new estimates, or to order up his own, he declares that there is a need for "real growth" in U.S. military programs. Again, maybe Brown is right. But he does not build confidence in either the intelligence process or the budget-making process by sounding off without demonstrating to the public the basis on which his judgments are made.

In fact, the real argument is not over what should legitimately be kept secret but over the terms of disclosure. We journalists don't know what we don't know, but we do know that most material offered up for our off-the-record elucidation will sooner or later—usually sooner—turn up in the public domain. Either it's furnished openly by officials with an ax to grind, or it's leaked by those same officials, often to journalists who play that leak with an eye to rendering themselves available for the next.

Bush, pronouncing himself "appalled" by the latest leaks on the intelligence estimates, says "there's little we can do about it." But there's plenty he and other officials can do about it. They can make a fresh estimate of what the public is entitled to know.

They can help demystify intelligence by cutting back the misguided and often self-serving tendency to regard both process and product as matters too sensitive to be shared with those in whose name they are justified.

The executive branch clings to the notion that intelligence is its own property, to be disclosed or withheld on its own judgment. The new Congress presumably will address this untenable contention more diligently than its predecessors. I would note here only that the executive should understand that the Congress, with its own procedures for discretion, can serve as a useful halfway house, as a good place to air information not regarded as fit to be let loose on the street.

The Pentagon already puts out an annual "posture statement" on American forces. Why not a parallel statement on Soviet forces? From time to time now the CIA publishes monographs; one came out just this week on Soviet military spending. Why not take the leap and publish a full-scale analysis?

True, information is power, and it can be used for smaller personal and bureaucratic purposes as well as larger national ones. The best way to balk "damaging" leaks of special-interest material, however, is to make a broad range of material available routinely in a context devised not by the special interest but by the government itself. Call it preemptive leaking, or public information.

Bush says he's learned that "intelligence-estimating isn't all that hard"—that is, estimates are not firm, they're "judgmental." But this is no reason to spare the public exposure to the exercise. It is not as though most people cannot cope with the idea that it's hard to pin down developments in the future. Of course they can cope. Advocates of "open government," please take note.

Senate unit hears Brown today

Washington (AP)—The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee predicted yesterday that the panel will recommend approval of Harold Brown as President-elect Carter's secretary of defense.

"I think it will be a favorable vote," Senator John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), the committee chairman, said at a news conference after a closed meeting of the panel.

Mr. Brown testified in a five-hour open session Tuesday and was scheduled to resume his testimony behind closed doors yesterday after Central Intelligence Agency officials briefed the committee.

However, the CIA briefing took all day

and Mr. Stennis said the questioning of Mr. Brown and Charles Duncan, Jr., his designated deputy, would resume today instead.

Mr. Stennis said the CIA briefing concerned, among other matters, a recent CIA estimate of Soviet defense spending. The CIA reportedly concluded that the Russians were outspending the United States by about 40 per cent, compared with previous estimates of 50 per cent.

The committee chairman said information obtained in the briefing might prompt some questions for Mr. Brown when the secretary-designate returned. Mr. Stennis said the Brown hearings may be completed today.

STATINTL

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 13 Jan
Item No. 1
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DISTRIBUTION II

UP-030

(CARTER)

(BY CHERYL ARVIDSON)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- PRESIDENT-ELECT JIMMY CARTER AND HIS NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM MET WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TODAY FOR A TOP SECRET BRIEFING ON SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND THREATS TO THIS COUNTRY.

CARTER AND THE BERIBBONED MILITARY OFFICERS WERE JOINED AROUND AN OVAL TABLE AT BLAIR HOUSE BY VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT WALTER MONDALE; CARTER'S CABINET NOMINEES AND OTHER TOP CARTER AIDES FOR A FOUR-HOUR SESSION.

A CIA STUDY WARNED CONGRESS EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT "SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES OVERALL ARE GROWING AND CURRENTLY ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES."

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID THE MILITARY CHIEFS, ARMED WITH THICK BRIEFING BOOKS AND CHARTS, WERE PREPARED TO GO INTO DETAIL ON EVERY ASPECT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS AS WELL AS A "THREAT BRIEFING" ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

AIR FORCE GEN. GEORGE BROWN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, CARRIED TWO THICK, RED LOOSELEAF BINDERS UNDER HIS ARM AS HE ENTERED BLAIR HOUSE.

OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS ARE NAVY ADM. JAMES HOLLOWAY; MARINE GEN. LEWIS WILSON; AIR FORCE GEN. DAVID JONES AND ARMY GEN. BERNARD ROGERS.

MONDALE, AN EARLY ARRIVAL IN THE MORNING COLD, PAUSED BRIEFLY BEFORE GOING UP THE STEPS TO TELL REPORTERS THAT CARTER LAST NIGHT BEGAN A SERIES OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS WHOM THE NEW VICE PRESIDENT WILL VISIT FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION TO EXPLAIN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY POLICIES.

IN A BREAKFAST SESSION EARLIER, CARTER MET WITH HAMILTON JORDAN, OUTGOING DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ROBERT STRAUSS, FORMER MAINE GOV. KEN CURTIS AND PHIL WISE. CURTIS, WHO IS EXPECTED TO BECOME DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, TOLD REPORTERS AS HE WAS LEAVING THAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE TRANSITION AT THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE AND THAT CARTER HAD TOLD HIM HE WOULD BE HAPPY "IF I DID HALF AS GOOD A JOB AS BOB STRAUSS".

TOP SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

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NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 12 Jan ⁷⁷

Item No. 3

Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION I

FBIS 27

L'HUMANITE CRITICIZES CIA SOVIET ARMS DATA

LD121259 MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1200 GMT 12 JAN 77 LD

(TEXT) REPORTING THE PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT BY THE AMERICAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON THE MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, PARIS' L'HUMANITE STRESSES THAT THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS TAKEN UP THE BANNER OF THE FULL-SCALE CAMPAIGN TO EXAGGERATE THE SO-CALLED SOVIET MILITARY THREAT. THE CIA DATA ON THE USSR'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE, THE PAPER POINTS OUT, ARE SPUN OUT OF THIN AIR IN ORDER TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND FORCE IT TO INCREASE MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND RESORT TO BLACKMAIL AS REGARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

12 JAN 1422Z JN/CRJ

Comment:

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the CIA Operations Center and of the appropriate analytic component in the Agency.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
12 JANUARY 1977

Soviets Pressing Carter for Quick Detente Moves

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The old guard in Moscow and the incoming new guard in Washington are both talking about reducing tensions and making new arms control agreements, but a note of haste and of anger exists in recent Soviet comments.

The Kremlin has been trying to rush the Carter administration into quick decisions on major Soviet-American questions while blaming the outgoing Ford administration for a cooling of relations between the superpowers.

The accusations escalated last week with attacks on the recently disclosed U.S. intelligence report saying the Soviet Union is seeking military superiority, rather than just parity. Soviet media pictured the report as a Ford administration attempt to prejudice the new administration's relations with Moscow.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, Cyrus R. Vance, the secretary of state-designate, avoided commenting on the report. Instead, he stressed the importance of working for reduced tensions with the Soviet Union, "particularly in the area of the reduction and control of nuclear weapons."

VANCE SAID the United States should seek a clear understanding with Moscow on the meaning of detente — a word that he said should be restored to useage after President Ford dropped it under political attack last year. The understanding should

cover how each side perceives detente to work and what the ground rules are.

The Soviet Union has always insisted that detente does not prevent it from helping revolutionary movements abroad, although its help in Angola was seen here as an erosion of detente.

Now the Kremlin is eager to reach quick agreements with the new administration without lengthy debate of the meaning of detente or the complexities of arms control. Just what top Soviet leaders hope to gain from this pressure is not clear.

But the fact that their average age is over 70 and the Brezhnev era in Soviet affairs might be coming to an end, while a vigorously youthful Carter is beginning four years in office, could be a pressure on them that

SOVIET LEADERS might also hope that quick decisions will enhance the possibility of American

agreement of restrictions on new weapons. For instance, the U.S. cruise missile that has contributed to the inability to draw up a new strategic arms control treaty — SALT II — is moving rapidly toward full-scale testing and deployment that the Soviets want to block.

Soviet negotiators have shown no inclination, however, to offer any compromises that might be balanced against the U.S. concessions they are seeking. The Kremlin pressure also could be intended to push this country into seeking a quick SALT II treaty — SALT I expires in October — without trying to outwait Soviet stalling on mutual concessions.

Calls for a quick thawing on frozen Soviet-American problems began in the official Soviet press several weeks ago. Then the Moscow media added the element of blaming the Ford administration for the freeze, signaling an abandonment of hope of doing any further business with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and a switch of public affections to the new team in Washington.

"THE OUTGOING Republican administration is trying to leave its mark on U.S. foreign policy and to consolidate in it those negative traits and moments which manifested themselves, especially last year, the pre-election year," an editorialized dispatch from the Washington bureau of the official Soviet news agency Tass said last week.

The Soviet Communist party's general-secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, reacted to the reported intelligence estimate and other public discussion in the United States of Soviet military intentions by denying in an interview published by Pravda that his country threatens anyone or would attack anyone.

Such statements are frequently made by Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders.

BREZHNEV ALSO expressed an aggrieved surprise at what he called

"one noisy campaign after another" in the West about the military situation.

The hardened estimate of Russian intentions is seen in Soviet media commentaries as a continuation of the alleged Ford effort to blight peaceful relations. It was not until last Thursday, however, that the Soviet public began to receive from the media a vague idea of the new estimate.

The Soviet defense ministry newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) referred to the new estimate in sarcastic terms. It carefully avoided commenting directly on the Soviet-American military balance or discussing the distinction between parity and superiority, however. For internal consumption the Kremlin always emphasizes that the Soviet armed forces are growing stronger, but comparisons with foreign forces are never made.

The government newspaper Izvestia accused the Ford administration of "a tactic of faits accomplis in the field of increasing military expenditures and of developing and deploying new, expensive systems of nuclear missile weapons . . . (It) wants by this means to exert pressure on J. Carter's new administration and to prevent the new president from fulfilling the promises he made during the election campaign to bring about a certain reduction in military expenditures."

A senior administration official notes that a Soviet turning against an outgoing administration and picturing the new one as a better hope is not new.

When Dwight D. Eisenhower came into office in 1953 a similar thing occurred, but after the May 1, 1960, U2 incident the Soviets shunned him and turned to John F. Kennedy as a better hope. The Kremlin had virtually abandoned Lyndon B. Johnson before Richard M. Nixon was inaugurated in 1969.

What's News—

* * *
World-Wide

Harold Brown disagreed with the contention of some intelligence experts that the Soviet Union is seeking military superiority. The Defense Secretary-designate said the U.S. has the ability to devastate the Soviet Union if attacked and should concentrate on maintaining that capability; he doubted reports that Russia has an advanced civil defense system. Brown favored new attention to conventional weapons, particularly the Navy's, but said he will try to hold down personnel costs.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 JANUARY 1977

SENATORS QUERY PENTAGON-DESIGNATE

Brown Calls U.S. as Strong as Russia

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Grim intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities are misleading and—if widely believed—could damage the nation's foreign relations, Secretary of Defense-designate Harold Brown said Tuesday.

In answering questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on his appointment, Brown said that the United States was at least as strong as the Soviet Union in strategic weapons.

"At present the Soviet Union could not attack the United States without our being able to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow that would destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning society," he said.

Brown was questioned about a secret—but widely leaked—report prepared for the CIA by a panel of non-government experts headed by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes. The panel concluded that the Russians were striving for strategic superiority that would permit them to win a nuclear war.

Intelligence sources say that the Pipes panel was established to draft a "worst case" study that would make sure U.S. policy-makers, while attempting to achieve detente, did not underestimate Soviet capabilities or intentions.

"If it were perceived, even mistakenly believed, by a large part of the world that the U.S. was strategically inferior in terms of nuclear arms to the Soviet Union, that might have a political effect (on U.S. foreign policy)," Brown said.

"For that reason, I think that the so-called conservative estimates or 'worst case' estimates of Soviet vs. U.S. capability at this point do not do a service to American political strength throughout the world.

"I think that taking the opposite tack, a too optimistic appraisal of Soviet capabilities, is also very dangerous," he added. "But everybody can see that."

Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.) told Brown it was possible the Kremlin "might be prepared to take the risk" of starting a nuclear war.

"If they were prepared to take that risk and they took it, senator, I think that would destroy this country and the Soviet Union," Brown responded. "I think we have to make sure they don't misperceive our capability."

Brown discounted concerns, most often expressed by conservatives, about Soviet civil defense efforts and about the Russians' "Backfire" bomber.

He agreed that a really effective civil defense program might affect the strategic balance by permitting one side to survive a nuclear exchange that would wipe out the other side.

But he said, "I'm not convinced that such a program is reliably available to either side nor am I convinced that the Soviets have gotten very far on it."

As for the Backfire, a supersonic bomber that the Air Force has cited as a reason for going ahead with production of the American B-1 bomber, Brown said that the

Russian craft was inferior to U.S. B-52s in terms of range and payload.

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) challenged Brown to repeat that the new Backfire was less capable than "the 20-year-old technology" of the B-52. Brown did just that.

The committee, which plans to discuss Brown's nomination in a closed session today, is expected to approve the appointment soon after the inauguration of President-elect Jimmy Carter on Jan. 20.

Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) said that Brown would have little trouble meeting the committee's rules against conflicts of interest. But Stennis said that Charles Duncan, Carter's choice for deputy secretary of defense, had a somewhat "more complex" problem. Duncan reportedly owns \$14 million worth of stock in the Coca-Cola Co., which does millions of dollars worth of business with the Defense Department every year.

Stennis said he assumed Duncan could dispose of his stock or take some action that would avoid any conflict.

Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) told Brown that the Pentagon must take additional steps to prevent conflicts of interest by military and civilian officials who go to work for defense contractors after dealing with those firms for the Defense Department.

Metzenbaum asked Brown if he would require procurement officials to sign a pledge that for two years after leaving the military they would not join a firm that contracted with the Defense Department. Carter has said he will require a similar pledge from officials of civilian regulatory agencies.

"I believe you have identified a genuine problem,"

Brown said. "I doubt if you have identified a solution."

But when Metzenbaum pressed the issue, Brown promised to "think about your questions; there may be some variation of it that would make it work."

In other hearings on Carter appointments Tuesday:

—The Senate Agriculture Committee quickly approved the selection of Rep. Bob Bergland to be secretary of agriculture after the Minnesota Democrat said that support and loan rates for farm crops were unrealistically low but indicated any increases would be linked to a new system of crop reserves to be held by farmers.

—Charles L. Schultze, Carter's choice to head the Council of Economic Advisers, told the Senate Banking Committee that the nation's economy should begin improving by late spring if Carter's economic proposals were approved quickly.

Schultze said the first impact of the proposed stimulus would be an increase in retail sales. He cautioned that the nation should not expect a sharp drop in unemployment right away. He said the jobless rate would begin to decline later in the year.

BROWN WOULD TRIM DEFENSE COSTS IN '79

Secretary-Designate Says at a
Senate Hearing That Savings
Could Be \$5 to \$7 Billion

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11 — Harold Brown, the designated Secretary of Defense, said today that he believed United States military spending could be safely reduced by from \$5 billion to \$7 billion annually through "savings" and "management," but not until the fiscal year 1979.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on confirmation of his appointment by President-elect Carter, Mr. Brown said he and Mr. Carter intended to make the reductions without trimming combat forces.

"The president and I agree there is a certain amount of waste" in defense expenditures that could be "squeezed out" of the "base structure and personnel costs."

A new Central Intelligence Agency estimate that Soviet defense spending is 40 percent higher than that of the United States was not touched on in the hearing.

The agency said its estimate was more conservative than last year's, in which it assessed Soviet spending, in terms of the dollar cost of the Soviet defense effort, at nearly 50 percent higher than American outlays.

Bases for Estimate

The C.I.A. attributed the shift to a 6 percent downward revision of estimates of Soviet defense manpower, elimination of double counting on military construction, and refinement of cost estimates. It also revised some American cost indicators. It put the latest total estimate of Soviet defense expenditures at \$120 billion for 1976.

Mr. Brown was questioned repeatedly on his views about Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, in the light of the latest C.I.A. estimate of Soviet goals, which is officially described as "somber."

The nominee, who was Secretary of the Air Force in the Johnson Administration, replied: "I think the Soviets are ahead in many categories. We are ahead in some. Over all the United States is not behind. But clearly the Soviets have improved."

Mr. Brown said: "At present the Soviet Union could not attack the United States without our being able to deliver a devastating retaliatory blow destroying the functioning of a modern society."

Was there strategic parity between the two superpowers, he was asked by Harry F. Byrd Jr., the Virginia independent.

"I think they are comparable now," Mr. Brown replied. "Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7" range essential parity can be said to exist."

NEW YORK TIMES

He said, "So-called conservative or worst-case estimates do not do a service to American friends around the world and too optimistic estimates are also a disservice."

Mr. Brown belittled reports of massive improvements in Soviet civil defense programs for shelter against nuclear attack, saying, "I believe civil defense efforts can be overcome by retargeting" of American missiles.

Mr. Brown also termed "almost laughable" an assertion by Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who retired last week as Air Force chief of intelligence, that senior United States officers were barred from speaking out about strategic views that diverge from the official Administration line.

Questioned on specific United States defense issues, Mr. Brown said he needed "more than 10 days" to decide what the Carter administration should do about the B-1 bomber project.

He said it was his "bias—a preconceived notion, a good idea in general to have a bomber component of the strategic force" along with intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles. He also noted that the 22-year-old B-52 bomber was an "aging" system.

But Mr. Brown said he was reserving judgment because of the "very high cost" of the B-1—which would cost close to \$23 billion for 244 planes. He said he would also judge the B-1 against alternative strategic delivery systems such as cruise missiles.

He said he felt strategic systems had drawn too much attention lately and that "we must pay attention to conventional forces."

A relaxed witness, Mr. Brown wore a red silk handkerchief in his breast pocket and crooked his left arm behind the back of his chair as if in a college seminar. He fielded questions with aplomb, but with a measure of caution.

He said a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union was desirable at least because it would serve to hinder other countries from "developing their own nuclear programs," and also because it would prevent "pressure" from developing for elimination of the 1972 Soviet-American treaty limiting antiballistic missiles.

12 JAN 1977 STATINTL

Crunch Decisions for Mr. Carter

Very soon after taking office next week, President-elect Carter will be confronted by strategic decisions that could profoundly affect military and foreign policies for his entire administration. He inherits an intelligence community fiercely divided over the Soviet Union's intentions. In the ascendancy is the somber view that the Soviets are driving for military *superiority* over this country rather than the *parity* that has provided the rationale for detente.

President Ford, in his farewell budget, is expected to use this grim assessment to advocate acquisition of three major weapons systems—the MX missile, the B-1 bomber and the sea-launched cruise missile. If Mr. Carter wants to modify the Ford proposal, he will have to act expeditiously. The new administration may have to testify as early as next month on funding for weapons systems. In addition, Mr. Carter has talked about the probability of a meeting in eight months with Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev that presumably would focus on a SALT II signing.

So far, the incoming President has given the impression that he would resist any major increase in military spending or any decisions that would torpedo chances for a SALT II agreement. He talked during the campaign about a reduction of \$5 billion to \$7 billion in spending, a pledge now turned into a search for efficiencies in an inevitably rising budget. He has put a "priority" label on SALT. And when asked the day after Christmas about the Soviet drive for "superiority," he replied that "we're still by far stronger than they are in most means of measuring military strength."

On the surface, this should be reassuring to those who question how much "security" the country gets from the billions spent on excess

overkill. But Mr. Carter has characteristically left himself an opening. He spoke only of the present arithmetic in the American-Soviet military equation though the current debate rages around conflicting assessments of trends and Soviet intentions.

In terms of "real" spending, pessimists feel the Russians curve is up and the American curve is down. This eventually could mean Soviet "superiority." They fear, too, that the Kremlin is not daunted by the idea of a war limited to strikes against nuclear targets instead of urban populations. If true, this would upset the U. S. assumption that a strategic nuclear exchange is unthinkable because both sides realize their populations would be vulnerable to "mutual assured destruction."

James R. Schlesinger was fired, as Defense Secretary in the Ford administration because he advocated costly "counterforce" weapons that would enable the United States to retaliate in kind against a Soviet strike on American nuclear weapons targets. But this did not halt unrest in the defense community that has led to a tough new official estimate of Soviet strength. This estimate will place enormous pressures on Mr. Carter, not least because he has welcomed Mr. Schlesinger into his administration and has said he is much impressed by his intellect.

Unless the incoming President is confronted with unassailable evidence of danger, he should mark time as best he can on major weapons systems and pursue strategic arms negotiations until he can get his own outlook of Soviet strategy. Both superpowers, in our view, face a less secure future if they waste themselves in bipolar confrontation instead of pursuing their mutual interest in dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

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11 JAN 1977

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Joseph C. Harsch

A fiasco in intelligence

According to current news reports President-Elect Jimmy Carter will find on his desk when he comes to Washington a radically revised estimate of the military capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union toward the United States.

According to the revised estimate, the Soviets are driving not for equality but for superiority and this drive, unless promptly and adequately countered, could lead to a disaster for the world position of the United States and its alliances.

The change in estimates, it is reported, is regarded as a tremendous victory for the "hawk" faction in the defense community in Washington.

This is the surface of a fascinating story about the gathering and use of intelligence in Washington. The story dates back to 1951 when the new Eisenhower administration was settling into the management of American affairs. At the Central Intelligence Agency, then in its infancy, the new director, Allen Dulles, accepted a recommendation that a group of eminent outside experts be employed to check over the estimates prepared within the agency.

The result was a panel of some 15 outsiders, mostly from university centers. Three or four times a year these people would come to Washington to review the work of the people inside government responsible for making up the national estimates on which strategy and policy are based. The panel was made up of people chosen for their objectivity. There were no zealots among them.

The existence of that system has never been disclosed or publicly known until the present controversy erupted. The system operated from 1951 until 1972. During that entire time there was never a single "leak" about its existence, its work, or its influence on the national estimates. Under this system the estimates were based on "evidence available from all sources with no vested interest in either foreign policy or military policy and no bias except toward establishing the truth as well as it can be perceived." (The quote is from Ray Cline, former deputy director of the CIA, in his current book, "Secrets, Spies and Scholars.")

This system was closed down at the end of the first Nixon administration, some say because it seemed to have outlived its usefulness. Others think it was killed by Henry Kissinger because he could not control it and because its estimates sometimes failed to support or justify his policies.

In 1976 George Bush, the new CIA director,

decided to revive the system in preparing the latest version of estimates on the Soviet Union and its capabilities and intentions. But he decided on one change in its character. Instead of picking experts noted for their objectivity he deliberately picked a panel of persons known for their dissent from the general line of thinking inside the government's own intelligence community. He wanted, he said, a "competitive analysis."

Mr. Bush got that — and something else he had not expected. On CBS television on Jan. 1 he said he was "appalled by the leaks," and the "lack of discipline" of some one or more persons who participated in that work. His panel of "competitive" experts did not show the capacity for anonymity which marked the work of the earlier panel. The names of those on that panel have not yet been printed. All the names of members of the "competitive" panel have been spread around the world, and their views given a velocity and weight which they had not previously been able to achieve.

The effect is to give new weight in the upcoming debate on military policy to the views of those who do have a "vested interest" in foreign and military policy. According to Mr. Cline, currently director of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mr. Bush's experiment in the "competitive" experiment "subverted" the process of arriving at national estimates. He called the panel "a kangaroo court of outside critics all picked for one point of view."

Mr. Bush could have obtained balance had he picked his "competitive panel" equally from "hawks" and "doves." Or he might have had two outside panels, one of "hawks" (as he did) and the other of "doves" (which he did not). That would have bracketed the work of the intelligence experts of government by both types of outside influence.

As a result, when Mr. Carter starts his work on national strategy he will have in front of him National Strategy Memorandum 246 which has been heavily influenced by the "hawks" but untouched by "doves." And when it comes to the ensuing debate in Congress and in the public press the "hawks" will have an advantage they could not otherwise have enjoyed.

It has been a great victory for the "hawks" and a fiasco for those who believe that the true function of the government's intelligence community is to arrive at information and estimates free from "the disorderly flood of advice based on military and diplomatic hopes and fears."

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

'A Mild Demurrer'

I am writing to enter a mild demurrer and reservation about your editorial of Jan. 5 describing the special CIA panel of outside experts on the USSR, headed by Professor Dick Pipes of Harvard, as a "kangaroo court." It is true that I used the term in a talk with Murray Marder, as he reported in his Jan. 2 article on the Pipes panel. My intent, however, was not to say the Pipes panel specifically acted like a kangaroo court but to argue in general against an out-and-out adversary contest between extreme viewpoints as a way of arriving at the truth in the national intelligence estimating process.

I should hasten to add that I have not seen either the new NIE on Soviet military capabilities or the Pipes panel report. Many of the distinguished people on the panel are my friends, and I fully share their deep concern about the implications of the massive Soviet military weapons programs.

The point of my remarks to Marder was that arriving at the most objective analytical reports possible as a contribution to policy-making is a difficult, delicate intellectual process. It should be approached in a spirit of scholarly, scientific inquiry and careful weighing of evidence. Reasonable men may differ, and these differing views should be expressed. A straight adversary proceeding sheds more heat than light.

RAY S. CLINE

Executive Director of Studies,
The Center for Strategic
and International Studies

Washington

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NEW YORK TIMES

Pentagon Chief Bids U.S. Reverse Trend Toward Soviet Superiority

By DREW MIDDLETON

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday that the United States must act now to reverse what he described as the trends of the last 10 to 15 years toward Soviet military superiority.

The outgoing Defense Secretary, criticizing the idea that American military capacity and strength are "sufficient," said at a public affairs luncheon at the Union League Club that "the facts drive one to the clear conclusion that the United States must act now and in the future to reverse these adverse trends by providing real increases for national security."

While the Soviet Union has been expanding its strategic and conventional forces, he said, the United States has been doing the reverse — reducing defense budgets more than \$48 billion in the last five to 10 years.

Views Are Shared and Disputed

Mr. Rumsfeld's views, which he said were not "cold-war rhetoric," are shared by a growing number of professional military men and civilian experts on the military balance between the two powers. They are disputed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and others in the State Department and elsewhere.

The Defense chief conceded that President-elect Carter can "of course" cut the defense budget by \$5 billion to \$7 billion,

as he promised during the campaign. The results of that cut, Mr. Rumsfeld said, would not appear in Mr. Carter's administration. "We've been making such cuts for the past 10 to 15 years," he said. But he added that while such cuts would not affect current abilities, would have a long-term impact on the country's security position. "The United States must pay for increased military capabilities."

A Long 'Adverse' Trend

The trends of the last 10 to 15 years, he said, have been "decidedly adverse, quantitatively and qualitatively as well as with respect to the key military balances."

"The facts drive one to the clear conclusion that the United States must act now and in the future to reverse these adverse trends, by increases for national security," he said.

Expansion of Soviet nuclear and conventional force strength, Mr. Rumsfeld said, has increased the options for the Russians in any given international situation. He did not, however, say when he expected the growing Russian military might to embolden the Soviet Union to challenge the United States in an area of American national interest.

The projected B-1 bomber and the cruise missile were strongly endorsed by Mr. Rumsfeld as necessary for a stronger military posture. The United States, he said, has a lead of "more than five years" over the Soviet Union in development of the missiles, and the B-1 is the "logical" successor to the B-52 as the manned bomber element in the American nuclear triad of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers.

He emphasized that good relations and agreements with the Soviet Union could be reached only from a position of strength. A Defense Department statement distributed at the luncheon outlined the military balance of the two powers. The salient points of the statement follow.

¶The latest estimate, completed in February 1976, shows that the constant 1977 dollar-value of resources allocated to Soviet national defense "appears to have grown" from \$107 billion in 1965 to \$144 billion in 1975. At the same time American defense budget has decreased in real terms, corrected for inflation, by more than a third from its 1968 wartime peak, and today is 14 percent below the prewar level of the early 1960's.

¶The Central Intelligence Agency estimates the burden of defense spending on the Russian economy at 11 to 13 percent of the gross national product while the United States defense budget represents about 5.75 percent of this country's G.N.P.

¶The Russians have increased the number of men they have under arms—excluding 400,000 members of military security forces—from 3.4 to 4.4 million since 1964, while the American military strength has declined from a peak of 3.5 million during the Vietnam war to 2.1 million today.

¶The Soviet Union has outstripped the United States in the development of new arms systems in fixed-wing aircraft, strategic offensive missiles, tactical missiles, surface ship and submarines, but the United States holds the edge in helicopters.

¶The United States has developed one new ICBM system since 1965, the Minuteman III, while the Russians have developed seven new ICBM's in the same period.

¶The Russians have increased their ICBM's from 225 in 1965 to 1,600 today, having overtaken the United States late in the last decade. Russian SLBM's have increased in number from 29 to more than 700, while the United States figure has remained at 655.

¶Over the last decade the Russians have outproduced the Americans in tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery, and Russian production of tactical aircraft and helicopters now exceeds American levels. United States antitank-missile systems are more sophisticated than the Russians though Russian production is ahead American.

¶Since 1955, the Russians have added three times as many ships to their navy than has the United States. The Soviet Navy emphasized smaller ships for coastal defense areas, while the United States Navy stresses large ships for distant operations and has added more tonnage to its fleet.

Mr. Rumsfeld defended the American aircraft carrier program, saying that the Navy's 13 attack carriers provide 90 percent of the country's stand-off weapons capability—weapons that can be fired out of range of hostile ships.

Kissinger Denies His Policy Gives Supremacy to Soviets

By Murray Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger cast farewell words of scorn yesterday at criticism that his policies are permitting the Soviet Union to gain military supremacy over the United States.

The attacks are welling up more strongly than ever as he leaves office, and Kissinger leaped to the old battle in response to a question at a valedictory appearance before the Washington press corps. The dispute has carried into debate over the current U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet power and intentions, and into new congressional inquiries.

Kissinger, who exclaimed at the 1974 U.S.-Soviet summit conference, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority?" yesterday added:

"I do not believe that the Soviet Union is achieving military supremacy over the United States. I do not believe that any American administration will permit a situation to arise in which the Soviet Union could achieve military superiority over the United States."

Secretary of State-designate Cyrus R. Vance, Kissinger's successor, asked for his judgment on the U.S.-Soviet military balance, said yesterday:

"It's a mixed bag. In some areas we are superior to the Soviets. In other areas they are superior to us. Overall, I think there is general parity between the two nations."

Vance said he has not yet read either the new intelligence estimate or a separate secret report made by a panel headed by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, in a competitive analysis supervised by Central Intelligence Director George Bush. Vance spoke with reporters after a closed meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in advance of his public confirmation hearing today.

Kissinger, in a farewell appearance at a National Press Club luncheon, said:

"The essence of the contemporary problem in the military field is that the term 'supremacy,' when casualties on both sides will be in the tens of millions, has practically no operational significance. It is necessary to maintain a balance."

Kissinger said nuclear strategy "is too important and vital . . . to be made the subject of partisan and doctrinaire political debate."

"The military danger we face is in respect to regional conflicts," rather than in "the strategic field," Kissinger said. He added that "Those [regional] forces must be modernized and strengthened."

Kissinger's last formal meeting with the Washington press corps combined seriousness and levity, on both sides. For eight years Kissinger has been the center of extraordinary press attention, enjoying far more adulation than criticism, although he cautioned yesterday of the dangers in "a state of almost perpetual inquest" by press vs. government.

"We have had, to put it mildly, an intense experience," Kissinger said, drily adding the prospect of a return match, by saying, "We are now at the end of our time together until late January, 1981."

Kissinger was surprised by National Press Club President Robert A. Alden with a belly dancer who gyrated just a few feet from him with bumps and grinds to commemorate the lighter side of the Kissinger imagery. She was Linda Dinsmore, 34, from Vienna, Va., a schoolteacher by day and dancer at night, under the stage name of Shadia.

Kissinger, who was accompanied by his wife, Nancy, said in summation of his experience with the press, "I will think of you with affection—tinged by exasperation."

The nation, he said, has survived "the trauma of Vietnam" and "the nightmare of Watergate," and "President Ford leaves to Gov. Carter a nation recovered, a nation confident in the progressive fulfillment of the American dream."

Kissinger said his own greatest disappointment in office was "the disintegration of executive authority that resulted from Watergate," which "consumed too much of our energy."

President-elect Jimmy Carter and Secretary-designate Vance, he said, "deserve the understanding and support of all Americans," as they face their own trials.

"The divisions that have characterized the last decade in this country must finally end," Kissinger said. "This is the time to build a new foreign policy consensus."

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You can't cut a budget you don't have

By John D. Lofton

WASHINGTON—It is being said by some that President-elect Carter is backing down on his campaign promise to slash the defense budget by anywhere from \$5 billion to \$7 billion yearly.

Those who are saying this are correct. When Carter's defense secretary-designate, Dr. Harold Brown, says that Carter never meant to indicate that \$5 billion to \$7 billion would be cut from the present Pentagon budget, he's shovelling smoke.

On June 16 of last year, candidate Carter told the Democratic Platform Committee: "Without endangering the defense of our Nation or our commitments to our allies, we can reduce present defense expenditures by about \$5 to 7 billion annually."

But, I for one, am glad the President-elect has begun to waffle on this issue. To be sure, Carter is still keeping a stiff upper lip, saying things like we are militarily "far stronger" than the Russians by most measures. But surely, with each additional classified intelligence briefing, he must realize things are not nearly so rosy.

Consider the numbers.

According to the highly respected, London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, U. S. defense spending is about \$160.1 billion whereas Soviet spending is anywhere from \$105 billion to \$135 billion annually. Other

categories compare as follows: total men under arms, USSR, 3,650,000, the U. S., 2,086,700; combat divisions, USSR, 168, the U. S., 19, including the Marines; tanks, USSR, 41,500, the U. S., 1,280.

The Soviets have 214 major combat surface ships, we have 176; the Russians have 231 attack submarines; we have 75. In the strategic force category, the Russians outnumber us both in ICBMs and sub-launched missiles. On the other hand, we have 453 long-range bombers, the Soviets have 135, but these are supplemented

by 650 medium-range bombers.

In addition to these raw numbers, there is also the overall question of what the Russians are trying to do with all this hardware — what outgoing CIA Director George Bush calls the "worrisome signs" that the Soviet Union's basic goal is not rough equality with the U. S. military forces, but strategic superiority.

Prior to this current national estimate of Soviet aims, it had been the view that the objective of the Russians was rough parity with U.S. strategic capabilities.

But this old view has been changed thanks in large part to pressure from a group of outside Soviet experts who have strongly taken issue with official government intelligence estimates.

After three months of studying all the evidence available to governmental intelligence experts, this group, headed by Richard Pipes, professor of Russian history at Harvard, has accused the CIA of understating for years the extent and nature of the Soviet threat.

One member of the Pipes group

says of their clash with the CIA: "Sometimes, we left them speechless. We had men of great prestige, some of them with memories going back 25 years or more, and they made devastating critiques of the agency estimates."

Other sources reflecting the Pipes group's findings say: "Whenever Nikita Khrushchev used to say, 'We need peaceful coexistence,' and in the next breath, 'We will bury you,' the CIA tended to say the first comment was policy, the second polemic."

Carter most likely is already familiar with the Pipes report because his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has already been briefed on its findings by Maj. Gen. George Keegan Jr., head of Air Force Intelligence.

Keegan is one of the few government intelligence experts who has for years believed that CIA estimates of Soviet intentions were based on faulty assumptions and faulty analysis.

In shifting his ground on the need to cut the defense budget by several billion dollars this year, President-elect Carter's personal credibility on this issue has been weakened. But the country's military credibility will be strengthened. And this is what really matters.

CIA Study: Soviets Increase Military Spending

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

A new CIA study sent to Capitol Hill yesterday concludes that "Soviet military activities overall are growing and currently are significantly larger than those of the United States."

The conclusion is based on estimates of the dollar costs of Soviet military activities compared with U.S. costs. CIA analysts calculated how much it would cost the United States to produce, man and operate a military machine the size of the Soviet one.

They found that in 1976 overall Soviet military outlays were about one-third higher than U.S. ones — or 40 percent higher if pensions are omitted. The Kremlin spent twice as much as the Pentagon last year to buy weapons and equipment, and twice as much on strategic forces of intercontinental attack capability, the study says.

A similar study made public by the CIA 11 months ago had estimated overall Soviet military spending in 1975 as 40 percent higher than comparable U.S. military authorizations — 50 percent higher without pensions. The new study shows a smaller gap as a result of changes in elements compared and statistical improvements.

SOME OF THE CHANGES appear to have been caused by congressional criticism of such studies. Several critics, like Sen. William Proxmire and Rep. Les Aspin, both Wisconsin Democrats, have contended that the elements compared have been unequal and that trying to judge what this country would pay in dollars for similar armed forces distorts the situation.

The changes include a 6 percent reduction of estimated Soviet military manpower as a result of a complete re-examination of the subject during the past year (but Soviet manpower is "about twice the U.S. total"), the elimination of double counting of Soviet construction troops, adding Coast Guard and Selective Service costs to the U.S.

side of the ledger, and switching from U.S. obligational authority to outlay figures.

Despite the change, the new study stuck to the CIA's basic point in recent years. Regardless of the accuracy of precise calculations in a difficult and uncertain field with a margin of error of up to 15 percent, it says, the general picture shows that Soviet military spending "exceeds U.S. defense outlays by a widening margin in every year after 1971."

SOVIET SPENDING HAS shown a continuous growth averaging 3 percent a year in the 1966-76 period, the new study says, while in uninfated, constant dollars U.S. spending has declined since 1968. The new study only goes through last year, but in the current fiscal year defense appropriations have begun a climb in constant dollar terms.

The study was made public a few days after the formal conclusion of a new, secret assessment of Soviet military plans. Leaks about the new National Intelligence Estimate indicate that it finds that the Kremlin is not simply trying to achieve military parity with the United States but is building toward superiority.

The dollar comparison provides figures which might be interpreted as supporting that conclusion, although the new study did not allude to it. Other possible support came last May in the CIA's publication of a study which estimated Soviet military expenses in rubles as between 11 and 13 percent of gross national product, a sharp increase from the previous CIA estimate of 6 to 8 percent.

Even the 11-13 percent figure has been attacked by some retired military intelligence officers and others as too low.

THESE CRITICS HAVE recently also pointed to signs of a massive Soviet civil defense effort as part of war preparations, including increasing industrial costs by dispersal and "hardening" of factories to withstand blasts. Not all analysts agree on the meaning of the signs, however. The new study omitted all civil defense costs except pay and allowances of uniformed personnel assigned to such

The CIA says that if military personnel costs are removed — Aspin has focused on pay comparisons as one of the greatest distortions — "U.S. defense outlays exceed the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities by about 10 percent over the 1966-76 period as a whole, although by 1976 the Soviet level is about 30 percent greater than the United States."

In the 1970-76 period, the Soviet Union has spent about 50 percent more than the United States on weapons and equipment, and the gap is widening with Soviet spending now twice as much, the study estimates. It puts Soviet military operating costs about 15 percent above the U.S. level in 1976.

THE SOVIET UNION is estimated to have spent in dollar terms $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much as this country on strategic forces in the 1966-76 period. The United States halted its missile buildup at a number it considered sufficient to insure nuclear deterrence, but the Soviets have gone ahead with strategic programs. They spent $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as much on strategic forces last year, the study says, but the comparison on intercontinental attack forces was only 2 to 1.

Soviet general purpose forces cost one-third more than U.S. ones last year and support forces about 10 percent more.

The study warns that "it cannot be used alone to draw inferences about the relative military effectiveness or capabilities of U.S. or Soviet forces." Such factors as size and technical characteristics of forces, allies' roles, strategic doctrine and tactical concepts, and morale must also be considered, it says.

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ON PAGE 27

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
10 JANUARY 1977

CANCEL ONE PROMISE

Defense Secretary-designate Harold Brown has given notice that Jimmy Carter's campaign pledge to slice \$5 billion to \$7 billion from the military budget won't be redeemed.

The President-elect has confirmed that fact in a roundabout, fuzzy-worded way. Carter claims he will trim all the fat he talked about, while conceding that defense outlays may actually increase.

No doubt his seeming turnabout will evoke the usual shrieks and squawks about the dangers of "re-kindling the arms race."

Actually, there has been no halt in the arms race on the part of the Soviet Union. The latest Central Intelligence Agency estimate—citing the USSR's build-up as evidence of a desire to achieve strategic superiority—merely endorses what many outside experts here and abroad have been claiming.

The sobering reality of the CIA's evaluation is bound to condition the thinking of Carter and Brown about the Pentagon budget and the administration's posture in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. There is no escaping—

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ON PAGE 8

10 JANUARY 1977

Washington Whispers®

★ ★ ★
Outgoing Attorney General Edward Levi has ordered the prosecution of any witness who may have lied to congressional committees. One witness whose many hours of testimony are under close scrutiny: Richard Helms, former head of the CIA and recently Ambassador to Iran.

★ ★ ★
A still-secret CIA assessment that Russia's arms build-up is aimed at superiority over the U.S., not just parity, will force Carter into an early review of détente and possibly an increase in military spending.

The Russian Bear Redux?

Nearly twenty years ago, a panel of prominent scientists and businessmen startled the Eisenhower Administration by warning that it was not doing enough to protect the U.S. against Soviet nuclear attack. The top-secret "Gaither Report,"* delivered only a month after the launching of the first sputnik, led to a massive increase in U.S. military spending and contributed to John F. Kennedy's talk in 1960 of a "missile gap." The Soviet arsenal was indeed expanding, but only after taking office did JFK conclude that the U.S. had never been in danger of losing its military superiority.

Last week, another panel of distinguished private citizens presented the incoming Carter Administration with the makings of a new missile-gap controversy. The group of relatively hard-line outsiders, led by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, had been invited last summer to join for the first time in preparing the annual national intelligence estimate of Soviet strategic intentions. The result: the most alarming forecast in years.

Previous estimates said the Soviet Union was aiming for military parity with the United States. This time, the outsiders promoted the view that Russia is seeking clear superiority. Though Jimmy Carter did not seem to be swayed by the findings, the report probably will make it harder for him to cut the defense budget.

Superiority: The panel's conclusions were not based on any dramatic intelligence breakthroughs. Instead, they were a reinterpretation of existing evidence. The seven outside experts charged that the Central Intelligence Agency was not taking a serious enough view of Soviet military expansion. They cited improvements in missiles, expansion of Russia's underground shelters and a continuing improvement of its low-level air defenses as unmistakable evidence, in the words of one outsider, that "the Soviets want strategic superiority." Then the consultants argued their case with CIA analysts. "That sobered up everybody," said one outside expert.

"The CIA draft of its national intelligence estimate was changed in the direction of our viewpoint."

In addition to the Pipes study of Soviet intentions, NEWSWEEK learned, two separate panels of outsiders of about ten members each dealt with specific technical questions: the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the actual effectiveness of its air defenses. They also came to some daunting conclusions. The panel on missile accuracy, for example, estimated that by the 1980s the Russians will

and the controversial B-1 bomber. Some extreme hard-liners in the Pentagon are talking of budget increases that could add up to nearly \$40 billion a year. Carter will not agree to anything like that, but even before details of the still-secret Pipes report leaked out early last week, he was backing away from his campaign promise to trim the defense budget by \$5 billion to \$7 billion (page 14).

The President-elect indicated last week he was not overly worried about the Soviet intentions. "I think it's appar-

ent that their rate of growth of military strength compared to ours has probably been fairly substantial," he declared. "But we're still, by far, stronger than they are in most means of measuring strength." Carter also made it clear he prefers a second-stage SALT accord with Moscow limiting strategic weapons, rather than a massive new military spending program. He said a summit meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev—possibly in this country—was "a likely prospect for 1977, although we haven't made any plans about it yet."

Maverick: The formation of the outside panel was itself a victory for superhawks like Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., the maverick Air Force chief of intelligence (box, page 24). With the approval of CIA director George Bush, Pipes chose six colleagues: Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corp.; retired Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Paul D. Wolfowitz of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; retired Air Force Gen. John Vogt; and Prof. William Van Cleave of the University of Southern California.

The outside experts concluded that the Russians are not reassured by the current nuclear standoff. "What drives the Soviets is their desire for security, but they go to extremes," said one panelist. "Americans emphasize deterrence and don't like to think about fighting a war if deterrence fails. The Russians want to be prepared in case deterrence



Moscow on the move: An 1890 view of the Russian threat

be able to drop an ICBM within 300 feet of its target—an astonishing improvement over the quarter-mile margin for error currently credited to the Soviets (U.S. missile accuracy at present is said to be 500 feet or less).

The outsider panel was recruited because President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board wanted a hard-line view to balance the more "relaxed" estimates of CIA analysts. The findings will now put pressure on the Carter Administration to spend more money on strategic weapons, including a new "super" ICBM

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JAN 10 1977

General Keegan's alarms

Keegan's fear is catching. Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, jr., retired Jan. 1 as Air Force chief of intelligence, but not before tipping the annual Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) national estimate of Soviet military strength and objectives from a comforting judgment of U.S.-Soviet standoff to a scary Soviet arms superiority plus intention to start an aggressive war.

With access to the same secret data, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said on Jan. 10 that he does not believe the Soviet Union is achieving military supremacy. He said "supremacy" has no operational meaning in nuclear war, and he warned that scare talk from the military is aimed at sabotaging efforts toward a new treaty limiting nuclear arms.

The CIA estimate is secret and goes to Congress, but David Binder of the New York Times wrote two long accounts about it, and Keegan's part in it.

By 1972 Keegan had become convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing for offensive war against the United States. Keegan argued then against acceptance of the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreements, and from then on he argued for putting his fears into the annual intelligence estimate.

Until 1976 he was in a small minority, but he spoke out so vigorously that the 16-member presidential board which puts the final stamp on the intelligence estimate

recommended that outside experts be brought in to join the intelligence community in drafting the next estimate.

In 1976 President Ford accepted the proposal, and seven eminent outsiders — professors and retired military and civilian officials with defense backgrounds — were brought in. The outsiders strongly reinforced Keegan's views.

As a result, the final national estimate is the gloomiest in 25 years, and the majority report says flatly that the Soviet Union is seeking military superiority over U.S. armed forces.

Some of the evidence for this scary view is new. Satellite photos keep coming in. Soviet military men's strategic discussions get printed in professional journals. Secret agents and defectors add a little. But much of the change in tone of the intelligence estimate is based on a shift among the U.S. estimators. Hardliners from away back, like Keegan, have now captured a majority.

President-elect Carter and his new security team will want to examine the report and its minority views critically. Keegan yelling "Boo!" is not the same as the Soviet Union deciding to attack. The same evidence could be interpreted in quite a different way, as Kissinger does, namely that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are modernizing their armed forces in competition with each other.

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USSR: 'SOVIET THREAT' CHARGE AIDS ARMS MANUFACTURERS

LD110537 MOSCOW IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA 2230 GMT 10 JAN 77 LD

(VIKTOR MOSKVIN COMMENTARY)

(EXCERPTS) THE UNITED STATES COMMANDER OF THE NATO FORCES SAID IN AN INTERVIEW TO THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT THAT NATO WOULD ULTIMATELY COLLAPSE IF IT DID NOT MATCH THE MILITARY BUILDUP OF THE SOVIET UNION. HERE IS A COMMENT BY OUR OBSERVER VIKTOR MOSKVIN. HE WRITES:

HARDLY A DAY PASSES WITHOUT SOME HIGH RANKING U.S. OFFICIAL, BIG CIRCULATION NEWSPAPER OR MAGAZINE MAKING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION THREATENS THE SECURITY OF WESTERN NATIONS. THE CIA HAS SUCCESSFULLY LEAKED DETAILS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WORKED OUT BY THE SO-CALLED "GROUP A AND GROUP B" AND THUS NOT ONLY ADDED TO THE PUBLICITY OF THE CURRENT ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN, BUT ALSO LED TO A NUMBER OF HEARINGS IN THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS LATE AS LAST WINTER. THE HEARINGS WILL BE HELD TO ASSESS THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED RESEARCH THAT THE SOVIET UNION PLANS TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEXT DECADE.

LIKE MANY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, THIS ONE SEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH A NUMBER OF GOALS. SOME AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS CONCEDE THAT ONE OF THE GOALS IS TO EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE NEW ADMINISTRATION BEFORE IT PROCEEDED WITH THE ELECTION PROMISES TO CUT THE MILITARY FAT AND WASTE BY \$5-7 BILLION AND SIGN A NEW LONG-TERM AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. ANOTHER GOAL SOUGHT BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IS TO SCARE THE AMERICANS AND OFFICIALS INTO APPROVING A STILL-GREATER MILITARY BUDGET.

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ON PAGE 1

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9 January 1977

Richard Pipes

An Answer From 'Team B'

The writer was director of the task force that recently provided a controversial critique of the American intelligence community's estimate of Soviet intentions. He is professor of history and former director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

During the past week, The Post has prominently featured no fewer than four articles on what it terms "the flap over the latest intelligence estimates of the Soviet threat"—but what in fact is more accurately described as an exercise aimed at improving the process of drafting the government's annual National Intelligence Estimates.

These articles contain allegations concerning the motives and integrity of the so-called "Team B," whose assignment it was to provide an alternative assessment of the intelligence data on Soviet strategic objectives, and which I had the honor to chair. The allegations call for a response.

To begin with, it must be stated that since the information bearing on this matter is highly classified, all the judgments of outsiders rest on hearsay, i.e., unauthorized leaks. Such information is inevitably selective and distorted. It is certainly not sufficient evidence on which to base one's judgment of such grave and complex matters, let alone to pontificate, as The Post does in its editorial calling for "Good Intelligence."

The plain fact is that your writers have no idea how good or how bad our National Intelligence Estimates are, nor how Team B is proposing to improve them. Indeed, like all the other newspapers, The Post mistakenly assumes that the Team B report has become part of the official NIEs, whereas in fact it is an entirely separate document.

Your editorial refers to our panel as a

"kangaroo court," which signifies a court set up in violation of established legal procedures as well as one characterized by dishonesty and incompetence. Those are strong words.

The fact of the matter, however, is that Team B was created to function as a body of expert advisers, not as a panel of judges. It was established and staffed by the Director of Central Intelligence; it was furnished by him with data; it was financed by him; its final report was submitted to him for consideration.

The Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, thus constituted the ultimate authority for both Team A, composed of the regular compilers of the National Intelligence Estimates, and Team B, its alternative.

So much for the procedural aspect. I will not bother to defend the panels' honesty, but as regards competence I cannot refrain from noting that, according to your correspondent, Team B owed much of its impact to the "prestigious names and reputations" of its members. You cannot have it both ways: imply we are incompetent and at the same time blame us for allegedly overwhelming CIA analysts with the weight of our prestige and reputation.

Joseph Kraft in his column perceives behind the whole affair an emergent political realignment. Turning from zoological to Biblical terminology, he sees it as pitting "the righteous"—persons particularly worried about Soviet expansion—against the "repenters," whose primary motive is guilt over Vietnam. The righteous, he says, prefer to work "through channels," as typified by the manner in which they allegedly "bent" the CIA estimates of the Soviet threat. However (still according to his interpretation) alarmed by Jimmy Carter's preference for the "repenters,"

"the righteous" have defied it to carry their message to the public.

I do not know where, when, and by whom this decision was taken, nor why I had been left out of it. For as far as I am concerned my efforts at publicity so far have consisted of refusing to appear on the national CBS and ABC networks, as well as two local Boston TV stations, and declining an invitation to take part in a conference on this subject projected in Washington, D.C., for inauguration week.

I have done so because I feel that "carrying the message to the public" would politicize the issue and thereby pervert and perhaps even undo the pos-

Taking Exception

itive work that I believe Team B has accomplished. I know that several other members of Team B feel likewise and also have refused opportunities to appear before the media.

If, however, leaks are meant, then I do not know on what evidence Kraft implies that their source has been Team B. Team B's report has by now been read by quite a few Washington officials, any one of whom may have taken it upon himself to leak the story, either because he sympathizes with the panel's views and wants to publicize them or because he disagrees with them and wishes to discredit them.

Which brings me to the heart of the matter, the issue of politicization. The problems facing modern government are growing more numerous as well as complex, and raise questions on which honest and competent people can honestly as well as competently disagree. Nowhere is this truer than in the case of the National Intelligence Estimates.

continued

DETROIT, MICHIGAN
NEWS

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JAN 9 1977

Ford is leaving Carter a touchy arms problem

By COL. R.D. HEINL, Jr.

News Military Analyst

Analysis

WASHINGTON — The Ford administration has approved a recent intelligence report which says Russia is now well on the way to reaching a goal of all-out military superiority over the United States.

In approving the report, which has caused intense debate on Capitol Hill, the outgoing President has left Jimmy Carter a loaded cigar that is almost certain to blow up in the face of the new administration.

The battle now raging centers around a document called the National Intelligence

Estimate (NIE), which is prepared annually by the CIA on information provided by the total intelligence community.

What has intensified the debate is that, for the first time in the NIE's 26-year history, an alternative report has been released. It's a far sterner version, prepared by a panel of outside experts, and goes even further in its warnings to the new administration.

These reports — no matter which version is accepted — raise an urgent question Mr. Carter would like least to face at this time. The question is:

Does the apparent Soviet across-the-board surge require immediate realignment of U.S. economic and political policies and priorities?

The National Intelligence Estimate is published in the fall in anticipation of the budget cycle and the forthcoming year's plans and decisions involving national security.

The CIA works up a top-secret, multivolume analysis representing the collective judgment of the intelligence community on important developments abroad, such as Soviet forces and capabilities and — most important —

the U.S.-USSR overall strategic balance.

Involved — besides the CIA — are the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, State, Treasury, FBI, and Energy Research and Development Agency.

Intelligence used includes satellite reconnaissance, monitoring of communications, study of Russian documents, agent reports and many other sources.

While that specific intelligence report is classified, other available estimates of U.S.-Soviet strength show a significant increase in Soviet arms spending since 1965:

- In 1965 the USSR had 224 ICBM's. Today it has 1,600 including four new models heavier than any American ICBM. By contrast, the United States has 1,054. Between now and 1982, intelligence experts estimate the Soviets will have completed development and test of at least 15 new major ballistic missiles.

- In 1965 Russia had 30 submarine-launched ballistic missiles; now, according to which estimate is accepted, it is anywhere from 730 to 875. The United States has 656.

- In 1965 the USSR had fewer than 450 strategic nuclear warheads compared to 3,700 today. Because of MIRV, the United States still has more warheads than the USSR (the exact number is classified). However, the American warheads are less powerful and the total throw-weight (or payload) of the Soviet warheads considerably exceeds that of the United States.

- Russia has 42,000 battle tanks compared to 9,000 in the U.S. inventory. Russia has 20,000 artillery pieces compared to 6,000 for the United States. The 1965 figures for these weapons are unavailable.

- In 1965 Russia had 3.1 million men under arms. Today the figure is 4.8 million. The U.S. Armed Forces total 2.1 million.

- In civil defense the Soviets are outspending the United States by 10-15 to 1. In the Moscow area alone, they have built over 75 nuclear-hardened underground command posts capable of withstanding severe blast pressures. Outside all major cities they have football-field-sized, underground food-storage depots. They are spending over a billion dollars a year on civil defense. By contrast, the U.S. Civil Defense Preparedness Agency got \$71 million in last year's budget.

- The Soviet navy has 229 major surface warships compared to 172 in the U.S. Navy. In general-purpose submarines, the USSR has 255 against 76 for the United States.

The newest report presumably could change these figures considerably. The new report is reviewed at ever-higher echelons and eventually reaches the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory board, the august 16-member committee that OK's the agency's annual 10-year forecast.

But during the last decade, the national estimating process has been blurred increasingly by questions and controversy as to what Russia is up to.

Not surprisingly, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency for some years have taken a pessimistic view.

By contrast, the predominant — but not unanimous — opinion of the CIA's highly qualified estimators has been moderately optimistic.

The prevailing view of the CIA has been that the USSR has been spending 6 to 8 percent of Russia's gross national product (GNP) for armaments, with an annual increase in real terms of about 2 percent.

By contrast, the minority CIA view — and that of the Pentagon — has been that the USSR commits as much as 16 to 17 percent to defense.

James B. Galloway, former CIA director, says the Kremlin has been upping defense expenditures by 5 percent a year — not 2 — for more than a decade.

continued

afense

7

CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Hawks cite Soviet buildup, map assault on Carter cuts

By James Coates

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—Military hard-liners, raising the spectre of an invincible Soviet Union, have begun a major attack to thwart President-elect Carter's campaign promise of heavy defense cuts.

Pentagon brass, joined by former national policy makers, have thrown everything into the struggle from classified Central Intelligence Agency files to longstanding congressional IOUs.

At issue is exactly how alarming analysts find the Soviet military buildup. Even some on Carter's Pentagon transition team admit recent data show the increase.

THE FIGHT has generated some of the bleakest warnings on Russian intentions since the Cold War. The outgoing Air Force intelligence chief, Gen. George Keegan Jr., has told interviewers he believes the Soviets likely will start a nuclear war unless the United States accelerates its arms program.

Shortly before Keegan went public, one well-placed foe of Carter defense promises leaked a top-secret CIA report that showed many respected intelligence experts had concluded the Russians were tricking the U.S. into giving them a "war-winning capability."

Dovish Carter advisers cite that leak as an example of how their budget adversaries are using former positions of power to blitz Carter's program.

PUSING FOR the sterner view are many leaders of the old White House-Pentagon-State Department establishment suddenly in the unfamiliar role of outsiders.

They're focusing on three red flags: Carter promises to curtail the enormously expensive B-1 bomber, to with-

draw American troops from Korea, and to cut military spending from \$5 billion to \$7 billion.

One indication that the Hawks may have the Doves on the ropes came last week when Defense Secretary-designate Harold Brown flip-flopped on Carter's multibillion budget cut promise.

IN JUNE, CARTER told the Democratic Platform Committee a \$5 billion to \$7 billion cut would not endanger national security. Last week Brown ruled out any drop at all.

Pentagon sources forecast President Ford will send Congress a \$123 billion record-breaking military budget Jan. 17, three days before Carter takes office. The budget will include items Carter said he wants cut such as the B-1.

Carter has only until Feb. 15 to inform Congress of any changes he wants before debate begins.

WITH LESS than 30 days to work on Ford's budget, Carter's planners must figure quickly if new CIA data indicate the Russians are preparing to survive a nuclear war.

The information does point to that, according to a new group of onetime national policy makers lobbying against any U.S. military relaxation.

The Committee on the Present Danger boasts 141 members including former Cabinet officers such as ex-Secretary of State Dean Rusk; former defense officials such as industrialist David Packard; and international military tacticians such as Paul H. Nitze, a former Pentagon expert on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).

THREE MEMBERS of the group served on a 10-member advisory panel that recently concluded U. S. analysts

Chicago Tribune, 1/9/77 (continued)

Here They Are Again

Right after the season to be merry comes the season to be somber—at least for those in the U.S. Government whose business it is to give us our annual scare about the national security at budget time. And “somber” is the word that dominated the lengthy leak from the CIA which led *The New York Times* the very day after Christmas. When this intelligence analysis of Russian “intentions” was not somber, according to the *Times*’s account, it was “grim,” in the view of the “high-ranking” and “top-level” officials of the CIA cited in the story. The headline gives the tone—“New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms.”

Normally, if that is the word, it is the military that bangs the warning drum as the federal budget heads toward Congress. But this year, threatened by an incoming President who has said he would shave \$5 billion to \$7 billion from the enormous defense budget, new forces have been mobilized to sound the alarm and scare the daylight out of us. And so, before Carter the President ever sees this hair-raising CIA document, the readers of *The New York Times* are told all about what Carter “will receive” after he settles into the White House.

A CIA “participant” in this estimate is quoted as saying that “For us the question is not whether the Russians are coming but whether it is feasible for them to get here and how soon. That comes back to the question of United States will and determination. If we don’t have it, then there is superiority” (presumably for the Russians). The evidence for the new gloom or panic is sketchy in the *Times*’s story, but we are told that “the worrisome signs included newly developed guided missiles, a vast program of underground shelters and a continuing buildup of air defenses.”

There is, not surprisingly, a “hero” in this story, and the suspicious mind would also nominate him as a prime source. His name is Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., and his function until January was Chief of Intelligence for the Air Force. He is said to describe himself as “the eye of controversy” in the American intelligence world, one who “has been contesting the estimates of Soviet intentions for twenty-two years.” Since all this is about strategic confrontation between the two superpowers, and since the Russians have done little in that vague realm except, questionably, in the cloudy world of “intentions,” one must wonder what General Keegan has been contesting all those years. The *Times* tells us just that he “became convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing for offensive war against the United States” and therefore opposed the ABM and offensive nuclear weapons treaties between us and the USSR of the early 1970s.

One might dismiss this story as just the stuff of defense establishment budgeteering (and a bad news value

judgment by the *Times*) were it not for one revelation in this yarn about the new mechanics of intelligence evaluation, one which is more ominous than “somber.” It appears that the Ford administration decided in 1976 that this process was too optimistic in its product. And so, with the approval of George Bush, director of the CIA, a panel of “outsiders” was set up to contest the conventional view that the United States and the USSR were in a state of “rough parity.” The criterion for membership in this group of challenging thinkers was that they should be “more pessimistic” about the Russians than the parity bunch. Thus the dialectical deck was stacked and the game of “capabilities” began, with “intentions” as the wild card.

Apparently this pushed the whole estimating process toward the black or pessimistic side of the board and the Reds were in a position to win—unless “will” (read “dollars”) strengthened our side. That is the legacy of the Ford administration, which does not want to leave the 1970s equivalent of the 1950s “missile gap” to its successors and never mind that there was no missile gap back then, as John F. Kennedy, after campaigning against it, quickly admitted when he took office.

This whole business is a shell game, familiar and discredited. It is insulting to President-elect Carter, and he should so regard it. He cannot punish George Bush, the present CIA director who is about to leave office, or General Keegan in his retirement. But, as he prepares his own defense budget and gets ready to deal with the Soviet Union on the serious and promising business of strategic arms limitation, he should keep in mind that one of his first important tasks is to bring the defense-intelligence bureaucracy to heel.

Defence

The repenters and the righteous

Washington, DC

Mr Jimmy Carter is coming into office in the middle of an intense, semi-public dispute about the strength of the country's defences. The latest public shot was the leaking over the past fortnight of accounts of the CIA's intelligence review of the Soviet Union. This secret estimate of Russian forces is made each year and used, in part, to justify the annual defence budget. Once formally adopted it becomes the official, though still closely-guarded, reckoning of Russia's current military intentions. This has not prevented recent reviews from coming under attack from defence-minded critics, who believe the CIA has underestimated the speed with which the Russians are arming.

With these criticisms in mind, the president's foreign intelligence advisory board decided that a team of non-CIA specialists should review the same basic data that the CIA used and then help draft the estimate on Russia—to balance the supposed complacency of the CIA. The result, by all accounts, was a victory for the outsiders. The "grim" report leans to the view that Russia is seeking military superiority over the United States. That has been the pessimistic view of the Pentagon's defence intelligence agency for some time. Its former director, retired Lieutenant-General Daniel Graham, who was a leading member of the non-CIA panel, believes that two trends in particular make this broad conclusion inescapable: the growing share of its national product which the Soviet Union devotes to defence and the apparent vigour of its civil defence programme.

There have been strong signs that the CIA's experts were coming to these conclusions by themselves. In October, the CIA revealed new estimates of the share of the Soviet gnp that goes on defence spending; these were almost double what it had reckoned before. But bringing in "outsiders" has made it look as if the CIA was dragged towards these conclusions unwillingly, and that has not helped its reputation.

The intelligence review of the Soviet Union is bound to colour Mr Carter's decisions on the defence budget and on terms for the new round of strategic arms limitation talks (Salt) even though his incoming defence secretary, Mr

Harold Brown, is known to be sceptical about the significance of the Soviet civil defence effort. When asked about the CIA report, Mr Carter himself said "We're still by far stronger than they are in most means of measuring military strength."

This does not necessarily mean that Mr Carter is a dove ready to crush the hawks. The terms themselves no longer quite fit. The columnist Mr Joseph Kraft suggests they should be replaced by the "repenters" and the "righteous". Mr Carter's foreign policy and defence team, he says, is made up largely of "repenters" who turned against the war in Vietnam and now, in repentance, strongly favour limiting the arms race. The "righteous" believe in a growing Soviet military challenge which must be met in kind. Mr James Schlesinger, the new president's adviser on energy, is among the "righteous". So are Mr Paul Nitze, a former Salt negotiator, and Mr Eugene Rostow, former under-secretary of state, who helped last year to launch the Committee on Present Danger, a vocal, defence-orientated lobby. Senator Henry Jackson is the most notable congressional member of the group.

As their strategic doctrine, the "repenters" on the whole still think the threat of assured destruction is enough to deter the Russians. The "righteous" believe the United States must convince the Russians it is ready to fight a limited nuclear war, for which elaborate, accurate and expensive new weapons are essential. The doctrine of limited nuclear war took root under the outgoing administration and was used to justify some of the new arms which Mr Carter is inheriting, in different stages of development, from Mr Ford: the B-1 bomber, the cruise missile, and the mobile, land-based M-X missile which is meant eventually to replace the present arsenal of Minuteman ICBMs.

Which, if any, of these new projects will go ahead is up to Mr Carter. He does not, to judge from his public statements, accept the notion of limited nuclear war, but that by itself is no test. Weapons, once begun, acquire their own momentum. Mr Carter's doubts about the B-1 bomber leave open the possible compromise of authorising production, but for far fewer than the 244 aircraft the air force wants. An early decision will be needed, too, on the cruise missile, the big stumbling block in Salt. For all his reputation as a "hardware man", Mr Brown is unsure about the need for a long-range missile. Limiting both may be difficult

new weapons are coming to be seen as substitutes for each other, and some defenders of the cruise missile advertise it as a cheap and efficient alternative to the B-1 bomber.

Particular weapons aside, the defence debate bears directly on the size of the military budget as a whole. The outgoing Ford team will request \$123 billion for the Pentagon in the next fiscal year, beginning in October, when its final budget presentation is made in a fortnight's time. That is \$11 billion, or just under 10%, more than congress appropriated for fiscal year 1977. In fact not just next year, but for the years immediately following, the Pentagon looks forward to steady, if moderate, growth in the defence budget in real terms. The size of the alternative military budget which Mr Carter's incoming administration will be submitting shortly after Mr Ford's is not known. But the budget Mr Ford is leaving behind is not so grossly overweight as to make cuts easy in the present climate of debate. Every military budget contains some padding, known in the trade as "cut insurance", but it is usually hard to find.

During the campaign's early stages, at least, Mr Carter used to say that \$5 billion-7 billion could be cut from the Pentagon's budget without weakening the nation's defences. Just what amount his sum was to be subtracted from was never made clear. But the distinct impression was left that Mr Carter had some pruning in mind. Mr Brown, though, said at the first meeting of the new cabinet appointees that defence spending would probably rise, not fall next year, possibly even in real terms.

That is certainly the view of the defence industry. In the lean years of the rundown after Vietnam, arms spending in real terms fell from \$24 billion (1977 constant dollars) in 1969 to \$15 billion in 1974. It is on the rise again, and the defence industry wants it to stay that way. As the head of the Raytheon Company, ranked 12th among the 20 largest defence contractors, recently put it: "The Soviets are the defence industry's greatest ally." Plainly, the pressures on Mr Carter not to save on "hardware" are high. Costs at the Pentagon for wages and pensions now take up 55% of the budget, and Mr Brown says that "The whole pay structure needs to be looked at." Beyond that if Mr Carter still has knife in hand, is the delicate issue of the growing cost of military bases overseas, some of which are thought to have outlived their usefulness.

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Page 3
NEW YORK TIMES

3 Sets of Senate Hearings Expected On Soviet Might and Strategic Aims

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7—The Senate will hold at least three sets of hearings on Soviet military ability and strategic objectives this winter, Congressional aides said today.

The hearings are in part "regular, scheduled business," according to staff aides engaged in preparing for them, and in part motivated by interest in a debate among American intelligence specialists about Soviet strategic intentions.

Late last month, George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, and other leading intelligence officials said that the American intelligence community was taking a "more somber" view of Soviet military capacities and aims. It was also reported that the latest intelligence community "national estimate" of long-range Soviet goals concluded that the Soviet Union sought strategic superiority over the United States within the next decade.

Intelligence officials said the controversial estimate, approved Dec. 21 by the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which is made up of the heads of all intelligence and security agencies, was signed by Mr. Bush this morning. A summary was given to President-elect Carter's designated National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, last week.

Study of U.S. Intelligence

The House is also expected to take up questions about Soviet strategic capacity—but later, Members of the House International Relations Committee said their first order of business was reconstitution of their subcommittees by Feb. 1.

The Senate hearings include a continuing closed-session study of American intelligence collection, production and quality by the Select Committee on Intelligence. This study is being conducted

under the authority of a subcommittee on intelligence quality control headed by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, Democrat of Illinois.

A spokesman said the subcommittee has been "fully apprised" of a dispute on Soviet aims and abilities between an "A-team" of intelligence community officials and a "B-team" of outside specialists brought into "competitive analysis" by Mr. Bush late last year.

In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will begin hearings next Friday on the effectiveness of American strategic-weapons systems in relation to Soviet abilities.

Extension Expected

The call for these hearings was made last May by Senator Charles H. Percy, the Illinois Republican, who proposed that they serve as a vehicle for examining the efficacy of new Federal expenditures on intercontinental ballistic missiles, the disputed B-1 bomber and the Trident nuclear submarine program.

A committee aide said, however, that in view of the latest intelligence estimate of Soviet strategy, the hearings would undoubtedly be extended to take up questions concerning "the Soviet threat and a briefing on strategic balance" in closed sessions.

The Foreign Relations Committee's second hearing, Jan. 19, is scheduled to hear testimony from Paul H. Nitze, former deputy secretary of defense, who was on the "B-team" of outside estimators leading the movement toward a grimmer intelligence appraisal of Soviet strategy last autumn.

REMEMBER THE NEEDiest!

Intelligence: insiders, outsiders

In a television interview last Sunday, CIA Chief George Bush spoke of the "ferocity" with which "some worrisome signs" of Soviet strategic plans are currently under debate in his shop. That ferocity, he indicated, is novel.

Ferocity may not be an ideal spirit in which to argue over raw intelligence data. Nor is it necessarily the worst. Given that so much of the strategic debate reaches us in a state of arid abstraction, it could be refreshing.

The source of the "ferocity" — assuming that Mr. Bush chose his word carefully — is not far to seek. Last June, on the advice of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Mr. Bush retained a team of strategic thinkers, headed by Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard, to look over the shoulders of official intelligence professionals as they drew up the new National Intelligence Estimates.

No one except the participants actually knows the sequel. There are reports, presumably from the "outsiders," that characterize the independent evaluation as a bloody contest — a sort of wrestling and gouging match in which the outsiders "licked" the insiders, with the upshot an unusually bleak estimate of Soviet warmaking capacity.

But notwithstanding its obvious interest in the integrity and accuracy of intelligence estimates, it isn't given to the public to know whether this account is truth or baloney or something between. One must allow that a combination of ego massage and journalistic fancy may figure in the wrestling-mat scenario. The picture of official softies and unofficial hardliners brawling at a felt-topped table in Langley seems improbable.

It would be understandable if the official intelligence community took amiss the intrusion of outside evaluators. That intrusion will be seen by some to insinuate bias or incompetence or both on the inside. And those who have experience of the "ferocity" of scholarly tiffs may well imagine what occurs when disagreement is compounded by intimations of mistrust.

We see no need, in any case, for the public to share this official touchiness. The independent evaluation of intelligence work by outside panels is not unprecedented; and it is neither more gratuitous nor "patently political" than evaluations of, say, Congress or the White House. Considering the stakes at hazard, it may be more important.

Given certain raw and fairly well documented facts — e.g., in this case, the hardening of Soviet missile silos, extensive civilian defense and food storage programs, and a steadily enlarging defense budget — disagreement over their meaning is inescapable. The least outsiders may suppose about intelligence-evaluation is that it carries a large dimension of human judgment and demands compromise on disputed points. Presumably, then, the greater the variety of views brought to the process, the greater the likelihood that final estimates will be sensible and realistic — even at the cost of some procedural "ferocity."

Mr. Bush was distressed that this struggle over the National Intelligence Estimates made its way, piecemeal, into public print. Perhaps indeed it intimates a certain indiscipline in those who talked out of school. But the exposure is a mixed misfortune. Of all government processes, intelligence evaluation is the most secretive, even though the public is often asked to ratify costly decisions based on it. The secrecy can be justified when information would lead to important sources and methods; much of it, however, especially in retrospect, is excessive. In judging the wisdom of Mr. Bush's unusual procedure, it would help to know more about prior successes and failures of intelligence judgment — and we assume there are both. We have in mind no quest for scapegoats by name and person, obviously, but only the raw material for forming some sense of how competent the intelligence apparatus and its methodology are.

There are those who believe, for instance, that it was a significant failure of intelligence not to foresee the great enlargement of Russian civil defense measures following the mutual renunciation of anti-ballistic missile development. Was it or wasn't it? What is the point of keeping the public in the dark?

We ask these questions, not in the expectation of ready answers, but to suggest only this — that when the public has no basis for judging the effectiveness of the intelligence-estimating process it may well settle for next best things, one of which may be "outside expertise" and an adversary estimating process when the estimates are in preparation. It is not a wholly satisfactory substitute; but it is certainly one that comes to public mind, as it did to Mr. Bush's.

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 7 Jan 77
Item No. 21
Ref. No. _____

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FBIS 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANALYSIS NOTE RG/WA

FURTHER MOSCOW REACTION TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (SEE ANALYSIS NOTE, ITEM 40 OF FBIS WIRE OF 6 JANUARY)

ADDITIONAL SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT ON THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING A NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC INTENTIONS HAS BEEN MONITORED SINCE THE ISSUE WAS FIRST MENTIONED IN A TASS COMMENTARY BY VALENTIN ZORIN ON 6 JANUARY. COMMENT CARRIED BY MOSCOW RADIO SINCE THEN HAS BEEN CONFINED TO FOREIGN-LANGUAGE BROADCASTS, BUT SOVIET AUDIENCES WERE TOLD ABOUT THE ISSUE IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE MILITARY NEWSPAPER RED STAR ON 7 JANUARY, WHICH MAKES MANY OF THE SAME POINTS AS THE ZORIN COMMENTARY.

ACCORDING TO A TASS SUMMARY (SEE ITEM 15 OF THE 7 JANUARY FBIS WIRE), THE RED STAR ARTICLE CHARGES THE OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION WITH COMPLICITY IN THE "NOISY CAMPAIGN" ABOUT A SOVIET MILITARY THREAT THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ARTICLE DESCRIBES AS PART OF THAT CAMPAIGN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SPECIAL GROUP" TO STUDY SOVIET INTENTIONS AND THE RESULTANT REPORT CHARGING THAT "FOR A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS" U.S. ANALYSTS "HAVE SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED SOVIET INTENTIONS AND THE DEGREE OF THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES."

BOTH THE ZORIN COMMENTARY AND RED STAR FOLLOWED PAST SOVIET MEDIA PRACTICE IN AVOIDING ANY MENTION OF THE FACT THAT THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN FOCUSED SPECIFICALLY ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MOSCOW SEEKS PARITY WITH OR SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED IN TWO MOSCOW RADIO COMMENTARIES BROADCAST IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SERVICE TO NORTH AMERICA. IT HAS LONG BEEN MOSCOW'S PRACTICE TO DEAL MORE OPENLY WITH SENSITIVE BILATERAL ISSUES IN BROADCASTS TO NORTH AMERICA THAN IN OTHER SOVIET MEDIA.

BOTH OF THE CURRENT RADIO COMMENTARIES SUGGEST THAT THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE NEW ESTIMATE AT THIS TIME IS CONNECTED WITH EFFORTS BY MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS TO MUSTER SUPPORT FOR U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS. IN ONE COMMENTARY TASS DEPUTY DIRECTOR SERGEY LOSEV (ITEM 08 OF 7 JANUARY FBIS WIRE) SEEMED TO BELITTLE THE IMPORT OF THE REVISED ESTIMATE BY NOTING THAT "OF COURSE PEOPLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION WHO KNOW THE REAL SITUATION NOT ONLY MISTRUST SUCH EVALUATIONS BUT LOOK ON THEM WITH HUMOR."

IN THE OTHER RADIO COMMENTARY, VLADIMIR POZNER (ITEM 04 OF 7 JANUARY) CONCEDED MORE OPENLY THAN DOMESTIC MEDIA HAVE YET DONE THAT THE USSR CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM WAS AT THE HEART OF RENEWED U.S. QUESTIONING OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES. IN A COMMENTARY HEAVY WITH SARCAISM, POZNER CONCLUDED THAT A NEW GAP, THE "SURVIVAL GAP," HAD BEEN BORN. LIKE LOSEV, POZNER SEEMED TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BREADTH OF SUPPORT FOR THE REVISED ESTIMATE IN WASHINGTON BY QUOTING U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE-DESIGNATE HAROLD BROWN AS DOUBTING THAT THE USSR CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM COULD CONFER A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

7 JAN 2006Z RLL/CAT

FOIA b7

PRAVDA DENOUNCES OUTGOING U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS POLICY

LD071800 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0745
GMT 7 JAN 77 LD

("NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE"--TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 7 JANUARY, TASS--THE "B-1" BOMBER BUILDING PROGRAM "CAN NOT ONLY AGGRAVATE THE ECONOMIC MESS OF THE UNITED STATES BUT MIGHT ALSO COMPLICATE THE TALKS ON LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS," SAYS TODAY'S PRAVDA.

THE PAPER DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THE OPPONENTS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE HAVE AGAIN BEEN STEPPING UP THEIR STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE B-1. ON A DECISION OF THE PENTAGON PRODUCTION OF THREE SERIAL BOMBERS HAS STARTED. THIS STEP IS SEEN AS "DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE FUTURE DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION."

2073

THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, DO NOT NEED A NEW ROUND IN THE ARMS RACE, BUT AGREEMENT ON A BAN ON CREATING SUCH TYPES OF ARMS AS "TRIDENT" CLASS SUBMARINES, "B-1" BOMBERS AND ANALOGOUS SYSTEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO CURB THE DANGEROUS AND WASTEFUL ARMS RACE AND TO INSURE LASTING PEACE, STRESSES PRAVDA.

THE IMPRESSION IS BEING FORMED THAT THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION, WHOSE POLICY WAS REJECTED BY THE MAJORITY OF U.S. ELECTORS, IS USING THE LAST DAYS IN OFFICE TO BRING OPEN PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ITS SUCCESSORS, TO BIND THE HANDS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, MAKING IT HARD FOR IT TO FULFILL THE PROMISES IT GAVE DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, SAYS A COMMENTARY PUT OUT BY TASS. ONE OF THOSE PROMISES WAS TO MODERATE THE PENTAGON'S APPETITE AND CUT ITS BUDGET. THIS HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE ALARM AMONG CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOT BY CHANCE THAT IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS BEFORE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION COMES TO POWER THAT A MASSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN ORGANIZED IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH THE WASHINGTON POST HAS DESCRIBED AS AN "EXERCISE IN INTIMIDATION." EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE TO HINT TO AMERICANS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S "PREPARATIONS FOR WAR" WHICH, IT IS CLAIMED, THREATEN U.S. SECURITY, AND ABOUT THE NEED TO FURTHER INCREASE MILITARY EFFORTS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS.

THE ORGANIZERS OF THAT CAMPAIGN IGNORE THE UNIVERSALLY KNOWN AND UNQUESTIONABLE FACTS, WHICH ARE THAT IN PAST YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN, AND STILL IS TAKING, REALISTIC STEPS AIMED AT STOPPING THE ARMS RACE.

7 JAN 2019Z RLL/CAF

7 JAN 77

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FBIS 17

MOSCOW: U.S. 'SOVIET THREAT' CAMPAIGN DANGEROUS GAME

LD080502 MOSCOW IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA 2230 GMT 07 JAN 77 LD

(VLADIMIR POZNER COMMENTARY)

(TEXT) GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THE PRESENT SOVIET MILITARY THREAT CAMPAIGN NOW BEING CONDUCTED IN THE UNITED STATES. ONE IS STANDARD PRACTICE AND HAS TO DO WITH THE UPCOMING DEFENSE BUDGET. THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT IS INVARIABLY UNVEILED BY THE PENTAGON EVERY TIME A NEW DEFENSE BUDGET COMES UP FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSION; BUT AS OPPOSITION TO ASTRONOMICAL EXPENDITURES IN THE MILITARY AREA GROWS, THE SOVIET THREAT IS PROPORTIONATELY BLOWN UP. THE IDEA IS NOT SIMPLY TO PUT PRESSURE ON CONGRESSMEN BUT ALSO VIA THE MEDIA TO CREATE PUBLIC SUPPORT AND, IF POSSIBLE, EVEN DEMAND FOR WHAT IS TERMED AS A STRONGER POSTURE.

THE SECOND ASPECT IS AIMED AT JEOPARDIZING ANY FUTURE AGREEMENT IN THE AREA OF ARMS LIMITATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE IDEA HERE IS TO HAMMER HOME TO MILLIONS OF AMERICANS THE SHORTSIGHTEDNESS OF SIGNING ANY AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. AT PRESENT THE COMBINED RESOURCES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS WELL AS OF SUCH SUPPOSEDLY OBJECTIVE AND NONESTABLISHMENT SOURCES AS SO-CALLED OUTSIDERS--UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ECONOMISTS AND THE LIKE--ARE BEING USED TO CREATE THE IMAGE OF A VAST SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAM, OF A SOVIET UNION NO LONGER SEEKING ROUGH PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARMS FIELD BUT BOUND ON SECURING SUPERIORITY.

IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS CAMPAIGN COULD CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO ACHIEVE ANY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ALONG THE WAY TO DISARMAMENT. IT IS REALLY A PRETTY DIABOLICAL PLAN. ITS AUTHORS ARE WELL VERSED IN THE ART OF PROPAGANDA. PRESENT DEFENSE SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD VERY CANDIDLY SAID HE--MEANING THE PENTAGON WITH ALL ITS RESOURCES--WOULD KEEP HARPING ON THE THREME OF THE SOVIET THREAT UNTIL IT BECAME A GENERALLY ACCEPTED FACT. YES, REPETITION IS A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT.

STATINTL

THE INVITATION OF OUTSIDERS TO PARTICIPATE IN CIA EVALUATIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IS ANOTHER STEP IN THE SAME DIRECTION. WHILE THE CIA AND OFFICIAL BRASS ARE SUSPECT IN THE EYES OF THE AVERAGE AMERICAN, THESE OUTSIDER ARE NOT AND THEIR ESTIMATES ARE EVEN MORE RADICAL THAN THE CIA'S. THEY CRITICIZE THE INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE AND THESE WEEKLY BOW THEIR HEADS AND CRY "MEA CULPA." ALMOST SLAPSTICK COMEDY, WERE IT NOT SO SINISTER. THEN GENERAL KEERAN IS DRAGGED OUT ONTO THE STAGE AND MADE MUCH OF AS ONE OF THE FEW MEN WHO WAS ALWAYS AGAINST ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS.

ON THE EVE OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S COMING TO (28E), A CONCENTRATED EFFORT, ALMOST UNPARALLELED IN SCOPE, IS BEING MADE TO CURTAIL WHATEVER ACTIVITY IT MIGHT HAVE IN MIND IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT. IT IS A DANGEROUS GAME, AS DANGEROUS AS IT IS DISHONEST.

8 JAN 0608Z MJL/TM

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4

WASHINGTON POST
6 JANUARY 1977

Congress Enters the Debate on Soviet-U.S. Power

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Congress is entering the Battle of the Estimate now raging within the intelligence community over the possibility that the Soviet Union threatens to surpass American military power or may already have done so.

The inquiries on Capitol Hill center on recent disclosure that a panel of outsiders, who take an alarmed view of Soviet military intentions and capabilities, was brought in to challenge the official government estimators of Soviet power.

A Senate intelligence subcommittee is looking into the question of whether the official estimates were slanted by this procedure. The Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality of Intelligence is headed by Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.).

Another inquiry was begun by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), a senior member of the Senate's Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

Proxmire asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether they agree with a published military claim that "the U.S.S.R. already has achieved military superiority over the United States" and that the Soviet Union "is not only aiming for superiority but preparing for war."

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in an initiative begun before the dispute about U.S. intelligence estimates, is planning early hearings on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. It intends to start with witnesses from outside the government.

Together, these inquiries, and perhaps others in the House, encompass a controversy that will coincide with debate over the new defense budget, and the Carter administration's plans for intensified U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations.

Proxmire said yesterday that "there is a tendency in the military establishment to cry wolf at [defense] budget time."

Proxmire is questioning the use of a panel of prominent critics of U.S.-Soviet detente policy, led by Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard, in the internal debates over the current top secret official estimate of Soviet military power.

Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush coordinated the unusual adversary process, in which the outside panel reinforced "worst case" analysts inside the government, especially in military intelligence.

"Do we let one outside group with known hawkish tendencies influence our estimates?" Proxmire asked yesterday. "What would happen if it became known that our intelligence estimates were being influenced by a high-level group of forceful personalities committed to disarmament?"

"The intelligence community needs intellectual stimulation from outside its closed confines," he said. "But to limit that stimulation to one philosophy, to one ideological group," he

said, "is to do violence to the concept of intelligence free from pressure."

Proxmire, it was learned, on Tuesday sent a four-page questionnaire to Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, questioning public claims by Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who retired last weekend as Air Force chief of intelligence.

Keegan has been a fierce dissenter to the entire pattern of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, and has praised the challenges raised against them by the Pipes panel.

Proxmire said public comments by Keegan "raise the most serious questions about the strategic relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R." He put to Brown 25 questions drawn from an interview with Keegan in The New York Times, asking for "the official views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" on Keegan's claims.

Keegan was quoted as saying that:

"By every criterion used to measure [nuclear] strategic balance—that is, damage expectancy, throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage or technology—I am unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States."

In another interview, with Newsweek magazine, Keegan was quoted as saying: "We are blinded by our hopes, our perceptions of Soviet objectives and our assumption that nuclear war is unthinkable and that no one would survive." Keegan also said, "The Soviets are working on dramatically exotic new weapons, 20 years ahead of anything ever conceived in the U.S."

Proxmire wrote Brown that if Keegan is correct, "then indeed this country does face a crisis of confidence in our military capacity. If not, then we

need to know the facts, all the facts, so that other judgments can be drawn."

Proxmire yesterday questioned whether reports of Soviet military superiority have included the following factors:

"Our lead in [nuclear] warheads over the Soviet Union—9,000 to 3,600—or our five-year lead in MIRV [multiple warhead] technology; or the increased capabilities of the Trident submarine program; or the improved command, control and communications procedures; or the greatly enhanced re-targeting capability of U.S. missile forces; or the U.S. development of cruise missiles, or our early warning devices in space, and at sea and on the ground, or many other areas where the U.S. has a significant lead over the Soviets."

E 80

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

January 6, 1977

two of such four Representatives shall be affiliated with the political party.

(c) (1) The President, the majority leader of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, after consultation among themselves, shall each appoint as members of the Task Force four individuals not officers or employees of the United States who, because of their knowledge, expertise, diversity of experience, and distinguished service in their professions, are particularly qualified for service on the Task Force.

(2) In making appointments under this subsection, the President, majority leader of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take care that the following interested parties are adequately represented by the members so appointed:

(A) State and local governments.

(B) Members of the academic community concerned with the taxation of real property.

(C) Citizens groups and associations concerned with the taxation of real property.

(3) Appointments shall be made pursuant to this subsection without regard to political affiliation.

(d) The members of the Task Force—

(1) shall be appointed within ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act; and

(2) shall be appointed for the life of the Task Force.

(e) One of the individuals appointed to the Task Force by the President shall be designated by the President as Chairperson of the Task Force. Such individual shall serve as Chairperson for the life of the Task Force.

(f) A vacancy on the Task Force shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made.

(g) Thirteen members of the Task Force shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number may hold hearings.

(h) The Task Force shall meet at the call of the Chairperson or whenever thirteen members present a petition to the Chairperson asking for a meeting of the Task Force.

DUTIES OF THE TASK FORCE

Sec. 2. (a) The Task Force shall study and evaluate—

(1) the taxation of real property by State and local governments;

(2) the effects of such taxation on middle income and fixed income taxpayers; and

(3) the feasibility of Federal taxation and other policies designed to reduce the dependence of State and local governments on such taxation.

(b) The study and evaluation described in subsection (a) shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) An examination of means which would allow State and local governments to reduce real property taxes—

(A) through the waiver by the United States of the immunity of Federal instrumentalities to such taxes;

(B) through Federal grants-in-aid and loans to State and local governments to assist such governments in providing services which otherwise would be supported by real property taxes;

(C) through the utilization of other forms of taxation in place of real property taxation;

(D) through an analysis by State and local governments of their overall taxation policies and of ways to redistribute tax burdens; and

(E) through the consolidation of local political subdivisions and other taxing districts so that tax burdens may be equitably distributed.

(2) An analysis of the tax burdens of persons and organizations with respect to income produced by the real property owned by any such person or organization.

(3) An examination of means to reduce the real property taxes of fixed and middle income taxpayers and other individuals sub-

(A) through the granting of Federal tax relief to such taxpayers;

(B) through the granting of exemptions from real property taxes to such taxpayers; and

(C) through the taxation of real property owned by persons and organizations presently exempt from such taxation, including State and local governments and charitable, non-profit, educational, religious, humanitarian, and philanthropic organizations.

POWERS OF THE TASK FORCE

Sec. 3. (a) The Task Force, or, on the authorization of the Task Force, any subcommittee or members thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, issue such subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses, hold such hearings, take such testimony, receive such evidence, take such oaths, and sit and act at such times and places as the Task Force may deem appropriate and may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before the Task Force or any subcommittee or members thereof.

(b) Subject to such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Task Force, the Chairperson shall have the power to—

(1) appoint and fix the compensation of an executive director, and such additional personnel as he deems advisable, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that the executive director may not receive pay in excess of the maximum annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of such title and any additional personnel may not receive pay in excess of the maximum annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-15 of such General Schedule, and

(2) obtain temporary and intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with the provisions of section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(c) The Task Force is authorized to negotiate and enter into contracts with organizations, institutions, and individuals to carry out such studies, surveys, or research and prepare such reports as the Task Force determines are necessary in order to carry out its duties.

COOPERATION OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

Sec. 4. (a) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the Federal Government is authorized and directed to furnish to the Task Force, upon request made by the Chairperson, and to the extent permitted by law, such data, reports, and other information as the Task Force deems necessary to carry out its functions under this Act. All such requests shall be made by the Chairperson of the Task Force.

(b) The head of each department or agency of the Federal Government is authorized to provide to the Task Force such services as the Task Force requests on such basis, reimbursable and otherwise, as may be agreed between the department or agency and the Chairperson of the Task Force.

(c) The Task Force may accept, use, and dispose of any gift or donation of services or property.

(d) The Task Force may use the United States mails in the same manner and upon the same conditions as any other Federal agency.

(e) The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Task Force on a reimbursable basis such administrative support as the Task Force may require.

PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES

Sec. 5. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), members of the Task Force shall

(b) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Task Force, members of the Task Force shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under subchapter I of chapter 57 of the United States Code.

FINAL REPORT

Sec. 6. The Task Force shall transmit to the President and the Congress not later than the date one year after the first day on which all members of the Task Force have been appointed, a final report containing a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Task Force, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable (including recommendations for legislation).

TERMINATION

Sec. 7. On the ninetieth day after the date of submission of its final report to the President, the Task Force shall cease to exist.

CIA SAYS REDS SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 6, 1977

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, the Central Intelligence Agency has finally discovered what has been apparent to many people for some time—namely that the Soviet Union seeks superiority over the United States in military matters—not parity as Mr. McNamara used to wish us to believe. Of course, the usual pundits in the press are saying that this is just a gambit of the outgoing Ford administration and the Department of Defense to keep the defense budget high, but the facts have been there for anyone to see for years. All studies confirm that except in one or two categories, we are behind the Soviet Union in any type of calculation that can be made. The story reporting the CIA's findings as it appeared in the Washington Star for December 26, 1976, follows:

CIA SAYS REDS SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY. ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CALLED VERY GRIM

(By David Binder)

President-elect Jimmy Carter will receive an intelligence estimate of long-range Soviet strategic intentions next month that raises the question whether the Russians are shifting their objectives from rough parity with United States military forces to superiority.

In reporting this, high-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives over the next 10 years, just completed, was more somber than any in more than a decade.

A top-level military intelligence officer who has seen the estimate commented: "It was more than somber—it was very grim. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it."

Previous national estimates of Soviet aims—the supreme products of the intelligence community since 1950—had concluded that the objective was rough parity with United States strategic capabilities.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

FBIS 20

NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 6 Jan 77

Item No. 2

Ref. No.

DISTRIBUTION I

TASS: FORD ADMINISTRATION USING LAST DAYS TO PRESSURE CARTER

L0061240 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH-1215 GMT 6 JAN 77 LD

("A VIEW FROM MOSCOW"--TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW, JANUARY 6, TASS--VALENTIN ZORIN, THE POLITICAL COMMENTATOR OF THE ALL-UNION RADIO AND TELEVISION, WRITES FOR TASS:

SIXTEEN YEARS AGO, BEFORE LEAVING THE WHITE HOUSE GENERAL EISENHOWER MADE A SPEECH WHICH WAS DESTINED TO BECOME A MILESTONE IN HIS BIOGRAPHY. IN THIS SPEECH THE PRESIDENT GAVE CURRENCY TO THE TERM "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX." WISENED BY LONG EXPERIENCE IN HIGH MILITARY POSITIONS AND IN THE WHITE HOUSE, DWIGHT EISENHOWER CONSIDERED IT HIS MORAL DUTY TO WARN HIS COMPATRIOTS AGAINST DANGERS STEMMING FROM THE SELFISH INTERESTS OF THOSE POWERFUL CIRCLES WHICH HAVE CAST IN THEIR LOT WITH WARS AND WAR PREPARATIONS.

PRESIDENT FORD, WHO HAS SAID MORE THAN ONCE THAT DWIGHT EISENHOWER IS FOR HIM ONE OF THE POLITICAL MODELS, ALSO DECIDED EVIDENTLY TO GIVE SOME ADVICE TO HIS SUCCESSORS. SOME OF THIS ADVICE IS CONTAINED IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED BY TIME MAGAZINE. IN THE LAST DECADE, PRESIDENT FORD ASSERTED IN HIS INTERVIEW, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN PRESSING AHEAD WITH A PROGRAMME FOR GRADUALLY STRENGTHENING AND MODERNIZING ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN GIVING LESS ATTENTION TO ITS MILITARY MIGHT AND ALLOWED THE GAP BETWEEN IT AND THE SOVIET UNION TO NARROW.

THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT LIMIT ITSELF TO MAKING STATEMENTS. DURING PRESIDENT FORD'S LAST YEAR IN OFFICE U.S. MILITARY SPENDING IS TO AMOUNT, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL FIGURES, TO 120,600 MILLION DOLLARS, THE BIGGEST EVER MILITARY BUDGET IN U.S. HISTORY.

A MAJORITY OF AMERICAN ELECTORS VOTED FOR JAMES CARTER WHO PROMISED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO MODERATE THE REAGAN'S APPETITE BY CUTTING ITS BUDGET. THIS SEEMS TO HAVE AROUSED CONSIDERABLE

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7

OCT 10 1977

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
TIMES-PICAYUNE

M - 205,141

S - 306,992

JAN 6 1977

Intelligence: Out into the Heat

One may applaud the idea of including outside experts in the preparation of the annual Central Intelligence Agency report on the Soviet Union, but if it is to produce a debaters' donnybrook spread before the public — and the Soviets — one may rightly feel some concern.

This is just what happened in preparing the 1976 report — the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on which is based a broad range of executive and legislative actions on defense, finances, economics, foreign policy, military procurement and other matters. CIA director George Bush and William Hyland, President Ford's deputy assistant for national security, tried the experiment of giving a board of experts the same raw data as the usual CIA group to see what they would come up with.

The ground rules insured what would happen: CIA judgment for some years has been that the Soviets, militarily, are trying for "parity" (variously definable) with the United States, and the outside team was to be made up of those who were less sanguine on the sub-

ject. Result: Table-thumping battles, an NIE that suggests the Soviets may be trying for "superiority," and leaks that spread the arguments in unseemly detail all over the media.

The problem, of course, is interpretation beyond the standard intelligence practice of assuming that capability indicates intent. This is not always true, but one cannot always read minds. Either side of the NIE debate or both could be right; in any event, neither basic judgment is new or undebated.

But another rule of intelligence is that competition among services is productive as long as the services are not actually at each other's throats. Much of intelligence by nature is inference, deduction and working hypotheses, and much of the policies based on it — but only partly on it — is necessarily the same. Though all this seems to deprecate the value of intelligence and intelligence analysts, it can be a healthy enough process, containing valuable mechanisms for self-correction, if discreetly contained.

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 6 Jan 78

Item 6 INTL 9

Ref. No.

DISTRIBUTION I

FBIS 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANALYSIS NOTE AG/WA

MOSCOW REACTION TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

MOSCOW'S FIRST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES SURROUNDING THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES CAME IN A COMMENTARY BY VETERAN RADIO AND TELEVISION OBSERVER VALETIN ZORIN CARRIED BY TASS ON 6 JANUARY (SEE ITEM 20 OF THE FBIS WIRE OF 6 JANUARY 1977). ZORIN LINKED THE PUBLICITY FOR THE REVISED ESTIMATE AT THIS TIME TO ATTEMPTS BY THE OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION TO TIE THE HANDS OF PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER IN FOREIGN POLICY. SEVERAL COMMENTARIES SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR HAD CHARGED THE FORD ADMINISTRATION WITH ATTEMPTING TO "PRESSURE" CARTER, BUT THEY HAD FAILED TO MAKE CLEAR THE PRECISE SOURCE OF THEIR CONCERN.

ZORIN NOTED THAT "FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY" AN "OUTSIDE GROUP" HAD BEEN SET UP TO CRITICIZE EXISTING APPRAISALS OF SOVIET POLICY. HE SAID THAT "PRESSURE FROM ABOVE" WAS BEHIND THE RESULTANT REPORT CLAIMING THAT WASHINGTON HAD BEEN "UNDERESTIMATING FOR YEARS SOVIET INTENTIONS AND THE DANGER THEY REPRESENT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES." ZORIN DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE DEBATE HAS BEEN FOCUSED SPECIFICALLY ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MOSCOW SEEKS PARITY WITH OR SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES. HIS RETICENCE IN THAT REGARD IS CONSISTENT WITH MOSCOW'S PAST EFFORTS TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO A DIRECT EXCHANGE OF CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES ABOUT SPECIFIC FORCE LEVELS.

CHARLESTON, W.VA.
GAZETTE
M - 63,294
GAZETTE-MAIL
S - 106,775

JAN 5 1977

Editorials--

U.S. No Less Secure Than Ever

An incoming new administration headed by a president who had on the campaign trail insinuated from time to time that enough was enough and that the United States wasn't a talonless hawk made it inevitable that the Central Intelligence Agency, before Jimmy Carter moved into the White House, would issue a report counteracting such dangerous nonsense.

Said report was issued, and as surely as arms merchants and generals and admirals understand each other's needs and aspirations the nation's nervous Nellies began wagging their heads and wondering when ultimatums would be thundering out of the Kremlin.

At least one editorial writer at the *Charleston Daily Mail* is shivering at the thought that his country is a talonless hawk.

The Soviet Union, he tells readers some top-level intelligence officer told *The New York Times* -- and by jeepers, if you read what one of the nation's top-level intelligence officers says about the relative strength of the U.S. and the USSR in that newspaper, it just has to be so, particularly when you recall what you once read in the same flawless journal from the same oracles about how the North Vietnamese were on their knees -- is out to achieve arms superiority over this country. Moreover, the doleful prediction continues, the Soviet Union will accomplish its objective.

The United States, mourns the *Daily Mail* pessimist, isn't as secure as it used to be.

Wherein isn't it as secure?

Does it have fewer missiles than it formerly had? Fewer missile-bearing submarines? Have we lost our capacity to blow up the world? If we haven't and still retain the awesome power to incinerate mankind, why aren't we secure?

Fortunately, most American citizens aren't damn fools. They know perfectly well, top-level (are there any other kind who get quoted in august American publications) CIA intelligence agents, stories in *The New York Times*, and *Charleston Daily Mail* editorials notwithstanding their nation is as secure today as it was yesterday, the day before yesterday, and several thousand days before that.

Indeed, they know that if anything the United States is stronger than ever. That the finest technological triumph of this decade and possibly of this century or any other one was executed by their country with its recent rocket shot to Mars. They know that if their scientists can command laboratories to perform certain tasks on a planet whose distance from earth varies between 248 million and 35 million miles they doubtless can fire a nuclear missile to strike any spot in the Soviet Union -- including the areas in which are President Brezhnev's regular residence and his vacation dacha, assuming top-level intelligence officers have spotted them, which un-

DALLAS, TEXAS
TIMES HERALD

E - 214,519

S - 257,936

JAN 5 1977

George Bush's swan song

GEORGE BUSH'S public service career may be in eclipse, but the Central Intelligence Agency director is riding down to the wire in trademark integrity and straight talk.

The Texan recently stepped out of the solitude of intelligence secrecy to go on national television to blast those who spill secrets involving national security.

It had to do with carefully managed leaks of a new CIA report on long-range Soviet military plans — leaks that planted top secret information in the press. To Bush it was an "appalling" act that violated security agreements and showed an intolerable lack of discipline in the intelligence community.

IT INFURIATED Bush and his temperature rose even higher when some implied that the CIA had deliberately leaked the information to make life uncomfortable for incoming President Jimmy Carter.

Around Washington the speculation was that the CIA leaked scare talk on growing Soviet military supremacy to dissuade Carter from following campaign promises to cut the national defense budget by billions of dollars. That bullet struck Bush amidship and he very grimly denied it.

He said he had agreed to come out of the shadows of CIA and onto national television precisely to "gun down" such tawdry talk and that the CIA had "great integrity" and would never offer conclusions to force the hand of a President or a President-elect.

Bush's contempt for secret spillers in

government is shared by a lot of others. Since Watergate and the Pentagon papers there has been a growing string of leaks, some of which brushed extremely close to endangering the national security.

It may not be the winning thing to



FELIX
McKNIGHT

do, politically, but George Bush stood up to (1) condemn the sources of leaks within the intelligence system and (2) obliquely remind the recipient press that it, too, should examine its responsibility.

It was characteristic of the man, whose future is uncertain.

Once before, we reflected in this spot that if Mr. Jimmy Carter really wanted to show a splash of sorely needed bipartisan class he would consider George Bush for a lofty place on his new team.

For the record, our reward was a very positive 90 per cent reaffirmation of trust and faith in the rangy transplanted Texan and a murmuring 10 per cent who informed us that Mr. Carter could handle his own Democrat business — which did not include the naming of

a former GOP national party chairman to his fold.

Mr. Carter not only ignored the wisdom we dispensed but, according to the insider journalists, wrote the fiftyish Bush off his list in brusque finality.

It seems that when George Bush made the traditional official pilgrimage to Plains, Ga., several weeks ago for a daylong briefing of the President-elect on the nation's critical intelligence systems, the atmosphere became a bit electric.

LEAKED REPORTS (again) indicated that Bush was set up for a head-to-head delineation of highly sensitive foreign problems with the new President but balked when some of Mr. Carter's youngish aides appeared for the session.

It was reported, with only silence and no corroboration from either side, that Bush declined to go over the entire inventory of crises in the presence of Carter campaign aides who had not received cleansing national security clearance.

Something happened, for sure. Only a few days later George Bush submitted, irrevocably, his resignation as CIA director — effective the day after Mr. Carter's inauguration. Since then, Mr. Carter has named Ted Sorenson, the old John F. Kennedy speechwriter, as the new CIA chief.

Too bad that George Bush is going into at least temporary eclipse as a public servant. His latest, and perhaps final, act indicates the soundness of his concerns for this nation.

THE WASHINGTON POST
 5 January 1977

Good Intelligence

THE FLAP OVER THE latest intelligence estimate of the Soviet threat brings to public awareness the largely unnoted issue of the quality of intelligence: its relevance and incisiveness; its timeliness, its freedom from political or other bias. This is not so glamorous a matter as the conduct (or disclosure) of covert operations, or the collection of information by clandestine spies or exotic technologies. Thus it has received insufficient attention from intelligence practitioners and investigators alike. But for the President and his policy-makers, it is the main thing.

The current flap started building in 1975 when the generally conservative President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board suggested that an outside panel, composed entirely of specialists suspicious of détente, be permitted to second-guess ("competitive analysis") the intelligence community's annual Soviet estimate. A strong and savvy President would not have installed what has since been called, fairly, a "kangaroo court." An undistracted intelligence leadership would have blunted an exercise plainly trampling on the mutual trust that producers of intelligence need in order to offer their best judgment to their consumers—the policy makers. To see why, you need only consider where this exercise could end if the findings of the first "competitive review" did not fit somebody or other's preconceptions or predilections. Would the competition then be widened with the appointment of yet another team of second-guessers? This particular outsider estimate produced more alarm about Soviet intentions than had ever been expressed in this series before. But nobody seriously doubts that another outsider's group, composed of equally reputable authorities of a different persuasion, could produce a less alarming conclusion.

Now, let us keep first things first. The difference between the earlier intelligence community estimate and the new community-outsider estimate is essentially a judgment call, and a highly subjective one at that. Menace, like beauty, can be in the eye of the beholder. No significant new Soviet developments have

been adduced. But the basic reason why any such significant difference in analysis can develop in the short space of a year lies in the uncertainties built into current Soviet policy. Soviet military programs are large enough, and Soviet political strategies adventurous enough, to support honestly differing interpretations of their intended purpose and ultimate scope. There is something real to argue about.

But that in turn underlines the need for high-quality intelligence estimates produced by a process itself commanding respect. We can think of no better formula for *bad* intelligence than to let a single-viewpoint panel with a heavy ideological flavor second-guess the making of the crucial estimate, at a time of transition when official analysts lack the firm support of their chiefs and the material being estimated is subject to unusually diverse judgments. We are in no position to contend that official analysts are without flaw or bias. We are quite aware that the procedures by which intelligence had best be produced are in dispute among experts. But we have little faith in a procedure so patently political as that by which the new estimate was produced. That the outsiders, supposedly experienced professionals, leaked a laudatory and self-serving account of their work ("we just licked them on a great number of points") only deepens our reservations.

Mr. Carter is said to have chosen Theodore Sorensen as his intelligence chief out of a judgment, developed in the course of the campaign, that the former Kennedy speechwriter has a special talent for working his way through a large mass of sometimes contradictory material and filtering the essence of it to the President without fear or favor. For reasons we have stated, we have some reservations about Mr. Sorensen's broader qualifications for the job. But if this is the way he intends to approach it—and if this is, indeed, his special talent—he will at least be bringing to the vital business of intelligence analysis a judicious evenhandedness which was sorely lacking in the handling of this year's annual estimate of Soviet intentions.

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

MORNING - 284,110
WEEKEND - 283,330
JAN 4, 1977

CIA: SOVIETS SEEK SUPERIORITY

President-elect Jimmy Carter has some grim news awaiting him when he takes office.

He will receive a Central Intelligence Agency estimate next month indicating the Soviets are seeking military superiority over U.S. forces rather than parity as had previously been assumed, according to The New York Times.

A high-level military intelligence officer, who had seen the estimate of Soviet strategic objectives, called the report "more than somber — it was very grim."

The signs that apparently caused the new assessment included "newly developed Russian guided missiles, a vast program of underground shelters and a continuing build-up of air defenses," the Times said.

Liberal critics already are attacking the new CIA estimate as being rigged by "hard-liners" on defense due to participation of a team of outsiders in the estimate.

This is an irresponsible charge to make against a panel comprised of Richard Pipes, professor of Russian History at Harvard; Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation; Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, ret., former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; John Vogt, a retired Air Force General, and Prof. William Van Cleve of the University of Southern California, former delegate to the strategic arms talks.

It is exceedingly dangerous for any layman far removed from the CIA to try to impute ulterior motives to intelligence estimates. Unless there is solid evidence to prove such a charge — which there most certainly isn't in this case — it is reckless to suggest that the CIA report can safely be ignored.

What is important is that President-elect Carter and the American people start facing up to the harsh reality that the ruthless men in the Kremlin are driving relentlessly toward superiority over this country — a goal

they apparently have had ever since they were forced to back away from U.S. power in the Cuban missile crisis.

It was reported that the panel of distinguished outsiders asserted the ultimate Russian intention "was to develop forces capable of interfering with the free flow of ocean transport, denying raw materials to the West, disrupting fuel supplies, defeating the 'protection of power from sea to land' by Western forces, defending nuclear capability from American nuclear submarines and developing strategic forces that would ultimately have a superior first-strike capability."

What lends credence to this assessment is that it is in line with reports from other authoritative sources, such as Jane's Fighting Ships, which have found similar evidence that the Soviets are preparing for aggressive war and continuing an unparalleled buildup of their Navy, Air Force and ground forces, as well as their strategic weapons systems.

In view of past experience it is fair to conclude that the Russians would not hesitate to try to intimidate the new President at some point of contact around the world. The Russians will be testing not only the actual U.S. strength in arms but the will of Mr. Carter and the American people to defend their interests.

Some allies have begun doubting the U.S. ability to lead the West. Over the weekend Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa warned his people that they could expect no help from anyone if they are attacked by the Communists.

The Communists want to capture the southern tip of Africa for its enormous wealth and strategic position, said Vorster. But the West no longer has the stomach to oppose these designs, he said.

Hopefully Vorster is wrong. For, if he is right, the Soviets probably won't wait too long to test Carter's mettle in this crucially important region.

OVERSEAS NEWS

Hawkish view of Soviet force may tie Carter's hand

From JONATHAN STEELE: Washington, January 3

Calculated Washington leaks of official intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic intentions have caused a major row over the size of the annual defence budget and in particular over the way in which the estimates are formed.

Last week, to judge from odd comments made during Mr Carter's three days of meetings with his prospective cabinet, the president-elect appeared to be backing off his promise to cut the defence budget by between \$5 and \$7 billions. The latest filip may make it even more likely that he will adopt the generally harder line on post-Vietnam defence spending which President Ford began.

The key development now is the new intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions. At the suggestion of the director of his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Mr Leo Cherne, President Ford last summer asked a panel composed mainly of outside experts to review the same evidence about the Soviet Union as the Administration's analysts. It was the first time in 26 years that outsiders have been called in to join the intelligence estimating operation which is normally handled by the CIA and officials from the various armed service agencies.

The exact reason for the invitation to the outsiders is not clear. The outside panel's chairman, Professor Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian history at Harvard, explained it this way: "In general," he says "there has been a disposition in Washington to underestimate the Soviet drive. The moderately optimistic line has prevailed."

Pipes deliberately put the pessimists because there is no point in another optimistic view.

Not surprisingly, the pessimists came up with a pessimistic view of Soviet intentions in their part of the report which will be formally approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board this week. More important, the pessimists managed to influence the In-House section of the report as well, so that the whole document, which will be circulated in top Government circles over the next few weeks, is a grimmer analysis than any in recent years.

Washington is now buzzing with questions. Who leaked the story of the two reports? How serious is the disagreement between them? Did the intelligence bureaucrats allow themselves to be swayed by the outside pessimists for reasons as mundane as job insecurity? Was the whole exercise adopted by President Ford to tie his successor's hands?

Herbert Scoville, a former CIA deputy director for science and technology, believes it was. "I think this whole thing was clearly an attempt to leave a legacy for the new administration—or for the Ford administration if it continued—which would be very hard to reverse."

Now the integrity of the intelligence estimating process has been questioned. It is extremely difficult for insiders to stand up to the pressure of a biased point of view when the people at the top want to prove something.

Another former deputy director of the CIA, Ray Cline, who is a well-known sceptic about Soviet intentions, none the less deplored the idea of bringing in outsiders. "It is a kangaroo court—outside critics all picked for one point of view," he said.

He line, sources say that the new "national intelligence estimate" from the Soviet Union

does not claim that the Russians yet have military superiority over the United States.

But it does say, on the basis of higher estimates of Soviet defence spending and the continuation of the Russian civil defence programme, that the Russians are more than ever driving towards superiority. However, these concepts are themselves imprecise and debateable.

The focus switches from Soviet intentions to their capabilities which are more easily measurable. The great majority of insiders and outsiders apparently still agree that the Russians are behind. Yesterday Mr Donald Rumfeld, the outgoing Secretary of Defence, explained it this way: "We have seen the Soviet Union over 15 to 20 years move from a somewhat primitive post-war society into a military superpower. During the same period the United States obviously has been reducing in real terms its level of effort."

"The Russians started well down. They used to be about 5ft 3in. They are now about 5ft 9in. and you are not going to like them when they are 6ft 5in."

President Ford's and Mr Rumfeld's argument has consistently been that because of the long lead time needed for building new weapons the US must decide today if it is not to become number two nation in a few years' time. However, one official spokesman, Major-General George Keegan, who retired on Saturday as the air force chief of intelligence, said today that the Soviet Union had already achieved military superiority.

Mr Carter so far has taken the more optimistic position. He said: "We're still by far stronger than they are in most means of measuring military strength."

US Air Force general says the Russians are preparing for war

From Fred Emery

Washington, Jan 3

"Worrisome signs" in the Soviet defence build-up are being analysed by American intelligence agencies this year "with a ferocity and intensity" that was missing before, Mr George Bush, the outgoing Director of Central Intelligence, has stated here.

However, Mr Bush declined to confirm repeated and detailed reports that the formal government "national estimate" of Soviet intentions and capability to be inherited by the Carter administration will, for the first time, conclude that the Soviet Union now seeks "superiority" rather than mere "parity" in strategic terms.

In a television interview, which found Mr Bush repeatedly refusing to answer questions about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations, the Director said only that "varying opinions" on Soviet strength would be presented to the President and his policy-makers. He angrily denounced any suggestion that the estimate was leaked in order to force Mr Carter's hand against making any cuts in American defence spending.

Mr Bush said he was "appalled" that outside experts, brought in for the first time to run "a competitive analysis" against the CIA's own experts, should have dared leak the results of their supposed "victory" over the CIA men. Of course, by being appalled he was virtually confirming the fact.

Today one of the insiders who must have appalled Mr Bush is quoted in an exclusive interview by *The New York Times*. He believes that the Soviet Union has not only attained superiority already but that it is preparing for war—in which he estimates that 35 to 40 Americans would be killed for every Russian.

General George Keegan, who retired on New Year's Day as Chief of United States Air Force Intelligence, is credited by *The New York Times* with being the driving force behind the grim new "national estimate" of the Soviet Union.

He has long been a maverick in the intelligence community. He has denounced the Salt 1 treaty outlawing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences and he predicts the "greatest global conflict in history" within two decades unless there is a radical change in American intelligence perceptions. His views are hotly disputed within the State Department.

General Keegan's alarm is based on his observation of a vast Soviet civil defence nuclear shelter programme, which includes massive stockpiling of foods, he explains in the interview.

He also is alarmed by Soviet plans to introduce 15 new ballistic missile systems by 1982, seven or eight of which he says will be tested by 1978. "By every criterion used to measure strategic balance—that is, damage expectancy, throw weight, equivalent megatonnage or technology—I am unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States", he said.

This is heresy to the Administration. While the Soviet build-up is acknowledged, it is held that the United States is far ahead in the number of nuclear warheads, in deployed Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), in Cruise missile technology and in guidance systems generally.

General Keegan cited prolific documentation for his views, much of it in open Soviet publications, but also including thousands of photographs, presumably from spy satellites.

On the military side he claimed that the Soviet Union had undertaken a huge "hardening" programme, to reinforce underground military installations against nuclear attack.

These included, he said, headquarters of all the main military services duplicate reserve installations, and those for the entire chain of command for nuclear forces from the general staff down to regiments.

General Keegan called the evidence in the industrial area "equally shocking". He said there were enough mass shelters with the principal manufacturing plants to protect more than 60 million workers from nuclear attack.

He added: "What it all means is that the Soviet believe they can survive a nuclear war, not without, of course, suffering a great deal of damage in the process."

Current American doctrines of deterrence rest upon the tenet that both sides can inflict "unacceptable damage" and that therefore both are deterred. But General Keegan disagrees, not without scorn, for the "civilian academicians and econometricians" who have devised the current strategy. He thinks they do better in the Soviet Union with strategy and force planning "almost exclusively a product of the military

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ON PAGE A-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 January 1977

Joseph Kraft

Righteous Concern

Is Jimmy Carter a closet dove on dealing with the Russians? That dark suspicion is obviously entertained by the leading American hawks.

So they are breaking from their preferred role as insiders to go public with a series of dire warnings on the danger of the growing Soviet military buildup. The Carter administration, in consequence, will take office in an atmosphere heavy with threats of political reprisal against any move to ease tensions with Moscow.

To understand all this it is useful to switch from the familiar hawk-dove distinction to the Biblical contrast between the repenters and the righteous. The repenters are those who have changed their views on Vietnam, and now see in the war a general sign of something wrong with American foreign policy. As part of their repentance, they advocate emphasis on arms control, the underdeveloped countries and human rights.

The repenters have cornered the job market in the national security area of the Carter administration. The list includes Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State, Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense and Theodore Sorensen as Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, Mr. Vance has assembled a first-rate staff of whiz kids dominated by the repentance outlook.

The righteous are those who believe that this country's basic post-war foreign policy of strong resistance to Communist pressure has been correct. If they regard Vietnam as a bad thing, it is on the grounds that it undermined the national interest in an active foreign policy. They are particularly concerned about Soviet efforts to make a bid for domination while American will to resist is flagging.

The best known of the righteous are former Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

'The righteous . . . are particularly concerned about Soviet efforts to make a bid for domination . . . They have suddenly started to carry their message to the public.'

former under secretary of defense Paul Nitze and former under secretary of state Eugene Rostow. They receive important staff support from various academics, notably Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard and Prof. Albert Wohlstetter of Chicago.

The righteous then generally make a point of expressing their views through channels. They tend to identify public relations as something not done by serious men, something well-nigh frivolous. A typical example of their "insider's" instinct is the way they recently bent the official CIA estimates of the Soviet threat.

The starting point was a series of articles by Prof. Wohlstetter purporting to show that the CIA estimates had consistently understated Soviet strength. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (a supervisory body dominated by righteous figures such as the physicist Edward Teller and the former director of defense research John Foster) then instituted an inquiry into why the agency had consistently underestimated Soviet strength.

In response, the outgoing CIA Director, George Bush, hand-picked a team of experts known for their righteous views. Raw intelligence data was submitted to the team, which returned with the verdict that the Russians were seeking nuclear "superiority" over the U.S. Under the gun of that finding, the official CIA Board of National Estimates has apparently raised its assessment of the Soviet threat.

For a long time leading figures of the righteous school, notably Messrs. Rusk and Nitze, seemed to have the ear of Jimmy Carter. But as the appointments began, it became clear that Carter was going for the repenters. So far only one of the righteous, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who will be national security adviser in the White House, has found an important place in the administration.

In these conditions, the righteous have suddenly started to carry their message to the public. Rusk, Nitze and Rostow have announced the formation of a lobby to advertise the Soviet threat, which has been given the Paul Reveren title of Committee on the Present Danger. The intelligence estimates put together by the anti-CIA group—the so-called B Team—have been leaked in a way that exaggerated the menace of Soviet pressure.

I am not insensitive to the arguments of the righteous. I think the lesson of Vietnam has been overgeneralized, and I believe there is a growing Soviet military capacity.

But the right way to meet that threat is by constructive proposals for long-term actions. Undiscriminating alarms are bound to strike the general public as a case of the boy crying "wolf," and sure to look to the Carter administration as a piece of blackmail calculated to head off any moves toward more accommodation with Russia.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM News Center 4

STATION WRC TV

DATE January 3, 1977 5:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT CIA vs Pentagon Estimates

BILL STERNOFF: Tom Braden has something unusual for the new year. A kind word for the CIA.

TOM BRADEN: What with all that we already know about bungled bag jobs and assassinations that shouldn't have been attempted and didn't work anyhow, I know you don't expect to hear anything good about the CIA.

Well I don't have anything really good to tell you except that the CIA appears to be about to lose its principal function, that is to prepare the national estimate which tells the President what the Russians are up to.

It's an important job because the President, like all other rational human beings, acts on the basis of what he knows, and for 30 years what the President knows has been what the CIA told him.

Now the Pentagon says the CIA estimates are too soft. The Pentagon says the Russians are preparing a first strike and are out to wipe us off the map. The Pentagon has prepared its own estimates and from now on it's prepared to take over the CIA's job.

We come full circle in lot of things and this is one of them. Thirty years ago we founded the CIA as a civilian agency for the sole reason that intelligence coming from the military is susceptible to built in bias.

When the military wants more ships or planes or weapons or money intelligence about what the Russians are doing can be used as justification. Soley put the intelligence collection function in the hands of people who didn't have a built in bias. That was

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PARKERSBURG, W.VA.
SENTINEL

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JAN 3 1977

Another Scare

Americans are in for another massive propaganda scare campaign as the military-industrial complex in this country seeks to pressure President-elect Jimmy Carter into approving huge new arms expenditures.

The idea that the U.S. is falling behind the Soviets in military strength has been building for some time. President-elect Carter's campaign promise to cut the defense budget has had the military establishment working overtime to counter the proposal.

Now it has been revealed that Mr. Carter will soon receive an intelligence estimate of long-range Soviet strategic intentions that raises the question whether the Russians are shifting their objectives from rough parity with the United States military forces to superiority.

In reporting this, high-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives over the next ten years, just completed, was more somber than any in more than a decade. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces.

Previous national estimates of Soviet aims — the supreme products of the intelligence community since 1950 — had concluded that the objective was rough parity with United States strategic capabilities.

Haven't we been down this road before? Are we to forget that famous "missile gap" of the 1960 election? Remember what the late President John F. Kennedy said after his election? He said he learned that the "missile gap" never did exist but was used to terrify millions of Americans to help advance the Pentagon's proposals for bigger defense spending.

In light of past experience we cannot help but suspect that the scare stories today are primarily designed to head off President-elect Carter's efforts to reduce waste in military spending while he seeks to create new arms curb agreements with the Soviet Union.

Isn't it clear by now that an escalating arms race does not benefit the security of the United States. For the sake of our children, shouldn't we face up to the fact that every arms race in history has ended in war?

Surely we are not willing to buy that shopworn argument that one way of stimulating this nation's economy is to pour billions more of our tax dollars into making armaments. Labor Department statistics have shown that military projects are among the least productive of employment, as well as being highly inflationary.

3 JAN 74



Soviet aim is arms superiority, officials suggest

Washington (AP)—The Secretary of Defense and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency suggested yesterday that the Soviet Union may have abandoned an arms policy of parity with the United States to seek weapons superiority.

Donald H. Rumsfeld and George Bush declined direct responses on separate broadcast interview programs as to the content of the latest national intelligence estimate compiled by the CIA. Unattributed press reports concerning the document prepared for the President said the Russians are working toward arms superiority.

Secretary Rumsfeld on the ABC program Issues and Answers was asked if the CIA's survey was in agreement with the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, which had been saying for some time that the Russians were seeking superiority.

"I can say this much, that it is true that the judgments within the entire U.S. intelligence community have closed and come closer together, and that is good," he said.

On the CBS program Face the Nation, Mr. Bush, the CIA director, was asked for his personal assessment as to whether the Russians were seeking superiority or whether the United States may be inferior

in view of current trends.

"There are some worrisome signs that are being looked at very, very closely, worrisome signs that are being reviewed with a ferocity or intensity this year that perhaps weren't examined with the same intensity last year," Mr. Bush said.

Mr. Rumsfeld said it was his own opinion that over the past 15 to 20 years the Soviet military trend has been adverse to the United States. "If those trends continue and are not arrested and reversed, it would have the effect of injecting a fundamental instability in the world," he said.

U.S. General Fears Soviet Has Won Military Superiority

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2—The man who has played a central role in swinging the United States intelligence community toward a more grim estimate of Soviet strategic objectives says he believes that the Soviet Union has already achieved military superiority over this country.

Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who retired yesterday as the Air Force's chief of intelligence, said in an interview that he had reached this conclusion primarily as a result of recently acquired information. It involves, he said, a vast Soviet military and civil defense shelter program, stockpiling of foods and grains for war emergency and development of some 10 to 15 new ballistic missile systems the Russians will test in the next few years.

"Today, because of the civil defense measures in the U.S.S.R., I believe the United States is incapable of carrying out its assigned wartime retaliatory tasks of crippling the Soviet industrial economy, the essential civilian-military leadership, nuclear stockpiles and the basic fighting capacity of the U.S.S.R.," he said.

Soviet Leads Seen in All Areas

"By every criterion used to measure strategic balance—that is, damage expectancy, throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage or technology—I am unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States."

General Keegan, who graduated from Harvard and obtained a master's degree in international studies at George Washington University, said that he had accepted an appointment by Dr. Arthur B. Metcalf as executive vice president of the United States Strategic Institute, a private organization concerned with questions of strategy. The 55-year-old officer will also become military editor of Strategic Review, a publication of the institute, which has offices in Boston and Washington.

The Keegan views had a significant impact on the intelligence community's preparation of the 1976 estimate of Soviet strategic objectives, according to George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, and other top-ranking intelligence officials.

His most somber view, that the Soviet

Union was not only aiming for superiority but was preparing for war, remained for a long time in the minority in the intelligence community and is still disputed by specialists in the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the National Security Council.

In a three-hour interview Friday in his Pentagon office, he cited among the examples of "hard evidence" for his views a collection of thousands of photographs, pamphlets and "open-source documents" on Soviet military sites and civil defense projects.

"In the military area alone they have hardened on the order of 35,000 installations," he said. "These include 75 underground command posts for the civil military leadership within the Moscow Beltway alone." He said some of these structures were "several hundred feet deep and wide" and capable of "withstanding 1,000 pounds per square inch of blast pressure."

General Keegan said the "hardened" sites included headquarters of "all the major military services," duplicate reserve installations for each, and for the entire nuclear chain of command "from the Soviet General Staff to the lowest regiment which handles nuclear weapons from Vladivostok to East Berlin."

In addition, he stated, the Soviet forces have "hardened" 10,000 surface-to-air missile defense sites and were in the process of hardening more than 4,500 battlefield early warning and ground control intercept radars.

"In the industrial area the findings are equally shocking," he continued. He said the evidence, including "open Soviet literature," indicated the construction of enough mass shelters "co-located with principal manufacturing plants of the Soviet Union" to protect more than 60 million workers from nuclear attack.

Bunkers for civilians in all major cities include several at Moscow University, "the size of football fields," he said.

Beyond this, he said, with the aid of a "human source," who had helped design and engineer food storage depots, his collection teams had identified "grain-storage bunkers the size of several football fields on the perimeters of all major cities guarded by the military—the most elaborate of their kind in the world."

He said his intelligence sources had also located "several major academies,"

including one engaged in training officer cadets in four-year civil defense programs. They are being trained, he said, to serve under Col. Gen. Aleksandr T. Altunin, a World War II veteran who commands "the entire civilian, industrial and military survivability programs of the Soviet Union" with a staff of more than 50 senior generals posted throughout the country.

Further intelligence established that 25 percent of all Soviet factory workers are in training programs preparing them for "civil defense leadership roles," he said.

Civil Defense the Turning Point

"The civil defense program was the decisive turning point in my judgment that we had already lost the strategic balance," he said, adding that he had reached this conclusion "four years ago."

"The implication is that they have quietly and at extra expense taken measures to assure that the essential civilian-military leadership, the fighting capability and the production capacity can continue to function under conditions of total war," he said.


"What it all means is that the Soviets believe they can survive a nuclear war, not without of course suffering a great deal of damage in the process."

This conclusion, together with his assessment of newly developed Soviet offensive war capabilities, has led General Keegan to the estimate: "that the greatest global conflict in history is likely to occur within the next decade or two unless there is a radical change in United States intelligence perceptions."

General Keegan touched only briefly on Soviet offensive weapons, saying he would deal with that in another interview. But he remarked that in 1973 he had come to "the realization that prior to 1982 the Soviets would place into test at least 15 new major ballistic missile systems."

"In the interim we have confirmed with hard evidence that seven, possibly eight intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine ballistic missile systems will be tested before 1978 and there is more credible evidence that a substantial number will follow prior to 1982," he added.

General Keegan said he felt that a grave imbalance in favor of Soviet military capacity had developed out of a failure over the last 15 years to adjust American strategic thinking to Soviet strategy.



George Bush with his daughter, Dorothy, before television interview

Associated Press

Bush Is Silent on Assessment of Soviet Aims

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2—George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, today refused to say whether the United States intelligence community now believed that the Soviet Union was aiming for strategic superiority over the United States.

Answering questions on the CBS program "Face the Nation," Mr. Bush said that recent Soviet military developments had caused members of the intelligence community to "take a new look and revise estimates" of the Soviet Union's strategic objectives.

He said that the new National Estimate of Soviet Strategic Capabilities and Objectives completed and approved Dec. 21 was a result of "competitive analysis" by the community's regular intelligence estimators as well as a group of outsiders. "People took a look at the same data and came up with different conclusions," he said. But he refused to give his own opinion.

Mr. Bush said he was "appalled at the leaks" and the "lack of discipline" of some intelligence officers and outside estimators that led to press reports about the latest estimate.

Bush 'Appalled' By Leak of New CIA Estimate

By Warren Brown

Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush said yesterday that he is "appalled" by leaks of a new government report on long-range Soviet military intentions and that those who leaked the information violated security agreements and lacked discipline.

"I'm a little disillusioned because I never thought that we could be in this kind of phantom duel where you're battling with unnamed sources," Bush said in a television interview.

"I just thought that we were more disciplined within the intelligence community," he said.

The report, the National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union, is an annual U.S. estimate of Soviet strategic objectives over the next 10 years. The estimate is classified top secret.

However, it has been widely reported that an outside panel, commissioned last June to challenge the judgment of government intelligence analysts, concluded in the current estimate that the Soviets are seeking military superiority over the United States.

The articles said the conclusions of the outside panel differed from those of the U.S. analysts, who have contended that the Soviets are seeking military parity with this country, not superiority.

Bush refused to confirm or deny any of the reported conclusions.

"I'm not discussing the conclusions," he said. "The worst thing a director of central intelligence could do is to come here and appear on this program and discuss sensitive conclusions of national intelligence estimates."

"I'm simply not going to do it," Bush said. "To the degree a member of the team (responsible for analyzing the intelligence estimates) is giving out a conclusion, he is violating a security agreement, and I don't want to be a party to that," Bush said.

The CIA director said he appeared on the interview program, "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP) in part, to "gun down" speculation that the CIA was coming up with a tough estimate of Soviet military plans, and then allowing it to be leaked to the press as part of a plan to dissuade President-elect Jimmy Carter from seeking to cut the defense budget.

That speculation "just couldn't be farther from the truth," Bush said.

"That gets to the integrity of the process," he said. "And I am here to defend the integrity of the intelligence process . . . The CIA has great integrity. It would never take directions from a policymaker—me or anybody else—in order to come up with conclusions to force a President-elect's hand or a President's hand," he said.

Bush said that though he was "disillusioned" about the leaks surrounding the intelligence estimate, he would not do away with the concept of having outside experts come in to review and analyze official intelligence data.

"The concept . . . of challenging conclusions by outside expertise has enormous appeal to me," he said. He added that he is "considering a plan" and will recommend to his successor, Theodore Sorensen, that outside experts be used in a similar capacity.

"I still feel that, to the degree outsiders with expertise can critique estimates, the policymakers are apt to have a finer (intelligence) product."

Asked to give his opinion about whether the Soviets are seeking military superiority over the United States, Bush said: "There are some worrisome signs that are being looked at very, very closely—worrisome signs that are being reviewed with a ferocity, or an intensity, this year that weren't examined with the same intensity last year."

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The 'Defense Gap'

A passionate and in our view wholly unfounded controversy over the nation's defense posture is gathering strength in the fallout from Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign and the impending inauguration of a President pledged to bring the Pentagon under control and to cut defense spending. The same hard-line forces that applauded John F. Kennedy's discovery in the campaign of 1960 of a "missile gap" favoring the Soviets — a gap that later quietly evaporated — are at work again. They are creating a national anxiety aimed at committing the new Administration to the development of vastly expensive and unnecessary new weapons systems.

The most recent and most ominous assertion of a defense gap is a report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency with the help of a group of outsiders selected for their pessimistic views of Soviet intentions; which is to say that on its face the document is rigged in behalf of a hard-line view. According to *The New York Times*, the report states flatly that the Soviets are seeking military superiority, not just parity with us; that Soviet intercontinental missiles are now almost as accurate as ours; that the Russians are investing a great deal on air defenses and are working toward a first-strike capability, and so on.

Perhaps so, although those are mere assertions or else judgments from evidence susceptible of producing contrary conclusions. But beyond that, the question arises: Of what value is "superiority" when at best it is no more than superiority of overkill? And would not the nation that actually employed its superiority trigger its own extinction as well? As the Center for Defense Information noted the same day that the CIA's pessimistic assessment was leaked to the public, the fact is that the United States possesses formidable military forces. Under the Vladivostok guidelines alone we have the right to deploy 2400 strategic launchers, of which 1320 may have multiple warheads, and it can be assumed that we have done so. The launchers include ICBMs, strategic bombers and a fleet of invulnerable submarines. We have in addition at least 7000 tactical nuclear devices in central Europe and untold others elsewhere.

The Center for Defense Information is a privately-funded policy institute with a reputation for a balanced view of defense prob-

lems. It has urged President-elect Carter to avoid commitment to such costly redundancies as the B-1 bomber, the proposed development of four new tactical wings for the Air Force and to certain shipbuilding programs that may well not meet the changing needs of tomorrow's Navy. "This is a time for restraint and for a full exploration of alternatives to a continued buildup of armaments," the center said. The facts justify such an approach.

In the campaign Mr. Carter pledged to cut the defense budget by as much as 7 billion dollars. It was generally overlooked that he was talking about "the first budget that I prepare," meaning the one that he will present to Congress in January 1978. But that should not mean that President Ford's military budget should stand above critical analysis when it is unveiled shortly. Mr. Carter has the right to amend the Ford proposals. The vigor with which he attacks that assignment will say a good deal about his willingness to take on the Pentagon's vested interests when he produces his own budget.

As John W. Finney pointed out in *The Times* the other day, if Mr. Carter is to achieve substantial savings, he will be compelled to "challenge some basic assumptions on defense planning, some politically protected programs and some jealously guarded benefits of military and civilian employees of the Defense Department." The generous military pension system alone costs 8.5 billions a year and costs are rising. Indeed, as Mr. Finney noted, defense spending has grown in real terms by 2 per cent annually in the last two years under Pentagon pressures to "catch up" and to "modernize."

The missile gap of the Kennedy years grew out of a report commissioned by President Eisenhower that erroneously predicted a coming Russian missile advantage. It recommended a vast increase in spending and a nationwide fallout shelter program costing 25 billion dollars. It was declassified in 1973 and made public last spring. Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin called it "an important historical document" that should be "reflected upon by thoughtful Americans concerned about the seemingly endless weapons systems gaps" that have developed and disappeared over the last 20 years. Mr. Proxmire's warning could hardly be more timely.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
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JAN 2 1977

defense

Russia 'Seeking Superiority'

SINCE 1950 the U.S. intelligence community, in its annual estimates of the intentions of the Soviet Union, had maintained that the Russians had been willing to settle for rough parity with United States military forces.

But last week, in a draft copy of the 1976 national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives made available to the New York Times, it became apparent that something had changed—that the U.S. now believed the Russians sought military superiority.

"It was more than (a) somber report," said a top-level military intelligence officer who had seen the new CIA estimate. "It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over the United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view. The questions begin on when they will achieve it."

The estimate was based on a year's worth of research, including the collation of photo-reconnaissance, monitoring of Soviet signals, clandestine agents' reports and studies of Soviet documents, but, according to the Times, it was also based on a new look at old evidence.

Because there had been sharp dissent on Soviet intentions in previous years, a group of seven outsiders last June had been invited by CIA Director George Bush to join in drafting the new long-range Soviet estimate.

The new group reportedly analyzed and challenged estimates prepared by the regular intelligence community, and as a result pessimistic assessments were being heard even from analysts who had previously taken a rosier attitude toward the Russians.

"The consensus is breaking up," said another high-ranking CIA official who had participated in the new estimate. "Maybe it will be a different consensus next year. A great many analysts are disturbed increasingly

*'The Soviets are
developing across
the board'*

by what they see on the Soviet side — more and more weapons programs. The Soviets are developing across the board. That is bothering people. ICBM's everywhere you look."

Although declining to discuss the specifics of numbers and kind, Bush let it be known, the New York Times reported, that alarming signs had included newly developed guided missiles, an enormous span of underground shelters and a continually expanding network of air defenses.

The intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions was particularly important because it usually provided the guidelines for the size and shape of the U.S. defense budget, including U.S. approaches to East-West relations, detente and strategic arms talks.

The Times said that participants in the evaluation process indicated that the pessimistic view had prevailed at length because of persistence on the part of a chronic gadfly in the defense intelligence community, Major General George J. Keegan Jr., retiring Air Force chief of intelligence.

Keegan, who described himself as "the eye of controversy" throughout 22 years of dissenting within the intelligence community, had filed a flurry of dissents against the Soviet weapons consensus. At length, he and Harvard Russian history professor Richard Pipes, one of the outsiders, had prevailed on opponents so that the national estimate had been redrafted three times before settling into its final form.

The report was expected to go to President-elect Jimmy Carter this month, and Carter had been on the record during the campaign as promising to cut from \$5 billion to \$7 billion in "waste" from the Pentagon budget.

"For a new President or a new secretary of defense, it's one thing to make decisions about spending when the intelligence community concludes that the Russians are seeking 'rough parity,' and another thing when the intelligence community tells you that the Russians are seeking superiority," said one military source.

The cuts, the military man said, could only be considered as "attempts to undercut the U.S. military position."

2 JAN 77

Page A6

WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Constituency Favoring Arms Buildup Seen Growing

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Regardless of how the most recent national intelligence estimates on the Soviet threat are interpreted, a broadened constituency favoring higher defense spending faces the Carter administration, according to Pentagon leaders.

This promises to make 1977 a repeat of 1976 when Congress gave the Pentagon virtually all the money it wanted for a military force of 2.1 million service people armed with new generations of weapons.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said in an interview that the constituency was broadened as the information the Pentagon put out on the Soviet military buildup got through to Americans and their representatives in Congress.

"It has not been so much a revelation" that the Pentagon suddenly made about the buildup, Rumsfeld said, "but a water treatment" of repeating the facts over and over until they penetrated the public consciousness.

While agreeing with that observation, the Pentagon executive in charge of dealing with Congress—William R. Brehm, assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs—said the new congressional budget committees also helped broaden the constituency for the defense budget.

Instead of the old procedure of members picking at little parts of the Pentagon budget sent to the House and Senate floors by the Armed Services and Appropriations committees, CONGRESS THIS YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME "had to bite the bullet" and come up with its own figure on how much is enough for national defense, Brehm noted.

As it turned out, the House and Senate Budget committees set a ceiling of \$112.1 billion in budget authority for the Pentagon for fiscal 1977, or almost the \$123.3 billion requested. The fiscal year began Oct. 1.

Brehm credited former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger with starting the turnaround in the attitude toward defense spending by attacking Congress and others who favored cutting the Pentagon budget.

After Schlesinger was fired by President Ford in November, 1975, with part of the reason being Schlesinger's refusal to support a military budget \$6 billion lower than he favored, Rumsfeld went to the Pentagon. He made the case for higher defense budgets in softer but persistent pitches.

"When I came to the Pentagon 14 months ago," Rumsfeld said in an interview, "the facts" about the Soviet military buildup "were the same as they are today."

Rumsfeld said he read the most recent national intelligence estimates about the Soviet buildup and found nothing new in them in the sense of

any spectacular advances in weaponry.

The new intelligence report, the Defense Secretary said, "is very close to what I've been saying all year." What Rumsfeld said at his Sept. 27 news conference at the Pentagon typifies what he has been saying all year:

"The Soviet Union today is clearly militarily stronger and busier than in any other period of its history . . . The Soviets continue to press ahead with aggressive development programs for both land-based ballistic missiles and submarines launched ballistic missiles.

"The scope of these programs is unprecedented, either in the Soviet Union or in the United States," Rumsfeld continued.

Rumsfeld did not suggest the Soviets were out to achieve military superiority over the United States or blow up this country in a surprise strike.

"I didn't think it was necessary to talk about intentions," Rumsfeld said in an interview with The Post. However, other arms specialists, like former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul H. Nitze, shaped the iron Rumsfeld had heated by assigning dark intentions to the Russians.

Rumsfeld acknowledges that Russia's military modernization program is within the law, so to speak. He said: "We continue to expect that the Soviets will eventually deploy close to the 1,329 MIRV (multiple warhead) missiles permitted under the Vladivostok understanding, assuming a SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) II agreement is reached."

Other Pentagon executives have gone beyond Rumsfeld's restrained alarm about the Soviet military buildup.

Said Malcolm R. Currie, the Pentagon's research director, on Feb. 26: Russia's technical advances in missiles "are only done for one reason, strategically, and that's to develop a countervailing capability. It's the only rational explanation . . . The Soviet Union has never accepted this theory of assured destruction" under which each side figures it would not be worth fighting a nuclear war because of the massive damage that would be inflicted by both sides. "They feel strategic war is kind of inevitable . . ."

On top of that scary rhetoric came the hawk vs. superhawk debate on national defense between President Ford and challenger Ronald Reagan during the Republican presidential primary campaign, plus public opinion polls indicating the American people wanted a stronger military.

Democratic political leaders advised their members in Congress last year to contain the defense budget debate to Ford vs. Reagan by going along with Ford's Pentagon budget request. While this amounted to only a temporary broadening of the constituency, the polls had a more lasting effect.

"Americans have become significantly more sympathetic toward overall military and defense spending," said Potomac Associates in discussing the results of its polling last year in a pamphlet, "The Pursuit of National Security: Defense and Military Balance."

Specifically, the Potomac Associates poll indicated a growing number of Americans wanted defense spending to go up, with 9 per cent of those surveyed in 1972 favoring an increase; 17 per cent in 1974 and 23 per cent in 1976. The percentage that wanted defense spending to be reduced dropped from 37 per cent in 1972 to 33 per cent in 1974 and 20 per cent in 1976.

The Pentagon's new defense budget calls for \$123 billion for fiscal 1978 starting next Oct. 1, about \$16 billion over the fiscal 1977 request but not a panic reaction in the view of defense leaders. The five-year budget plan Carter will inherit calls for a steady growth in defense spending in response to the Soviet buildup.

But partly because the "Russians are coming" rhetoric will be broadcast louder than ever this year as hawkish organizations aided by new interpretations in the Central Intelligence Agency's latest report on the Soviets, arms control groups fear defense spending will soon get out of hand.

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ON PAGE 1

2 January 1977

Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intent

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

President-elect Jimmy Carter will inherit an intense dispute over U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's global strategy.

The new estimate of long-range Soviet military intentions is accompanied by exceptional controversy. It goes beyond the usual debate over assessing secret evidence gathered by satellite, submarine, radio-listening posts, and other methods for gauging the accuracy and production rates of Soviet weaponry.

For the first time in 26 years, a special panel was commissioned to challenge the judgment of the official government analysts. The special group argued that the traditional estimators for years have been seriously miscalculating the basic intentions of the Kremlin, and understating the threat to the United States.

The result is a new, sterner National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union. Supporters of the adversary process claim it is a "more realistic" projection of the Soviet threat over the next 10 years. Critics charge that it is a flawed product, with its objectivity impaired by "outside pressure."

This top secret report, usually completed by December to reinforce the defense budget, awaits formal approval this week by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

The validity of the new estimate is defended by George Bush, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and also government-wide director of central intelligence. In the latter role, Bush and Richard Pipes, professor of Russian history at Harvard University, jointly agreed on 10 specialists, including Pipes, who could add a new dimension to the annual, most critical National Intelligence Estimate by joining in sifting through the secret data.

Team A, which produced the official report, was headed by Howard Stoen, CIA national intelligence officer on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. The CIA declined to list the members of the team. The official intelligence estimates are negotiated inside the intelligence community, which is comprised of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Treasury, Energy Research and Development Administration, and the FBI.

Team B, led by Pipes, former director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, worked on the intelligence estimates for about three months, starting in August. It included the following:

Daniel O. Graham, retired Army lieutenant general, who directed the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency until last January; Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corp. expert on Soviet military affairs, and retired Air Force colonel; John W. Vogt, Jr., retired Air Force general who commanded the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam and U.S. air forces in Europe; Paul H. Nitze, former deputy secretary of defense, a specialist on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear strategic arms limitation talks who helped form the new Committee on the Present Danger.

Also, William R. Van Cleave, professor of international relations, University of Southern California, who has served on the U.S. SALT delegation; and Foy D. Kohler, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, 1962-66, and now a professor at the University of Miami's Center for Advanced International Studies, with which Graham is also associated.

Team B also included the following officials still on active government duty:

Air Force Brig. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr., assistant chief of staff, studies and analysis, who has helped develop U.S. positions in the SALT talks; Seymour Weiss, who served as director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and was recently ambassador to the Bahamas; and Paul D. Wolfowitz, deputy assistant director for planning in the verification and analysis bureau of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Among those who are pleased with the outcome of the Team A-Team B competition, the debate is variously described as "bloody, but healthy," or "constructive" and "long overdue." Critics call it a "bludgeoning" exercise, which further demoralized analysts in the battered CIA.

It was only last week that senior officials at the White House and the State Department began to study the final draft of the new NIE, and also a much briefer report of the Pipes panel. The latter is described as a more pessimistic estimate of Soviet intentions and a strong criticism of the present method for estimating intelligence.

There is no succession, though, to see the overhaul. Ever disagree.

strategy, however, it cannot be readily rewritten. It will appear in two to three volumes that serve as a reference for policy makers across the top echelon of the government, although they are not bound by it.

The State Department reiterated that in response to questions last week. It said NIEs "represent the collective judgment of the agencies making up the intelligence community of important developments abroad, such as Soviet strategic forces and objectives." But they "never contain recommendations for U.S. policy alternatives" and "would not in themselves necessarily lead to selection of a particular policy option."

Sources on both sides of the dispute agree that the new, official NIE will record that the Soviet Union appears to be driving more than ever toward military superiority, beyond equality or parity with the United States. These terms are themselves imprecise and disputed, however.

This would be the trend of the U.S. intelligence estimate in any event, officials say. During the past year, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger helped to raise the alarm about Soviet intentions, although he champions U.S.-Soviet detente and nuclear strategic arms control talks.

Some of Kissinger's associates maintain, therefore, that they see nothing "surprisingly new" or "even unexpected" in the new official estimate.

But the challenge that was mounted in the drafting process came from critics inside and outside the government who saw Kissinger and his policies as a prime target. As a result, many insiders and outsiders agree, the adversary system used in making the new intelligence estimate clearly stiffened the official projection of Soviet intentions.

As a consequence, the new NIE, plus the Pipes report, plus the encouragement given to pessimists or "worst case" theorists on Soviet intentions inside the government, is regarded as a higher barrier for the Carter administration to overcome to carry out its own broader objectives for U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control.

Continued

YOUNGSTOWN OHIO
VINDICATOR

E - 102,190

S - 157,476

JAN 1 1977

The CIA and Soviet Strength

The Board of National Estimates, the arm of the Central Intelligence Agency that makes final judgments on intelligence, has just completed its annual appraisal of the long-range plans of the Soviet Union. The report will go to President-elect Jimmy Carter soon after the inauguration, but high CIA officials are quoted as describing it as "more somber" than any such report has been for a decade.

Reports in earlier years indicated that Moscow was aiming only for a rough parity with American strength. The new one concludes that the true Soviet objective is superiority.

The "somber" nature of the report is reason for serious concern for a nation that may have been lulled by detente. Even more serious, however, is the fact that the CIA revised it to its present form only after, and probably because, an independent panel of experts challenged the soft appraisals of Soviet intentions that have been submitted in recent years.

The CIA's report for the President may well be the most important single document in the fields of defense and diplomacy. It is the basis for White House decisions as to defense programs and arms negotiations. Misjudgments in it could lead to disastrous weakness in both our weapons development and in the positions we take in negotiating limitations on arms.

Because of insistent reports that there was strong internal dissent to these appraisals, the White House has been considering an "outside" analysis of the process for some years. Last September the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board appointed seven knowledgeable men to make an independent study. The panel was headed by Richard Pipes, professor of history at Harvard and an expert on Russia.

The Pipes group's report to the President, because of the information it analyzes and its critical importance, probably will not be published, but those familiar with it call it a devastating indictment of the work of the Board of National Estimates. It took a much more serious view of the information used by the CIA's board and dissented so sharply from the conclusions that the CIA revised its judgment that Moscow still was seeking only equal strength with the United States.

Time after time, news stories have informed the average citizen of the Soviet buildup of tanks, submarines, missiles, planes and men. Not long ago, *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* said this country had seriously underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet forces. This outside information, developed without the benefit of the CIA's resources, makes the agency's conclusions all the more mystifying.

One of Theodore C. Sorenson's most important tasks, after he is confirmed as new director of the CIA, will be to analyze the Board of National Estimates and perhaps reorganize it completely. Revision of its report because of the Pipes panel is virtually an admission of incompetence. And in an area as important as this, incompetence is little better than treason.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-9**WASHINGTON STAR
1 JANUARY 1977

TRB

Hawkish pressure in a CIA leak

In the newspaper business, someone else's scoop is often called a leak. But leak seems to be the correct term when the story in question is about a government document that is not merely top secret but "top secret ultra."

That is the classification of the Central Intelligence Agency's annual national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives. Such a document is intended to be seen by only 10 or at the most 15 officials at the top level. It is never to be discussed outside that elite group.

News was thin on the day after Christmas. Even a lesser story would have gotten a good play in that Sunday *New York Times*. It was not surprising that the editors decided to lead the paper with a sensational story that reported a CIA finding, after an "absolutely bloody" argument, that the Russians had abandoned their goal of nuclear parity with the United States and had begun seeking superiority.

The details were chilling. The winners of the argument were quoted as saying that the ultimate Soviet aim was to develop forces capable of interfering with world shipping, denying raw materials to the West, disrupting fuel supplies, defeating the "projection of power from sea to land" by Western forces, defending nuclear capability from American nuclear submarines and developing strategic forces that would ultimately have a superior first-strike capability.

Reading between the lines, one could guess that the leak came from the alarmist, hawkish faction, which *The Times* said included the Air Force chief of intelligence, Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., and a panel of seven outsiders, among whom was Paul H. Nitze, former deputy secretary of defense. The story said the panel members were chosen for their hawkishness.

The CIA has been known to leak secret materials when the publicity would do it good. In this case, the CIA is said to have been the loser, since the specialists had been less alarmist but were beaten down and forced to reverse themselves by the hawkish outsiders.

This Christmas leak was merely the latest of quite a string of items that tend to put President-elect Jimmy Carter on the spot, pressuring him to go for a substantial increase in the military budget instead of ordering the reduction of 5 to 7 per cent that he promised in his campaign.

A few days earlier, the old familiar *Jane's Fighting Ships*, a British publication which used to consist of just dry comparative statistics, showed up in a new role of advocacy. Its offshoot, *All the World's Aircraft*, came out with a ringing editorial plea for the United States to go ahead with production of the controversial B-1 bomber.

Another source of pressure is the American Security Council Education Foundation's new film, "The Price of Peace and Freedom," being offered free to television stations across the country and sold widely (210 copies so far at

The film shows Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf; Air Force Gen. Daniel James Jr., commander of the North American Air Defense Command; Air Force Gen. Russell E. Doughtery, commander of the Strategic Air Command, and Admiral Isaac C. Kidd Jr., commander of Atlantic forces, all warning against increasing Soviet military might in a context that lobbies for more arms spending and attacks the mutual reduction of antiballistic missile installations agreed to in Moscow in 1974.

Their statements are so inflammatory that they would amount to mutiny if the present commander-in-chief had a firmer hand on the helm and stood up for his own administration's policies.

Even the staid Brookings Institution, which some of Nixon's aides considered dangerously leftist, startled some arms control specialists recently with a symposium that warned of a Soviet threat of supremacy and called for substantial additional military spending for the next five years.

Various private groups have a rash of seminars in the works to alert congressional aides, the press and the public to the alleged U.S. weakness and Soviet strength and encourage them to support a record U.S. arms budget.

The alarm has already had its effect. Talk of arms

reduction has almost died out. To many, it has become accepted common knowledge that the Russians already are getting ahead and soon will destroy the United States unless this country takes drastic action.

Still, the clamor seems to have a note of desperation. The next President continues to say he will stick by his campaign promises. Some of the hawks say privately that they fear he will go ahead despite their warnings, not only with budget reductions but also with a new SALT agreement.

One explanation being given for the leak to *The Times* is that the hawks who are said to have won the argument may eventually lose it if Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is able to persuade his successor, Cyrus R. Vance, that the present balance of terror actually is relatively secure and that the wisest course is to avoid building new weapons systems that would "destabilize" the uneasy balance while hurrying to negotiate new weapons controls.

The countermeasures available to the new president are being discussed. The first is an idea for a white paper that would declassify some of the mystery around the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance and provide a clear, official U.S. statement that would be open to public debate in conformance with Carter's promise of open policy making.

The other is a bureaucratic device, a logical further step in the "competitive analysis" that led to the new estimate of Soviet intentions. Instead of a group of hawkish outsiders, a group of dovish or at least moderate outsiders would be brought in to criticize the reported new consensus.

This could be done by reconstituting the present 16-member President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which now is headed by Leo Cherne and includes such other hardliners as Adm. George W. Anderson Jr., John B. Connally, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, Robert W. Galvin and Dr. Edward Teller.

The last four named are all affiliated with the American Security Council, parent organization of the producer of the alarmist film. Carter already is feeling their pressure. He doesn't need them as official

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DEC 30 1976

As We See It

Bush Stacked the Deck On Soviet Military Goals

HOW MUCH the United States should spend for defense depends, to a large degree, upon the answer to this question: Are the Soviets attempting to maintain military parity with the United States or to gain military superiority?

The prevailing view in defense planning has been that the Soviet objective was parity. That judgment will change in an intelligence estimate that President-elect Carter will soon receive, according to sources quoted by the New York Times. These sources say that military analysts who believe the Soviets want clear superiority have begun to prevail.

Mr. Carter said Monday he recognized that recent Soviet military growth has been substantial but that "we're still by far stronger than they are in most means of measuring military strength." He indicated that in his first meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev he will express concern about the Soviet buildup.

We cannot judge the merits of the argument about whether the Soviets are seeking parity or superiority. But the way in which director George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency has approached that question seems open to serious question.

Mr. Bush has stacked the deck. To scrutinize the CIA's own assessment of Soviet military advances and their meaning, Mr. Bush called in a seven-member team of outsiders. Apparently, he deliberately enlisted experts known to hold or lean toward the view that the Soviets want not parity but military dominance.

If the New York Times report is correct,

the outsiders have largely prevailed in heated discussions with the CIA's officials. The result, it is said, is a long-range intelligence estimate that indicates the Soviet Union is well on its way toward a goal of achieving superiority.

We can see the usefulness of calling in outsiders to offer views counter to those of the CIA's experts, but not the usefulness of choosing outsiders largely or entirely of one persuasion on the central question involved.

Those who believe Moscow's military objectives are expansive, including a first-strike capability, are especially alarmed by the Soviets' development of better guided missiles, large-scale construction of underground shelters and continuing rapid buildup of military forces in general.

They think the Soviet goal is to be able to disrupt shipping lines and the flow of raw materials, to limit the West's capacity to land troops from naval vessels and to protect their own nuclear attack capabilities. With achievement of those and other objectives, according to this view, the Soviet Union might choose to launch an attack.

Those are grim assessments, and of course Mr. Carter would be derelict if he did not take them seriously. We should not allow the Soviets to develop a first-strike potential that would be so convincing that they could bully the Western world or be tempted to go to war.

But there must be a better way to arrive at sound intelligence estimates than the one Mr. Bush has chosen. Mr. Carter would do well to move immediately for a more balanced examination of the questions involved.

BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA
POST-HERALD

M - 77,059

DEC 29 1976

Curbing military payrolls

In his first interview since Jimmy Carter picked him to be defense secretary, Dr. Harold Brown has promised to take a hard look at the pay, retirement benefits and perquisites of the armed forces.

Brown, a former secretary of the Air Force who knows his way around the Pentagon, deserves congratulations for his intention. Also sympathy, for he is tangling with a buzz saw.

There is no doubt that the soaring pay and fringe benefits of the all-volunteer armed services have become a major headache. Personnel costs now amount to 55 per cent of the total defense budget. Overly generous pensions cost \$8.5 billion a year, about 7 per cent of the budget, and are rising fast.

Brown said he will study not only retirement costs but also pay, allowances, commissary privileges, medical care and all other personnel benefits.

"I have not reached any conclusions," he said. "I start with a preconception only that it (personnel cost) is a very large fraction of the defense budget and that if you are going to try to save very much money without looking at that, you are trying to run a race with one leg tied behind you."

If Brown is to succeed in getting the military payroll under control, he'll need a lot of luck. Servicemen, retirees and their allies in Congress (some of whom are looking to pensions for service in the reserves) form a potent lobby. They were, for example, able to defeat President Ford's efforts to revise military pay and perks.

And yet, some slowing of the pay spiral is essential. Without it the coun-

try will be unable to afford the weapons systems on which its future security may depend.

One can, of course, engage in wishful thinking and conclude that the arms race is winding down and weaponry is the field where savings can be made safely.

This view, however, flies in the face of the Central Intelligence Agency's latest annual estimate of the Soviet Union's strategic objectives for the next 10 years. In its grimmest report in a decade, the CIA concluded that Russia is no longer seeking "rough-parity" with U.S. armed might but clear "superiority."

It is easy to scoff at the CIA estimate as a scare to help the Pentagon justify a higher budget request, rumored at \$123 billion for the next year. But such a reaction might be dead wrong.

In point of fact, for the first time this year the CIA brought in outside experts from academia and the think tanks to help it analyze intelligence about the Soviet arms buildup. And it was these outsiders — after studying the Kremlin's new missiles, vast program of underground shelters and enhanced air defenses — who forced the CIA to "warden" its estimates of Moscow's intentions.

With Russia apparently strengthening its forces across the board, this country must act to maintain the military balance. If that is to be done without straining the economy, we can afford neither gold-plated weapons systems nor bloated personnel costs. Carter and Brown truly have their work cut out.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
STAR

E - 252,294
DEC 30 1976

Viewing the Soviet arms buildup

A FLEDGLING organization, formed to sound an alarm about growing Russian military strength, has received a big assist from a Central Intelligence Agency estimate of Soviet intentions.

The nonpartisan Committee on the Present Danger believes that the chief threat to the health and survival of the Western democracies lies in "the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup." Russia's expansionism and its efforts to win military "preponderance," the committee feels, "threatens to destroy the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends."

The CIA estimate blends nicely with that grim warning. It states flatly that the Soviets, who were once believed interested only in achieving rough parity with U.S. military forces, are now seeking superiority. Among the signs detected in the CIA's assessment and reassessment are newly developed guided missiles, a big program of underground shelter construction and a continuing buildup of air defenses.

The estimate will provide "input" for the coming debate within the Carter administration on the size of the defense budget and the priorities it will contain. The committee, with its blue ribbon board of directors made up of educators, scientists, businessmen and labor leaders, will beat the drums from

outside the administration, trying to rouse public opinion in support of more military spending.

The committee's focus on the Soviet buildup as "the present danger" raises anew some questions: How much military hardware is enough? Must we match the Soviets gun for gun, missile for missile, soldier for soldier? Don't quality of weapons, as well as research and development ability, count more than quantity? The United States, we have long felt, has a sufficient quantity of weapons, of a quality that tops that of the Soviets, to deter any major offensive strike by Russia. We see no need to engage in an open-ended arms race simply to stockpile more weapons and thus maintain a numerical superiority. Such a race would weaken the nation's economy and its social fabric, two areas in which we now enjoy superiority.

The committee's focus is too narrow, we feel. There is more than one "present danger." There is danger in the escalating trade in arms, in the growing ability of many nations to produce nuclear weapons, in the increasing gap between developed and poor nations, in the dependence of the industrial countries on Arab oil. We urge the committee to lift its sights, to look beyond the Soviet military buildup.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
NEWS
DEC 30 1976
E - 328,581

What are the Soviets up to?

The Central Intelligence Agency has just completed its annual estimate of the Soviet Union's strengths and intentions, and as one intelligence officer described it, the report "is more than somber, it is very grim." Its basic conclusion is that the Soviets have gone beyond the point of seeking parity with the United States in military forces; they now seek superiority.

The continuing buildup of Soviet strength, from ships and tanks to nuclear-tipped missiles, has been noted before. The plain evidence of that buildup contributed to the ease with which the big appropriation bills for defense passed Congress this year, and to the unease that pervaded the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization early in December. The CIA report is a new cause for concern.

The United States recognized long ago that it could not retain the nuclear superiority it held just after World War II. But as the Soviets built up their nuclear armament to the point where both superpowers possessed the means for "overkill," the conviction grew that safety as well as sanity lay in the concept of equality. With neither side able to knock out the other without dooming itself also to destruction, there could be no possible gain in nuclear war.

What worries the Kremlin watchers now are signs that the Soviets have undertaken a big program of underground shelters, along with a buildup of air defenses and guided missiles. This adds up to a "first-strike" potential, and that would

have to be based on a belief in the Soviet Union that it could attack, yet survive retaliation. For the Soviets to build on a premise of that kind could force a shift in the whole course of American planning and strategy.

The Soviets already have a formidable lead in ground forces and conventional weapons such as tanks. The latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships concedes that Soviet seapower is outstripping that of the West. If the U.S.S.R. gained a clear superiority in nuclear arms, and believed it could fend off any nuclear retaliation, what would prevent it from holding the United States at bay with nuclear blackmail while it unleashed conventional forces toward whatever objective it chose?

This is the sort of question raised by the new intelligence report, and there are no easy answers. The United States certainly does not want to be dragged into a furious new arms race, or travel again the road of fallout shelters, civil defense stockpiles, and all the rest. But neither can the nation afford to sink into complacency.

The main hope is that the CIA report is unduly alarmist, and that the signs are being misread. Beyond that, the effort to conclude a new agreement with the Soviets through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks must be pursued with extra diligence, which is a commitment President-elect Carter has already made. But in any case, the new report is a bitter dish to set before a President just coming into office.

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ON PAGE 1

THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
30 December 1976

IN FOCUS Trying to Think Past the Pentagon Drawing Board

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Pentagon and Congress have been trying to work out what ships the U.S. Navy should have. The continuing discussions will basically determine the size and composition of the American fleet in the 1990s, because ships ordered in the mid-'70s will form the backbone of naval strength two decades later.

Second of two articles

A lot of consideration has been given to the number of ships both needed and affordable, and some thought to the military missions they should be capable of fulfilling.

But there has been almost no serious consideration of what kind of world those ships will be operating in by 1995; what countries might be allies or enemies then, what sealanes might need to be kept open — and, therefore, what kind of Navy will really be needed then.

The government is not set up to think that far ahead on the big problems. Instead, it tends to project current attitudes and programs into the future without much effort to figure out whether the future might be significantly different.

OTHER MAJOR WEAPONS systems, most notably the B1 bomber, are being developed in a virtual vacuum of thinking about the ways in which needs for them might change over their lifetime of a quarter-century or so.

There is no over-all strategic concept of shifting security needs in a changing world. As a result, there is no intellectual framework within which policies can be formed as a guide to the selection of foreign relations positions or of weapons to defend those positions.

Some of the strategic concepts which are most treasured in the Pentagon are accidental. The prime example is the triad system of having three independent elements of strategic nuclear power to deter the Soviet

Union: bombers, land-based ballistic missiles in fixed silos, and ballistic missiles in submarines. The elements came first; the theory was then developed to explain them.

There are now efforts to add additional legs to the triad, such as mobile land-based ballistic missiles, air-launched ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles both airborne and at sea, and anything else that appears as a gleam in the eyes of military scientists.

The Pentagon attitude generally is, if it is possible, build it — and the justification in terms of changing theoretical explanations can always be worried about later.

This situation makes it almost impossible for the U.S. government to plan ahead in a logical fashion to deal with its security problems, either in terms of rapidly mounting costs for ever more complex weaponry or of foreign political and domestic public opinion aspects of deploying new types of armaments. But the bigger part of the problem is that the government has never been properly set up to do any long-range thinking.

WHEN A NUMBER of senior administration officials who are responsible for American foreign and military affairs are asked about long-range thinking on basic problems, they react with concern but discouraged resignation.

"Strategic thinking is one of the most difficult problems facing us," according to a man who carries a large part of the nation's security burden but declines to be identified by name. "The government bureaucracy just isn't capable of coping with it."

Various administrations have tried in the past to produce some far-sighted ideas by selecting intelligent, perceptive people and giving them offices in which to think big thoughts. But, the burdened man says, one of two things invariably happens.

Either they write big, fat studies that draw conclusions but cover them with all sorts of qualifications, producing so much paperwork that the busy official who assembled them does not have time adequately to contemplate and assimilate the results. Or some crisis arises, the official needs extra manpower to deal with it, he looks around to see who is not busy, and the thinkers are dragged down from their ivory tower to fight a fire — never to return.

"That's ridiculous," snorts another official. He agrees that it happens, but says the basic fault is that top people do not appreciate the need for strategic thinking enough to keep their weight behind it.

John M. Collins endorses this view. Collins is a Library of Congress specialist who has been finding a widening audience during the past year for his preaching on the need to renew the nation's strategic concepts.

"UNLESS THE president of the United States, or people close to him who can reach him, realizes the importance of an updated strategic framework for policies and takes positive action to get the right people into an environment conducive to creative thinking, nothing will get done — and we run the risk of ordering the wrong weapons, following the wrong policies in various parts of the world, wasting money and effort," Collins says.

The burdened official points out that formulating policies on the basis of original thinking about the world one or two decades ahead means putting the

PITTSBURGH, PA.
PRESS

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S - 722,358

DEC 29 1976

Military Payrolls

In his first interview since Jimmy Carter picked him to be Secretary of Defense, Dr. Harold Brown promised to take a hard look at the pay, retirement benefits and perquisites of the armed forces.

Dr. Brown, a former Secretary of the Air Force who knows his way around the Pentagon, deserves congratulations for his intention. Also sympathy—for he is tangling with a buzz saw.

The soaring pay and fringe benefits of the all-volunteer armed services have become a major headache.

Personnel costs now amount to 55 per cent of the total defense budget. Overly generous pensions cost \$8.5 billion a year, about 7 per cent of the budget, and are rising fast.

★ ★ ★

Dr. Brown says he will study not only retirement costs but also pay, allowances, commissary privileges, medical care and all other personnel benefits.

"I have not reached any conclusions," he says. "I start with a preconception only that if (personnel cost) is a very large fraction of the defense budget and that if you are going to try to save very much money without looking at that, you are trying to run a race with one leg tied behind you."

★ ★ ★

If Dr. Brown is to succeed in getting the military payroll under control, he'll need a lot of luck—and full support of the taxpayers who don't enjoy such benefits. Servicemen, retirees and their allies in Congress (some of whom are looking to pensions for service in the Reserves) form a potent lobby. They were, for example, able to defeat Presi-

dent Ford's efforts to revise military pay and perquisites.

Some slowing of the military-pay spiral is essential. Otherwise, the country will be unable to afford the weapons systems on which its future security could depend.

One can, of course, engage in wishful thinking and conclude that the arms race is winding down and weaponry is the field where savings can be made safely.

This view, however, flies in the face of the Central Intelligence Agency's latest annual estimate of the Soviet Union's strategic objectives for the next 10 years.

In its grimmest report in a decade, the CIA concludes that Russia is no longer seeking "rough parity" with U.S. armed might but clear "superiority."

★ ★ ★

It is easy to scoff at the CIA estimate as a scare to help the Pentagon justify a higher budget request, rumored at \$123 billion for the next year. But such a reaction could be dead wrong.

In point of fact, for the first time the CIA this year brought in outside experts from academia and the think tanks to help it analyze intelligence information about the Soviet arms buildup.

And it was these outsiders who—after studying the Kremlin's new missiles, vast program of underground shelters and enhanced air defenses—compelled the CIA to "harden" its estimates of Moscow's intentions.

★ ★ ★

With Russia apparently strengthening its forces across the board, the United States must act to maintain the military balance.

If that is to be done without straining the economy, we can afford neither gold-plated weapons systems nor bloated personnel costs.

President-elect Carter and Secretary-designate Brown truly have their work cut out for them.

ARTICLE APPEARED

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

ON PAGE A-1

29 DECEMBER 1976

INTROGUS Is the U. S. Surviving on Stale Strategic Concepts?

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

The world keeps changing. The foreign policy and military situations facing the United States today are very different from those of two decades ago.

First of two articles

The old simplicity of a nuclear confrontation between a Soviet-led East and an American-led West has blurred into the complications of many additional factors of international relations. Weaponry has new, more complex capabilities of unclear implications. Vietnam and other nonnuclear wars have affected U.S.

perceptions of foreign affairs as well as willingness to take actions abroad.

But one thing has changed only little. U.S. strategic concepts about surviving in the world have scarcely progressed beyond the 1950s.

There is a small, increasing circle of persons in Washington that thinks this is potentially perilous for the nation's security. Concepts that are not adapted to present realities lead to inadequate or just plain wrong policies without much awareness of the potentially dangerous mistakes.

But the policy-makers are often too caught up in immediate problems to re-examine the basic ideas that guide them. Some observers think that only strong support from the White House can encourage fresh conceptual thinking — but not guarantee it, since it takes more than just orders, it takes inspiration.

THE JUST-DISCLOSED revision by the U.S. intelligence community of its estimate of Soviet military intentions, so as now to credit the Kremlin with seeking military superiority over the United States instead of wanting only parity, emphasizes the need for inspiration.

The easy reaction by the United States to this new evaluation would be to seek more and better of the

same old military answers to perceived threats. In fact, however, some key pieces of the framework of strategic concepts upon which the old answers were built are being challenged by the Soviet refusal to accept the theoretical bases of American ideas.

The ideas that developed in the '50s have become part of the common language of world affairs. The balance of terror, mutually assured destruction and other megadeath concepts are the accepted background to current thinking both within the government and among the general public.

Such ideas were developed by intellectuals with well known names like Henry A. Kissinger and Herman Kahn, while little-known ones like Thomas C. Schelling contributed to concepts of managing superpower disputes and other aspects of living with nuclear weapons. They were influential in shaping such major American policies as the flexible response military concept of the Kennedy administration, which sought to fill the hole left by the presumed unusability of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear deterrence system.

THERE HAS BEEN a tendency in recent years in both governmental

and academic circles to assume that all of the strategic thinking has been done and now it is only necessary to implement ideas from "the golden age" of the '50s and early '60s. Attention is focused on foreign political and military problems in terms of budget cycles plotted against the background of known strategic concepts, without any original looks being taken at fresh ways to approach those problems.

Some of the great names from that golden age, like Kahn and Schelling, think that the ideas that lie behind U.S. security have gotten out of date. The author of a book on strategy who lately has begun stimulating some military and civilian minds on the subject, John M. Collins of the Library of Congress, contends that the United States is surviving on "stale strategic concepts."

It has survived so far because the competition has not been too tough, Collins says, but the military balance is shifting away from a confident American control of its destiny.

SIMPLY BUYING every conceivable type of new weapons is not the answer, according to Collins. The man in the street has a vital interest in up-to-date, cohesive strategic thinking that insures his security without wasting his money on unnecessary weapons whose long-term need has not been thought out.

A member of Secretary of State Kissinger's brain trust who deals with Soviet-U.S. relations, Dr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, says the changed situation today "calls for new integrated thinkers. The rising cost of defense, the vulnerability of land-based weapons systems, the possibility of radically new weapons like death rays, the increasing 'third world' complications to the old bipolar relationship — all these mean that we cannot rest on our intellectual oars."

A number of high-level officials say, however, that it is impossible for the government itself to come up with the theoretical approaches to military and political affairs which are the strategic background to current policies. The government is organized to cope with obvious problems, not to originate ideas.

29 DECEMBER 1976

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

'Far Stronger'

While we respect President-elect Carter as a problem-solver, and hope that these abilities will eventually apply to the disarmament talks, we wish he would stop setting himself up as a mark for Mr. Brezhnev.

Mr. Carter's remark Monday that "we're still by far stronger than they are in most means of measuring military strength" is a handsome Christmas present for the Soviet leader. In his wildest dreams a red party chairman would not imagine receiving an open declaration by the incoming President that the Soviets are entitled to yet more arms if they are to achieve parity with the United States.

This remark can only be called a blunder, and it comes atop a series of statements suggesting that Mr. Carter's learning process will include repeating all of the classic negotiating errors. He has billed an agreement as being of terrible urgency to him; the past Soviet response to such statements has been to toughen their terms. He has suggested that he will be negotiating under a deadline, which is the same thing only worse. He has already started to talk about summit meetings, in which the Soviets have deftly exploited the need of U.S. Presidents to have an agreement to show the electorate. He even seems to have allowed Henry Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev to persuade him that his adversaries in the negotiations are not in the Kremlin but in the Pentagon.

The notion that there is a public relations battle to be fought with the Pentagon is the best explanation we can think of for Mr. Carter's statement Monday. We would like to know what "means of measuring military strength" he has in mind. The standard public source for military comparisons is The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and it may be worthwhile to run through some of the comparisons, keeping in mind they are conservative numbers, not reflecting the current ferment in the intelligence community.

One measure of military strength might be total men under arms. The United States has 2,086,700, and the Soviet Union has 2,650,000. Another comprehensive measure might be defense spending. U.S. spending, after the Schlesinger-firing increases, was

hard to measure, but the range of estimates reprinted by the IISS ran from \$105 billion to \$135 billion.

For more specific measures, one might want to look at, say, combat divisions. The U.S. has 19, including the Marines, while the Soviets have 168. Or tanks: U.S.—1,230, U.S.S.R.—41,500. Or major combat surface ships: U.S.—176, U.S.S.R.—214. Or attack submarines: U.S.—75, U.S.S.R.—231, and aircraft carriers: U.S.—13, U.S.S.R.—1.

And since it is the subject of the arms talks, one should look at strategic forces. ICBMs: U.S.—1,054, U.S.S.R.—1,527. Sub-launched missiles: U.S.—656 in 41 submarines, U.S.S.R.—345 in 78 submarines. And, long-range strategic bombers: U.S.—453, U.S.S.R.—135 (plus 650 medium-range).

Now of course, these raw figures do not measure everything. A sophisticated comparison would have to include the quality of the equipment, the specific missions, and a good dollop of human judgment. While not all of the non-numerical considerations are in the U.S. favor, enough of them are that it's possible to believe the forces are at rough parity. But it is hard to imagine even the most other-worldly computer game in the Pentagon or at Caltech concluding that the U.S. force is "far stronger."

In addition to which the Soviets are adding to their current forces so energetically the CIA has been forced to reconsider many of its former estimates. As the evidence has accumulated that the pessimists in the U.S. defense community have been right all along, the CIA has doubled its estimate of the proportion of Soviet gross national product being absorbed by arms, and concluded that the Soviet effort is aimed not at achieving parity with the U.S. but superiority to it.

Stopping this Soviet momentum, at least in the strategic area, is what the U.S. aims in the arms talks are all about. These aims are scarcely likely to be advanced by telling the Russians, the American public and the world that the Soviets have not yet reached parity. As a first step in the learning process, Mr. Carter ought to remember that his press conference words reach beyond Plains, and that when he meets with Mr. Brezhnev he will be meeting with

PROVIDENCE, R.I.
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DEC 28 1975

New estimate of Soviet strategy snarls Carter policy

If the Soviet Union is straining to achieve strategic superiority over the United States, as asserted in a new intelligence estimate, then Jimmy Carter's job as President will be greatly complicated.

President-elect Carter's objective in the defense field has been to cut the budget by \$5 billion to \$7 billion. And military analysts were convinced, even before the full import of the new intelligence study became known, that the Ford administration had already made the task virtually impossible by slashing the budget itself.

But the ramifications of the new estimate, an amalgam of CIA analysis and an outside study, go beyond the terms of budget-cutting. The "somber" conclusions suggest that Russia's drive to overcome the long-held U. S. advantage might override all attempts at arms control and spin the world into a new crisis of strategic instability.

Thus, almost the first priority for President Carter, his defense chief, Dr. Harold Brown, and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, will be to apply their own evaluation to the known facts and the informed judgments that went into the CIA report.

On their scrutiny of the bitterly fought-out judgments, will hang the amount of money available for social objectives of the Carter administration. Even more important, this scrutiny will affect U. S. policy on continuing the SALT talks and on picking up a recommendation of a recent proposal for similar arms control talks on conventional weapons.

The CIA report, which incorporates much of the outsiders' study (now known as the Pipes Report), culminates a series of leaks from top-level sources on the continu-

ing buildup of the Russian navy, a vast program of underground shelters, new advances in guided missiles and improved air defenses. A disturbing factor in the origin of the report is the hotly contested assumptions and analysis that went into the consultations of CIA officials and the outsiders.

Still, George Bush, CIA director, showed a commendable openness in assigning the independent study to the committee headed by Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard, as a means of testing the work of the CIA staff, however sound their work may have been in the past—for example, during the Vietnam war.

In the era of detente, it had seemed clear that both the United States and the Soviet Union were aware of the catastrophic results of an uncurbed arms race. That perception may still govern the policies of the two superpowers. Only persistent probing, at the SALT talks and elsewhere can determine whether things have really changed or whether both sides can draw back before the insanity of unbridled competition in a field where they already possess many times the capacity to destroy each other.

President-elect Carter, with a background in the navy, knows full well the politics of defense budgeting and the scare tactics of overestimating Russian power that have long been used by over-aggressive generals and admirals. He still has difficult decisions to make on nuclear-powered carriers, the B-1, the Cruise missiles, changes in military pension conditions and wage increases for uniformed and civilian employees.

But his most important — and most difficult — job may be to convince the military men both at home and in Russia that an unchecked arms race will have no winners, only losers.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 31

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
28 DECEMBER 1976

AN OMINOUS EVALUATION

America's intelligence community has reached the disturbing conclusion that the Soviet Union is making a conscious effort to achieve nuclear superiority over the U.S.



Paul Nitze

The evidence of what the USSR is up to has been accumulating for years.

In spite of detente and arms-limitation negotiations, the Kremlin has deployed newer, bigger and more sophisticated missiles.

Moreover, the Soviets have devised an extensive civil-defense apparatus designed to reduce the effectiveness of our retaliatory weapons.

None of these developments occurred overnight. The signs were apparent, but the Central Intelligence Agency had previously played down their importance. This year, outsiders with more skeptical and realistic views were called in to help prepare the assessment.

Most notable among them was Paul Nitze, a former Pentagon official and disarmament adviser. Only a few months ago, Nitze published a devastating analysis of the Soviet Union's moves to upset the balance in strategic power. He built his convincing case on the same factors which led to the latest, "very grim" estimate by the CIA.

Arguments about the reasons for the USSR's massive buildup are, in our opinion, irrelevant and immaterial.

The very fact that Soviet leaders are striving for a "first-strike capability" poses a clear and present danger to our national security which must assume top priority among the concerns of the incoming administration.

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Carter Sets Mideast, SALT Bids

Meeting Brezhnev In '77 Is Termed 'Likely Prospect'

By Don Oberdorfer
and Morton Mintz

Washington Post Staff Writers

A series of potential foreign policy initiatives by President-elect Jimmy Carter, involving strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union and meetings with Israeli and Arab leaders about Middle East peace, was disclosed yesterday.

En route to the first of three days of meetings with his Cabinet designees at St. Simons Island, Ga., Carter said that a meeting with Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev is "a likely prospect for 1977," although specific plans have not yet been made.

Amplifying the point in a Time magazine interview released yesterday, Carter expressed the hope that a new strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement to be negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union by next fall will expand on present limitations and that discussions would "lay the groundwork for much more drastic reductions in common nuclear capabilities."

Carter reported that preliminary exchanges between himself and Brezhnev have explored the possibility of reducing the agreed ceiling on strategic offensive weapons below that tentatively approved by President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November, 1974. As he indicated during his campaign, Carter said he would like to arrange an actual reduction in the nuclear arms of the two sides, including some destruction of existing weapons.

Asked by reporters yesterday about the relative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, Carter replied, "I think it's apparent that their rate of growth of military strength compared to ours has probably been fairly substantial, but we're still far stronger than they are in most areas of measuring military strength."

Published reports said a new CIA estimate, which will await Carter following his inauguration, takes a more somber view than those of recent years about a Soviet drive to surpass the United States in strategic armaments.

On the Middle East, Carter told Time that he believes the first step toward resumption of comprehensive peace negotiations should be meetings between himself and Israeli and Arab leaders.

He mentioned Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad and said he contemplates meetings with unidentified "others." After these sessions, the United States might make a public proposal to initiate peace talks, he said.

Carter expressed uncertainty about the timing, saying he has not decided whether it would be appropriate to convene exploratory meetings prior to the Israeli national elections, reportedly to be held May 17.

The suggestion of meetings involving himself and senior leaders is the first indication of the level at which Carter expects to handle the difficult problem of Middle East negotiations. Earlier this month he said peace efforts in that region would be "among the very highest and earliest priorities" of his administration.

Carter's meetings with Soviet and Middle Eastern leaders evidently would take place in the United States, if he can arrange them. He said last week his intention is to remain within the country, with few exceptions, during 1977. He made clear in the Time interview that his preference is to meet Brezhnev in the United States.

Diplomatic sources said Carter's plan to meet Israeli and Arab leaders appears to be his way of seeking a renewed sense of momentum toward a settlement in the region without endorsing the Arab demand for an early return to the Geneva peace conference. There were unconfirmed reports in Arab capitals over the weekend that Carter might send an emissary to the Middle East to explore chances for peace, an initiative still believed to be a possibility.

Israel's Rabin, who is facing a likely fight for renomination as Prime Minister at the convention of the ruling Labor Party in February and a full-scale election campaign in the spring, is reported to be eager for an early meeting with Carter to enhance his domestic prestige.

Diplomatic sources believe it is likely that Egypt's Sadat would agree to visit Washington in pursuit of Middle East peace. There is greater doubt about Syria's Assad, who has never visited the United States and who has taken a stiff position in previous Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Saudi Arabia's King, Khalid, and Crown Prince Fahd, and Jordan's King Hussein, are among the other senior Middle Eastern leaders who would have an important role in a comprehensive settlement. Representatives of Palestinian groups—including the Palestine Liberation Organization, which the United States has refused to deal with so far—would also play a major role in any settlement.

Carter's relations with the Arab world are likely to be affected by his attitude and that of Congress regarding legislation aimed at blocking U.S. participation in the Arab boycott of Israel. A strong anti-boycott measure cleared both House and Senate in the past session, but was stopped short of final passage at the urging of Ford administration officials concerned about U.S.-Arab relations.

Carter sharply criticized Ford and attacked the Arab boycott in several terms during the campaign. He reiterated his attack Dec. 16 in a message to the American Jewish Congress, declaring that "there is no room in the international arena" for "foreign discrimination" against Americans "on grounds of their race, their religion or the countries with which they trade."

An American Jewish Congress spokesman said yesterday its recommendations are being formulated for dispatch to Carter, adding that the group is "optimistic" that a strong anti-boycott provision will become law next year.

Carter met yesterday afternoon with his economic advisers, including Treasury Secretary-designate W. Michael Blumenthal, budget director-designate Thomas B. (Bert) Lance and Charles Schulz, who is to be chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Vice President-elect Walter F. Mondale, Labor Secretary-designate F. Ray Marshall and Charles Kibbe, the Atlanta lawyer who is a long-time Carter confidant, sat in on the meeting.

The President-elect declined to be specific about a tax cut or other measures when questioned by reporters before the session. Lance said of a possible tax cut goal on the order of \$15 billion, "That's still the figure I most hear."

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ON PAGE 19

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 December 1976

Press Again Given Report That Russia Is Seeking Arms Lead

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The New York Times said Sunday that an official U.S. intelligence estimate has concluded that the Soviet Union is seeking strategic superiority over the United States.

This makes at least the fourth time this study, classified top secret and representing the consensus of U.S. intelligence agencies, has been discussed with reporters.

Some congressional sources believe this may be part of a campaign by hard-line factions in the military and intelligence communities to reduce the new administration's options.

The study's conclusion is not necessarily new. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has been discussing the "trends" for a long time, saying "the Russians are 4-foot-8 right now, but they're growing, and you're not going to like them when they're 6-foot-4." Air Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed has declared that the Russians want strategic superiority as he argued for production of the B-1 bomber and faster development of the new MX missile.

According to U.S. intelligence sources, the MX is an experimental, multiple independently targetable missile (MIRV) with 20 warheads and is believed to have three times the explosive payload of the U.S. Minuteman III with its three warheads. The MX, however, is believed to be in its early developmental stage and is not expected to be operational before 1980.

The newspaper quoted a top-level military intelligence officer on the estimate:

"It was more than somber—it was very grim. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it."

In November, the Boston Globe reported that a draft of a national security decision memorandum said that the Russians were seeking strategic superiority, and that President Ford wanted the study completed by Dec. 1.

In mid-December, Administration sources indicated that the study accepted the draft's assertions when they told United Press International about a new generation of nuclear Russian missiles now in the research stage.

A congressional source with wide expertise in the area of military affairs said the new conclusions would have an effect on the Carter administration. The President-elect campaigned on a promise to cut \$5 billion to \$7 billion in waste from the Pentagon budget.

"For a new President, or a new secretary of defense, it's one thing to make decisions about spending when the intelligence community concludes that the Russians are seeking 'rough parity' and aggressively seeking to improve their strategic equipment," he said.

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ON PAGE A-3

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
27 DECEMBER 1976

How New Study of Soviet Arms Affects Carter

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

By one decision of potentially far reaching economic implications and another of major significance for the Washington political scene, the Ford administration has insured that defense will be one of the most discussed problems of the Carter administration.

U.S. defense requirements in relation to the Soviet Union have always been controversial. They have been argued between those who have warned of a growing Soviet military threat requiring more expensive American defense efforts and those who have contended that the danger is overdrawn to justify larger spending than necessary.

The terms of this controversy have now been sharply shifted by a new estimate of Soviet military developments from the U.S. government intelligence community. It strongly supports the warnings.

The annual estimate of Soviet military intentions finds that the Kremlin is seeking to attain superiority over U.S. military forces, according to information obtained by the New York Times and published by The Star yesterday.

This revised the previously confident assumptions by the U.S. intelligence community as a whole — despite strong dissensions — that there was not an arms race under way on the Soviet side of the superpower balance. The revision raises the question of whether U.S. economic priorities should be realigned to provide greater military strength for this country.

THE IMPLICATION that Congress should be more receptive to large Pentagon spending proposals aroused immediate comment on Capitol Hill. Congressional aides were quoted yesterday as seeing in the news an effort to influence the annual battle over the military budget.

This reaction touched on the importance of both the decision to revise the intelligence estimate, with its budgetary implications, and the decision to publicize the revision, affecting the political discussion of defense.

George Bush, who is both director of the CIA and head of the whole intelligence community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the New York Times that new evidence and a reinterpretation of old information contributed to the reassessment of Soviet intentions.

Normally, the CIA director does not give interviews on national intelligence estimates. Even when reporters learn something about decisions within the intelligence community, CIA directors usually will not talk about them, refusing to confirm or deny them or to provide additional information to put them into perspective.

The government has often approached the New York Times to publicize things that it is reluctant to announce directly. Recent articles have recalled that Soviet Leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's 1956 "secret speech" was handed to the New York Times for publication, complete with CIA footnotes, without public explanation of the agency's involvement.

WHETHER BUSH SIMPLY agreed to talk about the new intelligence estimate when asked, or the Ford administration approached the New York Times to publicize it, the effect of giv-

ing the information an official stamp was the same. It guaranteed that the revision in evaluating the Soviet challenge would become known with an authoritative ring which will profoundly affect the future defense dialogue in Washington.

By finding that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority, the new estimate finally abandons the assumption made by the government during the 1950s that the Kremlin would view superpower relations in the same rational way that this country did — seeing the wasteful futility of trying to win a race to accumulate unusable weaponry and therefore settling for military parity.

Some experts on Soviet affairs, both civilian and in the armed forces, have never accepted that old assumption.

It has always been possible to find writings in Soviet military journals which support an interpretation that the Kremlin is determined to control the world's strongest military machine and use it to spread the Soviet form of communism. When such quotations have been used in U.S. arguments over the military threat, however, critics have tended to dismiss them as outmoded Marxism mouthed ritualistically without significance.

A SUCCESSION OF civilians has gone to work at the Pentagon and become believers in a dangerous Soviet threat which requires a greater U.S. military effort. But others have argued that such people were brainwashed by the professional soldiers, who simply wanted to justify more weapons.

Continued

NEW YORK TIMES

26 Dec 76

NEW C.I.A. ESTIMATE FINDS SOVIET SEEKS SUPERIORITY IN ARMS

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION 'GRIM'

Somber Assessment Is Attributed
To Outside Advisers Brought
Into Study For First Time

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25—President-elect Carter will receive an intelligence estimate of long-range Soviet strategic intentions next month that raises the question whether the Russians are shifting their objectives from rough parity with United States military forces to superiority.

In reporting this, high-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives over the next 10 years, just completed, was more somber than any in more than a decade. A top-level military intelligence officer who has seen the estimate commented: "It was more than somber—it was very grim. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it."

Previous national estimates of Soviet aims—the supreme products of the intelligence community since 1950—had concluded that the objective was rough parity with United States strategic capabilities.

Bush: 'Worrisome Signs'

"There are some worrisome signs," George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, said in an interview in characterizing the latest estimate, "and the viewpoints, interpretations and comments on these will be adequately reflected in the estimate."

He said the shift in assessment developed from evidence gathered in the past year and from new interpretations of older evidence that had resulted from "a competitive analysis" in which, for the first time, a team of outsiders analyzed and challenged estimates prepared by the regular intelligence community. As a result some of the governmental analysts changed their assessments.

While Mr. Bush declined to discuss the substance of the estimate, it can be authoritatively reported that the worrisome signs included newly developed guided missiles, a vast program of underground shelters and a continuing buildup of air defenses.

He acknowledged that the 1976 estimate had been prepared amid controversy in the intelligence community, partly induced by the deliberate introduction of the team of outsiders, who were supplied with the same raw material as the estimate team headed by Howard Stortz, the Central Intelligence Agency's national intelligence officer on the Soviet Union.

Upholding Right of Dissent

Mr. Bush, who said the final estimate contained "a full expostulation of the views of the principals," asserted that he had promised to uphold the right of dissent at the outset of his tenure 11 months ago. "I feel I have made good on that," he added.

There have always been officials in the intelligence community who took a grim view of Soviet strategic objectives, but until this year, according to insiders, they constituted a small minority. In the interview Mr. Bush spoke of changed percep-

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A Big Year for Reassessment Of China — Inside and Out

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

The leading international journal of modern Chinese studies, *The China Quarterly*, insisted for several years that "the speculation was unfounded (that) Chou En-lai was under pressure" in Peking politics. It accepted official statements that political campaigns raging in China were just educational efforts, not a power struggle.

The latest issue, which went to press after Chou died last January and his chosen successor as premier was purged, but before Mao Tse-tung died in September, says "the unexpected events" of that purge "necessitate at least an interim reassessment of political developments in the People's Republic over the course of the last several years."

There has been a lot of reassessing on China this year. *The China Quarterly* was in good company in misjudging the political scene. Despite some notable but largely ignored exceptions, the U.S. government as a whole made the same mistakes.

"THERE HAS BEEN a bitter fight going on out at" the CIA for more than a year over interpretations of Chinese affairs, according to one of the most senior government officials receiving intelligence estimates. Another source said heads are likely to roll at the agency as a result of this year's Peking events and disclosures showing some analysts to have been usually wrong.

Both the National Security Council and the State Department also had analysts and diplomatic reporting officers who failed to see the nature of the Chinese power struggle since 1973, although there was a minority which has been vindicated by recent developments.

The turnover of personnel in these two branches of the government is such that few are still in jobs involving China to be held accountable for misjudgments. But errors by career specialists at the CIA, while often easily buried in the secrecy of the agency, can be more readily traced and have repercussions.

While Chairman Mao was alive, China seldom lacked for dramatic and unexpected events: The Great Leap Forward and its collapse in the late 1950s, the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution of the mid-60s, the alleged attempt by Mao's heir Lin Biao to kill him in 1971. But after that, most government officials and academic specialists wanted to believe that things had quieted down.

SO THEY WERE NOT prepared to see or understand signs in late 1972 and early 1973 of a new conflict developing in China, this time pitting Mao's radicals against Chou's bureaucrats. They knew that Mao and Chou were the closest of comrades, and never mind if Mao had fallen out with Lin and other former closest comrades.

The radical effort to use political campaigns like criticism of Lin and the ancient sage Confucius as a way of attacking Chou, and signs that he had been weakened politically by the spring of 1974, were ignored, denied or misunderstood by many observers.

It was only after Chou died and his no longer protected heir Teng Hsiao-ping was purged by the radicals, and then Mao died and the now unprotected radicals were in turn purged by Chou's old colleagues, that the nature of the struggle became unquestionable.

One reason the U.S. government as a whole did not want to believe a power struggle was under way beginning in 1973 was that a diplomatic mission was opened in Peking that year. Its State Department and CIA staff could see that everything was normal, and Chinese officials told them so. Like virtually all foreign diplomats in Peking, they denied that Chou was under any significant pressure.

The analytical signs said otherwise. A few people in Hong Kong, including U.S. diplomats, picked them up.

IN SOME CASES, their careful reading between the lines of long, boring Chinese newspaper articles and radio broadcast transcripts yielded clues which the CIA was then asked to check out with its secret sources — and did. This is the reverse of the usual public concept of spies coming up with inside information which can later be found reflected in public material.

But such insights into what was really happening found resistance. The so-called "Peking view" won out over the "Hong Kong view" for more reasons than the natural tendency to believe people on the spot.

For one thing, senior people at the CIA tended to work from old assumptions about China rather than taking unprejudiced looks at fresh information. Analysts who might once have had a realistic grasp of events lost it when they got promoted away from daily contact with the minutiae, yet made judgments anyway.

For another, after the opening of relations with China in 1972 the State Department developed a vested interest in the stability and continuity of Chou. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was reluctant to hear anything which questioned Chou's political ability to keep U.S. relations on the same track.

The academic community tended to work from old assumptions, too. Or it would equivocate on the meaning of new evidence or obfuscate by trying to turn a radical-bureaucrat fight into a complex array of forces of no analytical value in understanding the current situation.

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The Washington Star

Problem for Next CIA Chief

A Behind-the-Scenes Fight On Intelligence Evaluating

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

A reorganization is being considered of the system that produces the government's most basic intelligence evaluations to guide major policy decisions.

An argument now is under way within the intelligence community over the possible change to eliminate what are known as national intelligence officers. There is widespread dissatisfaction with the way the present system works and personal infighting among intelligence specialists who run it.

Insiders say that some specialists are resisting the examination of the way the system works because their own errors and shortcomings in intel-

BUT THERE HAVE been complaints about the way the national intelligence officer system works. Whether abandoning it would mean moving the responsibility for NIEs back into the CIA is uncertain and, at this point, controversial.

The controversy also involves a broader question of the quality of intelligence.

In comments directed generally at the CIA, but encompassing the separate functions of the intelligence community staff under the DCI, there is widespread criticism of this quality. Some criticism is of failures of political analysis for not seeing trends in foreign countries, some of estimating military developments incorrectly. The CIA's admission early this year that it had long been wrong by half on Soviet military expenses encouraged such criticism.

The congressional investigations of the CIA during the last two years turned away from any searching examination of intelligence failures. But President Ford has been concerned with what one outside critic summarized as the question, "How does the machinery over such a long period of time come up with false analysis?"

THE QUESTION overstates the situa-

tion, since much of the intelligence is good, informed observers say. But interviews with a number of members of the intelligence community, both inside and outside the CIA, produce some suggestive answers.

One is that judgments are usually made by people who have lost touch with the raw material. Intelligence officers who start their careers dealing with all the details of a limited subject sometimes develop opinions which then affect their estimates when they have been promoted into higher positions, even though later raw material might show reasons for changing those opinions.

Attitudes developed for outside reasons also affect judgments. Politics can play a part. And, one senior analyst says, "There is a bureaucratic tendency to reject the nit-picking of those who point at the little details that add up against" senior officials' judgments.

Perhaps the most insidious danger, another person said, is a very human intelligence is used selectively to fit into the established pattern of thought.

ligence analyses have come under fire. Other specialists are reported to want changes made in order to regain some of the bureaucratic power they lost in a change three years ago.

STUDIES BEGUN MANY months ago by CIA Director George Bush already have led to some changes in intelligence organization. But Bush has announced his retirement Jan. 20 from his dual posts and any major shakeup will have to await his successor — who will inherit a can of worms. President-elect Jimmy Carter has not yet named a new man.

The person in the job is both the agency's director and the director of central intelligence, or DCI. The latter title makes the job's holder the

See INTELLIGENCE, A-14

president's coordinator of activities, budgets and intelligence results from the government's entire intelligence apparatus, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, parts of the State department, the National Security Agency and other units.

The DCI supplies to the president national intelligence estimates, known as NIEs, the big-picture assessments based on all evidence available to the government. They are the starting points for establishing basic foreign and military policies. For the last three years they have been the responsibility of national intelligence officers who work directly for the DCI — out-

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

GLOBE

DEC 17 1976

H - 276,621

S - 570,834

High-level study says CIA understates extent of Soviet threat

By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A group of outside experts, after a three-month investigation, has told the White House that the intelligence community for years has understated the extent and nature of the Soviet threat.

The group, headed by Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard, called for a thorough reorganization of the mechanism used to make intelligence estimates, taking the function away from the Central Intelligence Agency and putting it directly under the President.

Well-placed sources familiar with the study say it is the most devastating indictment ever made of the CIA's Board of National Estimates and pointedly questions whether the alleged misappraisals may have flawed the strategy followed by the Nixon

and Ford administrations in their SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Pipes group made a brief oral report recently to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which created it in September. That is being backed up by two lengthy written reports, one of which provides an independent, parallel version of the annual Soviet strategic assessment produced by the Board of National Estimates. The second report offers recommendations to reform thoroughly the assessment process.

It is considered likely that President-elect Jimmy Carter, who talked of the possibility of revamping the intelligence community during the presidential campaign, will study the Pipes group conclusions as a starting point for any changes he might want to consider.

At this point, however, the Pipes reports are so highly classified, sources said, that it is unlikely Carter's transition team will be allowed to see them until after Carter takes office.

Sources say the CIA was so upset with the draft of the Pipes study that it rewrote a significant portion of its own analysis for this year, in effect mirroring some of the conclusions of the outside body and of previous dissents by Air Force and Defense intelligence.

The National Intelligence Estimate is regarded as the single most important document the President and other top Administration officials employ in basing judgments ranging from how much to spend on nuclear missiles, tanks and ships, to what options can

be prudently considered in arms control negotiations.

It consists of an executive summary and three detailed books consisting of hundreds of pages.

It is produced by the Board of National Estimates, with contributions from all US intelligence agencies and conclusions are written solely by the CIA. Other agencies have the right to register dissents. In recent years the final arbiter of the strategic section has been Howard Stoertz, who is the CIA representative to the SALT talks.

Sources say the Pipes group, after studying all the evidence available to the intelligence community, and after talking to experts in and out of government, concluded that the Soviet Union's basic goal is to achieve strategic superiority worldwide. By contrast, the national estimates for the last several years have held that the Russians were satisfied with a position of approximate military parity with the United States but might seek to go somewhat beyond equivalence if not checked by arms control agreements or US actions.

The latter was the fundamental premise of the American SALT strategy. The Pipes report says it is contradicted by extensive evidence, including Soviet writings, speeches and intelligence gathered by secret agents.

The CIA, the Pipes group said, tended to ignore, or play down such evidence as not supported specifically by reconnaissance satellite photos.

continued

Panel to Double-Check Estimates Of Soviet Threat by Spy Agencies

By William Beecher

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Concerned that the intelligence community in recent years may have significantly understated the threat of the Soviet military buildup, a presidential advisory group has commissioned an independent analysis by outside experts.

Well-placed sources say the unusual study was ordered by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board after comparing the approximately 15-page executive summaries of the last two years' national intelligence estimates against voluminous backup material. The summary conclusions often were "softer" than the detailed analysis on which they were based, the sources said.

The annual national intelligence estimate (NIE) is regarded as the single most important document on which the President and other top administration officials base judgments, ranging from how much to spend on strategic missiles and tanks to what sorts of options can be considered without undue risk in a variety of arms control negotiations.

REFERRED TO BY its initials within government, the NIE is the joint product of the whole intelligence community.

The outside study group is headed by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, a specialist in Soviet affairs. It is

charged with coming up, by Nov. 7, with a parallel NIE executive summary for 1976, together with its recommendations for ways to minimize institutional bias in the existing analytical process.

Besides Pipes, others reportedly involved in the study include: Paul Nitze, former deputy secretary of defense, Navy secretary and State Department policy planner; Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, recently retired director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency; retired Gen. John Vogt, former commander of the U.S. Air Force in Europe; and onetime staff director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Prof. William Van Cleve of the University of Southern California, a onetime member of the U.S. SALT delegation; and John Paisley, retired analyst for the CIA.

Also working actively with the group, sources said, is at least one government official, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

WHILE NITZE IS one of Jimmy Carter's advisers on military and foreign affairs, sources insisted that the top-secret study was not politically motivated and would not be available to any but the most senior administration officials. And its due date falls shortly after the presidential election.

They conceded, however, that some of those on the outside study group have been identified in the past with relatively hard-line views on the Soviet threat. For example, Graham, when he headed DIA, long argued that the CIA was grossly understating the cost of the Russian defense program. Earlier this year, the CIA, after extensive analysis, concluded that it had indeed been underestimating that cost — by nearly 100 percent.

Sources familiar with the outside study say that since work began in early September the Pipes group has been given total access to the same raw intelligence and detailed ana-

lyses available to those drawing up this year's official NIE. Additionally, the group has called upon a variety of experts in and out of government to seek their opinions on the implications of key Soviet defense programs.

THE SOURCES SAY the group discovered, for example, that there was no mention of the Soviet civil defense effort in the executive summary for any of the 10 years ending in 1974, even though a multibillion dollar Soviet effort had been under way during that period. A crash study by CIA and DIA is now attempting to analyze the portent of that program.

The group also learned that recent NIEs have estimated there was no way the Soviets could gain strategic superiority over the United States over the next 10 years, regardless of what the United States did in its own defense programs. Such an estimate could have major impact on what programs the United States pursues and with what sense of urgency or equanimity.

The Pipes group is believed to be looking at the possibility of suggesting that the staff involved in drawing up the NIE be physically moved out of CIA headquarters and be responsible directly to the President, rather than the CIA director.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 September 1976

Arms report rewritten to suit Kissinger?

By Fred S. Hoffman
Associated Press writer

Washington

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, retired military intelligence chief, says analysts rewrote an estimate of Soviet progress in missile warhead development after Henry A. Kissinger disagreed with their original conclusions.

"I was employed at the CIA when one fully coordinated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet strategic attack systems was returned for rewrite by Dr. Kissinger because he disagreed with certain conclusions," General Graham said. "It was rewritten."

General Graham said Dr.

Kissinger, then head of the National Security Council (NSC), wanted the estimate to indicate faster Russian progress toward achieving multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). "The estimate was changed in his direction," General Graham said.

He recalled that the incident occurred in late 1969 or early 1970 when the Nixon administration was working toward an agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

The general, who retired last January as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, suggested that Dr. Kissinger wanted a more

ominous intelligence estimate to support arguments that such an agreement was imperative to curb Soviet missile gains.

An associate of Secretary of State Kissinger said General Graham's version of the incident was overdrawn and "not quite a fair representation" of what happened. "I don't believe that Kissinger sent the National Intelligence Estimate back to get a different conclusion," the Kissinger associate said.

"He probably told them to look at the NIE again and consider all possible interpretations of the evidence. There was a fair amount of debate in Washington at the time about the Russian S9 missile and whether they were MIRVing it. 'I would seriously doubt that Kissinger would tell the technicians what to conclude. To my knowledge, he has never done that.'"

The CIA was given an opportunity to comment but did not do so.

General Graham mentioned the incident briefly and without detail in an article in Strategic Review, journal of the privately financed United States Strategic Institute. He elaborated in an interview.

As General Graham recalled it, the original conclusion reached by specialists from various government in-

telligence agencies was that the Russians had more likely tested a shotgun-style multiple warhead (MRV) than the more sophisticated MIRV, which could be aimed precisely at separate targets.

"The evidence was not clear at the time to say it was a MIRV," General Graham said. "I myself felt it was more likely an MRV development. But Kissinger didn't like the conclusion which the whole intelligence community came up with after lots of hours of wrangling. It arrived back at the Office of National Estimates with a suggestion that he didn't like it. So they came up with another conclusion more to his liking. It went back to the NSC with heavier emphasis on MIRV."

General Graham, who was on the staff of the NIE office at the time, said, "We were pretty annoyed."

Asked why Dr. Kissinger might have sought a different conclusion, General Graham said he could only speculate, but that it is his belief that Dr. Kissinger wanted to underscore the urgency of getting an arms limitation agreement.

"At that time, the more horrendous the Soviet developments, the more necessary it would be to cut off their nuclear weapons growth with an arms limitation agreement," General Graham said.

The United States and Russia completed their first SALT agreement in 1972, but it placed no limits on MIRV warheads. In 1973, the Pentagon announced officially that the Russians had successfully tested MIRV-armed missiles.

Summer 1976

THE INTELLIGENCE MYTH OF WASHINGTON

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL O. GRAHAM



THE AUTHOR: General Graham is Research Professor at the Center for Advanced International Studies, the University of Miami. Prior to his retirement on January 1, 1976 he had served as Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. During the past sixteen years General Graham has held a wide variety of positions in the intelligence field, including assignments in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; as Intelligence Officer, Office of National Estimates, CIA; as Commanding Officer of the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion in Hawaii; and with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. He also served in various positions with the Defense Intelligence Agency prior to joining the Intelligence Community Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency in May 1973. General Graham has attended a number of Service schools, including the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. General Graham's study, *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads*, was published as a special USSI Report in March 1976.

IN BRIEF

It is part of the Washington mythology that military intelligence consists primarily of self-serving overstatements of the external threat by military intelligence professionals who are either dumb, dishonest, or both. A review of the facts shows that it is long past time when sensible people, private and public, should rid themselves of this Washington mythology about inflated military intelligence estimates. Policy-makers charged with the organization and functions of the U.S. intelligence machinery should note that bias can never be entirely excluded from intelligence products, but that military analysts are no more susceptible to bias than are their CIA or State Department colleagues. To extol one set of biases over another is justifiable only to a convinced ideologue—it has nothing to do with seeking objectivity. Those who genuinely seek objective judgment from intelligence should bear in mind two cardinal points: first, retain strong intelligence analytical capabilities in both CIA and DIA, insuring that neither becomes subordinate to the other in substantive matters; second, protect the U.S. intelligence community's sources of information.

Columnists, journalists, TV pundits, members of Congress and other "knowledgeable sources" often explain the perceived Soviet threat as follows:

As any sophisticated observer of the Washington scene knows, once a year the military intelligence people trot out scary stories about

the Soviet "threat." Just as the flowers that bloom in the spring, the Pentagon's perennial warnings of danger from the USSR blossom around budget time. If the main object of the admirals and generals this year is to sell a new bomber, the Soviets are sure to be painted as feverishly building a new bomber. If it's tanks they want, then—lo and behold—the Soviets

Master's candidate a former military interrogator

By Jim Chmielowiec
ids Staff Writer

Military Intelligence wasn't a cloak and dagger affair for Jim Sack. He was merely a "Befrager", or friendly interrogator of communist defectors, for the 66th Military Intelligence (MI) battalion in Munich, Germany from 1971 to 1973.

Sack served as one of the information-gathering tentacles of U.S. intelligence, which roughly 20 years earlier also included an I.U. professor who worked as a CIA information analyst.

Sack, now a master's candidate at I.U., said, "I made reports on everything from the price of butter in Romania to production rates of the non-ferrous metal industry in Poland and its paramilitary operations."

Sack was part of an MI operation of 30 to 40 interrogators, housed in a three-story German apartment building, who questioned people leaving European Communist countries. Though the information he obtained was seldom of a military nature, it described economic and social situations that were important to U.S. military planning and spy training.

"We interrogated anyone from Romania who looked like he had a story to tell," he said. The interrogations were not coercive, "no rubber hoses or anything like that."

Sack questioned 10 to 15 persons during his three years in Munich. Most were laborers, but a few, such as a top executive of the Romanian oil industry, had held important posts.

Defectors went both ways through the Iron Curtain. And many of these were criminals or social misfits, Sack said.

"One of our standard fill-in-the-blank questions was 'Why did you cross?.' Their reasons often were political or economic, plus the fact that they had committed some crime." Such criminals usually were sent back to the country they came from, Sack said.

The intelligence reports that Sack and his fellow interrogators made were put in envelopes and sent to Building No. 1 in Munich, where they were distributed to Allied intelligence agencies.

Reports always went to the CIA, which was known as "DAD" to MI personnel in Munich, Sack recalled.

But the interrogation was far from secret, he said. A Czechoslovakian and Hungarian television crew once filmed a documentary about the interrogations that Sack and his colleagues conducted on defectors.

"The East Germans knew what we did, and we knew what they did. We both knew it was a waste of time," Sack said.

Reports like those prepared by Sack were analyzed by government intelligence specialists such as Robert F. Byrnes, now, a distinguished professor at I.U. Byrnes worked for the CIA in the Office of National Estimates from 1951 to 54, reporting directly to the CIA director.

continued

WASHINGTON POST
27 APRIL 1976

Agency Forced to Alter Own Data

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House and the Pentagon mounted a campaign of pressure on the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969 to alter national intelligence estimates so that they would reflect a greater Soviet nuclear strength and a higher danger of surprise attack than U.S. analysts believed existed at the time.

In its final report on foreign intelligence, the Senate intelligence committee also documented the withholding by former CIA Director Richard M. Helms of intelligence estimates that might have cast doubt on the advisability of U.S. troop movements into Cambodia in May, 1970.

In the intelligence imbroglio over Soviet strategic nuclear strength, the report said, Helms deleted an important paragraph from a major CIA assessment. The paragraph downgraded the risk that the Soviet Union would try to develop a surprise nuclear strike capability.

The issue lay at the heart of the first major strategic arms debates of the Nixon administration and was vital to formation of the U.S. position in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between Washington and Moscow.

Helms doctored the CIA document, the Senate report said, "after an assistant to Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird) informed Helms that the statement contradicted the public position of the secretary."

The case was cited as an example of the pressures upon the director of central intelligence, who is charged with the responsibility for providing "objective and independent national intelligence."

There have been previous reports of disagreement between CIA estimates and those of the White House and the Pentagon on Soviet strategic nuclear

was the first official acknowledgement of the pressures applied against Helms to alter the supposedly independent assessments by this agency's senior analysts.

At issue in the conflict were the Nixon administration's decisions on employment of the MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle) as well as the ABM (antiballistic missile) system to protect the U.S. Minuteman missile force against a possible Soviet first strike.

Laird, particularly, took more alarmed view of Soviet first-strike and MIRV capabilities than the CIA's senior analysts. His was a position supportive of the MIRV and ABM programs, which became deeply enmeshed in domestic political controversy in Washington early in the Nixon administration.

In one case, Helms was called to the White House by Henry A. Kissinger, then special assistant to the President for national security affairs, because of disagreements between Kissinger and the CIA Board of National Estimates over the capability of the Soviet SS-9 missiles, the Senate report relates.

"Kissinger and the NSC (National Security Council)

staff made clear their view that the new Soviet missile was a MIRV and asked that the Helms draft be rewritten to provide more evidence supporting the DCI's (director of central intelligence) judgment that the SS-9 had not demonstrated a MIRV capability," the report said.

The chairman of the CIA board of national estimates rewrote the draft but did not change the agency's conclusion that all seven tests of the SS-9 showed its missiles were not independently guided after separation from the launch vehicle. They fell, thereby, into the category of MRV (multiple re-entry vehicles), a less threatening stage of development and one which showed that the Soviet Union was substantially behind U.S. ballistic missile technology.

Three members of the Board of National Estimates said that in this case, they interpreted the White House request as "a subtle and indirect effort to alter the DCI's national intelligence judgment."

In a related incident, Helms under pressure deleted a paragraph from a national intelligence estimate that said, in part:

"We believe that the Soviets recognize the enormous

difficulties of any attempt to achieve strategic superiority of such order as to significantly alter the strategic balance. Consequently, we consider it highly unlikely that they will attempt within the period of this estimate to achieve a first-strike capability . . . with assurance that the U.S.S.R. would not itself receive damage it would regard as unacceptable . . ."

In testimony to the Senate committee last January, Helms said the dispute over assessing the Soviet first-strike capability became a "battle royal," which he said, "became so contentious that it seemed almost impossible to get it resolved . . ."

The Board and Office of National Estimates was abolished in 1973 by William E. Colby when he assumed the CIA directorship. The move was taken against the background of growing contention on strategic intelligence questions between Kissinger, as presidential national security adviser, and the CIA analysts. Kissinger was reported by one former intelligence official to have scrawled the word "crap" on a national intelligence estimate with which he disagreed.

Within the CIA analytical community the move was viewed as a blow to

STATINTL
continued

TOP OF THE NEWS

The last of the American Caesars

By Robert Sam Anson

It was when the last helicopter landed—with the knowledge that no more would follow—that the horror of what had been left behind finally overtook the Americans. On the deck of one of the carriers, the Marine colonel who had led the rescuers was weeping, openly and unashamedly. All that day, he had been telling crowds of terrified Vietnamese to remain calm, that there would be room for everyone, that the Americans would never forsake their friends. And now, events had made him a liar. Hundreds—a full 70 percent of the embassy's Vietnamese staff—had been left behind. The thought of them weighed heavily on the survivors. Some of the mission members were cursing, not caring who heard or what would be reported later. One embassy official wandered aimlessly about the ship, mumbling expletives over and over to himself. Others, tight-lipped and silent, stood off, lost in private grief. Then, suddenly, the man who had led them—their last proconsul—appeared at a hatchway. A blue Navy bathrobe was pulled round his shoulders, and he coughed from pneumonia; yet, somehow, the regal presence was still there, tattered but intact. To the reporters who approached, Graham Martin, United States Ambassador to the now-defunct Republic of Vietnam, had few words and no apologies. He looked

up for a moment in the glare of the television lights, his eyes tired and sick, and then turned away. As he disappeared, someone noticed he was munching on an apple.

By all accounts, it was a classic Martin performance: cool, imperturbable, with the faint though unmistakable trace of the bizarre. The people who

Graham Martin was the perfect choice to preside over the collapse of South Vietnam: imperial, arrogant and deluded. All he lacked was a fiddle

worked for him the last months of the war came to expect such things of the ambassador. And when, finally, the war was over, they would never forgive him for it.

If it were not for Martin, some of them said, they would still be in Saigon; indeed, there would still be a Saigon. If it were not for Martin, they would not have made promises to the Vietnamese that Martin had no intention of keeping. If it were not for Martin, the Vietnamese who had worked for them and had been in

friends—and, to some of them, their lovers and families—would be with them now, instead of in the dark of Saigon, with their fate entrusted to new masters. Even now, in the quiet offices in Washington, the bitterness is slow in draining. "Martin," says one man who worked for him, "made Judases of all of us."

That was not how they felt in the beginning. It was not how anyone felt in the beginning, about Graham Martin or Vietnam. In the beginning, they both seemed bright, full of promise. By the end, their fates had become inextricably intertwined, the horror of one bound up in the horror of the other. Martin was not only a man; he was, in those days, a metaphor for all that had gone so wrong with American empire. Its fall was his fall.

That was the irony, right from the start. For when the word came to Saigon in the winter of 1973 that Graham Martin would soon be arriving to take command of the embassy over which Ellsworth Bunker had presided the last six years, there was, if not rejoicing, at least relief. The signing of the Paris accords in January 1973 had made the old Vietnam hands profoundly uneasy. Whatever assurances Henry Kissinger might provide, the agreement clearly gave away much more than it got. The nonexistent cease-fire, which devolved into general, if low-level, warfare, soon proved that. Compounding their anxiety was the steadily dwindling level of support which Congress annually provided the South

EVENING - 626,713
WEEKEND - 375,607

NOV 5 1974

Kissinger Testimony Challenged

By THOMAS B. ROSS

WASHINGTON (CS-T) — Secretary of State Kissinger's public comments on last year's Arab-Israeli war have been sharply challenged in secret intelligence reports.

Intelligence officials interpreted the reports, portions of which were made available to the Chicago Sun-Times, as raising serious questions about Kissinger's explanation of why the war caught him by surprise and why he later recommended a worldwide U. S. military alert.

Kissinger said at the time that he had been advised by U. S. intelligence before the Egyptian attack 13 months ago that there was "no possibility of hostilities" in the Middle East.

The intelligence officials contrasted this statement with an estimate released by the State Dept.'s Bureau of Intelligence and Research on May 31, 1973. It said:

"If the UN debate of next week produces no convincing movement in the Israeli-Egyptian impasse, our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become a better-than-even bet."

Varying Estimates

The officials acknowledged that the forecast was softened in a later prediction, but they insisted that it was not totally withdrawn. The second bureau estimate, on Sept. 30, said

"There are reports that Syria is preparing for an attack on Israel, but conclusive evidence is lacking. In our view, the political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian move against Israel at this time."

In fact, the Syrians joined battle shortly after Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal on Oct. 6, 1973.

On the U. S. military alert, the officials maintained that U. S. technical intelligence—that acquired by mechanical means such as satellites and electronic eavesdropping—did not support Kissinger's explanation.

Kissinger said former President Nixon ordered the alert on the basis of "certain readiness measures [and] the alerting of certain Soviet units."

But the intelligence officials insisted that the technical intelligence did not indicate that the Soviets intended to intervene directly with troops in support of Egypt.

The Brezhnev Message

Kissinger also said he was "puzzled by the behavior of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place" and "the ambiguity of their actions and conversations."

The intelligence officials argued that the only concrete hint of Soviet action was in a message from Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezh-

nev, which they interpreted as restrained. It reportedly declared in reference to the Soviet proposal for a joint U. S.-Soviet ceasefire force:

"I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we would be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally."

The intelligence officials contended that Kissinger had deprived himself of valuable assessments on the Middle East by dismantling the CIA's Office of National Estimates five months before the war.

They said the last CIA national intelligence estimate on the Arab-Israeli war was produced on May 17, 1973.

With Kissinger returning to the Middle East today in an effort to stave off another war, the intelligence officials said they had decided to reveal the documents on last October's war in an effort to fend off unfair accusations against them in the future.

The CIA: Time to Come In fr


Question: "Under what international law do we have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country?"

Answer: "I am not going to pass judgment on whether it is permitted or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of the countries involved."

That blunt response by President Gerald Ford at his press conference last week was either remarkably careless or remarkably candid. It left the troubling impression, which the Administration afterward did nothing to dispel, that the U.S. feels free to subvert another government whenever it suits American policy. In an era of détente with the Soviet Union and improving relations with China, Ford's words seemed to represent an anachronistic, cold-war view of national security reminiscent of the 1950s. Complained Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho with considerable hyperbole: "[It is] tantamount to saying that we respect no law save the law of the jungle."

The question on "destabilizing" foreign governments followed Ford's confirmation that the Nixon Administration had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to wage an \$8 million campaign in 1970-73 to aid opponents of Chilean President Salvador Allende's Marxist government (see box page 21). Until last week, members of both the Nixon and Ford Administrations had flatly denied that the U.S. had been involved in undermining Allende's regime. They continue to insist that the CIA was not responsible for the 1973 coup that left Allende dead and a repressive right-wing junta in his place.

Congressmen were outraged by the news that they had once again been misled by the Executive Branch. More important, disclosure of the Chile operation helped focus and intensify the debate in Congress and the nation over the CIA: Has the agency gone too far in recent years? Should it be barred from interfering in other countries' domestic affairs? Where it has erred, was the CIA out of control or was the White House at fault for misdirecting and misusing the agency? Should it be more tightly supervised, and if so, by whom? In addition, the controversy spotlighted the fundamental dilemma posed by an open, democratic society using covert activity—the "dirty tricks" or "black" side of intelligence organizations—as an instrument of foreign policy.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR WILLIAM E. COLBY
"There's nothing wrong with accountability."

At the center of the storm was William Egan Colby, 54, the CIA's director for the past year. Shrewd and capable, Colby has sought from the day he took office as director to channel more of the CIA's efforts into the gathering, evaluation and analysis of information and less into covert actions—the "operational" side of the intelligence business. Says he: "The CIA's cloak-and-dagger days have ended."

Certain Actions. But obviously, not quite. It was Colby who oversaw the last months of the CIA activity in Chile as the agency's deputy director for operations in 1973, though this operation apparently ended shortly after he became director. But it was also Colby who disclosed details of the covert action to a closed hearing of the House Armed Ser-

vices Subcommittee on Intelligence last April 22. A summary of his testimony was leaked to the press two weeks ago. By the time Ford met with the press, Colby's revelations were more than a week old; the President had been briefed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and doubtless was ready to field reporters' questions. Said Ford: "Our Government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes."

Since so much had already leaked out, Ford perhaps had no choice but to make an admission. But his statement seemed to set no or few limits on clan-

7 JUN 1974

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C.I.A., Bruised by Vietnam a Undergoes Quiet Changes

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6 — Bruised by the domestic politics of the Vietnam conflict and the Watergate affair, its influence in the White House broken by the practitioners of détente, the Central Intelligence Agency is undergoing a major, perhaps fundamental, transformation.

Its claws—the covert operations that once marshaled large mercenary armies in Laos and Latin America and toppled undesired governments in Iran and Guatemala—are now largely retracted.

Its weightiest organ in the bureaucracy, the Board of National Estimates, a federal court of intelligence, has been abolished.

Under its new director, William E. Colby, some of the agency's functions and priorities have been shifted, with seemingly paradoxical results.

Although President Nixon has given Mr. Colby more power and responsibility than most of his predecessors, the director has markedly less access to the White House.

Based on Nine Interviews

While he may not face as much rivalry from the military intelligence establishment as some critics feared, Mr. Colby's agency is being challenged by the State Department's intelligence and research bureau, newly revitalized at Secretary of State Kissinger's behest.

These changes, which by the nature of the intelligence profession have taken place quietly, became known through interviews in the intelligence community.

The rules of the game requires that there be no attribution of information acquired from high intelligence officials. When Mr. Colby sees newsmen—he has done so more frequently than any of his predecessors since he took over last summer—he requests that not even the terms "officials" or "sources" be used.

The mandate given Mr. Colby by the President provides him not only the power to preside over all intelligence operations, but also the power to allocate the entire intelligence budget of about \$8-billion.

Even tactical intelligence, previously a

ously maintained by the military services, comes under his purview.

Changes at the Top

Impelled by apparent failures of Israeli tactical intelligence during the October war, American intelligence officials have decided to place greater stress on relaying information on the deployment of opponent forces to field commanders in West Germany and South Korea.

But the most striking changes in the Central Intelligence Agency have come at the top, having been initiated by Mr. Colby himself.

He replaced the 10-man Board of National Estimates and its staff of 20 last October with a system manned by what he calls national intelligence officers.

Founded in 1950 by Walter Bedell Smith, and run originally by the Harvard historian William Langer, the board in its heyday had been an "independent corporate entity," in the description of a former member. It produced long-range estimates of the intentions and capabilities of antagonists.

"I felt the board was essential to doing honest intelligence," this retired member continued. "It was impossible for the White House to order up something that fit their views. It was impossible then, but it's possible now."

The new 11 national intelligence officers are expected to range through the entire government and beyond to put together their evaluations.

Each has a geographic region or a topical area, among them the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Japan and the Pacific, Latin America, Europe, strategic forces, central purpose forces, economics and energy.

More Short-Term Studies

The new officers are preparing more short-term assessments and fewer long-range estimates. This is partly in response to the demands of their chief consumer, Secretary of State Kissinger.

"It's ad hoc-ism," said an agency official. "The old board could respond to a request for an estimate in five days or 24 hours. But it didn't like to. We used to schedule the work three to six months in advance."

Explaining why he be-

sary, even though regrettable, the official went on:

"The board couldn't have gone on. It was in a helluva rut. It thought in big strategic terms and didn't get into grubby options. It was often too general and philosophical. Also its profound skepticism on Vietnam didn't help the board in this town."

"Besides, Henry Kissinger is hopelessly antibureaucracy. He wants his intelligence handed to him scribbled on the back of an envelope."

An aide of Mr. Kissinger remembers the old blue-covered national estimates as "blah—they ended up with the least common denominator."

The new estimates carry dissenting views from within the intelligence community as an integral part of their texts. In the old system dissents were registered as footnotes.

Key Military Man Hired

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But there are lunchtime debates among the agency's senior officials about the value of maintaining the planes, the weapons and the trainers that were associated with the secret armies.

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State Department's Role

"It needs to be diminished very considerably," said another. "We are not in a position nor is it worthwhile to try influencing the course of action in every other country. There are also the budgetary realities."

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JUN 1974

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C.I.A., Bruised by Vietnam a Undergoes Quiet Changes

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6 — Bruised by the domestic politics of the Vietnam conflict and the Watergate affair, its influence in the White House broken by the practitioners of détente, the Central Intelligence Agency is undergoing a major, perhaps fundamental, transformation.

Its claws—the covert operations that once marshaled large mercenary armies in Laos and Latin America and toppled undesired governments in Iran and Guatemala—are now largely retracted.

Its weightiest organ in the bureaucracy, the Board of National Estimates, a federal court of intelligence, has been abolished.

Under its new director, William E. Colby, some of the agency's functions and priorities have been shifted, with seemingly paradoxical results.

Although President Nixon has given Mr. Colby more power and responsibility than most of his predecessors, the director has markedly less access to the White House.

Based on Nine Interviews

While he may not face as much rivalry from the military intelligence establishment as some critics feared, Mr. Colby's agency is being challenged by the State Department's intelligence and research bureau, newly revitalized at Secretary of State Kissinger's behest.

These changes, which by the nature of the intelligence profession have taken place quietly, became known through interviews in the intelligence community.

The rules of the game requires that there be no attribution of information acquired from high intelligence officials. When Mr. Colby sees newsmen — he has done so more frequently than any of his predecessors since he took over last summer — he requests that not even the terms "officials" or "sources" be used.

The mandate given Mr. Colby by the President provides him not only the power to preside over all intelligence operations, but also the power to allocate the entire intelligence budget of about \$6-billion.

Even tactical intelligence, previously an

ously maintained by the military services, comes under his purview.

Changes at the Top

Impelled by apparent failures of Israeli tactical intelligence during the October war, American intelligence officials have decided to place greater stress on relaying information on the deployment of opponent forces to field commanders in West Germany and South Korea.

But the most striking changes in the Central Intelligence Agency have come at the top, having been initiated by Mr. Colby himself.

He replaced the 10-man Board of National Estimates and its staff of 20 last October with a system manned by what he calls national intelligence officers.

Founded in 1950 by Walter Bedell Smith, and run originally by the Harvard historian William Langer, the board in its heyday had been an "independent corporate entity," in the description of a former member. It produced long-range estimates of the intentions and capabilities of antagonists.

"I felt the board was essential to doing honest intelligence," this retired member continued. "It was impossible for the White House to order up something that fit their views. It was impossible then, but it's possible now."

The new 11 national intelligence officers are expected to range through the entire government and beyond to put together their evaluations.

Each has a geographic region or a topical area, among them the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Japan and the Pacific, Latin America, Europe, strategic forces, central purpose forces, economics and energy.

More Short-Term Studies

The new officers are preparing more short-term assessments and fewer long-range estimates. This is partly in response to the demands of their chief consumer, Secretary of State Kissinger.

"It's ad hoc-ism," said an agency official. "The old board could respond to a request for an estimate in five days or 24 hours. But it didn't like to. We used to schedule the work three to six months in advance."

Explaining why he had

sary, even though regrettable, the official went on:

"The board couldn't have gone on. It was in a helluva rut. It thought in big strategic terms and didn't get into grubby options. It was often too general and philosophical. Also its profound skepticism on Vietnam didn't help the board in this town."

"Besides, Henry Kissinger is hopelessly antibureaucracy. He wants his intelligence handed to him scribbled on the back of an envelope."

An aide of Mr. Kissinger remembers the old blue-covered national estimates as "blah—they ended up with the least common denominator."

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5 MAR 1974

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Secrets redefined 'New' CIA— with Colby's brand on it

By Benjamin Welles
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

After seven months in office the soft-spoken William Egan "Bill" Colby has begun to leave his stamp as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

First, Mr. Colby — the only career intelligence man to reach the top except for Richard M. Helms — has done much to restore the loyalty and morale of the CIA's 15,000 employees.

This development is in sharp contrast to the image of his predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, who humiliated some subordinates and fired dozens of others, and whose departure to become secretary of defense led, as one source put it, to "dancing in the halls from joy."

Mr. Colby's principal change so far has been to restructure sharply the 24-year-old system of spotting and analyzing potential threats to U.S. safety and bringing these to the President's attention.

Prestigious board

Ever since the 1950 Korean war this has been done by the CIA's Board of National Estimates: a prestigious — if shadowy — group of about 12 experienced intelligence veterans, ambassadors, admirals, generals, scientists, and executives.

The board, backed by an expert staff, has been producing yearly up to 60 "national intelligence estimates" ranging from the massive annual studies of Soviet strength and probable intentions on which the Pentagon budget and the U.S. strategic posture are based down to analyses of what might happen in so small — but important — a country in terms of U.S. interests as Panama.

But the board has tended in recent years to turn out increasingly massive studies that often obscure sharp differences between rival intelligence agencies and portray instead a bland "lowest common denominator" of agreement.

During the first Nixon administration these wordy "NIEs" often irritated Henry A. Kissinger; a busy man who rarely had time to judge

("Tell me the truth," he once insisted, "if there are differences between different intelligence agencies I want to know it.")

Mr. Colby has begun recasting the system. He has scrapped the Board of National Estimates and its backup staff. In their place he has begun naming key aides as "national intelligence officers" for specific top-priority topics. He tends to think of them as "Mr. Russia," "Mr. Salt talks," "Mr. Middle East," etc.

Mr. Colby's innovation has been criticized. Veterans warn that whereas the Board of National Estimates was like a court, uninfluenced by policies of the administration in power, concerned solely with objective analysis — the new "one man" system may make it easier for the White House to pressure Mr. Colby and his NIOs to tailor their findings to the administration's policies.

Mr. Colby defends the new system as faster and more accurate. The strings, of course, all now run into his own hands — rather than, as before, into a group of prestigious, elderly but often balky, experts.

More important in Mr. Colby's view, the new system of individual NIOs considers the key factor of how to collect needed intelligence — whether by spies, by orbiting satellites, or by electronic bases around the world — plus relative costs.

Rising costs form a pressing part of Mr. Colby's preoccupations. He gives no details, but outside experts say the U.S. intelligence community has been held to about \$3.5 billion a year for several years; with the CIA spending \$600 million of that yearly. The Defense Department alone spends more than \$2 billion yearly on intelligence — without which the United States could scarcely enter serious disarmament negotiations with the Russians.

Yet with prices inexorably rising Mr. Colby has been faced with the rueful choices of (A) keeping all programs and personnel going and asking Congress yearly for more money; (B) keeping all programs but cutting into research and development; or (C) trimming less-essential programs.

Realizing the widespread mistrust of the CIA, Mr. Colby has started eliminating time-encrusted shibboleths of secrecy. There are three types of "secrets" in his view:

- o "Bad secrets or government misbehavior which enterprising journalists expose for the public good.

- o There are secrets which need no longer be secret: CIA involvement in analysis of world events or in science, research, and technology.

- o Finally there are "good" secrets — matters which should be protected — such as the identity of a key informant in a hostile government.

Mr. Colby is said to feel strongly that if everything CIA does is covered by a blanket of secrecy, "good" secrets risk being exposed because the cloak of security must cover so much.

Guess Who's Try In America Esta

Who's Who and
—A Long L

By Tad Szulc

One day it is the controversy over the Central Intelligence Agency's role in Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept CIA skulduggery in a remote province in Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission that quite a few American newsmen have been operating as CIA informants abroad. Or the discovery that the agency has been secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Colorado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregulars at hidden camps in Greece while bank-rolling colonels on the ruling Greek junta and financing famous European statesmen and contriving to overthrow the Libyan regime.

The CIA, it would seem, just cannot stay out of the headlines, which is a commentary on the agency itself and on the contradictions in our society. Though it obviously is one of the most secretive agencies in the United States government, the CIA probably receives more publicity than any Washington bureaucracy except for the White House. Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes indignant, often sensationalist, and frequently lopsided. The CIA's track record in the 27 years of its operations largely accounts for this lavish yet unwanted coverage—it's done everything from stealing the text of Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech denouncing Stalin and the Bay of Pigs, to overthrowing foreign regimes, to running the Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly outfitting the Watergate "Plumbers"—but it is our endless fascination with espionage and cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers unflinchingly receptive to stories and books about the CIA.

On a more serious level, however, our interest underlines the important point that a secret agency cannot function in utter secrecy in what still is a reasonably open society. The CIA is the subject of continued public scrutiny and debate—even if the scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom well informed, and even if it is true that the agency has been allowed to run wild and uncontrolled—reinforced by the Watergate affair—that

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highly sensitized to the role of intelligence agencies here and abroad. But so strange is our morality that we usually tend to accept the national security need for building better and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indignantly at the notion of American involvement in global intelligence operations.

This is where the contradictions of our society come in. However, the reality is that effective foreign policy depends not only on classical political and economic diplomacy, but also on military deterrents and the availability of solid intelligence. To abolish our intelligence services would be tantamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament, something not seriously proposed here. We its sister agencies will go on existing; so will

consequently to the President. The USIB is headed by the Director of the CIA, who also acts as Director of Central Intelligence and, again in theory, as chief of the intelligence community. William Colby replaced Richard Helms in this twin-post last September (there was a five-month interregnum during which James M. Schlesinger managed to shake up the community quite considerably before moving on to be Secretary of Defense), but there are no indications so far that Colby carries much more weight with the Nixon-Kissinger White House than did Helms. Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was in deep disfavor with Kissinger. The White House tends to regard Colby as efficient intelligence bureaucrat and administrator (despite his long career as a clan-

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Intelligence in the Colby Era

CIA in Flux

by Stanley Karnow

When President Truman was contemplating the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency more than a quarter-century ago, Secretary of State George C. Marshall warned against the new organization on the grounds that its "powers... seem almost unlimited and need clarification." Since then the CIA has successfully resisted hundreds of attempts by Congress to limit and clarify its powers, and the latest such bid this time by Senator John C. Stennis of Mississippi promises by be equally ineffective. Stennis, whose Armed Services subcommittee is supposed to supervise the CIA, has consistently protected it against any serious investigation, control or criticism, and, consistent with that practice, his present bill is less a genuine effort to harness the agency than a diversionary tactic designed to prevent other members of Congress, notably Senator William Proxmire, from pushing through stronger measures. The CIA is likely to emerge unscathed again.

Even so, other pressures have combined to diminish the CIA's influence, and, although it continues to carry on covert and sometimes reckless activities, the agency is not quite the sinister "invisible government" of years past. For one thing its reputation has suffered badly from misadventures like the Bay of Pigs and the secret war in Laos, as well as its tangential involvement in the Watergate scandals, and, as a result, it has fallen prey to the fierce bureaucratic rivalries of Washington. It has gradually become overshadowed by the Defense Department's various espionage services, which now account for about 85 percent of the estimated six or seven billion dollars spent annually by what is known in the idiom of the capital as the "intelligence community." The biggest of the Pentagon outfits is the National Security Agency, whose 25,000 employees manage satellites, fly reconnaissance aircraft, and, among other jobs, monitor open and secret foreign radio communications from some 400 clandestine bases around the world, all on a budget that runs into the billions. In contrast the CIA staff of 15,000 operates on roughly \$750 million per year, and, in many respects, it could not function without military support. Unlike the Defense Department, moreover, the CIA cannot seek funds directly from Congress, but makes its requests to the Office of Management and Budget. Therefore, while he is technically in charge of

continued

Joseph Alsop

Putting a Price on a Russian Threat

A startling development in the darkest recesses of the government here throws light on the intensive talks of Premier Chou En-lai and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in far away Peking.

In brief, the official U.S. estimate of Soviet spending on military preparations on China's northern border has been abruptly increased by an enormous amount. To be specific, the former figure was about \$6 billion-equivalent, as the price tag of this huge Soviet military effort. The newly agreed price tag is \$40 billion-equivalent.

The difference has been partly fuzzed over by a time-problem—no doubt intentionally. In other words, the first of the foregoing price tags covered the period from 1966 through 1970. Whereas the new estimate covers the period from 1965 (when almost nothing had yet been done) through the first part of 1973.

Nonetheless, the Kremlin's estimated rate of annual expenditure on the preparations on the Sino-Soviet frontier has now been approximately tripled, and this has also happened virtually from one week to the next. In addition, the same senior analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency made both the first and second estimates. So the first question, rather obviously, is how the devil the two contrasting estimates can be reconciled.

The answer ultimately lies in the now-dissolved Office of National Estimates of the CIA. In the American bureaucracy, this office used to be the main stronghold of the viewpoint that may be summed up: "It isn't there; it isn't there; it really can't be so." This was the response to developments as diverse and unpleasant as the first stages of the Soviet moves against Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the intervening Soviet attempt to put ballistic missiles secretly into Cuba.

The same reaction to possible unpleasantness led the Office of National Estimates—and thus the more grandiose Board of National Estimates—to attach almost no significance to the Soviet military build-up on the Chinese border. This produced a most curious and significant contradiction within the highest ranks of the U.S. government.

In brief, all men and women in the highest ranks have at least limited access to the official national estimates. The national estimates consistently peep-pooched the Soviet threat to China, and the estimates formed the opinion of all but a few insiders. Meanwhile, a totally different view was taken by the tiny group of true policy-makers, conspicuously beginning with

Dr. Kissinger and his White House staff, and including others like former CIA director Richard Helms, who by no means invariably followed his own Office of National Estimates.

From as early as some time in 1969, therefore, the small but decisive band of the President's true policy-makers have been proceeding on basic assumptions sharply at variance with the official national estimates—though not at variance with the facts in the case. The amazing, quite recent jump from \$6 billion to \$40 billion in turn resulted from an effort to get the underlying data behind the estimates into better accord with the facts.

Because of the peculiar approach of the former CIA Office of National Estimates, a series of critical, vastly expensive factors had been omitted from the old \$6 billion price tag above-described. One omitted factor, for instance, was the immense cost of 30 brand-new Soviet jet airfields, all built in range of the Chinese border on former cow-pastures, and mainly in areas presenting grave logistical difficulties.

The new CIA director, William Colby, therefore asked that the old price tag be re-studied, with adequate allowance for the formerly omitted factors. The result was the tripled estimate of Soviet expenditure on the military build-up along the border. This great change, please note, was made by the identical analyst who prepared the earlier estimate. Even now, there are also reasons to think the new estimate is still inadequate because some omissions were not corrected.

Here, then, is a cautionary talk about the way the U.S. government sometimes operates. It helps to explain the sleep-walking atmosphere that still prevails in Washington, despite great and obvious dangers overseas. As to the tale's relevance to the Chou-Kissinger talks, it means that U.S. figures for Soviet investment in preparations to attack China are now nearly in line, with Chinese figures.

In the Mideast, meanwhile, the Soviets have just shown they are more and more strongly tempted by a policy based on naked military power. That makes it all the more interesting to know why the Soviet leaders have been investing on the Chinese frontier at the rate of \$5 billion equivalent per annum—and all the while preparing to do something they have no intention of doing, if the fashionable view is correct.

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23 OCT 1973

New Chief Getting CIA Back on Its Feet After a Series of Stumbles

Langley, Va.

Like a middle-aged gent forced to suddenly run, the Central Intelligence Agency is catching its breath these days following a series of disquieting experiences.

Since it was established in 1947, the CIA has always been able to blunt congressional criticism, shield its staff and budget figures, win loyal support from presidents, and otherwise work in relative secrecy. The very nature of this organization makes powerful people curious, and then resentful when they can't find out what is going on.

But in recent months, its role in the Laotian war, the bad luck the agency fell into in the Watergate affair, hefty manpower cuts, and the departure of two directors within six months, left the CIA gasping.

Its new director, William Egan Colby, 53, an old pro who describes his job as "hiring out," has been a settling influence since he took over last month. His predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, in the few months he was in office, severed about 1,000 people from a payroll estimated at 18,000, and indicated changes designed to please Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger and others in the administration have not been satisfied with the usefulness of information provided by the CIA, particularly that coming out of the agency's top study unit, the Office of National Estimates. That body is about to be abolished, and some critics claim this means the CIA will consequently be less objective in its evaluations for the White House and State Department.

The CIA also seems to have pulled back from clandestine operations which, while forming only a small part of its overall activity, brought the agency an aura of intrigue and adventure, and also fierce criticism. The CIA's role in toppling governments has always been exaggerated, but even in its current "hold-down" phase, officials have not missed the possibility of such activities in the future.

The CIA's basic work is just what its title denotes—an information collecting agency, but one unsurpassed in the world. Its staff tends more to academic than spy-master types. Indeed, about 21 per cent hold advanced degrees, and fully one-third come from the social sciences. Increasingly, CIA staffers concern themselves with economic questions because the power-game in the world today moves toward that area.

The CIA also collects such seeming trivia as depths of harbors, the conditions of caves, and biographical information about officialdom of every nation in the world. The biographies include tidbits about a leader's health, weaknesses and inclinations—stuff any gossip columnist would drool over.

The U.S., like all major nations, had an intelligence collecting service through its history, but it was not until the intelligence disaster accompanying Pearl Harbor that we realized the need for a central information collecting agency. There are eight major intelligence-gathering units in the U.S. government, but the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have to be considered the key ones. Of the estimated \$4 billion to \$5 billion spent by the government on intelligence, the CIA receives about \$500 million.

The CIA, because it is supersecret, is credited or blamed for all manner of events. When Mr. Colby testified in Senate confirmation hearings, he had to deny that the CIA engineered the 1967 coup in Greece, ousted Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, made a private deal with Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol, and conducted the Phoenix program in Vietnam as one of assassination.

Denials aside, what is important is that many Americans and certainly the majority of young people believe the CIA is responsible for these acts, and more. Denials or forums to make denials, and is vulnerable on this

score. One consequence is that the CIA has a difficult time signing on the "cream" of college graduates. Yet some rather prominent names once worked in the CIA, or were involved in its projects—Yale's University's Rev. William Sloan Coffin is one, and feminist Gloria Steinem is another.

All major nations and many minor ones have their CIA's. The Russians have their KGB and GRU. France has its Service for Documentation and Counter-Espionage. The British will not admit to anything, but M-6 is their CIA, and its director, Maurice Oldfield, had to leave his post recently after his name was publicly revealed.

Perhaps one sign of the times concerning the CIA is the one put up this summer on the highway leading to its huge central building here. The sign, which directs traffic, is the first CIA sign ever seen in these parts, though thousands of people drive to work at the CIA each day.

First Of Three Reports

CIA Expert Traces Growth Of Secret Operations

By Ed Offley

The Central Intelligence Agency has come a long way, although some think it has taken the wrong direction.

Originally enacted by Congress in 1947, the CIA was charged with gathering and coordinating intelligence produced by it and other federal intelligence agencies. Today, the CIA is much, much more than that: It has evolved into the core of a shadow government, whose edifice is unrecognizable and whose power is unstoppable.

That's the opinion of one government official whose job enabled him to learn more about the CIA than most of its own employees ever could. L. Fletcher Prouty served as the Pentagon's chief support officer for the CIA for nine years from 1955 to 1963. As a full colonel in the Air Force, he was not constrained by the CIA's oath of secrecy.

In late August, 1955, Prouty was ordered to establish a CIA support office in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force. In 1960, he transferred the office to the office of the Secretary of Defense, and later expanded the support facility under the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. Prouty retired from the Air Force Dec. 31, 1963.

Documented History

Prouty has written a documented history of the CIA, which traces its birth under the National Security Act of 1947, through the "activist" directorship of Allen W. Dulles, who brought the agency into clandestine operations, and through the CIA's deceptive role in getting the United States into the Vietnam War.

"The Secret Team" (1973, Prentice-Hall), presents an indictment against the CIA, saying that it has subverted the language and intent of

doing so has become a threat to American democracy at home and international stability abroad.

In an interview in Williamsburg last Thursday with The Virginia Gazette, Prouty said that most accounts of the CIA are misleading, because few people know that only 10 percent of the agency's activity is concerned with the gathering of intelligence. "If you know what you're talking about," Prouty said, "You know that 90 percent of the agency's activity is in clandestine operations."

Power Of Exclusion

Prouty defined the "secret team" as personnel who have access to secret intelligence, which is "the really powerful stuff — inside information, advance knowledge, satellite data, agent data. This is what breeds the team." He added that the concept of "need to know" extends a total power of exclusion to those not on the team.

Who is on this team? Prouty explained that it begins with the National Security Council and the top executives of the CIA, and extends to a ring of Executive Branch officials, senior military officers, "think tank" analysts and leaders of the education and business worlds. "Henry Kissinger, by law (in his role as Presidential advisor for foreign affairs and chairman of the National Security Council), leads the team," Prouty said.

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states: "Powers and duties of the CIA—403.(d)(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Loophole Used

The above quoted section of federal law was the primary means by which the CIA went beyond in-

telligence gathering and into clandestine operations during the early 1950s, Prouty said in his book. The chief architect of clandestine operations was Allen Dulles, director of the CIA during 1950-1961.

In "The Secret Team," Prouty wrote that Dulles' appointment as head of the agency "foretold the existence of a vast, secret intelligence organization, a top echelon clandestine operations facility at White House level, a hidden infrastructure throughout other departments and agencies of the government, and the greatest clandestine operational capability the world had ever known...."

The Intelligence side of the CIA is now little more than a "cover" for the CIA's ultra-top secret operations, Prouty told the Gazette.

Pouring It Out

"They (intelligence branch) have a job to do — to provide the President with intelligence. So they pour out their stuff day after day, like a newspaper or magazine," Prouty said. "But their big gripe is that people don't read it, and even if they read it, they don't heed it."

Prouty explained that the main function of the CIA's intelligence branch has been the preparation of the "national intelligence estimate," an intelligence situation report prepared for the President and other top government officials with the freshest information gleaned from the CIA's worldwide network.

"Those reports are very matter-of-fact," Prouty said. "They'll say, for instance, 'We're sure there's going to be a coup in Chile.' And the next day they'll say, 'Every appearance is that the coup d'etat will take place within the next 30 days.' They keep pouring this stuff out."

"We Told You"

"Well, sure enough, sooner or later there's a coup d'etat, and they (intelligence branch officials) say, 'See? We told you.'"

VIETNAM, S.
continued

More Intelligence Changes Considered

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

In another phase of the administration's drastic shake-up of the intelligence establishment, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is giving serious thought to abolishing the State Department's small but influential Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Kissinger revealed this intention last month during a closed-door confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to informed intelligence sources, Kissinger has already begun to bypass his in-house intelligence bureau and has been giving the CIA assignments that the bureau normally would handle.

Kissinger's disclosure of his dissatisfaction with the intelligence bureau, known in the department as INR, came during a hearing Sept. 17 that otherwise concentrated on his role in initiating wiretaps on 13 government officials, including Kissinger aides, and four newsmen.

THE TRANSCRIPT, a declassified version of which was made available today, shows Kissinger musing out loud on whether INR should be abolished outright or merged with existing geographical bureaus in the State Department.

"From what I have seen of the intelligence product of the State Department, the present function is not satisfactory," Kissinger told the senators.

The new secretary of State is widely believed to have held a similar opinion of the national intelligence estimates which had been prepared under a 23-year-old system by the Board of National Estimates, an elite group within the CIA.

Early last summer, in one of his first official decisions, newly installed CIA Director William E. Colby ordered the abolition of the 10-man board, and, according to reliable reports, forced its director, John W. Huizenga, into retirement.

Other sources in the intelligence community noted, however, that abolition of the bureau, if it takes place, would mark another breach in the wall between intelligence analysts and the operatives whose job it is to carry out policies which are supposedly based on "clean" and unbiased estimates.

In other sections of transcript of the closed hearings on Kissinger's nomination, these points emerged:

• A confidential FBI report on the 1969-71 wiretapping, which has not been revealed in full even to the committee, shows that Kissinger and the current White House chief-of-staff, Alexander INR bureau at State Army colonel, on Kissinger's National Security Council staff, personally requested three specific targets for the taps. But Atty. Gen. Elliot L. Richardson, who also testified in the closed session, insisted that this overstated Kissinger's role. He emphasizes that Kissinger did not "originate" the taps. Kissinger himself insisted that the idea originated with then-FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and former Atty. Gen. John M. Mitchell and that the taps were ordered installed by President Nixon. At Kissinger's request, 49 consecutive pages dealing with the wiretap issue were deleted from the transcript.

• A top-level White House crisis team, the so-called Washington Special Action Group, was convened as soon as news of last month's coup in Chile was received.

singer, the group decided to avoid any appearance what-

soever of U.S. involvement and passed the word so forcefully that "everyone was afraid even to express sorrow" at the death of Chilean President Salvador Allende, reportedly a suicide the day of the coup. This oversight was corrected the next day, but not before it brought the administration a worldwide bad press. WSAG decisions, Kissinger stressed, are personally approved by the President.

• Kissinger defended the decision-making procedures devised for Nixon administration foreign policy as "much more systematic than those of President Johnson." But he promised soon to bring the State Department into policy making in a major way by reinvigorating its policy planning staff and thoroughly shaking up the higher echelons. "Some rather drastic moves will be made to bring younger men into key positions more rapidly," Kissinger told the committee.

The one reorganization he discussed in detail, however, concerned the INR and its probable abolition.

"THE ISSUE," Kissinger said, "is whether it is possible to have a separate intelligence function in the State Department - separated both from the geographical bureaus (in State) and from the other intelligence agencies - that can ever compete with the other agencies. . . ."

SEP 12 1973

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Cheer For CIA

Along with the scabies, psoriasis, elm blight and sundry popular causes of an adulatory era, let's hoist a cheer for the CIA, probably the most maligned for the least reason of any U.S. governmental activity.

The Central Intelligence Agency has done a superb job in its basic mission. Begun after World War II, when it became apparent the United States would have to assume some unaccustomed world responsibilities formerly borne largely by the British, the agency had to be built virtually from scratch.

There were a few operatives around from Wild Bill Donovan's cops-and-robbers wartime Office of Strategic Services, but that was not much of a base for an intelligence operation that would have to go up against the well entrenched, sophisticated Soviet apparatus.

The CIA borrowed a good bit from the British, but it soon began to operate on its own and to develop a reliable brand of intelligence. It gave U.S. officials an objective data base on which to make decisions.

Remember that this was being accomplished by penetration of closed societies, principally Russia and China. There are reasons to believe that the CIA was caught short by the speed with which the Soviet Union developed its first atomic bomb—but few other major developments escaped the agency.

Through the years, it maintained an objectivity of reporting that maddened the salesmen of particular causes in Washington and earned it some distinguished enemies. The agency never was popular with the State Department, for obvious reasons, or with the intelligence divisions of the various armed services, but it performed well.

Its failures were highly publicized, especially in one operational branch that probably never should have been incorporated within the intelligence-gathering agency. That is the "dirty-tricks" department, which brought on the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco and has been blamed for just about everything evil that has happened in the world—from droughts to assassinations.

Even the dirty-tricks branch had some spectacular successes against its even less principled adversaries in such places as Iran, Guatemala, et al, but its successes could never be advertised and it was tagged with failures on ventures it did not even involve itself in.

On the intelligence-gathering side, the CIA was helped enormously by technology. First the U-2, which was an important success, despite President Eisenhower's blunder in acknowledging it—a violation of the first law of intelligence collection. To do so only embarrasses your opponents.

The perfection of electronic snooping brought about the National Security Agency, an operation much larger than the CIA, but an invaluable source of information. Satellite reconnaissance, now that it has been developed and refined, provides an accurate and comprehensive check on weapons deployments all over the world.

How well has the CIA done at classic, cloak-and-dagger spying? For obvious reasons, few people know. There are some indications it has been moderately successful. That job is infinitely tougher when you are dealing with closed-society police states than with open ones such as ours.

Now the Nixon administration, according to the pro-administration

Washington Star-News, is revamping the CIA to eliminate the Board of Estimates and the National Intelligence Estimates. These currently are our highest balance sheets of digested intelligence.

If so, the White House is making another tragic mistake, of a piece with some of the others that have risen lately to plague it. The beef against the CIA apparently boils down to the fact the CIA does not always tell Mr. Nixon what he wants to hear. Killing the slave who brings the bad news is an ancient remedy, but it doesn't work—at least not for more than a brief interlude of fantasy.

NASHVILLE, TENN.
TENNESSEAN

M - 141,842

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SEP 20 1973

CIA Estimates Not Welcome

SOME ANCIENT kings, it is said, executed the bearers of ill tidings. It appears this custom is coming back in vogue with the Nixon administration.

The CIA's Office of National Estimates has, for the past 20 years, prepared formal reports for presidents on such matters as the Soviet military capacity, disarmament, and U.S. intervention in the crises of other countries, usually those of the "third world". This office has been recently abolished and will be replaced by a committee of intelligence analysts from various departments, such as the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Although the abolishment of the office is surrounded by the secrecy usual to CIA actions, it appears that the word came down from the White House. CIA sources said the office had been under constant attack since 1969 from the National Security Council headed by Secretary of State-designate Henry Kissinger. The estimates by the office had reportedly been termed "deplorable" by Mr. Kissinger, but it is also known that the reports differed from Nixon administration policies in Indochina, the Indian subcontinent, and Russian missile capacity.

Although the office's reports presented consensus views and offered minority views only in footnotes, former CIA officials say the office permitted frank discussions and all opinions were heard. These same officials say they fear the new system will not offer a broader perspective, but will only allow representatives of the Pentagon and DIA to sell pet projects and interests.

The secrecy surrounding the abolishment of the office will probably prevent any substantial discussion of the merits of the reorganization, but the effects promise to be long lasting—possibly to the regret of succeeding administrations.

NEW YORK TIMES

20 SEP 1973

C.I.A. Will Abolish Estimates System, Form a New Board

By DAVID BINDER

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 —

The Central Intelligence Agency is planning to abolish the 15-year-old system of turning out what it calls national intelligence estimates, sometimes as many as 50 a year.

The estimates on critical issues facing United States policy-makers drew on contributions from as many as seven intelligence-gathering agencies and sometimes from outside experts. They were drafted by the staff of the 10-member Board of national estimates, consisting of both "generalists" and specialists, and put into final form by the board.

The new Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, himself a career professional, decided that this system of analysis and assessment no longer suits the needs of the White House, his main customer, or the intelligence community.

In place of the board Mr. Colby intends to appoint about 10 problem-oriented specialists to be known as national intelligence officers. He is doing his selecting from about 50 candidates; the bulk in the C.I.A. but some in other intelligence agencies and some outside the intelligence profession.

They will be empowered to range throughout the intelligence-gathering agencies and into the academic world to pull together assessments of current issues. They will act as Mr. Colby's staff officers.

Some are to focus on obvious problem areas like the Soviet Union, China, Europe and the Middle East. Others will be assigned to issues like control of strategic arms and economics. At the moment no national intelligence officer will be assigned to Africa; should an African problem become sufficiently critical Mr. Colby would assign an officer to it.

He has emphasized that the estimative process is not being abolished by his reform. Rather, it is being reorganized to enable his officers to draw more fully on intelligence expertise that has developed outside the big C.I.A. compound.

Eaker's View

Rumblings in CIA

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER (USAF, Ret.)

A HEADLINE in the Washington Star-News August 19 read, "Elite CIA Unit to Be Abolished." On August 21, a New York Times headline stated, "CIA to Undergo Major Overhaul."

The articles under these headlines expressed concern over a proposed plan to eliminate the Office of National Estimates, a prestigious branch of the CIA organization charged with preparing the National Intelligence Estimates.

Obviously, sound defense planning must be based upon accurate estimates of the capabilities and intentions of all other major powers, whether prospective enemies or allies.

The Office of National Estimates has led a deeply troubled existence for many years. Its critics accused it of imperfect forecasts of Soviet intentions; of being dovish about Kremlin motives; and of failing consistently to anticipate Russian advances in science, technology, weapons and capabilities.

There was also a widely held suspicion of bias. Some "Eastern Establishment" members of the Office of National Estimates apparently have long regarded themselves as the protectors, if not the initiators, of "detente." By watering down predictions of the Soviet threat they evidently hoped to reduce U.S. defense budgets and thus decrease Russian fears of U.S. military might. Their effort resulted in Russian numerical superiority of ICBMs. It also led to the agreement, in the first round of SALT, which now virtually assures Soviet scientific and military supremacy within a few years.

THIS OFFICE allowed ideological fervor to color its findings. It became a captive of State Department "doves," articulate civilian bureaucrats and self-styled intellectuals who tended to see the world through rose tinted glasses. Throughout, their true motives were obscured in volumes of rhetoric. The National Intelligence Estimates they produced often exceeded 100 pages. Finally, the parity preconditions to detente were achieved. The price was America's loss of her technical and strategic edge.

The National Security Council evidently found the intelligence estimates prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of Defense much more reliable than CIA's effort. Increasingly, the national leadership has based its strategic decisions on intelligence provided by DIA and the National Security Council, disregarding CIA estimates.

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, in his brief service as director of CIA, tried to remedy all this. It was he who decreed the disbanding of the Office of National Estimates. With his transfer to Defense, the revolution at CIA has lost its chief architect. The old bureaucracy remains essentially intact and one now wonders what will replace the Office of National Estimates.

THE ARCHITECTS of intelligence organization in the future will do well to heed some lessons of the past. Intelligence deals with fundamental issues of survival. War, peace and the grey areas between involve a high order of uncertainty and risk assessment.

William E. Colby, nominated to succeed Dr. Schlesinger as head of CIA, is able and experienced in the intelligence field, having been with CIA since its founding and with its predecessor organization, the OSS of World War II.

But we shall have to wait to see whether Dr. Colby can meet the challenge. Whether, in an age of increasing centralization and bureaucratization of power, he can reform CIA's defective estimating process.

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HOUSTON POST
19 SEP 1973*It's often incomplete*

'Intelligence' can't tell all

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

Probably no field of public affairs suffers as much from sheer misinformation as intelligence activities, and this is especially true of the reporting function — which is responsible for about 80 percent of all intelligence activity but which generates almost none of the publicity.

Everyone knows that the function of intelligence is to inform command — those responsible for devising and executing policy. And when policy goes wrong, the first cry from those who were executing it is "Bad intelligence!" From the Chinese crossing of the Yalu in the Korean War

to the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, "wrong" intelligence has been used to lever responsible leaders off the hook.

"Intelligence" is practically never wrong. It is, however, almost invariably incomplete.

To begin with, intelligence agencies do not collect information gratuitously. They only collect in response to "requirements" which are "levied" by the "customer." In short, ask the right questions and you will get the best answer possible (which will in no case be complete). Ask no questions, or the wrong ones, (or discard or fail to read the answers you do get), and intelligence will be of little service to you.

Intelligence, moreover, cannot tell you what will happen,

it can at best tell you what happened, and the job of deciding what that means in terms of what will happen tomorrow is the customer's, not the collection agency's. The collection agency will not even evaluate the material as "true" or "false" — this too is the customer's job. What the collection agency will do is evaluate the chances that the source of the report is passing on accurately the information he claims he received, and it will also provide an estimate of the source's track record for credibility. But what you make of all that is up to you.

Collection agencies, therefore, will not engage in "estimative" functions — that is your responsibility as a customer. The bane of their existence is a customer who

doesn't understand this (a depressing percentage don't) and who then points to the reporting as an excuse for his fallible judgment.

There is an exception. The Office of National Estimates is housed in and chaired by the CIA, although the 10 or 12 people (assisted by a score of staff members) who compose it include representatives from all intelligence agencies. They have unlimited access to all intelligence sources, and perhaps 50 times a year they are called on to produce a "National Intelligence Estimate," usually in answer to a requirement from the NSC or the White House. Some are standing requirements, others crash ones levied on an hour's notice. Any customer can have a gut feeling the ONE estimate is wrong, but it takes a brave (or a brash) statesman to ignore ONE estimates. JFK was notorious for it.

ONE estimates, even with qualifications, are not infallible, but they are the closest facsimile of a crystal ball the country is ever liable to get. They reflect the distilled results of the work of hundreds of sources (each professionally evaluated) and of hundreds of professional analysts. Most basic American foreign policy rests on these estimates, which is why policy is never reversed abruptly when the Ours replace the Ins. At most such a change effects the tactics of policy, rarely if ever the strategy.

This is a major reason for the fact that our course in Vietnam continued through an In-Out-Out-In succession.

PROGRAM: EYEWITNESS NEWS	DATE: SEPTEMBER 17, 1973
STATION OR NETWORK: WTOP TELEVISION	TIME: 5:30 PM, STATINTL EDT

CHANGES COMING TO CIA

DAVID FRENCH: There's been a lot of re-examination of the government lately, but now one of the most staid institutions of our government may be undergoing some change. Mark Dolmage takes a look at the Central Intelligence Agency: the CIA.

MARK DOLMAGE: Outwardly and inwardly, the Central Intelligence Agency is quietly going about a shake-up these days, at its huge complex a few miles outside of Washington. In Langley, Virginia, there is now even a sign on the expressway directing spies or other interested parties to the building. A news camera is now allowed to photograph the outside of the building. But the CIA still does not reveal how much money it spends each year, nor does it hold news conferences to let everyone in on what goes on behind those hundreds of locked doors.

What is known is that Director William Colby is phasing out the much used and much criticized Board of National Estimates, and in its place establishing a group called the National Intelligence Officers. With the backing of President Nixon and Secretary of State nominee Henry Kissinger, Colby soon plans to have about ten very carefully screened experts in various fields of world affairs. They'll be known as Mr. China, Mr. Russia, Mr. Middle East, and so forth. The aim is to get information from these super experts which will be more precise, and not stifle dissent, as has been charged under the old system.

Several Congressmen and Senators have made it clear lately that the super-secret agency had better keep hands off domestic issues, and henceforth concentrate on assessing the military and peaceful intentions of the rest of the world. This is Mark Dolmage reporting.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Eyewitness News

STATION WTOP TV

DATE September 17, 1973 5:30 PM CITY Washington, DC

TWO REPORTS

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15 SEP 1973

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010010

Sharper Data for Nixon Sought in CIA Shuffle

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The Central Intelligence Agency is undergoing a shakeup designed to give President Nixon more accurate estimates of the military power and political intentions of key countries in world trouble spots.

The CIA's new director, William Colby, is quietly eliminating the Board of National Estimates and replacing it with about 10 carefully screened experts in various fields.

There will be a "Mr. China," a "Mr. Russia," a "Mr. Mideast," a "Mr. Strategic Weapons," and a "Mr. Latin America" among others in the new system, which is nearly ready to be activated.

The Board of National Estimates has been operating for about 20 years. Although its exact makeup is secret, the CIA director is its chief. It is composed of about a dozen men responsible for assessing military capabilities of nations whose actions would affect U.S. policy.

The new body, to be called the National Intelligence Officers, is being formed because of growing criticism over the performance in recent years of the Board of National Estimates.

It was understood that Mr. Nixon did not request the change, although Colby has met with Secretary of State designate Henry

A. Kissinger who gave his approval to the shakeup and told Colby he wanted "straight information" from the new experts.

Criticism about the old system centered around the fact that in order to achieve a consensus, intelligence reports would be so generalized that basic issues would be obscured.

Another criticism of the board was that in its effort to come up with intelligence reports acceptable to all interests, dissent was stifled.

Since the reports form the basis for important policy decisions by the President and his National Security Council, Colby felt it was necessary to sharpen the information sent to the White House.

The experts who are replacing the members of the old board will range for their information around all the agencies involved in intelligence gathering.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

14 SEP 1973

CIA shake-up shifts accent to 'experts'

New advisory board reported on way

By Dana Adams
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

William E. Colby, new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is reorganizing the top level of his agency to put the emphasis on expert knowledge rather than generalist advice.

Mr. Colby, according to word reaching the highest levels of the Washington bureaucracy, is getting ready to abolish the Board of Estimates, a group of about 12 wise men whose views, conclusions, and advice, packaged between blue-paper covers, have carried much weight in Washington ever since the CIA was created in 1947. They appeared prominently in the Pentagon papers, but their individual names were rarely mentioned. They tend to be retired ambassadors, admirals, and professors. Among the known members are retired ambassadors Llewellyn E. Thompson Jr. and Livingston T. Merchant.

The new group is to be called National Intelligence Officers and will differ from their predecessors in that they will be expert in particular fields, geographical or substantive—Europe, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, China, Southeast Asia, strategic weapons, economic intelligence, and the like.

Drawn predominantly from government employment, and especially from the CIA, they also will include men from the academic community and economic life.

Names weighed

A list of 40 or 50 names proposed by leaders among the intelligence agencies are on Mr. Colby's desk while he goes through the final motions of getting approval from the highest administration levels.

Secretary of State-designate Henry A. Kissinger is said to have observed that he had no objections as long as he got the intelligence straight. And if there were two or three opinions on a subject he wanted to know what they were.

There have been reports that the chairman of the old Board of Estimates, John Huizenga, was fired by Mr. Colby. In fact, it appears that he retired. But this does not minimize the new director's sharp disapproval of the fuzziness of some past products of the Board of Estimates.


The procedure hitherto has been that when the director of the agency asked for a report on some subject the most qualified member of the board would take on the job; but before the final draft was sent to the director it would be argued by the entire board.

Minority voices lost

In order to reach a consensus phrases were sometimes vaguely worded. The tendency was to strike a balance between different views. In the process minority voices could be entirely lost.

The National Intelligence Officers, numbering about 10, according to the director's needs, will be under firm direction not to let the minority views get lost. After all, they might be right. Final decisions will be made, not by the intelligence officers meeting as a group, but by the director who will also act as buffer between the individual officers and other agencies of the government.

As a last and critical stage in rounding off the report it will be discussed by the United States Intelligence Board of which CIA director Colby is chairman.



UPI photo

Colby—CIA shake-up
Generalists replaced by experts

WASHINGTON POST

9 SEP 1973

Nixon Zeros In on CIA Unit

Loss of Objectivity Feared in Upheaval

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

In abolishing the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates, the Nixon administration executed a bearer of often unwelcome tidings.

That fact is central to the quiet upheaval in the national intelligence bureaucracy that is being carried out under White House prodding by the CIA's new director, William E. Colby.

Because of the heavy coating of official secrecy that surrounds the issues and the personalities it is unlikely that the merits of the intelligence reorganization will ever be thrashed out in public or subjected to full congressional review.


Yet it could, in the opinion of some senior intelligence professionals, profoundly affect the quality and objectivity of the government's judgments on a wide range of strategic questions: Soviet military capacity, disarmament policy, U.S. intervention in "third world" crises, determining whether certain governments will stand or fall.

On matters such as these the Office of National Estimates has over the past 20 years delivered its judgments to four Presidents in formal papers—anon-

ymously and with little apparent controversy until the later years of the Vietnam war and the accession of the Nixon administration.

Since 1963, however, a widening breach has opened between the CIA's team of professional evaluators and the White House national security staff commanded by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security adviser.

On strategic military questions, such as Soviet missile and antiballistic missile technology, there have also been abrasive differences between the CIA analysts and Pentagon represen-



WILLIAM E. COLBY
...oversees change

tatives on the interagency team that produces the national estimates.

Kissinger is reported by authoritative White House sources to have found the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates "deplorable" in style and content. They were also sharply at divergence from the policies pursued by the Nixon administration.

Item: Early in 1970 the CIA provided the White House with an estimate that expressed grave pessimism over the prospects for long-term survival of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Nevertheless the administration steadily increased military aid to Lon Nol and the President was to pronounce the Cambodian effort as "the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."

Item: Shortly after the outbreak of Pakistani army hostilities in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in March 1971 the CIA produced a national estimate warning that India would be drawn into the war, that Pakistan would be dismembered and that Soviet influence in the subcontinent would be

greatly enhanced. ("The White House later complained that the estimate didn't have enough zing and impact," said one CIA evaluator. "We wondered if they read it.")

Item: In 1969 and 1970 the CIA's strategic analysts were far more conservative than Pentagon evaluators in their reading of Soviet ABM and MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability. Current Pentagon assessments of Soviet MIRV development tend to support the more conservative appraisal.

White House sources stress that the dissatisfaction with the intelligence products of the CIA stemmed mainly from their "mushiness," their inconclusive style and the sense that the agency was trying to impose policy on the President through its control of intelligence data and evaluations.

CIA analysts familiar with the national estimating process say it was at Kissinger's insistence that the reports grew longer and more detailed. Kissinger, they said, wanted them to include the arguments and justifications in the formal estimates.

During the turbulent interregnum of James A. Schlesinger's five-month term as CIA director this year the Office of National Estimates became one of the chief targets of a broad house-cleaning review. (The other was the CIA's Clandestine Service, otherwise known as the Department of Dirty Tricks.)

Schlesinger, according to one of the stories on the cocktail grapevine, announced to several members of the Board of National Estimates: "This looks like a gentlemen's club and I'm no gentleman."

But it was not until after the Pentagon that Colby

reached the decision to phase out the board, even though he has yet to acknowledge that he has abolished the office.

Its demise was most clearly signaled by the departure of John Huizenga, chairman of the Board of National Estimates, who left the agency early in the summer on a basis that was "not voluntary."

Huizenga's departure was described by the CIA's public information office as normal and voluntary retirement at age 60. It was not, according to authoritative CIA sources.

The new national estimates setup envisions a much smaller staff of analysts from various agencies in the Washington intelligence community. (The previous estimating body numbered 40 to 45 staff and board members.)

Rather than producing a collective product reflecting the judgment of the combined staff, the new emphasis will be on individual assessments by intelligence specialists.

Some senior intelligence officials are fearful that the new system will dilute the objectivity of the national estimates. Specialists, they argue, will tend to reflect the institutional biases of their own agencies, particularly the military.

Under the previous system differences were thrashed out before the drafting of a formal estimate. Dissenters registered their opposition in footnotes, which were passed along to the White House with the main body of the report.

One former member of the national estimates team expressed the underlying concern of those who oppose the change.

"They're selling out to the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency. If the CIA made any contribution to the intelligence community it was that its intelligence analysts had no axes to grind, no military hardware programs and no policies to defend."

CIA 3.03 PAKISTAN, E
CIA 1.01 Schlesinger, James
continued

CIA 1.04 Huizenga, John

7 SEP 1973

Colby Revamps CIA Unit in White House Shakeup

The Office of National Estimates, which CIA Director William E. Colby is abolishing in a White House-ordered shakeup, is to be replaced by a less structured group of intelligence analysts who will individually prepare intelligence estimates under new guidelines.

Despite an effort by the CIA leadership in recent weeks to deny that a radical shakeup of the intelligence evaluation procedure has already been decided upon the Star-News has learned:

- That Colby decided more than two months ago to abolish the elite 10-man Board of National Estimates which for more than 20 years carried collective responsibility for preparing objective intelligence estimates. The decision was discussed among high-ranking CIA officials late in June and revealed at a subsequent meeting of the high-level U.S. Intelligence Board, but has not been announced to the agency rank and file or to the congressional oversight committees.

- That the board's distinctive and prestigious product, the 50 or more National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) it prepared annually, will now be prepared by individual researchers in a loosely defined group with the new designation National Intelligence Officials (NIO).

- That NIE's henceforth will be altered to meet long-standing Nixon administration dissatisfaction with the calibrated and scholarly product of the board and its 20-man staff, which together formed the Office of National Estimates. Colby is said to have ordered the NIOs to make their assessments brief, to the point and factual.

To give the new NIE format an added air of precision, Colby has reportedly ordered the abolition of the long-standing verbal scale of certainty which used such hedge words as "apparent," "possible," "probable" and "almost certain."

INSTEAD, Colby has ordered a numerical scale of certainty from 1 to 10. The FBI has for many years graded informants cited in reports on a T-for-trustworthiness scale on which T-10 indicates total confidence and T-1 indicates almost no reliability.

Authoritative sources in the intelligence community have misgivings about these changes warning that the substitution of individual analysts for the collective product of the old system could rob future NIEs of objectivity.

These same sources scold at the new numerical grading system, calling it a "cosmetic way to achieve a false sense of precision."

Despite the frequently reported complaint of White House policy makers that NIEs were too verbose and took too long to read, intelligence sources familiar with the estimating process point out that estimates deliberately written at greater length in the Nixon administration because Henry A. Kissinger wanted them that way.

EVIDENTLY distrusting BNE output from the start, Kissinger passed the word that he wanted NIEs to include a detailed exposition of the evidence and a clear development of the analytical argument as well as the detailed summary of conclusions the NIEs had previously set forth.

The administration disclaimer that the new analytical function seems to be the

basic motivation behind the abolition of the BNE and its staff, despite the fear voiced by knowledgeable observers that "the independence and objectivity of the national estimates are threatened by the abolition of this office."

In an internal bulletin circulated in the CIA and to some congressmen a few days after the Star-News first reported last month that the ONE would be abolished, the CIA leadership declared that "the goal is to conserve resources and maintain efficiency by combining the production of NIEs with certain other agency and intelligence community functions."

One undeniable effect of the decision is to remove a body that had a unique and symbolic reputation for objectivity. It is understood some BNE members and ONE staffers will continue to analyze under the new title of National Intelligence Official. Others are to be assigned to a newly created Office of Political Research, reportedly to be headed by Ramsey Forbush, a former member of the BNE.

WHILE THE new structure at CIA clearly reflects White House wishes, the details are understood to be Colby's alone. He is especially credited with the guidelines calling for numerical grading and the decision to remove the estimating function from collective to individual responsibility.

According to one inside source, Colby has shown himself to be as much a stickler for form as his own arrangements as he was in setting his precision guidelines for writing estimates. Until he was finally sworn in as CIA director this week, he continued to operate from small offices in the

not move into the director's big suite until the formalities were observed. He also continued to park his car in a remote spot in the vast agency parking lots until Tuesday, when his title became official.

Colby's creation of NIOs in place of the ONE structure is not intended to take

the CIA's analyzing function across the line that divides prediction and assessment from policy making, informed sources stressed.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the analyses which are now beginning to come from the NIOs assiduously avoid policy proposals—thereby fulfilling for the moment the CIA leadership's pledge in its recent bulletin that "the objectivity of NIEs will be sustained."

For the longer runs, the relationship of the intelligence community to U.S. foreign policy will not be clear until Kissinger has settled into his new position as secretary of State. At present, he still dominates foreign policy from the White

House, in his capacity as head of the 120-man National Security staff.

But the stature and role of the revamped CIA in the second Nixon administration will not become firm until Kissinger develops a modus operandi for his new dual role as secretary of State as well as National Security Council. A key unanswered question is whether he will continue to rely on his own NSC crew or, by depending more on career bureaucrats at State, come to depend more on the product of Colby's newly reorganized system of producing intelligence estimates. — OSWALD JOHNSTON and JEREMIA O'LEARY

WASHINGTON POST
28 AUG 1973

Colby Plans Changes In CIA Evaluation Unit

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Acting Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby has acknowledged that "some changes will occur" in operations of the agency's top-level evaluative body, the Office of National Estimates.

But he maintained that the office's highly refined and prestigious product, the National Intelligence Estimate, will continue to be produced under the aegis of the CIA as it has for the past two decades.


Colby's assurance was conveyed internally through the CIA's employee bulletin in response to an Aug. 19 news story asserting that he had made a "firm decision" to abolish the office.

The National Intelligence Estimate (known among practitioners as "the NIE") is the U.S. intelligence community's most classified and senior-level assessment on major international issues. It has been relied upon by presidents for guidance on a variety of matters, such as Soviet missile capability and Vietnam war prospects.

There have been growing indications within the past year that influential members of the Nixon administration, notably Secretary of State-designate Henry A. Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, were unhappy with the CIA's strategic intelligence estimates.


During Schlesinger's directorship of the CIA early this year he was reported to have initiated action to overhaul the Office of National Estimates, with the endorsement of the White House. Colby is currently working out the details of the high-level intelligence reorganization.

The notice to CIA employees issued with Colby's authorization alluded to news reports suggesting that senior administration officials were disillusioned with the National Intelligence Estimates and that the CIA was under attack from the



JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

... former and current CIA chiefs involved in changes.



WILLIAM E. COLBY

having failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates that would support its policies."

It asserted that the NIEs would continue to be published and that "the objectivity of the National Intelligence Estimates will be sustained."

However, the "structure" of the Office of National Estimates is under review, the bulletin said, and some changes would occur. "The goal is to conserve resources and maintain efficiency by combining the production of National Intelligence estimates with certain other agency and intelligence community functions," the bulletin said, without further elaboration.

The fate of the office has important symbolic, if not practical, consequences in the intelligence community.

The strategic estimates of the CIA were criticized from within the administration for their pessimism on the Vietnam War, (an assessment corroborated by history) for underestimating Soviet military buildup, for failing to predict the intensity of the North Vietnamese 1972 spring offensive.

Although there was no open criticism of the CIA by administration officials, the

steady dribble of anonymous though official displeasure with the CIA's performance in news stories and particularly in the syndicated columns of Joseph Alsop last February.

Also last April the former deputy director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, Gen. Daniel O. Graham, called publicly for the reassertion of the military's "traditional" role over civilian analysts in strategic intelligence assessments.

A month after Graham's article was published, with presumed official clearance, he was assigned to the CIA as an aide to Schlesinger with responsibility for the military component of national intelligence estimating.

Because of the sensitivity of the agency and ultra-secrecy of the subject matter with which it deals, officials are reluctant to speak out openly on the quiet but intense bureau-

cratic drama now taking place in the upper echelons of the CIA.

Within the agency's old-boy network, which felt the impact of Schlesinger's cost-efficiency policies while he commanded the CIA, the rumored abolition of the Office of National Estimates is regarded as a serious blow to the independence and integrity of the intelligence-estimating process.

Schlesinger is known to have viewed the intelligence products of the CIA's career analysts as verbose in style and dubious in content. He did wield the executive firing broom more vigorously than any director in the agency's history, and his policies were viewed with dismay by the hierarchy of old-timers who had operated together since World War II days as alumni of the wartime Office of Strategic Services.

Colby is now the man in the middle. His ties are to the old boys through his life-time association with the CIA. His responsibility is to the administration, which seems determined to pursue their influence, starting last year with the dismissal of Helms.

That is why, rightly or wrongly, the final decision on the Office of National Estimates is being watched keenly by both sides.

SPRINGFIELD, OHIO
NEWS AUG 27 1973

E - 29,826

Make 'No' Stick

It looks like just another bit of bureaucratic rigamarole, but the decision is one of the more serious the Nixon administration has made, and the mistake it represents could be one of the most dangerous. The administration is taking steps to repel reality.

The move comes in the organization-chart form of closing the CIA's Office of National Estimates. That's the department responsible for surveying information from all U.S. intelligence sources and focusing it into a clear picture of some major international situation—the post-Tet capacity of the North Vietnamese, for example, or the probable effectiveness and effects of a U.S. anti-ballistic missile system.

The CIA has made its share of blunders, most of them—certainly the most notorious of them—in the dirty tricks business. The Office of National Estimates, however, is a victim not of its failures but of its success. It has been almost chillingly right.

The department emerged, for example, as maybe the only hero in the Pentagon Papers. Those documents show that the CIA estimates were right time after time, often in conflict with the romantic and self-serving optimism of the Defense Department.

With its reputation for intellectual integrity, rigorous and bias-free analysis and sometimes brutal clarity, the Office of National Estimates occasionally has rasped against the committed grain of President Nixon and his advisors. The staff is known to have ignored suggestions, apparently of rising intensity, that it jigger its reports to tell Mr. Nixon what he wants to hear rather than what the analysts feel must be said. The White House has not wanted reports that would help the administration make rational decisions but reports that would cheer and justify policies the administration had an ideological yearning to pursue.

Among the seepage from Watergate have been two allied trends now publicly recognized in the Nixon administration. One is the sterile

isolation of the presidency, an isolation in which outlandish efforts are made to exclude information that might unsettle the President or bother him with doubts about a preferred policy.

The other trend is the habit of discrediting as incompetent or even malevolent any failure by the FBI or CIA to verify plots in which the White House has invested feverish belief. The CIA was disbelieved and mocked when it reported that foreign governments weren't the cause of antiwar demonstrations, as the White House had heard and believed. The FBI was discounted as at least blundering and perhaps politically antagonistic when its investigation could find no support for the favored rumor that the Democrats had been wire-tapping Mr. Nixon during his 1968 campaign.

A small department—just 30 persons—the Office of National Estimates is a disproportionately important one. Its skills, methods, sources and judgment have been developed and refined for 25 years. It is not infallible, but its analyses have been remarkably astute. The nation needs that and cannot allow Mr. Nixon and his sycophants the pettiness of this attempt to exclude reality from the nation's most serious deliberations.

Congress must tell the President "no" on this one and make the "no" stick.

Letters to the Editor

Nixon and CIA

SIR: As a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency I am extremely concerned about the harm being done to the Agency by the partisan attitudes of the Nixon administration. The revelations in the Watergate testimony concerning the treatment of the agency and its former director, Richard Helms, and the more recent revelations concerning the abolishment of the agency's Office of National Estimates make it clear that the White House will go to any lengths to bend the agency to its designs, no matter how harmful those designs may be to the national interest.

Helms was appointed director during the period of my employment with the agency and he enjoyed an excellent reputation. It was particularly gratifying to see the top post go to a career intelligence man who would place the good of the agency and the intelligence community above any political considerations. Helms certainly proved his worth in this regard during his several years as director. When he left the agency and became ambassador to Iran I found it impossible to believe the change was voluntary. Why would a career intelligence man with his credentials — who held the top intelligence job in the world — agree to such a lackluster assignment? The Watergate testimony has shown that he was forced out because he would not allow the agency to be used to cover up White House participation in the scandal.

Now we learn that the Office of National Estimates is to be abolished. And the sin of this prestigious group of analysts appears to be that it did its job too well, producing accurate intelligence estimates rather than ones that supported the predetermined policies of the White House.

Perhaps the saddest aspect of all of this is that the Nixon administration, which after all is with us for only eight years, can, if it sees fit, destroy the effectiveness of a continuing governmental institution like the agency. We are all aware of the irreparable harm that has been done to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Now much the same thing seems to be happening to the agency. These institutions are absolutely vital to national security, but they cannot function effectively unless they are allowed to function independently.

One final note: Much has been made over the question of how much the President knew about Watergate. I cannot believe that he would have accepted Helms' resignation unless he were fully aware of the reasons behind it. This certainly lends support to those of us who feel the President knew about the cover-up. He would not otherwise have let go of a man of Helms' caliber.

Elliott Bunce.
Alexandria, Va.

DESPITE THE POPULAR MYTHOLOGY

A Good Word for CIA and Tree Borers

Along the scabies, psoriasis, elm blight and sundry popular causes of an adulatory era, let's hoist a cheer for the CIA, probably the most maligned for the least reason of any U.S. governmental activity.

Jim Fall
The Central Intelligence Agency has done a superb job in its basic mission. Begun after World War II, when it became apparent the United States would have to assume some unaccustomed world responsibilities formerly borne largely by the British, the agency had to be built virtually from scratch.

There were a few operatives around from Wild Bill Donovan's cops-and-robbers wartime Office of Strategic Services, but that was not much of a base for an intelligence operation that would have to go up against the well entrenched, sophisticated Soviet apparatus.

THE CIA BORROWED a good bit from the British, but it soon began to operate on its own and to develop a reliable brand of intelligence. It gave U.S. officials an objective data base on which to make decisions.

Remember that this was being accomplished by penetration of closed societies, principally Russia and China. There are reasons to believe that the CIA was caught short by the speed with which the Soviet Union developed its first atomic bomb — but few other major developments escaped the agency.

Through the years, it maintained an objectivity of reporting that maddened the salesmen of particular causes in Washington and earned it some distinguished enemies. The agency never was popular with the State Department, for obvious reasons, or with the intelligence divisions of the various armed services, but it performed well.

ITS FAILURES WERE highly publicized, especially in one operational branch that probably never should have been incorporated within the intelligence-gathering agency. That is the "dirty-tricks" department, which brought in the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco and has been blamed for just about everything evil that has happened in the world — from droughts to assassinations.

Even the dirty-tricks branch had some operations that were almost as even less publicized adventures. In such places as Iran, Guatemala, et al., but perhaps it could never be advertised and only a few of the dirty-tricks on whom it did not seem to be based on.

On the intelligence-gathering side, the CIA was helped enormously by technology that the U.S. which was so important success, despite President Ford's month's blather in acknowledging it was a victim of the the the of the the the

collection. To do so only embarrasses your opponents.

-The perfection of electronic snooping brought about the National Security Agency, an operation much larger than the CIA, but an invaluable source of information. Satellite reconnaissance, now that it has been developed and refined, provides an accurate and comprehensive check on weapons deployments all over the world.

HOW WELL THE CIA has done at classic, cloak-and-dagger spying, I don't know. For obvious reasons, few people do. There are some indications it has been moderately successful. That job is infinitely tougher when you are dealing with closed-society police states than with open ones such as ours.

Now the Nixon administration, according to the pro-administration Washington Star-News, is determining the CIA to eliminate the Board of Estimates and the National Intelligence Estimates. These currently are our highest balance sheets of digested intelligence.

If so, the White House is making another tragic mistake, of a piece with some of the others that have risen lately to plague it. The beef against the CIA apparently boils down to the fact the CIA does not always tell Mr. Nixon what he wants to hear. Killing the slave who brings the bad news is an ancient remedy, but it doesn't work — at least not for more than a brief interlude of fantasy.



EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

EB No. 371

22 August 1973

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1. Recent newspaper articles have reported that a decision has been reached to abolish the Office of National Estimates (ONE). It was suggested that the decision resulted from disillusionment among senior policy makers with the content of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's), and speculated that perhaps the Agency is under attack from the Administration for having failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates that would support its policies.

2. To avoid any misunderstanding that may arise from these articles, the following facts are presented:

a. National Intelligence Estimates will continue to be produced; and, they will be the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, as in the past.

b. The objectivity of NIE's will be sustained; and, the full resources of the Intelligence Community will be utilized in their production.

c. Just as reorganizations have been and will continue to be necessary in other components to stay abreast of changing requirements, so also is the structure of ONE being reviewed. Some changes will occur. The goal is to conserve resources and maintain efficiency by combining the production of NIE's with certain other Agency and Intelligence Community functions. Provision must also be made for comprehensive in-depth political research. Precisely how best to accomplish all this remains under study. When a firm decision is reached, employees will be fully and promptly informed.

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

WICHITA, KAN.
BEACON

E - 66,276

AUG 22 1973

Good and Bad

It's sorta like the mixed emotions expressed in the old joke about seeing your mother-in-law go off a cliff in your new Cadillac.

The Nixon administration is cutting out one office in the Central Intelligence Agency; that's good. But the reports are that the office is being abolished because it has failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates which would support the administration's politics; and that's bad.

Being disbanded is the elite 30-man Office of National Estimates which has prepared the top secret national intelligence estimates for presidents since Harry S Truman. The major

problem is that its studies of the Vietnam war and the anti-ballistic missile controversy did not agree with the Nixon administration's policies.

So, the story goes in Washington, the administration is pressuring the CIA to shape up or ship out, perhaps an office at a time.

It's good news for taxpayers when part of a bureaucracy is being disassembled but it's bad news for lovers of freedom and responsibility when that action is taken out of revenge or vindictiveness on the part of higher-ups.

It's a question of which you regard with the most affection—your mother-in-law or your Cadillac.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 AUG 1973

C.I.A. TO UNDERGO MAJOR OVERHAUL

White House Said to Want
More Concise Reports

Special to The New York Times

LANGLEY, Va., Aug. 20—The Central Intelligence Agency is about to undergo its first major organizational changes in 10 years, high officials disclosed today.

One agency operation facing reorganization is the top-level Office of National Estimates, which consists of 10 executives and 20 staff members.

National intelligence estimates—drawing if need be on the resources of the entire intelligence community, including the Defense Department and the Labor, Treasury and Agriculture Departments—are regarded as the C.I.A.'s most comprehensive reports.

These estimates are prepared mostly at the request of the National Security Council—that is to say, the White House—and deal with specific problems such as political terrorism, or a country or a region.

In the wide marble halls of the intelligence agency's headquarters, decorated with large abstract paintings, a visitor learns that the contemplated changes "will also affect the seventh floor," where the agency's chiefs are.

But senior officials denied suggestions that "heads might roll," or that basic intelligence procedures would be altered.

They pointed out that John W. Hutzenga, the last director of national estimates, retired in June when he reached the age of 60, the normal retirement age. "He did not resign, as was reported in the press," an official said, adding that other senior operatives had also retired in recent months upon reaching 60.

"The estimative process won't be lost in the jiggering and tinkering that is going on," an official contended. "And the talent won't be lost either."

'Repackaging' the Goal

The aim of the shift, according to officials here, is to achieve a "repackaging" of the Central Intelligence Agency's reporting, especially to the White House. One C.I.A. man spoke of "sharpening up our copy."

The changes appear to be in part a response to demands of the agency's principal customer, the White House, for precise, cleanly focused responses to specific policy questions rather than scholarly tomes, for which the Office of National Estimates has been noted.

The Office of National Estimates has been turning out its papers for more than two decades, sometimes at a rate of 50 a year. It has recently been facing a kind of competition from its nominal boss, the National Security Council.

Under the prodding of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, the 100-man National Security Council has produced more than 200 "national security study memorandums," on topics ranging from "chemical-biological agents" to "Iceland" and "Malta."

The C.I.A. changes may also result in a new name for the Office of National Estimates, formed in 1950 to provide a succession of Presidents with analyses to help them make policy decisions.

Huizenga

STATINTL

Elite CIA Unit To Be Abolished

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

In a decision with major implications for the national security, the Nixon administration has ordered a radical overhaul of the Central Intelligence Agency's method of analyzing and evaluating foreign intelligence.

According to authoritative sources in the intelligence community, William E. Colby, the newly installed CIA director, has reached a "firm decision" to abolish the Office of National Estimates, the elite, 30-man office that since 1959 has prepared the top secret and definitive National Intelligence Estimates; the papers on which a succession of presidents has based crucial policy decisions.

John W. Huizenga, the agency's Director of National Estimates and, as chairman of the Board of National Estimates chief of the CIA's intelligence analysts, resigned from the agency at the end of June. He will not be replaced.

THE decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates has not been announced. It is certain to provoke a reaction in Congress, which has already been stirred by revelations of the Watergate case to take a closer look at CIA operations than ever before.

The National Intelligence Estimates, generally referred to as NIEs, probably helped the CIA regain some public trust in recent years. As revealed by the Pentagon Papers, CIA estimates of the Vietnam war set forth unflattering facts, when the Pentagon was still claiming a military victory was possible.

Made by the Nixon administration, the NIEs were regarded as the most candid and objective that can counter to White House wishes during the bitter political debate over the ballistic missile.

Partly because of these controversies, NIEs came to be distrusted and ignored in the latter part of the Johnson administration and through almost the whole Nixon period.

President Nixon is known to have become personally disenchanted with the CIA performance during the ABM controversy, and it is an open secret that his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, has tended to deride and disregard NIEs since he joined the administration.

The decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates is certain to revive speculation that the CIA is under attack from the administration for having failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates that would support its policies.

White House dissatisfaction with the CIA is generally believed by sources close to the agency and to the administration to have been a major factor in the resignation of Richard M. Helms as CIA director shortly after Nixon's re-election last year.

Colby's move to eliminate the office that has been responsible for the most refined product of the government's multi-billion dollar intelligence gathering effort shows that he clearly intends to carry out the sweeping changes in the agency undertaken by his immediate predecessor as director, James R. Schlesinger.

BEFORE Schlesinger moved over to the Pentagon as defense secretary during the administration's Watergate shakeup last May, he had ordered a sweeping cutback in personnel. It was done in the name of efficiency, but older agency professionals denounced it as "brutal," and the purge swept from high-ranking posts in the CIA virtually

every officer there who had been close to Helms.

At the same time, Schlesinger brought into the agency, Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a controversial Pentagon intelligence analyst who has openly advocated stripping the CIA of its authority to analyze military strategic intelligence and giving that function to the Defense Department.

At this time, Graham was given a managerial function, but observers thought it likely that he would some day move into the intelligence estimating field.

It is not clear how much of the decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates is Schlesinger's and how much Colby's.

It is also not clear what Colby has in mind to replace the Office of National Estimates. Sources close to the director insist that there is no plan to make the NIEs directly subservient to the policy-makers in the White House.

THE Office of National Estimates was first organized early in the Korean War, when the American intelligence apparatus was still in its formative stage.

Its first director, Harvard historian William Langer, set up the dual structure that still exists: The 10-man Board of National Estimates and the 20-man National Estimates staff, which carried out the research and collated reports from intelligence gathering channels in the CIA and elsewhere in the government.

The estimates, about 50 a year, were prepared almost as though they were scholarly dissertations on a variety of subjects requested by the National Security Council. They were a consensus swept from high-ranking posts in the CIA virtually every officer there who had been close to Helms. At the same time, Schlesinger brought into the agency, Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a controversial Pentagon intelligence analyst who has openly advocated stripping the CIA of its authority to analyze military strategic intelligence and giving that function to the Defense Department. At this time, Graham was given a managerial function, but observers thought it likely that he would some day move into the intelligence estimating field. It is not clear how much of the decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates is Schlesinger's and how much Colby's. It is also not clear what Colby has in mind to replace the Office of National Estimates. Sources close to the director insist that there is no plan to make the NIEs directly subservient to the policy-makers in the White House. THE Office of National Estimates was first organized early in the Korean War, when the American intelligence apparatus was still in its formative stage. Its first director, Harvard historian William Langer, set up the dual structure that still exists: The 10-man Board of National Estimates and the 20-man National Estimates staff, which carried out the research and collated reports from intelligence gathering channels in the CIA and elsewhere in the government. The estimates, about 50 a year, were prepared almost as though they were scholarly dissertations on a variety of subjects requested by the National Security Council. They were a consensus swept from high-ranking posts in the CIA virtually every officer there who had been close to Helms. At the same time, Schlesinger brought into the agency, Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a controversial Pentagon intelligence analyst who has openly advocated stripping the CIA of its authority to analyze military strategic intelligence and giving that function to the Defense Department. At this time, Graham was given a managerial function, but observers thought it likely that he would some day move into the intelligence estimating field. It is not clear how much of the decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates is Schlesinger's and how much Colby's. It is also not clear what Colby has in mind to replace the Office of National Estimates. Sources close to the director insist that there is no plan to make the NIEs directly subservient to the policy-makers in the White House.

board had responsibility for their preparation.

Under a later chairman, Sherman Kent, the board and its staff developed the system of carefully graded verbal measures of certainty that still characterizes NIEs. "Apparent" is the most tentative and "almost certain" the most definite short of a flat assertion of fact. The grades in between are "possible," "suggested" and "probable."

This verbal precision was apparently infuriating to recent administrations. The White House, even before the Schlesinger reorganization of November 1971, sent word it wanted "facts, not opinions," according to one published account.

WHEN the 1971 plan was announced, it was reported as aiming for an intelligence product better tailored to the wants of its "consumers" in the White House. And when Schlesinger became CIA director, he made it known that NIEs would be more useful if they were "four pages instead of 40."

According to one anecdote current in circles close to the agency, Schlesinger confronted his first meeting with the Board of National Estimates with the observation: "I understand this is like a gentleman's club. Well, I want you to understand that I am no gentleman."

The appointment of Colby, a career professional in the CIA, brought sighs of relief at all levels of the agency. But the abolition of the Office of National Estimates, its elite staff, suggests the sighs may have been premature.

DAYTON, OHIO
NEWS

AUG 1973

E - 161,249

S - 215,360

Bureaucratic Rigamarole Really an Attack On Reality

It looks like just another bit of bureaucratic rigamarole, but the decision is one of the more serious the Nixon administration has made, and the mistake it represents could be one of the most dangerous. The administration is taking steps to repel reality.

The move comes in the organization-chart form of closing the CIA's Office of National Estimates. That's the department responsible for surveying information from all U.S. intelligence sources and focusing it into a clear picture of some major international situation — the post-Tet capacity of the North Vietnamese, for example, or the probable effectiveness and effects of a U.S. anti-ballistic missile system.

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With its reputation for intellectual integrity, rigorous and bias-free analysis and sometimes brutal clarity, the Office of National Estimates occasionally has rasped against the committed grain of President Nixon and his advisors. The staff is known to have ignored suggestions, apparently of rising intensity, that it jigger its reports to tell Mr. Nixon what he wants to hear rather than what the analysts feel must be said. The White House has not wanted reports

that would help the administration make rational decisions but reports that would cheer and justify policies the administration had an ideological yearning to pursue.

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The other trend is the habit of discrediting as incompetent or even malevolent any failure by the FBI or CIA to verify plots in which the White House has invested feverish belief. The CIA was disbelieved and mocked when it reported that foreign governments weren't the cause of antiwar demonstrations, as the White House had heard and believed. The FBI was discounted as at least blundering and perhaps politically antagonistic when its investigation could find no support for the favored rumor that the Democrats had been wiretapping Mr. Nixon during his 1968 campaign.

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Congress must tell the President "no" on this one and make the "no" stick.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM ALAN DOUGLAS SHOW

DATE April 12, 1973 11 PM

STATINTL

INTERVIEW WITH COL. L. FLETCHER PROUTY

ALAN DOUGLAS: And now, in this hour, we're going to be talking with a man who brings us some information we perhaps never knew before, maybe we suspected. But he brings us some clarification on the size, the scope and the intensity of the Central Intelligence Agency, that massive organization that has been speculated on for a number of years.

About eight years ago, Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty retired from the military. He was a support officer working for the Pentagon. He's an Air Force officer--a support officer with and for, I presume, the Central Intelligence Agency. About eight years ago, when he retired, I'm sure this book must have gone through his mind. He did not, like CIA men, sign an oath, he says, and therefore never felt as though he had any secrets to keep.

On the other hand, he's a man of integrity and, I think, discretion. What he comes to tell us tonight is sufficiently chilling so that I thought you ought to know about it, and you ought to know about it in a hurry. Jack Anderson commented in a recent column that the CIA was immensely interested in the book, apparently sent an emissary to talk to Colonel Prouty about the book. Did that man seem nervous to you, Colonel Prouty?

COLONEL L. FLETCHER PROUTY: Well, he tried to impress me with the fact that he had come from a bookstore, and I hadn't had any other bookstores make similar offers, so I asked him a few questions about what he had really come for. Finally he said, well, I'll tell you what I really want. He said, the CIA's been on my back to get your manuscript of your book, THE SECRET TEAM, and I'm just trying to fulfill a contract with the CIA.

DOUGLAS: So that was the extent of the contact you had from the Central Intelligence Agency?

PROUTY: Well, that I did personally. Now, other people that were reviewing the book in the manuscript form had also been approached by the same bookstore, and they had tried

5 MAR 1973

J. Schlesinger of CIA

By Benjamin Welles

James R. Schlesinger, newly named head of the Central Intelligence Agency, comes to the job unhampered by lousy intelligence experience — unlike his predecessor, Richard M. Helms, a life longman of clandestine operations.

Mr. Schlesinger is a traggy, systems analyst with a habit of tugging in his shirt-sleeves. If, while confer with his colleagues his shirttail hangs — as it often does — it bothers him. Calm, relaxed, analytical, he can lose half in a problem while the hours slip by.

Those who knew Schlesinger in his OMB (Office of Management and Budget) days — where he drafted for President Nixon a plan to reorganize the national intelligence community — praise his apt to spot the weakness in an argument structure — and quickly find ways to strengthen it. He has already begun to humanize the secrecy-shrouded Atomic Energy Commission, and in his next post he is expected to lead the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies of their accumulated fat and improve their product.

"I predict he's going to put some of the veteran cold warriors from World War II or the Korean days and promote younger men," said one of his closest associates. "He'll leave day-to-day operation in fir hands and concentrate on matters of time-level importance. Each time he goes to the White House you can bet he'll know his subject from A to Z."

The three areas that Mr. Schlesinger is expected to focus on include first the CIA's clandestine operations — still reportedly absorbing about \$400 million of its \$600 million budget and more than half of its 15,000 employees. Others are scientific research and the voluminous, often controversial, national intelligence estimates. The latter, insofar as they forecast Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions, has an immense impact on presidential budgetary and defense policies.

In recent years the CIA, which alone is authorized to conduct espionage abroad and, occasionally, to topple unfriendly governments, has had its funds for "TS" (clandestine services) appreciably slashed. Such paramilitary CIA operations as the "secret" war in Laos, begun on President Kennedy's instructions in 1952, now are drawing to a close; and the weekly meetings of the Policy Committee, the supersecret White House panel headed by Kissinger that passes on all covert operations sufficiently important to embarrass the United States Government if disclosed, are said to be decaying, indeed.

"Intelligence gathering has shifted from the spy in a foreign cabinet to the orbiting satellites that collect hundreds of photographs plus electronic intercepts," said a qualified source. "That is the Schlesinger plan."

show you photographs of Washington down to the minutest details of the White House lawns — but you still won't know what's going on inside the heads of the policymakers."

The brilliant high-resolution photograph of Russian and Chinese missile silos, nuclear plants, airfields, and submarine pens that are collected day after day (when the weather permits) by \$20 million satellites orbiting around the earth every 90 minutes 100 to 130 miles up make possible the SALT agreements. The U.S. and the Russians, who too have their satellites, each know what the other has; now and a-building. But whereas capabilities can often be ascertained through satellites — intentions require spies. In CIA jargon this is called "hum-int" — human intelligence.

Some experts even question whether the U.S. intelligence community has anything "downstream" — in development — to replace the spy satellites should the Russians or Chinese one day shoot them down or otherwise eliminate this vital security safeguard. Apparently the community is fearful of seeking fresh funds lest Congress or the OMB cut back the funds already allocated: \$1 billion yearly for spy satellites and as much for global code-breaking.

Mr. Schlesinger is expected, finally, to take a hard look at the overt — or evaluation — side of his CIA. Part of it, the Office of National Estimates, produces yearly for the President studies ranging from a quick analysis of the latest Central American flare-up to the massive survey, completed every September, of Soviet strength and likely actions.

Periodically domestic politics impinge on intelligence evaluations. Secretary Laird told Congress flatly in 1969, for instance, the U.S.S.R. was going for a "first strike capability"; i.e., had succeeded in MIRVing its giant SS-9 missiles — giving each component warhead the same independently targetable capability as have the U.S. Polaris and Poseidon missiles. CIA disputed this at the time — and still does — but none the less Kissinger sided with Laird's effort to pry more defense funds from Congress.

Whether Mr. Schlesinger can now insulate the CIA from administration pressure and keep its reporting honest remains to be seen. He comes to his task, however, with full Nixon backing; with no ties to the cold war; with few contacts in the press and with little interest in the social blandishments of the "Georgetown cocktail set."

Mr. Welles, for many years on the staff of the New York Times, is now an independent commentator on what goes on in Washington.

A. HEAD NAMES ESPIONAGE CHIEF

by Becomes Director of
landestine Operations

SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28—
As R. Schlesinger, the new
director of Central Intelligence,
named William E. Colby,
former head of the American
Education program in South
Vietnam and a long-time intel-
ligence operative, as director of
clandestine operations.
Knowledgeable sources re-
ported today that Mr. Colby, 53
years old, assumed his new
level job this week. Formal-
ly known inside the agency as
deputy director of plans, Mr.
Colby will be in charge of
C.I.A. espionage activities
and covert operations, widely
known in Washington as the
department of dirty tricks.
Mr. Colby's previous position,
deputy director of the agency,
which combined the functions
of the inspector general and
controller, has been abolished by
Mr. Schlesinger, the sources
said as part of his revamping
of the agency.

Two Generals Chosen

It was also disclosed that Mr.
Schlesinger has chosen two
highly regarded major generals
for his new Intelligence Re-
source Advisory Committee.

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The generals selected for the
committee are Maj. Gen. Daniel
O. Graham of the Army, who
is director of estimates for the
Defense Intelligence Agency,
and Maj. Gen. Lew Allen of the
Air Force, deputy commander
for satellite programs.

General Graham, whose pro-
motion to major general be-
comes official tomorrow, has
been a sharp critic of the
C.I.A.'s Office of National Esti-
mates, one of the top intelli-
gence review groups in the
nation.

Many Are Alarmed

His appointment has alarmed
many intelligence officials, who
view it as the beginning of an
attack on what some have
called a liberal bias in the
agency's intelligence estimates.
In a recent syndicated column,
for example, Joseph Alsop criti-
cized what he called the "spe-
cial historical bias" of the
analysts under the leadership
of the former Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, Richard M.
Helms, who was named Am-
bassador to Iran last January.

Mr. Alsop's column then went
on to note that Mr. Schlesinger
"is even bringing in from the
Defense Department the most
pungent and persistent critic of
the C.I.A.'s estimating-analyz-
ing hierarchy."

"This detested figure is, in
fact, to be named the new head
of the hierarchy, unless present
plans are changed," the column
said.

Intelligence sources said that
the unidentified critic of the
agency mentioned in Mr. Al-
sop's column was General Gra-
ham, who became well known
to officials in the agency after
serving a tour with it as a
colonel.

Another Appointment

It could not be learned
whether General Graham will
be named head of Mr. Schles-
inger's Intelligence Resource
Advisory Committee, although
official sources inside the C.I.A.
did confirm that he and General
Allen would be joining the di-
rector's staff. Agency assign-
ments have never been publicly
announced by the Government.
Another member of that
staff, it was disclosed, will be
Dr. Jack Martin, who until early
this year was serving with the
White House's Office of Science
and Technology.

The sources said that the in-
telligence committee had re-
placed the C.I.A.'s National In-
telligence Program Evaluation
staff, which was headed by
Bronson Tweedy and Thomas
Parrott, two key aides to Mr.
Helms who, The New York
Times reported last week, were
ordered to retire by Mr. Schles-
inger.

The Times also reported that
Thomas H. Karamessines, Mr.
Colby's predecessor as director
of the clandestine services, had
been ordered to retire by Mr.
Schlesinger. Agency officials
disputed that account today and
said that Mr. Karamessines had
in fact requested retirement
last year but had been asked
to stay on.

Mr. Karamessines has been
in ill health for some time.

The appointment of Mr.
Colby, a Princeton graduate
who began his intelligence ca-
reer with the Office of Strategic
Services in World War II, was
more favorably received by
many senior intelligence offi-
cials.

"He's the classic old espion-
age type," one intelligence
analyst said of Mr. Colby. "The
kind of guy who never attracts
attention."

Other sources questioned
whether Mr. Schlesinger's ap-
pointment of Mr. Colby would
lead to a widely expected
shake-up of the clandestine
services, which attained notori-
ety in 1967 with the disclosure
that it was secretly subsidizing
the National Student Associa-
tion.